Creative Copyright: Tailoring Intellectual Property Policies and Business Strategies for Creative Content Industries in the Digital Age by Viswanathan, Bhamati
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
SJD Dissertations Student Papers 
2015 
Creative Copyright: Tailoring Intellectual Property Policies and 
Business Strategies for Creative Content Industries in the Digital 
Age 
Bhamati Viswanathan 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/sjd_dissertations 
 Part of the Arts Management Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Fashion 
Business Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Policy Design, 
Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Technology and 
Innovation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Viswanathan, Bhamati, "Creative Copyright: Tailoring Intellectual Property Policies and Business 
Strategies for Creative Content Industries in the Digital Age" (2015). SJD Dissertations. 1. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/sjd_dissertations/1 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Papers at Penn Law: Legal Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in SJD Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: 















Tailoring Intellectual Property Policies and Business Strategies for 

















Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	   1	  	  
	  
CHAPTER	  1:	  FASHION	  
INTRODUCTION	   19	  
I.	  FUNDAMENTALS	  OF	  THE	  FASHION	  INDUSTRY	   24	  
II.	  COPYING	  IN	  THE	  FASHION	  INDUSTRY	   28	  
A. EARLY EFFORTS AGAINST DESIGN COPYING: FASHION INDUSTRY GUILDS 28 
B. DESIGN COPYING AFTER THE DEMISE OF THE FASHION GUILDS 31 
1. FASHION’S LOW-IP EQUILIBRIUM 31 
III.	  THE	  “PIRACY	  PARADOX”	   37	  
A. INDUCED OBSOLESCENCE 37 
B. ANCHORING 49 
C. SUMMARY: THE PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF LOW IP-PROTECTION 50 
D. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR FASHION’S LOW-IP EQUILIBRIUM 52 
1. COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE AS A BARRIER 53 
2. THE USEFUL ARTICLES DOCTRINE 54 
E. A SIDE NOTE “REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY” 57 
F. HOW CONGRESS CAN CIRCUMVENT THE USEFUL ARTICLES RULE, PART I 58 
G. HOW CONGRESS CAN CIRCUMVENT THE USEFUL ARTICLES RULE, PART II 60 
1. SEMICONDUCTORS 60 
2. BOAT HULLS 61 
3. POLITICAL BARRIERS 64 
4. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM 64 
5. RIVAL RENT-SEEKERS PROBLEM 67 
6. FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE 70 
7. INNOVATION IN THE CONTEXT OF FASHION 77 
  
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
CHAPTER	  2:	  EDUCATION	  
INTRODUCTION	   82	  
I.	  BACKGROUND	   87	  
A. EARLY SPACES OF COMMERCIALIZATION IN UNIVERSITY PATENTS 87 
B. SOFTWARE AND DIGITAL MEDIA 92 
C. LECTURES AND LECTURE NOTES 94 
D. COURSES: BEGINNING OF THE ACADEMIC COPYRIGHT ERA 99 
E. OWNERSHIP OF THE ELECTRONIC COURSE 101 
II.	  COPYRIGHT	  LAW:	  AS	  IT	  RELATES	  TO	  AGENCY	  LAW	   104	  
A. WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 104 
B. CONGRESS’S TWO-PART DEFINITION 105 
C. DEFINING “SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT” 108 
D. DISTANCE EDUCATION COURSES AS WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 109 
 1. FACULTY MEMBERS: “EMPLOYEES” UNDER THE WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE 
DOCTRINE? 109 
 2. DEVELOPING ONLINE COURSES: WITHIN THE “SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT?” 119 
 3. SO, WHO OWNS COPYRIGHT IN THE ELECTRONIC COURSE? 126 
III.	  MODERN	  INTERPRETATIONS	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  POLICY	   127	  
A. COMPETING OWNERSHIP INTERESTS 127 
B. INTELLECTUAL LAND GRAB: CULTURAL COMMONS VS. MICROPAYMENTS 130 
C. REASON TO COMPROMISE: “SHOW ME THE MONEY” 133 
IV.	  CAMPUS	  COPYRIGHT	  POLICY	  AGREEMENTS	   136	  
A. LIST OF SHARED RIGHTS, IN WRITING 136 
B. WORK MADE FOR HIRE REDUX: STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND SUBSTANTIAL 
CONTROL 139 
C. PROTECTING SPECIFIC FACULTY RIGHTS 141 
D. PROTECTING SPECIFIC UNIVERSITY RIGHTS 144 
E. ADDITIONAL CONTRACT PROVISIONS 146 
 1.LICENSES 147 
 2.ROYALTIES 147 
 3.EARLY DISCLOSURE 148 
 
  
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
CHAPTER	  3:	  MUSIC	  
INTRODUCTION:	  RISE	  OF	  USER-­‐GENERATED	  CONTENT	   150	  
I.	  DIGITAL	  MUSIC	  AND	  DIGITAL	  ERA	  BUSINESS	  MODELS	   158	  
A. DECLINE IN MUSIC SALES LINKED TO INFRINGING ACTIVITIES 158 
B. MISUNDERSTANDING THE SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE IN MEDIA; 
BUNDLING TRACKS INTO CDS; DECLINE IN BRICKS-AND-MORTAR RETAIL MUSIC 
STORES 160 
C. CHANGING MODELS FOR OTHER MEDIA AND CONTENT-RICH INDUSTRIES 161 
D. COPYRIGHT LAW VS. NORMS 163 
E. DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 165 
F. RIAA LAWSUITS 166 
G. YOUTUBE AND UGC 172 
II.	  BLACK	  MARKETS,	  LEGAL	  MARKETS,	  AND	  BUSINESS	  MODELS	   174	  
A. BLACK MARKET AS EXPRESSION OF CUSTOMER PREFERENCE 174 
B. RESISTANCE TO CHANGE BY MUSIC INDUSTRY 175 
 1. APPLE’S BUSINESS MODEL 176 
 2. HULU AND YOUTUBE 177 
 3. LEGAL RESPONSES: SUIT AGAINST YOUTUBE 178 
4. LACK OF CLARITY IN PARAMETERS OF COPYRIGHT DOCTRINE— 
PARTICULARLY WITH  RESPECT TO UGC AND YOUTUBE 179 
 5. LEGAL RESPONSES: THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 180 
C. NEED FOR MIDDLE GROUND SOLUTIONS; NEED FOR ALL  PARTIES TO BE  
REPRESENTED AT THE TABLE 181 
III.	  THE	  DIGITAL	  ERA	  AND	  THE	  COSTS	  OF	  COPYING	   182	  
A. THE MONETIZATION OF CONTENT: REVENUE HARVESTING AND  INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY VALUE 182 
1. VALUABLE ASSET MODEL: MAXIMIZING REVENUES  DERIVED FROM   
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES 182 
 2. APPLE’S BUSINESS MODEL 183 
B. SHIFTS IN USER EXPECTATIONS WITH RESPECT TO PRICES; MUSIC INDUSTRY 
PLAYERS’ REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE AND ACCOMMODATE SUCH SHIFTS 184 
C. ADDITIONAL REVENUES: SONG SAMPLES/PREVIEWS ON ITUNES 187 
D. ADDITIONAL REVENUES: ROYALTIES FROM RADIO BROADCASTS OF MUSIC 188 
 1. COUNTER: DO AWAY WITH SOUND RECORDING RIGHTS FOR WEBCASTERS  189 
E. ADDITIONAL REVENUE STREAMS: RINGTONES ON CELLULAR TELEPHONES 190 
F. MARKETS FOR CULTURAL AND ENTERTAINMENT ASSETS 191 
G. CONTROL MECHANISMS 192 
 1. PRE-DIGITAL CONTROL = CONTROL OF CREATION AND DISTRIBUTION 193 
IV.	  DIGITAL	  ERA	  DISRUPTION:	  THE	  INTERNET	  AND	  LOW	  COST	  DISTRIBUTION	   194	  
A. TECHNOLOGY, COPYING, AND DISSEMINATION: COPYRIGHT IN THE AGE OF 
DIGITAL REPRODUCTION 194 
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
B. DIGITAL ERA PIRACY: THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF UNAUTHORIZED USES 198 
 1. “PIRACY”; STRATEGIC USE TO ADVANCE MAXIMUM MONETIZATION OF CONTENT 198 
 2. FOCUS ON USER BEHAVIOR: UNAUTHORIZED USE VS. FAIR USE 198 
 3. ACTUAL EFFECTS OF UNAUTHORIZED USE 199 
V.	  THE	  INTERNET	  AND	  SHARING:	  DIGITAL	  ERA	  USES	  AND	  	  
GENERATIONAL	  SHIFTS	   201	  
A. CHANGING USE PATTERNS/PRACTICES 201 
B. NEW USER PRACTICES: UNBUNDLED MUSIC 202 
 1. UNBUNDLED MUSIC: OBJECTIONS FROM SOME ARTISTS; BUT OVERALL A SUCCESS 202 
C. ANALOGOUS INDUSTRIES: VIDEO CLIPS (FILM); AGGREGATED  NEWS CONTENT 
(NEWS) 204 
D. CREATIVE USES PRACTICES 207 
E. ACCESS AND CONTROL 208 
F. NEW CHOICES FOR USERS AND CREATORS 209 
G. LACK OF NEW BUSINESS MODELS 211 
CONCLUSION:	  ADDING	  VALUE	  IN	  THE	  DIGITAL	  ERA	   213	  
A. NEED TO RECOGNIZE “BLACK MARKETS” IN MUSIC 213 
B. NEED TO SUPPORT SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION 214 
C. NEED FOR CHANGING BUSINESS PRACTICES 215 
D. NEED FOR CHANGING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 217 
 
	   	  
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
CHAPTER	  4:	  ANALYSIS	  
INTRODUCTION	   220	  
I.	  WHAT	  ARE	  THE	  CONTENT	  INDUSTRIES	  AFRAID	  OF?	   220	  
A. UNFAIR SKEWING OF THE “INNOVATION LOTTERY” 220 
 1. HIGH FIXED COSTS OF PRODUCTION 221 
 2. DEVALUATION OF CONTENT 225 
3. DEVALUATION OF MIDDLEMEN AND THEIR FUNCTIONS  (SOME POSSIBLE LONG-
TERM OUTCOMES) 228 
 4. DEVALUATION OF CREDENTIALIZATION 229 
 5. LOSS OF TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF REVENUE 232 
 6. COMPETING WITH FREE 234 
7. OR COMPETING WITH ALMOST-FREE (SO CAN’T CLEAR MARGINS OF PRODUCTION 
COSTS) 235 
 8. ABILITY OR INABILITY TO PRICE DISCRIMINATE 236 
 9. STRUGGLING FOR FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE AND MARKETPLACE POSITION 237 
10. LIMITATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICALLY-DRIVEN STRATEGIES (DRM) TO THWART 
COPYING/PIRACY/USER BEHAVIORS 239 
11. PARALLEL OR ANALOGOUS LIMITATIONS OF ANTI-COPYING  STRATEGIES IN 
OTHER INDUSTRIES 240 
II.	  WHAT	  SHOULD	  THE	  CONTENT	  INDUSTRIES	  BE	  AFRAID	  OF,	  	  BUT	  MAYBE	  AREN'T	  
AWARE	  OF?	   242	  
A. BREAKDOWN OF NORMS OF BEHAVIOR BY CREATORS, USERS,  STAKEHOLDERS 
AND/OR COMMUNITIES 242 
 1. BREAKDOWN OF NORMS VIS-A-VIS STEALING VS. SHARING 242 
2. BREAKDOWN OF NORMS INVOLVING REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL,  ATTRIBUTION, AND 
CULTURAL RECOGNITION 243 
3. BREAKDOWN OF NORMS WITH RESPECT TO KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE AND 
COLLABORATION 248 
B. BREAKDOWN OF ECONOMIES OF PRESTIGE 250 
C. BREAKDOWN OF GUILD-LIKE SPACES GOVERNED BY NORMS AND  COMMONLY 
AGREED-UPON PRACTICES 251 
D. POSSIBLE UNDERMINING OF “NEGATIVE SPACE” IN FIELDS WHERE IP HAS NOT 
TRADITIONALLY BEEN CALLED UPON TO KEEP PRODUCTIVITY ROBUST 256 
E. LOSS OF FLEXIBILITY THAT NON-IP OR LOW-IP SPACES MAY AFFORD 258 
F. EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT VIA PROPERTIZATION OF THINGS WE DON’T 
NORMALLY CONSIDER COPYRIGHTABLE, SUCH AS CERTAIN PERFORMATIVE ACTS 260 
G. EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER VIA NOVEL CONSTRUCTION OF 
THE USEFUL ARTICLES DOCTRINE AND PREDICATED UPON THE POSSIBLE ELISION 
AND/OR BREAKDOWN OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FUNCTIONALITY AND 
ORIGINALITY 261 
H. POTENTIAL REPERCUSSIONS OF PROPERTIZATION ON THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 263 
I. POSSIBLE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF PROPERTIZATION ON THE  ACTUAL CREATIVE 
CONTENT ITSELF 264 
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
J. BREAKDOWN OF COMMONS 267 
III.	  SOLUTIONS:	  CHANGING	  THE	  BUSINESS	  MODEL	   271	  
A. WHAT CAN CHANGING THE BUSINESS MODEL DO? 271 
1. IT PROMOTES CERTAIN KEY BEHAVIORS GENERALLY AGREED ON AS BEING 
OPTIMAL FOR THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 272 
 2. BUSINESS-DRIVEN SOLUTIONS 273 
B. WHAT DOES CHANGING THE BUSINESS MODEL NOT DO? 284 
 1. PROMOTE UNIFORMITY 285 
 2. PROMOTE INTEROPERABILITY 286 
3. PROMOTE COLLECTIVE SOLUTIONS, AND OTHER COMMUNALLY-WORTHWHILE 
OUTCOMES 288 
 4. PROMOTE CUMULATIVE INNOVATION 290 
 5. PROTECT END-USER RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, OR LESS-POWERFUL 
STAKEHOLDERS 291 
 6. CURTAIL MONOPOLY-SEEKING BEHAVIOR 293 
 7. MAXIMIZE SPILLOVER AND NETWORK EFFECTS 294 
C. WHAT ARE THE RELATIVE ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES TO  CHANGING BUSINESS 
MODEL VS. IP LEVEL? 296 
 1. BUSINESS MODEL ADVANTAGES 296 
 2. IP ADVANTAGES 297 
IV.	  SOLUTIONS:	  CHANGING	  IP	   301	  
A. WHAT CAN IP DO?; WHAT CAN MORE/ENHANCED IP DO? 301 
 1. CREATE A MARKET 301 
 2. MANAGE RIGHTS METERING VIA LICENSING ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS PROS 302 
3. SUPPORT NEW BUSINESS SOLUTIONS, INCLUDING DISAGGREGATION, PRICE 
DISCRIMINATION, AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN VALUABLE ASSETS 305 
B. WHAT CAN MORE IP DO? 308 
 1. INCREASE REVENUES THAT YOU CAN EXTRACT FROM YOUR COPYRIGHTED 
MATERIAL 308 
2. INCREASE REVENUES BY ALLOWING CREATIVE WORKS IN LOW-IP OR NO-IP 
REGIMES TO BE COPYRIGHTED, AND PROTECT EMERGING CREATORS IN THOSE FIELDS 309 
C. WHAT’S WRONG WITH JUST MORE IP? 310 
1. CHANGES BALANCE OF IP/PUBLIC DOMAIN; OR CHANGES BALANCE OF RIGHTS 
BETWEEN COPYRIGHT HOLDER AND CONSUMER 310 
 2. LOCKS UP TOO MUCH SO THAT FOLLOW-ON INNOVATION MAY BE CHOKED OFF 315 
 3. CAN UNDERMINE A CONSTRUCTED COMMONS 316 
 4. CAN CHANGE THE BALANCE BETWEEN PROPERTIZATION AND DISCLOSURE 318 
D. WHAT ABOUT ELIMINATING IP? 319 
 1. WHY IT IS NOT ALWAYS FEASIBLE TO ELIMINATE IP 319 
V.	  REFINING	  THE	  IP	  SOLUTION:	  TAILORING	   325	  
A. STANDARDIZATION 328 
 1. STANDARDIZATION MAKES IP CLEAR AND EASY TO USE 328 
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
 2. STANDARDIZATION OF LICENSING RIGHTS IS STREAMLINED, EASY TO USE, AND 
FAIR  328 
 3. STANDARDIZATION OFFERS LEEWAY FOR IMPORTANT POLICY OBJECTIVES 330 
B. UNIFORMITY COSTS 334 
 1. INITIAL IP ENTITLEMENT ALLOCATIONS ARE NOT READILY ALIGNED 334 
 2. ECONOMIC COSTS 337 
 3. SOCIAL COSTS 340 
 4. COSTS TO USERS 341 
C. TAILORING 342 
 1. VARYING INITIAL ALLOCATIONS OF IP 344 
2. VARYING TERMS AND STANDARDS (DRAWN FROM ARGUMENTS IN PATENT LAW);  
OFFERING OPTIONS 344 
 3. CALIBRATING RIGHTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OPTIMUM DURABILITY OF WORK 346 
 4. PROMOTING IP-BASED REGULATORY SYSTEMS OR REGIMES 350 
D. WHEN TAILORING DOES NOT WORK SO WELL 351 
 1. PRICING AND REVENUES 352 
 2. PRICE SIGNALS 354 
 3. PRE-EXISTING NORMS 357 
 4. OPENNESS, UGC, OPEN SOURCE, USERS’ RIGHTS, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 359 
E. OTHER CONCERNS 361 
 1. DIVIDING UP THE FIELDS; ASSESSING IP ENTITLEMENTS; GAMING THE SYSTEM 362 
 2. INSTITUTIONALISM AND UNCERTAINTY 363 
3. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION ARGUMENT THAT TAILORING IS THE 
BEST WAY TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC DOMAIN? 364 
  
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
CHAPTER	  5:	  INDUSTRY	  PRESCRIPTIONS	  
I.	  FASHION	   366	  
A.	  BUSINESS	   366	  
 1. THE NATURE OF THE COPYING THEY CARE ABOUT (BY MARKET SEGMENT) 366 
 2. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS 368 
B.	  TECHNOLOGICAL	   373	  
 1. ONLINE CHANGES 373 
 2. POSSIBLE RESPONSES 374 
C.	  LEGAL	   376	  
 1. THE BIGGEST POSSIBLE CHANGE IS TO ESTABLISH FASHION COPYRIGHT 376 
 2. HOW TO MAKE FASHION COPYRIGHT EFFICACIOUS 378 
 3. OBSTACLES/CONCERNS 382 
 4. TRADEMARK 383 
D.	  CULTURAL	   384	  
 1. OTHER NORMS-BASED APPROACHES 387 
 2. THE FASHION INDUSTRY SHOULD OFFER MORE HYBRID OR NON-IP BASED REWARDS 
 3. THE FASHION INDUSTRY SHOULD INCORPORATE OUTSIDERS INTO ITS RANKS 388 
II.	  EDUCATION	   390	  
A.	  BUSINESS	   390	  
 1. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT STATE OF INDUSTRY 390 
 2. DISAGGREGATION OF EDUCATION INTO COURSES 391 
 3. MOOCS AS A KEY BUSINESS STRATEGY PRIOR TO MONETIZATION 393 
 4. FINANCING MOOCS 394 
 5. FACULTY LABOR AND COMPENSATION; ADJUNCTIFICATION;   
 PORTABILITY AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY 396 
 6. MONETIZATION 400 
 7. NETWORK EFFECTS (POSITIVE NETWORK EXTERNALITIES) 402 
  
B.	  LEGAL	   406	  
 1. IP SOLUTION TO DISAGGREGATION OF COURSES 406 
2. IP SOLUTION TO DISPUTE OVER COURSE OWNERSHIP  RELATING TO  
WORK-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE 407 
 3. PROPERTIZING COURSES 409 
4. TRADEMARK IN “NAME BRAND” OF SCHOOLS AND THE DEGREES THEY CONFER;  
TRADEMARK IN FACULTY 413 
C.	  TECHNOLOGICAL	   415	  
D.	  CULTURAL	   416	  
 1. EDUCATION AS CONSTRUCTED COMMONS	   416	  
  
III.	  MUSIC	   421	  
A.	  BUSINESS	   421	  
 1. PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 421 
 2. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS 424 
 3. INTEROPERABILITY 431	   
 4. LICENSING/STREAMING	   435 
 5. MAKING A MUSIC MARKET 437 
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
 6. OPEN QUESTIONS 440 
B.	  LEGAL	   441	  
 1. COPYRIGHT SOLUTIONS 441 
 2. SOLUTIONS BASED IN ANTI-PIRACY MEASURES 447 
 3. INCREASE SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 448 
4. FIX REGULATION OF ONLINE MUSIC STREAMING  
(INCLUDING PRICING OF RIGHTS/ROYALTIES) 448 
5. STREAMLINE MUSIC RIGHTS BY UNIFYING AND STRENGTHENING   
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS 448 
 6. PROACTIVELY TACKLE FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAY BE UNFAIRLY DISRUPTIVE 449 
C.	  TECHNOLOGICAL	   450	  
 1. INTEROPERABILITY 450 
 2. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTIONS 450 
 3. PAYMENT SYSTEMS 452 
D.	  CULTURAL	   452	  
 1. WORK TO PROMOTE INTEROPERABILITY AND OPEN SOURCE PRODUCTION AND SHARING 452 
 2. EMPHASIZE THE CONSTRUCTED CULTURAL COMMONS OF MUSIC 453 
 3. SUPPORT UGC, OPENNESS, USERS’ RIGHTS, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 455 
 4. NEED TO ADDRESS (AND IMPROVE) USERS’ ATTITUDES 456 
  
  
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
 
CHAPTER	  6:	  SALIENT	  FACTORS	  
INTRODUCTION	  TO	  SALIENT	  FACTORS	   459	  
I.	  BUSINESS	   460	  
A.	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  BUSINESS	  ISSUES	   460	  
B.	  HOW	  FLUID/RESILIENT/ADAPTABLE	  IS	  YOUR	  BUSINESS	  MODEL?	   460	  
 1. QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS	   460	  
 2. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS	   462	  
 3. IP SOLUTIONS	   463	  
 4. EXAMPLES	   463	  
C.	  CAN	  YOU	  CHANGE	  YOUR	  PROFITABILITY	  PARADIGM	  BY	  MOVING	  TO	  NEW	  REVENUE-­‐GENERATING	  
SOURCES?	  HOW	  MUCH	  CAN	  YOU	  CHANGE	  OR	  AFFECT	  PRICING	  AND/OR	  PRICE	  DISCRIMINATE?	   467	  
 1. QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS	   467	  
 2. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS	   468	  
 3. IP SOLUTIONS	   469	  
 4. EXAMPLES	   469	  
D.	  HOW	  IMPORTANT	  IS	  LICENSING	  VS.	  OWNERSHIP	  TO	  YOUR	  BUSINESS	  MODEL?	   473	  
 1. QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS	   473	  
 2. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS	   474	  
 3. IP SOLUTIONS	   475	  
 4. EXAMPLES	   475	  
E.	  DO	  YOU	  (STILL)	  RELY	  ON	  MIDDLEMEN/INTERMEDIARIES;	  IF	  SO,	  HOW	  GOOD	  ARE	  YOUR	  
PROS/CROS/CLEARING-­‐HOUSES?	   476	  
 1. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS	   478	  
 2. IP SOLUTIONS	   481	  
 3. EXAMPLES	   484	  
F.	  HOW	  DO	  YOU	  REMUNERATE	  YOUR	  LABOR?	   485	  
 1. QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS	   485	  
 2. BUSINESS AND IP SOLUTIONS	   487	  
 3. EXAMPLES	   489	  
II.	  LEGAL	   495	  
A.	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  LEGAL	  ISSUES	   495	  
B.	  HOW	  DO	  YOU	  MAXIMIZE	  IP	  PROTECTION?	   496	  
C.	  IF	  YOU	  ARE	  A	  NEGATIVE	  SPACE:	  IS	  IP	  GOOD	  FOR	  YOUR	  INDUSTRY,	  IS	  COPYING	  GOOD	  FOR	  YOUR	  
INDUSTRY,	  OR	  IS	  A	  HYBRIDIZED	  MODEL	  GOOD	  FOR	  YOUR	  INDUSTRY?	   497	  
D.	  IF	  YOU	  ARE	  SEEKING	  TO	  IMPLEMENT	  OR	  ENHANCE	  YOUR	  IP	  PROTECTION,	  HOW	  MUCH	  
TRANSACTION	  COSTS	  WOULD	  CHANGE	  INCUR?	   498	  
 1. QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS	   498	  
 2. BUSINESS AND IP SOLUTIONS	   500	  
 3. EXAMPLES	   504	  
III.	  TECHNOLOGICAL	   506	  
A.	  IS	  TECHNOLOGICAL	  PROTECTION	  GOOD	  FOR	  YOUR	  INDUSTRY?—INTRODUCTION	  TO	  
TECHNOLOGICAL	  ISSUES	   506	  
Bhamati Viswanathan   Creative Copyright 
B.	  WHAT	  TECHNOLOGICAL	  PROTECTION	  DO	  YOU	  HAVE	  IN	  PLACE	  AND	  	  	  
HOW	  EFFECTIVE	  IS	  IT	   507	  
C.	  HOW	  MUCH	  DO	  YOU	  VALUE	  INTEROPERABILITY?	   508	  
D.	  WHAT	  KIND	  OF	  POSITIVE	  EXTERNALITIES	  DO	  YOU	  HAVE?	   509	  
 1.	  BUSINESS SOLUTIONS	   510	  
 2. EXAMPLES	   514	  
IV.	  CULTURAL	   520	  
A.	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  CULTURAL	  ISSUES	   520	  
B.	  DO	  YOU	  HAVE	  THE	  CRITICAL	  FEATURES	  OF	  A	  CONSTRUCTED	  COMMONS/GUILD?	  AND/OR	  ARE	  
YOU	  SUPPORTED	  BY	  AN	  INSTITUTIONAL	  EDIFICE?	   521	  
C.	  DO	  YOU	  HAVE	  IMPORTANT	  CULTURAL	  FEATURES	  AT	  WORK	  THAT	  SUBSTITUTE	  FOR	  SOME	  OF	  THE	  
OPERATIONS	  OF	  A	  FORMALIZED	  LEGAL	  IP	  SYSTEM?	  THAT	  IS,	  (A)	  DO	  REPUTATION,	  ATTRIBUTION,	  
AND	  HOMAGE	  WORK?	  (B)	  DO	  PRIZES	  AND	  REWARDS	  WORK?	  (C)	  DO	  YOUR	  NORMS	  AND	  PRACTICES	  
INHIBIT	  STEALING?	  (D)	  ARE	  THERE	  SANCTIONS	  WITHIN	  THE	  COMMUNITY	  AGAINST	  
STEALING/PLAGIARISM/OUTRIGHT	  COPYING?	   523	  
C.	  HOW	  MUCH	  ROOM	  IS	  THERE	  FOR	  OPEN	  SOURCE	  PRODUCTION?	  DO	  YOU	  BENEFIT	  FROM	  OPEN	  
SOURCE	  PRODUCTION?	   524	  
E.	  HOW	  MUCH	  SPILLOVER/NETWORK	  EFFECTS	  CAN	  YOUR	  INDUSTRY	  PRODUCE?	   526	  
 1. BUSINESS SOLUTIONS AND NORMATIVE APPROACHES 526 
 2. IP SOLUTIONS 529 
 3. EXAMPLES	   530	  









A. The Creative Content Industries and Disruptive Innovation 
 
Creative content industries are complex ecosystems,1 in which various aspects -- legal, 
commercial, technological, and cultural -- are contiguous with, and contingent upon, one 
another. Changes to such highly entwined systems resonate throughout the industry, and may 
result in profound alterations that are irreversible and possibly costly, both in measurable 
economic terms and in incommensurable cultural and normative dimensions. When disruptive 
innovation in the form of new digital technologies emerges, it can pose formidable challenges to 
the already fragile ecosystems of creative industries. The obvious and often-sought response is to 
call for increased protections of the creative properties that rights-holders generate and own. But 
advocates for enhanced intellectual property rights are liable to overlook or discount both the 
costs and the deeper effects that entitlement shifts can exert on creative content industries. While 
disruptive innovation places creative production at risk, merely expanding rights may strike at 
the heart of creativity itself. It is essential, therefore, to ensure that the cure is not more deadly 
than the condition it seeks to correct. 
 
1.What Is Disruptive Innovation? 
 
Many creative content industries have confronted the disruptive innovation of digital 
technologies, throwing their markets and profitability models into disarray. Clay Christensen, 
whose pioneering work sets forth the theory of disruptive innovation, 2 describes it as an 
                                                
1 The analogy drawn between cultural ecosystems and natural environments came to the fore in the 1990s, 
and its acceptance among legal scholars is in large part attributed to the efforts of James Boyle. See James 
Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind, Yale Univ. Press (2008); see also 
Deborah Tussey, Complex Copyright: Mapping the Information Ecosystem, Ashgate (2012). 
2 See generally, CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997); Clayton M. Christensen & Michael Overdorf, Meeting the 
Challenge of Disruptive Change, 78(3) HARV. BUS. REV. 66 (Mar./Apr. 2000); Clayton M. Christensen, 
Richard Bohmer, & John Kenagy, Will Disruptive Innovations Cure Health Care?, 78(5) HARV. BUS. 
REV. 102 (Sept./Oct 2000); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN,& MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR'S 
SOLUTION : CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH (2003); CLAYTON M.CHRISTENSEN, 
SCOTT D. ANTHONY, & ERIK A. ROTH, SEEING WHAT'S NEXT: USING THEORIES OF INNOVATION TO 
PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE (2004); Clayton M. Christensen, Heiner Baumann, Rudy Ruggles, & 
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innovation that helps create a new market and value network, and eventually disrupts an existing 
market and value network, displacing earlier commercial paradigms, technologies and systems.3 
A hallmark of disruptive innovation is that it does not merely represent a new technology, but 
rather comprises an innovation that changes an entire market.4 In other words, these are 
innovations that can improve a product or service in a way that is unanticipated by a market, 
typically first by designing a product or services for a different set of consumers, which 
eventually results in prices being lowered in the existing market.5 Critically, in Christensen’s 
terms, it is not the technology alone that is disruptive, but rather the business model that the 
technology enables that creates the actual disruptive impact.6 Christensen’s theory of disruptive 
innovation has been applied a wide range of industries, including American steel mills and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Thomas M. Sadtler, Disruptive Innovation for Social Change, 84(12) HARV. BUS. REV. 94 (Dec. 2006); 
SCOTT D. ANTHONY, MARK W. JOHNSON, JOSEPH V. SINFIELD, & ELIZABETH J. ALTMAN, INNOVATOR'S 
GUIDE TO GROWTH - PUTTING DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION TO WORK (2008); Clayton M. Christensen, 
Mark W. Johnson, & Darrell K. Rigby, Foundations for Growth: How to Identify and Build Disruptive 
New Businesses, 43(3) MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 22 (Spring 2002).  
3 Disruptive innovation stands in contrast to a sustaining innovation, which does not create new markets 
or value networks but rather only evolves existing ones with increased value, which allows firms within 
its purview to compete against each other’s sustaining improvements. Id. 
4 A sustaining innovation is typically an innovation in technology, whereas a disruptive innovation will 
change entire markets. Id. 
5 Christensen makes the distinction clear by outlining what he calls the “ "technology mudslide 
hypothesis". This, as he recounts it, is the overly reductive idea that an established firm fails because it 
doesn't keep pace technologically with other firms. On this analogy, firms are akin to climbers who are 
seeking to find a footing on uncertain ground, and whose continual effort must be sustained just to keep 
upright. This relentless effort is all-demanding, and any cessation in effort -- due, for instance, to a 
complacency stemming from a long period of profitability -- will precipitate a sudden and rapid downhill 
slide. Christensen argues that this hypothesis does not adequately reflect how firms and markets truly 
function. He argues that well-run firms are indeed aware of innovations in the industry, but they are 
unable to pursue adaptive changes for several reasons: (i) their business model is predicated upon 
continuing in a given course; (ii) their profitability is predicated upon consistency, and changing course is 
uncertain to sustain or contribute to current profitability; and (iii) the development of adaptive business 
tactics and practices may consume resources that are needed for sustaining innovations, and likewise 
needed to compete against current competition. In sum, Christensen argues that a firm’s existing value 
networks is liable to discount, or to place insufficient value on, the disruptive innovation, which prevents 
the firm from pursuing adaptive strategies. At the same time, start-up firms may inhabit different value 
networks, up to the point at which their disruptive innovation is able to invade the more established value 
network. At that point of invasion, the established firms are not readily able to fend off the new entrants, 
or may weakly attempt to parry with an imitative attempt at innovation. This delayed strategy, however, is 
more likely to reward latecomers, however established they may be, with a mere ability to survive, rather 
than a means to grow, compete, and thrive. See CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA supra note 2 
at 47. 
6 Christensen and his colleague Mark W. Johnson have elaborated the dynamics of “business model 
innovation.” See Mark W. Johnson, Clayton M. Christensen, & Henning Kagermann, Reinventing Your 
Business Model, 86(12) HARV. BUS. REV. 50 (Dec. 2008). 
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automobile manufacturing. In the case of creative industries, it is equally relevant, and offers a 
powerful scope for investigating recent upheavals that are roiling diverse creative economies. 
 
2.Disruptive Innovation and Three Creative Content Industries: Case Studies In Change 
 
To better understand the effects of disruptive innovation on creative content industries, as well as 
to approach crafting a framework for solutions to its myriad challenges, I begin this Paper with a 
detailed examination of three creative content industries: fashion, music and education. This 
situates the nested issues that disruptive innovation raises in a concrete context, while allowing a 
more granular exploration of industries that are at various stages in their development and 
change and that have widely varying levels of protection. Extrapolating from these industries 
allows us to identify what content industries fear and, equally importantly, what they should fear 
or at least take into consideration. The three industries are particularly instructive in the 
exploration of technological change and its effect on creative markets in part because they are 
situated at various critical points in the timeline of disruption. 
 
The fashion industry is currently facing challenges from the kind of widespread copying, 
appropriation and dissemination that digital technology makes readily possible. As a “low-IP” or 
“negative space” regime, however, it does not rely on copyright in its arsenal of strategies and 
tools with which it can respond to such incursions.7 Interested parties in the industry have 
recently lobbied for legislative change that would grant copyright in some fashion design, 
thereby enhancing protection across the board.8 But while legislation has been proposed, it is 
currently stalled and remains controversial, demonstrating that industry responses to disruptive 
innovation are still at their inception. 
 
The educational sector is at a midpoint of change, in which certain scholarly activities and 
output, such as scientific research and discovery and other patentable work product are 
                                                
7 It does however, have trademark protection against illicit counterfeiting. 
8 Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010). See also Susan 
Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69 (2008). 
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established subjects of institutional propertization and control.9 Other pedagogical activities and 
output, however, such as courses and course materials, have not historically been propertized, 
and are subject to debate over the copyrightable nature of the work and the allocation of 
ownership in such copyright grants. The advent of the Internet has brought these concerns to the 
fore, as online education has made forays into the educational sector by enabling the production 
of massive open online courses (MOOCs), introducing for-profit education providers in what has 
traditionally been a not-for-profit sector, and potentially making possible to unbundle courses 
from degree-bearing programs or specific institutionalized boundaries, as well as to allow the 
provision of potentially profitable ancillary services and products. These profound changes call 
for an orderly allocation and management of rights, such as agreements between online course 
providers and universities for the provision of courses; agreements within institutions formally 
allocating copyrights and related rewards in courses among institutions, departments and faculty; 
and other mechanisms for ensuring that courses may be propertized and, if possible, monetized.  
 
The music industry stands at a more mature point in the disruptive innovation cycle. The advent 
of the Internet in the music industry is well-known, as it has unfolded over the last two decades 
with marked consequences.10 Digitization has enabled widespread changes in consumer practices 
and preferences, such as a proliferation of peer-to-peer file sharing 11; increased consumption of 
individual digital tracks via online music providers that offer licensing rather than sales of 
content; accelerating consumption of music via online streaming sites rather than traditional 
sources such as radio broadcasting; and significant increases in user-generated content (UGC) 
enabled by digital technologies such as computerized sound editing, content sharing sites, and 
rapid broadband allowing enhanced online content streaming.12 In the wake of these changes, 
                                                
9 This has been facilitated, and to some extent precipitated, by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. See Michael 
W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1361, 1412-13 (2009). 
10 See STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION : THE SPECTACULAR CRASH OF THE RECORD 
INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2009). 
11 Some of this peer-to-peer activity has been found to be illicit, as in the cases of Napster and Grokster. 
Although it must be noted that online music sharing sites survive, such as PirateBay, BitTorrent, and so 
on, there are also legitimate sites that attempt to screen out copyrighted content. 
12 Olufunmilayo Arewa, Youtube, UGC, and Digital Music: Competing Business and Cultural Models in 
the Internet Age, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 431 (2010); Urs Gasser, iTunes: How Copyright, Contract, and 
Technology Shape the Business of Digital Media - A Case Study, (Berkman Center for Internet & Society 
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industry participants are struggling to formulate a successful response: music producers are 
wrestling with an ongoing decline in revenues derived from recorded music; music providers, 
delivery services, and technology companies whose products carry and disseminate content, are 
competing to secure market dominance in various markets and media; and music intermediaries 
such as collective management organizations are striving to strengthen and streamline music 
rights management; to facilitate cross-licensing; to empower original composers; and to expand 
revenue streams for rightsholders. 
 
B. Analysis of Challenges Posed by Disruptive Innovation to the Creative Content 
Industries 
 
Understanding the dilemma that creative content industries face begins with an examination of 
the challenges that they confront, some of which are endogenous to their industry and culture, 
and others of which are exogenous and may stem from larger factors such as economic shifts, 
changes in end-user populations, innovations in complementary fields (such as improved 
logistics, communications, and infrastructure), and so on. Many of the more obvious changes are 
evident in the commercial and competitive pressures that creative industries face, such as losses 
of primary revenue sources due to technological innovations and the accelerating pace of 
technological adoption by savvy end-users, some of whom may seek to subvert commercial 
practices or co-opt properties for their own purposes and without due remuneration. 
 
But other, subtler forces are also at play. Creative fields are undergirded with a deep-rooted 
substructure of norms, or shared cultural tenets and practices, that are integral to the operations 
and sustainability of creative environments and endeavors. These cultural or norms-based 
arrangements not only serve to bolster intellectual property rights and business practices, but in 
some instances may stand in their stead. In the fashion industry, this may be evinced by 
longstanding practices of apprenticeship, homage, and attribution, characteristics that recall an 
earlier lineage of fashion guilds and latter-day quasi-guilds. In the education industry, 
reputational capital, built through scholarship, research and discovery, and in some cases 
                                                                                                                                                       
at Harvard Law School Research Publication No. 2004-07, June 2004), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=556802.  
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mentorship are strong evidence of the prevalence of norms. Academic freedom, the overriding 
and elemental principle of professional autonomy in scholarship and teaching, is another such 
norm. Further, a strong support of collaborative and interdisciplinary work, ongoing efforts to 
share fundamental research, data and information, and increasing efforts to participate in open 
access sharing of key resources, likewise express the prevalent norms of higher education. These 
contribute to an understanding shared by many commentators of the university as a kind of 
commons, in which resources are shared, managed, worked and reaped communally and with a 
view to both self-interest and the interests of the greater good.13 In the music industry, similar 
community-wide practices abound, such as formal exchanges in concerts, orchestras and 
chamber music groups, jam bands and sessions, formal or informal apprenticeships with master 
musicians, and so on.14 Sampling, musical quotation of prior works, tributes, and other acts of 
homage likewise express norms of reputation and attribution, some of which persist without the 
formalization of ordered rights. 
 
In all of these cases, cultural and norms-based practices and principles not only supplement legal 
policies and business behaviors but at times may actually do the work that formalized 
arrangements might otherwise have executed. In this Paper, I examine some of the functions that 
normative approaches undertake, and emphasize that their functionality may not readily be 
replaced by more the formalized apparatus of intellectual property entitlements or the operational 
mechanisms of business tactics and strategies, and thereby highlight their incommutable 
importance to the ecosystems of creative industries. 
 
C. Analysis of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Changing the Business Model versus 
Changing Intellectual Property Entitlements 
 
                                                
13 Michael J. Madison, Brent M. Frischmann, & Katherine J. Sandburg, The University as Constructed 
Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. &POL’Y, 365, 397 (2009); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). See also CORYNNNE 
MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK: BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(2001); HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL (1990). 
14 Interestingly, peer-to-peer file sharing evinces some of the desire of music lovers to share music and 
enrich the listening audience, although perhaps not by sanctioned means. 
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Examining the three creative ecosystems in question has allowed us to extrapolate and identify 
what content industries fear and, equally importantly, what they should fear or at least take into 
consideration. The next question is what are the solutions they propose to meet and overcome the 
challenges identified, and in particular what are the strengths and weaknesses of their proposals. 
Industries often gravitate to changing business strategies and models to stay competitive and 
ahead of the disruptive innovation curve. Private ordering solutions, transactional, contractual 
and licensing arrangements, and other strategies are flexible, specific, and cost effective. 
However, they do not offer across-the-board changes that can strengthen a struggling industry, 
and they can result in adverse effects on constituencies that are not well-represented at the 
bargaining table, such as end-users, start-up ventures, and so on. Recalibrated intellectual 
property entitlements can promote industry-wide priorities, such as using compulsory licensing 
to encourage licit creative borrowing, instituting rights to incentivize emerging talent, and so on. 
But both sets of changes come with costs, such as encroaching on commons-like arrangements, 
undermining shared norms that guide practices, diminishing the public domain, propertizing 
intangible and incommensurable creative output, and other possible negative consequences. The 
advantages and disadvantages of these variable sets of changes are complex, indsustry-specific, 
and themselves subject to change. Nonetheless, I offer an optic on the interplay between 
changing business practices and legal practices for two reasons: first, to alert creative content 
industries to the high stakes that their choices entail; and second, and perhaps more importantly, 
to suggest a helpful way to approach crafting a solution that will steer the best possible course 
among options that will maximize creative returns and sustain the creative ecosystem. 
 
D. Tailoring: The Optimal Solution for Creative Content Industries 
 
Confronted by the fundamental tensions of intellectual property -- which are exacerbated by the 
pressures of disruptive innovation -- creative content industries are actively searching for new 
business strategies and enhanced legal protections. However, they lack a basic framework that 
will enable them to shape pragmatic solutions calibrated to their needs and objectives. This Paper 
attempts to fill the lacuna by offering such a framework. Having shown that these industries are 
each uniquely configured and face a highly particularized set of concerns, I argue that they 
cannot be compelled to resort to a one-size-fits-all solution, such as a uniform expansion of 
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copyright or a universal change in business paradigms. Rather, a carefully crafted approach is 
required, in which a workable and tailored solution meets each challenge with a measurable, cost 
effective, and administrable set of steps. This approach is explicitly designed to maximize 
creative generation, production, and delivery, while still preserving rights of user access that are 
essential to ensuring user creativity and enriching the public domain.15 
 
At the outset, tailoring works within the boundaries of intellectual property entitlements, but 
takes advantage of certain flexibilities that the law affords in order to achieve an outcome that is 
best suited to the particular contours of a creative content industry.16 Some of these measures are 
afforded by the accommodations that are inscribed in copyright law, such as certain areas of 
exceptional protection, limitations to exclusivity conferred by the fair use doctrine, compulsory 
licensing mandates, and so on. Others may be achieved by seeking permissible modifications to 
                                                
15 My theory of tailoring draws upon, and is indebted to, the framework for tailoring elucidated by 
Michael Carroll in two seminal works: Michael W. Carroll ,One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); and Michael W. Carroll 
One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law,15 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006). 
16 I begin with accepting the premise underlying patent and copyright law—that creators or innovators 
must be able to exclude others in order to extract benefits from them to compensate for the costs of 
creation or innovation. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997) (“In a private market economy, individuals will not invest in 
invention or creation unless . . . they can reasonably expect to make a profit from the endeavor.”). I do not 
go so far as to assert, like some commentators, that pecuniary motivation is the sole, or even primary, 
motivation to create. See, e.g., TYLER COWEN, IN PRAISE OF COMMERCIAL CULTURE 18 (2000). I believe 
that innovative activity many have many overdetermined motivations; and a rational, selfish actor may 
innovate without receiving entitlements, and may still confer the benefits of her creativity on society. See, 
e.g., TERESA M. AMABILE, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 14–15 (1983); TERESA M. 
AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT: UPDATE TO THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY 153–77 
(1996); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegan, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURV. 589 (2001) 
(reviewing evidence that intrinsic motivation can be reduced by prospect of external reward). See also 
Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1198–1204 
(2007) (examining creative processes and proposing a decentered model of creativity). As in the case of 
“economies of prestige,” certain non-pecuniary rewards may also offer sufficient motivation for creative 
production, even absent formal entitlements. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in 
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1586 (2003) (describing alternative incentives to innovate). Business 
strategies and motivations may also suffice, as in the case of publication used as a loss leader to increase 
future income streams, such as speaker’s fees, improved professional status, and so on. See, e.g., William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 333 
(1989) (describing forms of non-pecuniary income authors derive from publication). And competitive 
motivations may also prove sufficient stimulus to create and innovate, in order to differentiate their 
products and services from their competitors, whether or not exclusive rights ensue. See, e.g., Jonathan B. 
Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 590–92 
(2007). 
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copyright, such as expanding carve outs, lobbying for changes to the duration of copyright 
protection, seeking to preserve options in copyright, and so on. These, however, may entail 
significant transaction costs, and therefore must be weighed particularly carefully against the 
benefits that they may confer. 
 
A more expansive understanding of tailoring also extends beyond the purview of intellectual 
property entitlements to span the use of other practices -- commercial, technological, and 
normative -- that can be made either in conjunction with or in lieu of legal solutions or formal 
ordering arrangements. Some measures may be achieved by business practices that eschew 
entitlements, looking rather to strategic tactics and competitive advantages to protect content and 
maximize profitability. For instance, industries can strive to maximize lead time advantage, 
profit from network effects, exploit market segmentation, or expand the exploitation of protected 
properties in new markets, and thereby grow their market share without incurring the transaction 
costs that can accompany changes to legal rights and protections. They can also enter into private 
arrangements, such as contractual agreements and intra-firm transactions, and cross-licensing. Or 
they can use a mix of tactics, such as building strategic intellectual property portfolios to 
leverage protection within firms and among groups of competitors. Technological measures, 
such as the use of digital rights management protections, are also available to enhance business 
strategies, such as restricting interoperability with a view to thwarting incursions on revenue-
bearing properties and securing a dominant market position. These commercial strategies and 
technological measures enable creative content industries to reposition themselves in the face of 
disruptive innovation. When coupled with the exercise of copyright protections, they can be 
especially effective deterrents to the threat of revenue losses at the hands of digital copyists and 
disseminators of content. 
 
Even where copyright protection is functionally absent or minimal, creative content industries 
have recourse to collective action solutions and norms-based practices that can offer vital support 
systems to help achieve many of the objectives underlying intellectual property law, such as 
fostering and incentivizing creation, while also furthering other complementary goals, such as 
promoting collaborative efforts, rewarding originality with reputational returns, and sanctioning 
unacceptable practices such as content appropriation without attribution or recompense. These 
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solutions can draw from longstanding collective action paradigms, such as commons, guilds, and 
patent pools, that allow industry participants to unite in the service of shared goals, such as 
managing precious resources, protecting vital revenue streams, and building shared or 
complementary value propositions. Many of these norms-based practices have the added 
advantage of being so deeply engrained in certain creative content industries as to constitute part 
of their foundational culture, which lends them particular efficacy, moral suasion, and lasting 
power. Moreover, they are constitutive of many such ecosystems, and, as will be argued in this 
Paper, often advance public welfare goals that copyright alone cannot fully realize.17 
 
When properly executed, tailoring offers a flexible, resilient and administrable approach to 
equipping creative content companies to respond to disrupted environments in a cost effective 
manner. But like any such approach, it does raise some potential concerns. How to divide the 
creative fields into distinct areas of protection, if protection is to be accorded by sector rather 
than uniformly, is one such question. Institutional concerns, administrability concerns, and 
political economy concerns, such as the distortionary effects of lobbying, may not be adequately 
allayed by tailoring efforts without incurring transaction costs. The effects of tailoring on price 
                                                
17 The investigation of cultural norms, preferences and practices is particularly fascinating, as it reveals 
the real possibility that creative work can and will be generated without the incentive structure posited by 
intellectual property entitlements. In music, for instance, he explosion of “user-generated content” (UGC) 
speaks to the production of creative output without propertization. In education, scholarship and research 
resulting in publication is not typically accompanied by royalty fees or direct remuneration; rather, 
indirect benefits flow from publication and the reputation that is secured by advances in scholarly work. 
See, e.g., Howard P. Tuckman & Jack Leahy, What Is an Article Worth?, 83 J. POL. ECON. 951, 951–52 
(1975) (making the classic argument about indirect compensation from scholarship). Similarly, it has 
been argued that business methods patents are not necessarily requisite to the generation of innovative 
work. See Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 309, 
322–27 (2002). This view is hardly settled, however. Some commentators have noticed distinctions 
between those who create with the promise of exclusive rights and those who do not -- as some would 
say, the difference between professionals and amateurs. Cf. Susana Juniu, Ted Tedrick & Rosangela 
Boyd, Leisure or Work?: Amateur and Professional Musicians’ Perception of Rehearsal and 
Performance, 28 J. LEISURE RES. 44, 44 (1996) (finding marked differences between amateur and 
professional musicians toward rehearsal). Others have observed a distinction between open source 
software programmers motivated by non-pecuniary factors and those who rely on a proprietary strategy as 
a basis for their motivation. See, e.g., Jürgen Bitzer, Wolfram Schrettl & Philipp J. H. Schröder, Intrinsic 
Motivation in Open Source Software Development, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 160, 160–61 (2007); Jean Tirole  
& Joshua Lerner, Some Simple Economics of Open Source, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 197–99 (2002). 
These open questions only underscore the importance of crafting tailoring policies and practices that are 
flexible and adaptable, so that as more is understood with respect to creativity in a field, better balances in 
propertization and non-pecuniary incentive strategies may be struck. 
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signals, competitive practices, and other industry strategies is also complicated, and the 
balancing of competing interests not be readily resolved. I touch on some of these concerns, 
recognizing that they are likely to remain open questions, and posit that the case for tailoring 
rests ultimately on an evidentiary showing that tailoring succeeds when it offers the best possible 
solution, and the maximum net benefits, that are comparatively worth the costs, administrative or 
otherwise, that implementing a tailoring system is bound to induce.18 
 
E. Industry prescriptions 
 
The tailoring framework can now be brought to bear on the the fashion, education and music 
industries. The industry prescriptions are broken down into four areas of approach -- business, 
legal, technological, and cultural -- that address each of the main aspects of challenge and 
solution. The prescriptions demonstrate that for each creative content industry a tailored solution 
is crafted to respond to the specific needs and concerns, as well as to preserve the underlying 
cultural norms and practices of the ecosystem, highlighted in the opening case studies. 
 
                                                
18 One way of assessing costs associated with tailoring is to compare them with costs generated by other 
incentive systems. For instance, some commentators call for a range of institutional forms of direct 
compensation. See, e.g., Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 
113 Q. J. ECON. 1137, 1146–48 (1998) (discussing auction model as superior to patent system); Douglas 
G. Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented 
Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 124– 25 (1997) (subsidizing buyouts by using a coupon 
scheme); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & 
ECON. 525, 526 (2001) (arguing in favor of optional system that allows innovators to be compensated 
under current patent regime or reward system); Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. 
L. REV. 115 (2003). Other commentators endorse prize-based rewards systems in lieu of intellectual 
property entitlements. See Joseph Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize 
Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 1279 (2006); Joseph Stiglitz, 
Give Prizes Not Patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21; STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163 (2004). I would argue that institutional compensations and prize-
based reward systems, or “economies of prestige”, can work alongside intellectual property allocations, 
and indeed are inscribed in certain creative content industries, such as the education sector. They are not, 
however, likely to be sufficient on a stand-alone basis, in part due to the political climate today (for 
instance, an increasing reluctance to fund higher education), and in part due to the likelihood that 
administrative costs in fields with enormous commercial output, such as fashion and music, would be 
prohibitive and persistent. 
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In the case of the fashion industry, I argue against advocates of expanded intellectual property 
rights in the form of  grants of copyright in original fashion design,19 and look instead to secure 
commercial viability via changing business practices, such as cross-licensing or vertical 
integration among designers and retailers, increased diversification of product lines and appeals 
across various consumer bases, and increased rapidity of product diffusion and creation to 
outpace appropriation. Culturally, fashion has long relied on reputational rewards such as 
attribution and homage, to advance the professional goals of original designers. These practices 
should not be undervalued, but should rather be encouraged by increased recognition in the form 
of prestigious rewards and prizes that confer career-enhancing reputational benefits on emerging 
designers. Further, drawing from the history of fashion guilds,20 practices of apprenticeship and 
collaboration among established and emerging designers will strengthen the industry and give 
emerging designers support. Lastly, the industry should consider creating collective bodies that 
offer resources to emerging designers, such as pooled funds to fight appropriation with public 
relations campaigns, appeals to consumers, and other culturally appropriate actions. These 
administrative bodies can be modeled on collective rights organizations that manage resources, 
revenues and rights in other creative fields. 
 
In the case of the education industry, I address patent and copyright separately. On the patent 
side, I argue that patenting rights in scientific research and discovery must be balanced against 
publication rights in scholarly work.21 This tradeoff is well-established in academia, but is 
constantly put at risk by ever-increasing demands for the propertization and eventual 
monetization of patentable work.22 The pressure to patent rather than publish can exert pressure 
                                                
19 Fashion is not without recourse to legal remedies, but these should rest in existing rights under 
trademark law. See C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
20 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, 
Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Conf. on the Legal Hist. of Intell. Prop., Working Paper, 
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543; Robert P. Merges  Medieval Guilds Redux: 
Contemporary Institutions for Collective Invention (2004), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/17026.htm; Randall C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comment on 
The Piracy Paradox, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959727. 
21 See Madison, Frischmann, & Sandburg, supra note 5 at 397. 
22 See generally Ajay Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge 
Transfer from MIT, 48(1) MGMT. SCI. 44 (Jan. 2002); Arti K. Rai and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg 
Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987). 
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on core tenets such as academic freedom and autonomy. This calls for cultural and normative 
pushback among academics, and the demonstration of institutional commitment to scholarship as 
a critical mission of education. It can also put pressure on fundamental scientific research, 
findings and resources, which may be subject to early propertization, thereby running the risk of 
creating multiple fragmentary rights that are onerous to cross-license or use. One solution that 
has met with some success is to create patent pools that enable researchers to share such basic 
information and data among interested researchers and academics.23 This solution draws upon 
the strengths of the university as a constructed commons,24 in which arrangements among its 
members are modeled upon commons arrangements in natural resources,25 enabling the sharing, 
management, protection and husbandry of precious resources without resorting to concretized 
property rights. Relatedly, the encouragement of scholars within academia to publish findings 
and share knowledge can be bolstered by open access publishing arrangements and services, 
modeled upon open source development in other fields such as software development.26 
 
With respect to the education industry and copyright, I argue that institutions should begin with a 
recognition of the value proposition that underlies education -- the aggregation of courses in 
degree-bearing programs -- and acknowledgement that this business model is not fixed but, with 
the aid of digital technologies, subject to change. The disaggregation of stand-alone courses is 
possible as a key strategy that can serve as a loss leader to attract new audiences or a long-term 
prospect of customized course monetization. The degree program, however, should be protected, 
as it is likely to remain the property in which the greatest value inheres. The financing of 
                                                
23 See, e.g., Ajay Agrawal & Lorenzo Garlappi, Public Sector Science and the Strategy of the Commons, 
16 ECON. OF INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 517  (2007); JEANNE CLARK, JOE PICCOLO, BRIAN STANTON & 
KARIN TYSON, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE 
PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS?, (Dec. 5, 2000), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf. 
24 See Michael J. Madison, Brent M. Frischmann, Katherine J. Sandburg, Constructing Commons in the 
Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657 (Aug. 2010). See also Madison, Frischmann, & 
Sandburg, University as Constructed Cultural Commons supra note 5.. 
25 See ROBERT ELLICKSON ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994); ELINOR 
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1990); JAMES M. ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE THE 
MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY (2004). 
26 See, e.g. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software, supra note 21 at 14; Robert P. 
Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s 
Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L. J. 369, 441 (2002). 
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MOOCs is almost certain to be underwritten by university operating budgets, grants, and 
external funding. This will increase pressure on institutions to propertize and monetize MOOC in 
the long term, requiring a clear delineation of rights in courses and materials. 
 
Copyright in courses can begin by looking to historic and legal precedent, which relied upon 
agency law and the work-for-hire doctrine to resolve disputes over copyright ownership in 
courses. However, the utility of these precedents are limited in today’s educational market, in 
which some faculty may function more like independent contractors and others may function 
more like employees, thereby blurring the distinctions underlying work-for-hire determinations. 
Educators are better served by considering propertizing courses and allocating rights among 
institutions and faculty with regard to critical factors such as the investment made in course 
development; the need to protect rights in the brand of schools and the degrees they confer; and 
other factors. Crucially, labor concerns play into the consideration of rights allocations, such as 
the need to support faculty mobility and the portability of their work, particularly as 
adjunctification becomes prevalent in academia, the rights of faculty to derive reputational 
benefits from courses they have designed, and the long-term needs of faculty to diversify income 
streams in lieu of secure tenure-based salaries. 
 
In the views of some commentators, the practices outlined above represent , or steer perilously 
close to representing, the commodification of education that may clash discordantly with core 
academic values and the instantiation of the university as a constructed cultural commons.27 But 
paradigm shifts in educators must be recognized and accounted for by policymakers. The 
adjunctification of the academy, in which tenure and tenure-track positions are being replaced by 
non-tenured positions, signals one such profound change. Copyright in courses may serve to 
precipitate such a change, or it may merely concretize it in practice.28 These and other possible 
outcomes may be affected by cultural efforts, such as an expressly renewed commitment to 
                                                
27 On commodification, see generally Margaret Jane Radin and Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object 
of Commodification (UC Davis Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16; Stanford Public Law 
Working Paper No. 97, 2004) (reviewing RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN 
LAW & CULTURE, (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams, eds., 2005)); MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED 
COMMODITIES (1996). 
28 Moreover, allocation of copyright can cut both ways: grants of copyright may promote the knowledge 
portability and employee mobility of faculty, or such grants may be withheld in exchange for 
compensation intended to secure faculty longevity at institutions. 
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shared academic values, norms, and cultural priorities and their instantiation in institutional 
practices and policies. Thus, for instance, the development of online courses and pedagogical 
methods for online teaching can be explicitly valued and rewarded with reputational benefits that 
are functionally equivalent to the benefits of publication and scholarship. Academics can also 
affirm commitments to collaborative efforts, commons-like arrangements whereby course 
development and pedagogical insights are exchanged, open access sources and sites that allow 
information, course materials, and other resources are shared, and other ventures that draw upon 
universities’ “culture of openness.”29 
 
In the case of the music industry, I argue that changes to the business model have already begun 
to be put in place, but may be better shaped to fit the contours of the current market. Increased 
returns derived from live performances and related merchandise sales, and relative decreases in 
sales of recorded music, are driving changes in standard music contracts. These contracts should 
expand to encompass rights in new revenue sources, such as online music streaming, delivery of 
music on new devices and via new services, and in new venues.30 Some commentators have 
called for middlemen in the music sector to be eliminated or radically streamlined,31 or declared 
that they will be rendered irrelevant if not obviated by digital technology,32 I argue to the 
contrary that middlemen play an important role in the authentication, appraisal, and marketing of 
music, the identification and nurturing of new talent, and the education of music audiences. 
Moreover, I argue that middlemen such as collective rights organizations (CROs) continue to 
                                                
29 Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as Constructed 
Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365, 381, n. 1 and n.2 (2009); JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE 
IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY: A REEXAMINATION (1992) (considering, reviving and building upon JOHN 
HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED (I.T. Ker ed., 1976) (1852)); 
CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY (5th ed. 2001); Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure 
of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267 
(Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
30 On bolstering the value of music content, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND 
COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008). 
31 W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright,92 IOWA 
L. REV. 835 (2007). 
32 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of 
Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002). 
Bhamati Viswanathan  Creative Copyright 
 
16 
play an important role in the management of music rights, returns, and artists,33 and therefore 
should be supported. In technological terms, the music industry should pursue interoperability of 
music delivery systems and products, which will serve to maximize consumer choice, incentivize 
product sales and facilitate product flows, and promote the development, implementation and 
adaption of socially optimal innovations in the music market. 
 
The music industry may still be besieged by large-scale appropriation of output, but it does have 
some recourse in copyright law.34 Clarification of copyright scope, liberties, and terms of use 
with respect to new uses of musical output, such as snippets, sampling, ringtones, and so on, 
should at once allow expanded use of work while metering royalties where appropriate.35 
Strengthening CROs will further contribute to copyright protections and related actions, enabling 
rightsholders to secure revenue streams in new media and other growing areas of licensing 
activity.36 As more user-generated content (UGC) is created and disseminated via digital 
technologies, CROs will be well-positioned to educate those who both create and consume music 
with respect to the importance of music copyright, as well as the counterweight importance of 
keeping music accessible, whether through facilitated licensing, open access, or systems 
interoperability. Finally, the music industry must reaffirm shared cultural priorities, such as the 
historical value placed on sharing, creative borrowing, collaboration, homage, attribution, and 
other nonproprietary standards and norms. Music, like education, is arguably constructed 
commons,37 with normative foundations that remain predicated upon openness, exchange, and 
                                                
33 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective 
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2002). 
34 I exempt from consideration lawsuits against users, which has generally proven to be costly, uncertain, 
and has run the risk of alienating audiences that are not only consumers of music but also comprise some 
of music’s future creators. Most importantly, it does not appear to have had an appreciable effect on 
music appropriation overall. See generally ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (2010). 
35 See generally ROBERT LEVINE, FREE RIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE 
BUSINESS AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK (2011). 
36 See Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules, supra note 34.  
37 See Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression As A 
Form Of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 (2004); Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons as 
Conversational Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 445-461 (Peter Yu 
ed., 2007); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2001). 
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enrichment of the public weal.38 As music consumers increasingly join the ranks of music 
creators, they present an ideal audience to educate, inform and reach with respect to the value of 
upholding music copyright and playing by its rules. 
 
F. Salient factors 
 
While compelling on their own terms, the fashion, education and music sectors are also 
instructive to other creative content industries, many of which are facing a similar array of 
challenges brought by disruptive innovation in their own sphere of operations. What are the 
salient factors that can be extrapolated from the analysis of these three ecosystems, and how can 
their treatment be understood by creative industries and appropriately applied to their own 
situations? Undertaking this last inquiry, I extract the critical elements that must be considered 
by creative content industries as they construct and tailor their own blend of legal, commercial, 
technological and normative solutions to secure their future productivity and growth. I draw 
liberally from a broad swath of industries, illustrating their particular dilemmas and suggesting 
tailor-made schemes that will afford them both the protections and the stimuli that they require to 
maximize creative output, while at the same time allowing them to preserve the aspects of their 
ecosystem that they most value and seek to sustain. I argue that although truly disrupted by 
recent innovation, the creative content industries should also be aware that new vistas for 
creative flourishing may be opening as well. This Paper offers a useful road map that highlights 
some of the scenery ahead, and suggests that creative content industries should draw on its 
detailed analysis both to navigate the new landscape and to situate themselves in a position that 




In this Paper, I begin in chapters One, Two and Three with an in-depth examination of the three 
creative content industries, fashion, music and education. I then proceed in chapter Four to make 
a contextual analysis of the three industries, situating them at the crossroads of choices that 
involve potential changes to their business models and intellectual property entitlements. I 
                                                
38 See Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?, supra note 37. 
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consider the options that are available, showing the comparative advantages and disadvantages 
that emerge when different choices are made. This leads to the understanding that a tailored 
approach offers an optimal, balanced solution, which can be calibrated to suit the needs of the 
creative content industries in question. In chapter Five, I apply the tailoring approach to each 
industry, offering industry prescriptions that touch respectively on commercial, legal, 
technological and cultural strategies and solutions. The inquiry into these three industries is 
meant to be fine-grained, but also intended to reveal the salient factors that they all must consider 
in making their choices. It is also intended to yield insights into the strategies and solutions that 
are available to, and may be more suitable for, other creative content industries that are similarly 
situated with respect to disruptive changes. In chapter Six, I extrapolate these salient factors, and 
explore their applicability to some of these industries. While by no means meant to be 
comprehensive, this applied inquiry seeks to show that the detailed exploration of tailoring 
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CHAPTER 1: FASHION 
INTRODUCTION 
 
American industries that rely on a host of intellectual property (“IP”) protections are buttressed 
by the standard utilitarian law and policy claim that strong IP provides necessary incentives to 
creative and innovate work, and simultaneously protects against unlawful copying and free-
riding on that work.1 Creative and innovative industries abound as if to prove the point: music, 
film, book publishing, and most scientific and technological innovations exist in IP-rich 
environments. There is, however, a creative industry that is anomalous, generating billions of 
dollars in revenue per year2 while to a great extent lacking in significant IP protection: the 
fashion industry. While U.S. fashion does have some trademark protection in logos, brands, and 
other identifiers, its principle creative element—apparel designs—remains essentially outside the 
protections of IP law.3 Even a cursory overview of the industry reveals a clear dichotomy: while 
trademarks in fashion remain protected by IP, original apparel designs are very frequently 
copied, and those copies are almost instantly disseminated to eager consumers, many of whom 
are as satisfied to own the copied version as the original product. Yet notwithstanding the 
seemingly gaping hole in IP coverage, the fashion industry is thriving, producing vast quantities 
of merchandise—i.e., clothing, accessories, and novelties—that are quickly replaced by 
designers and manufacturers, and just as quickly purchased and replaced by fashion’s customers. 
Moreover, the pace of apparel design remains fluid and swift, demonstrating the flexibility and 
ingenuity of its creators, who are spurred to innovate despite the relative lack of protection 
against copying that IP would otherwise offer. The robustness and fluidity of the fashion market 
therefore poses a conundrum to the conventional wisdom of IP theory, which would dictate that 
creativity founders without standard IP anti-copying laws in place. Famously known as the 
                                                
1 See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 441, 453 (2013) (discussing the utilitarian approach to intellectual property). 
2 C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1147, 1148 & n.1 (2009) (noting that, in 2007, U.S. sales in fashion neared $200 billion, “larger than 
those of books, movies, and music combined”). 
3 See id. at 1177 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 215-16 (2000)) (noting 
that  “secondary meaning is required for trade dress in apparel and other product design”).   
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“piracy paradox,”4 following a seminal article on the fashion industry’s singular practices,5 the 
story of fashion’s success serves to illustrate how creativity can work without being embedded in 
an IP-rich ecosystem. 
An increasing number of legal scholars have become intrigued by the paradox that the fashion 
industry presents. One side of the debate contends that fashion has been ill-served by the lack of 
legal protections in its low-IP regime, and that systematic reform is required to preserve 
incentives for creativity and original design, which are the lifeblood of the industry.6 Proponents 
of enhanced IP protection note that fashion designers stand virtually alone among innovators in 
their vulnerability to the copying and appropriation of their original designs.7 While trademark 
serves to protect the brands that comprise the works of these original designers, no other 
protection safeguards their actual creative product, the garments and styles they generate year 
after year. The argument for enhanced protection stands on grounds of fairness to innovators, 
incentives to promote their innovations, and a kind of equivalency with other fields that are IP-
rich. If music and film, to take just two instances, enjoy strong IP protections for their creative 
output, why should fashion not merit the same coverage of its underlying creative work? 
Proponents of change would argue that the only reason—and a weak one at that—lies in the 
historical oversight of fashion that is so anomalous, and arguably outdated, as to deserve 
reconsideration and, in light of present-day practices, substantial reform.8 
On the other side of the debate, advocates of maintaining fashion’s low-IP regime point to the 
status quo, arguing that there are ample incentives for creativity among original designers and 
                                                
4 See generally James Surowieki, The Piracy Paradox, NEW YORKER (Sept. 24, 2007), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/09/24/the-piracy-paradox.  
5 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). 
6 See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 82 (2008) 
(noting that U.S. IP “provides at best partial protection for innovative articles of clothing and 
accessories”); Samson Vermont, The Dubious Legal Rationale for Denying Copyright to Fashion, 21 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 89, 91 (2013) (noting that concerns advanced by supporters of thin IP protections 
in the fashion industry are “unwarranted in light of the experience of countries that protect clothing”). 
7 Vermont, supra note 6, at 91 (noting that copyright protection extends to other utilitarian works, “such 
as computer code, blueprints, and technical manuals”). 
8 See id. 
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measurable evidence of growth in the industry overall.9 This position is supported by several 
prominent legal commentators,10 but is also joined by many in the fashion industry who have 
either openly sided with copyists or tacitly given permission to copying by holding back any 
protests they might otherwise express through lobbying or other means of action.11 It is notable 
that while fashion designers and retailers will go to great lengths to secure, protect, and promote 
their exclusive, trademarked brands and logos, they will not make such efforts to keep their 
original designs equally secure. While the initial sketches may be kept under wraps, of course, 
designers will shrug when their three-dimensional versions are showed as actual apparel on the 
runways and racks and are almost immediately photographed, circulated, and appropriated 
thereafter. Moreover, while they may bemoan design copying, original designers will just as 
soon praise the act of “homage,” or tribute, that appropriation signifies within the industry.12 
Indeed, even outright copying, when granted due attribution, is often seen as an important facet 
of a designer’s oeuvre—her ability to appropriate cleverly, to “re-work” original designs into 
striking derivative work, and even her copies, whether outright or playfully tweaked, are all 
considered fully as valuable as the original work on which they riff. The significance of copying 
as an art form in itself cannot be understated in the fashion world; and its centrality very 
probably plays an important role in keeping the low-IP equilibrium of fashion in place. This 
stands in marked contrast to the wholesale condemnation of counterfeiting or “piracy” with 
                                                
9  See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1698; see also id. at 1720 (discussing how copying adds to 
the original’s vaue).  
10 See e.g., id.; see also Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act: Hearing on H.R. 2511 
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 75 (2011) (testimony of Christopher Sprigman, Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia School of Law); Ezra Klein, Copycats v. Copyrights, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 20, 2010), 
http://www.newsweek.com/copycats-vs-copyrights-71361. 
11 See, e.g., Lauren Milligan, Why Balmain’s Designer Loves Zara Copies, VOGUE (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/2014/07/28/olivier-rousteing-on-zara-copies-and-rihanna-the-new-naomi. 
In the Vogue article, Olivier Rousteing was quoted as saying:  
I think it was Coco Chanel who said if you're original, be ready to be copied . . . . I love 
seeing a Zara window with my clothes mixed with Céline and Proenza! I think that's 
genius. It's even better than what I do! I love the styling, I love the story… I watch the 
windows always, and it's genius what they do today. They go fast, they have a great sense 
of styling and how to pick up what they have to pick up from designers. I'm really happy 
that Balmain is copied - when I did my Miami collection and we did the black and white 
checks, I knew they would be in Zara and H&M. But they did it in a clever way - they 
mixed a Céline shape with my Balmain print! Well done! I love that. 
Id. 
12 See id. 
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respect to the copying of brands, logos, and other industry trademarks. Clearly even low-IP 
advocates consider fashion trademarks to be vital industry protections.13 But the protection of 
original designs meets with far more mixed reactions, even on the part of those who stand to be 
undercut by practices that might, in other creative industries, be deemed infringing upon the 
exclusive rights of their originators.14 
What accounts for the tolerance, unique among creative industries, accorded to appropriation in 
the fashion world? Why do original works of fashion receive far less IP protection in than in 
most of the major content-rich industries, and why does the fashion industry thrive despite its 
low levels of IP? And how does fashion continue to attract the investment, and to command the 
returns on investment, that are required for its ongoing innovation in original design? This 
paradox, which stands in such striking contrast to the conventional wisdom that high IP is 
required for creative content industries, lies at the core of the fashion industry. But it also serves 
to illuminate the complexities of IP itself, and to point the way to a greater understanding of the 
parameters of IP and the calibration of IP levels required to optimize growth in creative fields. 
In this chapter, I explore the creative cycles of fashion and seek to explain how a low-IP regime 
actually buttresses the industry’s vibrancy and growth. I argue that while innovation in the form 
of original fashion designs is a main driver of the industry’s economic success, follow-on 
appropriation of these designs, either through outright copying or through derivative “re-
working,” functions as an ancillary stimulus to its performance. In other words, appropriation in 
fashion does not undermine the sales of original works; rather, it generates a separate stream of 
sales and revenues that capitalize on the appeal of the larger trend put into place by the original 
designers. The relationship may be said to be symbiotic, rather than parasitic—for the later 
works make their appeal, and their sales, to another segment of the fashion marketplace. Thus, 
copying in fashion actually benefits the originators of creative work, and at the same time 
promotes innovation in the industry. This unexpected return, called the “piracy paradox” by its 
                                                
13 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1700.  
14 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.  
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early, distinguished commentators, may not be unique to fashion15, but it is vividly illuminated 
by fashion’s rapid and ongoing cycles of innovation, change, and creative renewal. 
I begin this chapter by casting a quick overview of the fashion industry. I consider the division of 
its marketplace into the “fashion pyramid,” and describe the process by which original designs 
are generated at the top of the pyramid and then trickle down through its layers until the lowest 
levels of mass-marketing are reached. In the course of this process, the original designs created 
at the start of a given fashion cycle will be subject to the industry-wide practice of design 
copying, and it is the design copies that will disseminate through the rank-and-file of fashion’s 
consumers. I outline the rudiments of design copying, and distinguish design copying from the 
somewhat similar but wholly distinct practice of trademark copying in the form of “counterfeits” 
or “knock-offs.” In this regard, one vital distinction is that while original designs are not 
protected by IP, brand names, logos, and symbols are indeed protected by trademark law, and are 
therefore subject to very different treatment in practice and at law.16  
I continue by delving into the two key aspects of the fashion industry—induced obsolescence 
and anchoring—that together secure its stability, and its success, while yet retaining its low-IP 
regime. These characteristics of the fashion industry rely, and indeed are predicated upon, the 
dual nature of the fashion industry’s wares: on the one hand, fashion styles are cyclical—they 
come into the forefront of consumers’ attention, and then become perceived as stale and passé, 
and eventually require replacement by the next, newest styles; and on the other hand, fashion 
goods are at least partially positional, or based in the perceived relative status by consumers. I 
show that these dual features contribute to fashion’s ongoing vitality, not only promoting the 
continual creation of original designs but also bolstering the generation of follow-on designs. 
Perhaps contrary to expectation, these practices of creation and copying enhance the well-being 
of fashion’s designers and retailers, and are thus tolerated without recourse to IP protections 
against appropriation and infringement of original works. I explore, but eventually reject, other 
possible rationales for the low-IP regime of fashion, such as (i) the structure of copyright 
                                                
15 I later explore analogous creative industries that share the low-IP, high-copying ecosystem of fashion 
and that, similarly, not only survive but are also able to thrive. 
16 Trademark protection, however, is generally outside the scope of my discussion. 
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doctrine in U.S. law; (ii) collective action problems; (iii) first-mover advantage; and (iv) rival, 
conflicted interests between fashion designers and fashion retailers. 
Lastly, I ask whether the low-IP regime of fashion is likely to withstand the current challenges it 
faces in light of technological changes that are likely to accelerate the fashion’s cyclicality, and 
to put pressure on original designers through ever more rapid, accurate, and potentially 
undermining appropriation. I concede that such practices may well heighten the fashion curve for 
original designers, but I argue that inherent to the creation of fashion trends is a much-needed lag 
period, in which trends emerge and are secured, and that this pause will continue to give original 
designers sufficient time to enjoy the full benefits of exclusivity and first sale. I further note that 
some of the salient features in fashion, such as the importance of reputational capital and the 
power of “homage,” the shared interest of designers and retailers in perpetuating style and trend 
cycles, and so on, together contribute to preserving fashion’s stability and vitality in the low-IP 
equilibrium that has been its preferred setting both historically and currently. 
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
 
The global apparel17 market is estimated at $1.11 trillion, of which approximately 20.5% are 
U.S. based18. The market for fashion is global, but its creative centers still cluster around a 
handful of cities in the U.S., Europe, and to a lesser extent Japan.19 Production of apparel has 
traditionally been splintered, with craftsmanship centered in European and American locales, and 
larger-scale production moving among labor markets featuring fast and cheap production, mostly 
in the developing world.20 Fluidity of wages in global labor markets, however, can make it hard 
                                                
17 The working definition of “apparel” comprises apparel, accessories, and “notions,” collectively. It is 
used interchangeably with “garment(s).” 
18 See Size of the Global Apparel Market in 2012, by Region (in Billion U.S. Dollars, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/279735/global-apparel-market-size-by-region. 
19 See id. 
20 GARY GEREFFI & OLGA MEMEDOVIC, U.N. IND. DEV. ORG., THE GLOBAL APPAREL VALUE CHAIN: 
WHAT PROSPECTS FOR UPGRADING BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/Pub_free/Global_apparel_value_chain.pdf  
(noting that apparel companies in the Western world “generally design and/or market—but do not 
make—the branded products they order”).  
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to follow where fashion production is located, as a constant search for cheaper production is one 
of the constants in the industry.21 
The fashion industry is relatively hierarchical in structure, and its designers and producers have 
been described as a falling into a “fashion pyramid” that is somewhat fluid yet well delineated.22 
The top category of designers create haute couture, singular pieces that typically entail extremely 
precise design, meticulous craftsmanship, and that strive for the highest standards of skill, 
originality and aesthetic appeal. These few pieces of work will represent the top designers’ acme 
of achievement, and they are both scrutinized for their creativity and critiqued for their strength 
of statement. Necessarily requiring great efforts to be crafted, the pieces themselves are, like 
other forms of artwork, usually purchased by wealthy individuals at very high prices; yet unlike 
artwork, some of these pieces will be commissioned as custom clothing, and worn by more than 
one customer. While haute couture sets the standard for fashion, it is by definition limited to the 
highest set, the “haute” consumer. Its bellwether is imitated, often skillfully but on a much lower 
scale of production, by designer ready-to-wear clothing, or prêt-à-porter. Thanks in part to lower 
manufacturing costs, the mass-market producers are able to generate far greater volume of these 
off-the-rack clothes, which are disseminated to customers hungry for style but more limited in 
funds than the top-level clients of haute couture. At the same time, haute couture producers are 
eager to reach these large volume clients as well, and not just through imitations but through 
offering access to the “real thing.” Hence, many designers will produce second lines of bridge 
collections or prestige collections—that is, limited-run works that they create specifically to 
appeal to the mass-market customer. These works are not as meticulously crafted as their finest 
counterparts, but they often display much of the originality and flair of the designers’ work, and 
can often enhance the designers’ prestige while expanding their visibility and renown among the 
consumer masses. Both these tiers of design will be imitated, with greater or lesser success, at 
the next lower level of fashion, in which even larger mass-marketing of apparel occurs at even 
more moderate prices. Lastly, apparel sold as a basic commodity can either strive for a modicum 
of fashion flair, or can merely serve as purely functional wear. 
                                                
21 See, e.g., Kevin Hamlin et. al., Ethiopia Becomes China’s China in Search Labor, BLOOMBERG (July 
22, 2014, 5:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-22/ethiopia-becomes-china-s-
china-in-search-for-cheap-labor. 
22 See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Privacy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1693.  
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There are a few constant features to the fashion pyramid: for one, prices generally track the level 
of fashion design. This is logical, as the top tier of production entails an enormous amount of 
creative effort, craftsmanship, and labor, as well as costly materials and elaborate settings. The 
corollary to this rule is that while top tier fashion strives for originality and vision, it appears to 
exhaust its creative appeal quite quickly, moving from the startling to the accepted in very short 
order. Thus, like the legendary phoenix, it flares, burns out quickly, and is forced to arise from its 
own ashes. In other words, it is marked by high design turnover and creative churn.  Competition 
in the design industry is particularly fierce, and more than in many other creative industries, the 
window for lying fallow and re-stoking creative juices is minimal, if it exists at all. Moreover, 
designers are under enormous market pressures, as their works must appeal to high consumers—
who buy few works at high prices, but not usually enough to pay the bills—and to mass-market 
consumers—who buy moderately priced works that have become popular, but who are choosing 
among an array of designers and trends. They must retain their “snob appeal” yet ideally become 
known to, and revered among, the masses. Their works may not last an entire season, but they 
must sell seasonally, and they must retain their appeal after a season ends. This creates a 
particularly frantic air to the fashion industry that, while perhaps not escaped by other creative 
fields, sets design turnover at the heart of production, consumption, and industry churn. 
Another well-known feature of the fashion industry is the cyclical nature of its flow of goods and 
patterns of consumption.23 Annually, top fashion design firms release their newest goods in a 
series of seasonal collections, or runway shows, and each season is marked by clothes that are to 
be consumed and worn during the successive season. Thus, for instance, a winter collection will 
showcase “cruise wear,” or clothing to be worn in warm and summery climes; likewise, a spring 
collection will display the garments of fall through early winter. Fashion followers accept the 
conventions of the collections, recognizing that the early releases function in part as signals that 
indicate what styles and designs, and indeed what trends, will be widely adopted and worn in the 
near future. Hard on the heels of the release of the runway shows, mass-market or “ready-to-
wear” producers will issue recognizably similar apparel that is intended to capture the signatures 
and trends of the season—as established by the top design firms—but that are also constructed to 
make the apparel more affordable to the average customer. Those pieces that appeal most to 
                                                
23 See id. at 1722.  
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consumers may be issued many times, sometimes with minor “tweaks” or adjustments to keep 
them fresh, appealing and, most importantly, differentiated (even to the most minor degree) from 
the originals. The trendiest pieces will soon issue from the lowest-end producers, such as 
massive department stores and discount stores, again with some variation in style, as well as in 
the construction of the garment. Finally, as the apparel of the season begins to lose its initial 
luster, the pieces will begin to appear at numerous locations (both high and low) on sales racks 
and at marked-down prices. The prices will continue to fall, as retailers at every level must clear 
out their racks to accommodate the next wave of fashion apparel. Thus, while the popularity of 
any one collection might vary greatly, the overall cycle is sure to continue and to keep customers 
awaiting with alacrity the next, newest batch.24 
The fashion industry is characterized by a relative lack of vertical integration among entities, 
such that design, production, distribution and sales are generally not clustered under the same 
corporate umbrella; and such entities tend to vary in size, output and sales.25 While firms may 
cluster at the high or low end, there are only a handful of conglomerates, such as LMVH and a 
few others in the field. Neither these clusters nor the conglomerates, however, represent a major 
share of total industry output. Indeed, the fashion industry is remarkably atomized, and stands in 
stark contrast to many other creative content-rich industries, such as music, publishing and film, 
in which a relatively small number of entities are responsible for generating a large share of total 
industry output.26 And yet, contrary to expectation, the fashion industry has persisted in 
maintaining a low level of IP protection across its ranks. 
This low level of IP protection presents an interesting challenge to conventional IP theory. It is 
generally accepted economic wisdom that concentrated markets allow firms to operate with 
relatively low levels of IP protection.27 This prevails especially when firms have non-IP based 
kinds of market power—such as preferred access to distributors, or dominant market position—
                                                
24 See infra note 102 and accompanying text. Greg Petro, Retailer/Designer Collaborations—The Missing 
Link, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregpetro/2013/02/28/retailerdesigner-
collaborations-the-missing-link/. 
25 See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1725 n.74.  
26 See id. at 1695.  
27 Id. 
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that allow them to reap the benefits of their work without being undermined by free-riders.28 In 
highly concentrated industries, such as music, publishing and film, it would be expected that 
firms could operate without needing strong IP levels to protect their innovative work. And yet 
quite the contrary is true: these industries have secured strong IP protections, while the relatively 
atomized fashion industry, for which conventional economic wisdom would prescribe those 
same protections, continues to operate in a much lower IP regime.29 This has been famously 
dubbed the “piracy paradox” by a pair of leading scholars who were among the first to examine 
the fashion industry, and who sought to explain its flourishing in a low-IP setting.30 And this 
piracy paradox, lying at the heart of the fashion industry, also lies at the heart of how we think of 
IP itself and what its proper distribution of protection and freedom can and should be. 
II. COPYING IN THE FASHION INDUSTRY 
A. Early Efforts Against Design Copying: Fashion Industry Guilds 
 
Historically, design copying has been rampant in the fashion industry. In an international 
context, U.S. firms long engaged in deliberate copying of European fashions, on occasion with 
the tacit consent of the firms being copied, as long as a toll could be extracted for the copies 
being made.31 Fashion industry histories trace these practices well into the turn of the twentieth 
century, and they prevailed through mid-century, as in the famous instance of copies of Princess 
Grace Kelly of Monaco’s bridal gown issuing a mere two days after it appeared at the royal 
wedding.32 In the domestic context, design copying arose virtually concomitantly with the 
emergence of the apparel trade itself, and secured a strong foothold in those department stores, 
such as Filene’s Basement, dedicated to the mass-market reproduction and sale of high level 
creations.33 By the 1950s, “style piracy” was universally acknowledged as an industry-wide 
                                                
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
30 Id.at 1717.  
31 See id. at 1695-96 (noting that “Seventh Avenue has a long, rich tradition of knocking off European 
designs”).  
32 Ruth La Ferla, Waiting for the Dress, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/fashion/24knockoff.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
33 See First Off-Price Store (1909), CELEBRATE BOSTON, http://www.celebrateboston.com/first/off-price-
store.htm.  
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practice, and if it was not outright condemned, it was certainly reproved as undermining the 
efforts of high-end designers and their fashion houses.34 
The earliest response to domestic copying in the fashion industry came swift on the heels of the 
industry’s emergence as a burgeoning marketplace. In 1932, the industry organized the Fashion 
Originators’ Guild, which registered American designers and their work product, including 
sketches and prototypes of their works.35 The Guild sought to compel major retailers to boycott 
known copyists, and to police design piracy among both outsiders and its own members.36 
Retailers and manufacturers were induced to sign a “declaration of cooperation,” binding them 
exclusively to the use and sale of original creations. Those who did not abide by the terms of the 
declaration were subject to boycott, or “red-carding.”37 The Guild also imposed severe penalties 
and fines on those members that transacted business with non-compliant retailers and 
merchants.38 
The Fashion Originators’ Guild enjoyed considerable success at thwarting industry-wide 
copying, particularly among its members.39 However, its practices also came to the attention of 
U.S. antitrust authorities, culminating in a lawsuit that reached the Supreme Court in 1941.40 In 
its decision of that year, Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, the Court 
held the Guild’s practices to be unlawful, constituting unfair competition and a violation of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts.41 The Court rejected the Guild’s argument that its practices were 
                                                
34 See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1696 (discussing a book published in 
1951 addressing the issue of “style piracy”).  
35 Sara B. Marcketti & Jean L. Parsons, Design Piracy and Self-Regulation: The Fashion Originators’ 
Guild of America, 1932-1941, 7 (Iowa State Uni., Digital Repository), available at 
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=aeshm_pubs.  
36 Id. at 10. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comment on The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design 2 (Uni. of  Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 328, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959727; see also 
Robert P. Merges, From  Medieval Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability 
Institutions, and Innovation 18-21 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch., Conference on the Legal History of 
Intellectual Property, Working Paper, 2004), available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=661543 (noting that 
successful guilds created the potential to foster innovation because of the incentives they provided).   
40 Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 668 (1941). 
41 Id. at 708.  
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“reasonable and necessary to protect the manufacturer, laborer, retailer and consumer against the 
devastating evils growing from the pirating of original designs and had in fact benefited from all 
four.”42 
Concomitantly, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) successfully prosecuted, and thence 
terminated, the Millinery Creators’ Guild, which had united the designers of women’s hats 
against widespread copying of its millinery designs.43 The U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the FTC’s position against the Millinery Guild, and despite acknowledging that the guild 
had in fact successfully impeded the copying of the hat designs of its members, the Court 
concluded that its solution was ultimately untenable and, indeed, unlawful under U.S. antitrust 
laws.44 Interestingly, the Court based its position in the argument that fashion designs presented 
too small a modicum of “originality” to merit copyright or protection.45 
At their inception, the American fashion guilds of the early twentieth century created a rather 
successful impediment to industry-wide practices of design copying.46 Their practices served as 
an effective substitute for formal IP rights and protections, until they ran athwart of the U.S. 
antitrust laws.47 As demonstrated by Robert Merges, the guilds differed from formal IP rights in 
fashion design only in a few respects: (i) the guilds based their practices on “an informal, inter-
                                                
42 Id.  
43 Millinery Creators’ Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 469, 472 (1941). 
44 Millinery Creators’ Guild v. FTC, 109 F.2d 175, 177 (1940).  
45 Id. (noting that “[a]n ‘original’ creation is too slight a modification of a known idea to justify the grant 
by the government of a monopoly to the creator”). It is interesting that the “originality” requirement in 
copyright law has historically tended to be relatively de minimus. Adam R. Tarosky, The 
Constitutionality of WIPO’s Broadcasting Treaty: The Originality and Limited Times Requirements of the 
Copyright Clause, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, at 7. Protection has been ceded to databases and 
accounting rosters, both of which have contained only a modicum of originality. See Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Met. Regional Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home 
Realty Network, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 691, 704-705 (D. Md. 2012) (citing 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(5)). In 
fashion, however, it has been argued that the aspect that might make design original—such as the cut of a 
shoe, or the drape of a sleeve—would not be original enough to merit protection. The reason for this 
apparent discrepancy is not at all clear, but some commentators argue that a certain skepticism regarding 
fashion’s creativity may underlie the different treatments. See Hemphill & Suk, supra note 2, at 1160-61; 
Scafidi, supra note 6, at 85-86.  
46 At any rate, the American fashion makers were not very concerned with the international context, 
perhaps because for the most part it was the Americans doing the copying there. See Raustiala & 
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1734 (noting that the Guild permitted copying of 
European designs).  
47 See generally Picker, supra note 39.  
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industry, quasi-property right, rather than a formal statutory right;” (ii) the guilds “required 
concerted action to achieve any appropriability;” and (iii) the guilds “concentrated [their] 
enforcement efforts at the retail level by requiring retailers to sign contracts and by policing 
retailers, rather than targeting competing manufacturers.”48 
Yet while the early U.S. fashion guilds presented an seemingly viable alternative enforcement 
mechanism to formalized IP rights and protections in their fight against design copying, they 
were effectively functioning as cartels, and were soon shut down under U.S. antitrust laws. Since 
their demise, no effective substitute—including a regime of formal IP rights—has arisen in 
American fashion design and fashion designs remain unprotected by law and in practice. A 
resurgence in copying has marked the fashion industry, and although it has become global in 
scope, it still runs rampant in domestic markets and among designers at every level of the trade. 
B. Design Copying After the Demise of the Fashion Guilds 
1. Fashion’s Low-IP Equilibrium 
 
Although the fashion industry remains rife with examples of design copying, a few of which will 
be detailed below, its response has historically been not to lobby concertedly for action, but 
rather to struggle internally for control over the renegade actors, and to ensure that their works, 
while sold, are not mistaken for originals and valued as such.49 This apparent quiescence, in the 
face of both unceasing design copying on the one hand, and ever-expanding IP regimes in other 
                                                
48 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5 ,at 1698 (quoting Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability 
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1364 
(1996)).  
49 The current proposed legislation is the first real thrust at formal, across-the-board regulation of copying 
since the guilds. See Katherine Boyle, Fashion Industry Testifies in Favor of Design Copyright 
Protections (Again), WASH. POST (July 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-
blog/post/fashion-industry-testifies-in-favor-of-design-copyright-protections-
again/2011/07/18/gIQAd2MuLI_blog.html. However, this proposed legislation has been, and remains, 
highly controversial within the field, and by no means can it be said that there is a general consensus that 
this is the appropriate response to industry-wide copying. See id. Unlike trademark protection, which 
enjoys widespread acceptance and even approval among fashion industry insiders, the anti-copying thrust 
of the proposed legislation has its vocal detractors, which accounts in part for its protracted progress to 
ratification. 
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comparable creative industries on the other hand, seems virtually unique to the industry, at least 
among its peers. 
This stasis in the face of changing IP practices in turn highlights an important feature of fashion: 
its “low-IP equilibrium.”50 In other words, the industry is distinguished by the relatively low 
levels of IP protection accorded to its fashion designs sufficient to maintain its overall 
equilibrium.51 The three central areas of IP—copyright, patent, and trademark—vary widely in 
the rights and protections they extend to industry participants. Together, they amount to a fairly 
modest measure of coverage, and yet this low level of IP has remained surprisingly stable since 
the demise of the guilds. We begin examining this apparent discrepancy, so counter to standard 
IP reasoning, by considering each of the main areas of IP in the fashion context. 
a. Copyright 
Why is fashion essentially left unprotected by copyright law? We know it stands outside 
copyright’s shelter because copying has been an issue in the industry, and the early guilds that 
arose in the United States were organized specifically to thwart its march through the industry 
when IP was unavailable to intervene.52 Further, following the demise of the guilds, copying has 
persisted in some industry practices, yet copyright protection remains inaccessible. Further still, 
we know of no provision that specifically exempts fashion from copyright law. However, a 
perusal of fashion’s case history reveals that it has been treated doctrinally as falling outside the 
purview of copyright due to a critical conjunction of its practical and expressive aspects. Broadly 
speaking, copyright doctrine denies its rights and protection to the class of “useful articles,” that 
is, concrete objects in which creative expression is melded with, and inseparable from, the 
practical utility of the object. Thus, for instance, furniture, fixtures,53 architecture, as well as 
                                                
50 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1699.  
51 Id. 
52 See supra notes 35-48 and accompanying text.  
53 See, e.g., Bel Air Lighting, Inc. v. Progressive Lighting, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-2822-TWT, 2010 WL 
966422 (Mar. 15, 2010, N.D. Ga.).  
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uniforms54 and other apparel, have been deemed by the courts to be simultaneously, and 
indivisibly, practical and expressive, and therefore outside copyrights’ domain.55 
b. Trademark/Trade Dress 
Trademark is very valuable to the apparel industry, as it serves to protect and preserve the 
identity of fashion brands—particularly the distinctive, recognizable brands of firms that operate 
at the top of the fashion pyramid—and to maintain their prestige against potentially encroaching 
competitors. Many fashion firms invest considerable resources into protecting their brands 
against two threats to their profitability: the overuse of licensing and overexposure due to 
excessive licensing,56 and the counterfeiting of trademarks that undermines the valuable 
signaling aspect of the brand.57 Trademark infringement cases involving apparel and accessories 
involve obvious violations of law, in which counterfeiters are alleged to pass off and sell goods 
bearing a protected trademark. These cases may be contrasted, however, with more gray area 
practices, such as the licit practice of creating and selling “knockoffs.” This illegal practice of 
passing off counterfeit goods must, however, be distinguished from its counterpart, the wholly 
legal practice of creating and selling “knockoffs,” goods that imitate the design and style of a 
product without strictly copying the product itself. While knockoffs are somewhat controversial 
within the industry—hewing, as many of them do, extremely closely to the original product—
they are also accepted in practice, and indeed comprise the bulk of many mid-tier, mass-market 
producers, such as H&M, Zara, and others.58 Counterfeiting, to the contrary, is fought tooth and 
nail in the industry, and many of the top level firms have devised elaborate measures, as well as 
                                                
54 See, e.g., Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005).  
55 There are, admittedly, some minor exceptions to this rule.  
56 See Suzy Menkee, Fashion Houses Move to Tighten Brand Control: A License to Kill, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 4, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/04/style/04iht-flicense.2.t.html (arguing that “it is 
impossible to protect the brand if you have too many licenses); also see, e.g., Christina Passariello, Pierre 
Cardin Ready to Sell His Overstreched Label, WALL ST. J., 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704547604576263541408680576 (last updated May 2, 
2011) (describing Pierre Cardin’s business practice as “the extreme of fashion licensing” and noting that 
his business strategy diluted his image).   
57 See Chavie Lieber, Why the $600 Billion Counterfeit Industry Is Still Horrible for Fashion, RACKED 
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.racked.com/2014/12/1/7566859/counterfeit-fashion-goods-products-museum-
exhibit. 
58 See, e.g., Alexandra Jacobs, Where Have I Seen You Before? At Zara, in Midtown, It’s All a Tribute, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/fashion/at-zara-in-midtown-its-all-a-
tribute.html.  
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brought extensive lawsuits, to try to stave off the unauthorized imitating of their marks and 
undermining of their brand.59 
While knockoffs do not present the clear-cut case of infringement that counterfeits entail, many 
designers of knockoffs will borrow liberally from the more striking design features of a creative 
fashion designer’s original works. Naturally, the protection afforded by trademark law to 
knockoffs is limited in scope only to the aspect of the garment or accessory that falls under its 
purview, such a brand, logo, or distinctive mark..60 For instance, the interlocking, reversed “Cs” 
on the Chanel brand is highly distinctive, and readily merits trademark protection; while similar, 
the repeating “Cs” of the Coach brand, in a notably different typeface and style, are distinctive 
enough to receive protection as well.61 Many brands like Chanel and Coach, having established 
their logos as both recognizable and desirable to their customers, are increasingly featuring these 
marks—in varying permutations, and varying degrees of prominence—on the outside of their 
apparel and accessories.62 In the case of these brands, the logos are such a significant and integral 
part of the product’s design that they cannot be appropriated without giving rise to a strong case 
of trademark infringement. To a great extent, then, trademark law would most likely protect the 
logos, and the products they embellish, against design copying.63 However, these cases represent 
only a fraction of the fashion industry’s output. In most instances, firms will place their 
trademarks in less visible locations, such as on an inner garment tag, a button, or a hidden label. 
In the case of these goods, trademark law will not protect against design copying, since the 
                                                
59 See, e.g., Ashley Lutz, Coach Has Dealt a Massive Blow to Internet Counterfeiters, BUS. INSIDER 
(Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/coach-wins-257-million-counterfeit-suit-2012-11; Erin 
Shea, Gucci Files Suit Against Counterfeit Sites, Protects Brand Image, LUXURY DAILY (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.luxurydaily.com/gucci-files-suit-against-counterfeit-sites-protects-brand-image/. See 
generally Lizzie Crocker, The Big Business of Fashion Counterfeits, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 24, 2014), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/24/the-big-business-of-fashion-counterfeits.html; Laura 
Moss, Welcome to fakeBay: How eBay ‘Designer’ Bargains Are Just Too Good To Be True, DAILY MAIL, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-558253/Welcome-fakeBay-How-eBays-designer-bargains-just-
good-true.html. 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Chong Lam, 677 F.3d 190 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming the lower court’s 
holding that defendant infringed on Burberry’s distinctive plaid pattern). 
61 Other examples include the Burberry plaid and the Tiffany’s trademarked turquoise blue shade. See Joe 
Mont, Tiffany Blue: The Color of Money, THE STREET (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.thestreet.com/story/ 
10977632/1/tiffany-blue-the-color-of-money.html; Erin White, Protecting the Real Plaid From a Lineup 
of Fakes, WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2003), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB105226424980720300.  
62 Note the case of the red Louboutin sole and its limitations, as determined in the recent case of 
Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent. 696 F.3d 206, 224 (2013).  
63 Trademark law’s protection is not without limits, however. See, e.g. id. 
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trademark will not seem an integral part of the products’ design. Thus, trademark offers only a 
limited scope of defense against design copying for the industry as a whole. 
Design copying in the fashion industry may also fall under the purview of trade dress, a 
component of trademark law that has been expanded over time to encompass product design64 
and even the “total image of a product.”65 In theory, trade dress may well be expansive enough to 
embrace fashion design; however, like copyright, it may also offer only a limited remedy at best, 
applying only to the non-functional elements of a product.66 But trade dress adds another 
requirement: it protects those design elements that are not merely adornment, but that are also 
“source designating.” 
Few design elements in apparel are likely to meet the “source designating” requirement, as noted 
by the Second Circuit in Knitwaves.67 In that case, the court explicitly pointed out that “[a]s 
Knitwaves’ objective in the two sweater designs was primarily aesthetic, the designs were not 
primarily intended as source identification.”68 Moreover, in the words of the Supreme Court, 
virtually any fashion design that does clear the threshold of source designation “almost 
invariably serves purposes other than source identification.”69 To raise the bar for trade dress 
protection, the Court held that product designers—including but not limited to fashion 
designers—must show that the design has acquired “secondary meaning” under trademark law.70 
This standard must be met by a showing that “in the minds of the public, the primary 
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the 
product itself.”71 
                                                
64 See Jeff Resnick, Comment, Trade Dress Law: The Conflicts Between Product Design and Product 
Packaging, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 253, 264 (2002) (discussing Supreme Court decisions involving product 
design). 
65 Nowadays, trade dress refers to “the total image, design and appearance of a product and may include 
features such a size, shape, color, color combinations, texture and graphics.” Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. 
Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). 
66 See e.g., Qualitex v. Jacobson Products, 514 U.S. 159 (1995).  
67 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).  
68 Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1009. 
69 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).  
70 Id. at 214.  
71 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). 
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This standard significantly restricts the possibility that a given fashion design will obtain trade 
dress protection, since most fashion consumers are unlikely to recognize design elements as 
identified with a given brand. Perhaps in the rare case of highly individuated brands, and highly 
sophisticated consumers, such a confluence occurs—there are “fashionistas” who will instantly 
recognize the sinuous weave and silken wool threads of a Missoni dress—but those instances are 
hardly sufficient to bring trade dress protection to the forefront of the fashion industry. At 
present, therefore, it seems clear that trade dress is not likely to avail fashion designers whose 
works are subject to design copying. 
c. Patent 
Patent law extends protection for “design patents”—which can in theory encompass new fashion 
designs—defined as “new, original, and ornamental design[s] for an article of manufacture.”72 In 
practice, the design patent offers, at best, limited protection to fashion design. 
The first impediment to affording wider protection through patent law is that the design patent 
provision only affords protection to works that are indeed “new,” and not to works that can be 
traced back to prior designs.73 This is an exacting, often impossible, standard for fashion design 
to reach, since fashion itself builds upon an extremely rich and long-standing heritage of prior 
work, and since fashion designers most often hearken back, either allusively or directly, to these 
earlier works even in their latest creations. It is astonishingly hard even to think of a garment that 
is truly novel—for instance, the iconic “wraparound” dress brought to prominence by Diane Von 
Furstenberg in the 1970s74 was well-preceded by many a silk wraparound dress in previous eras. 
While Von Furstenberg’s refinements are thought by many to have brought the dress to a new 
level of protection, it would probably not be considered “novel” by even its most ardent 
advocates—and it would most likely not qualify for design patent protection under the exacting 
novelty standards of patent law today. 
Further, as is well known, filing for patent protection is a costly and time-consuming process; 
and it is a process ill-suited to a fast-changing field that sees products become obsolescent in a 
                                                
72 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012). The term of protection is fourteen years. Id. § 173. 
73 See id. § 171(a). 
74 The Seventies, DIANE VON FUSTENBERG, http://www.dvf.com/timeline-70s.html .  
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mere season, a matter of months rather than years. Given the uncertainty that a design patent 
would even be issued, and the high costs involved, it is not a form of protection that might appeal 
to the fashion industry as a permanent, effective solution to the swift and inexorable design 
copying that seems so pervasive today. 
III. THE “PIRACY PARADOX” 
A. Induced Obsolescence 
 
Apparel and accessories are categorized by economists as “positional goods,”—goods whose 
value inheres in no small part in the status and worth that is conferred upon them by others (i.e., 
those who do not actually own them).75 Positional goods attain a special significance by their 
place in the social order: those who own them signal their heightened status by purchasing and 
displaying their ownership of these goods, and those who covet them affirm the desirability of 
the goods, and thence the consequence of their owners.76 Embedded firmly in the social context, 
the value of positional goods is fundamentally relative, for it fluctuates in relation to what 
members of society consume and how they regard what is being consumed, displayed and 
desired.77 
But positional goods are often two-sided, in that their value is not exactly directly proportional to 
the nature or scope of their ownership.78 There is a point of diminishing returns, at which the 
value of such a good diminishes when “too many” people know about it, own it, or have access 
                                                
75 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, at 1718-19.  
76 There exist some two-sided positional goods that simply increase in value as their use becomes more 
widespread. Id. at 1719 n.61. These goods are, broadly speaking, subject to positive externalities and 
network effects. Id. Thus, for example, mobile telephones have become increasingly valuable—and 
although perhaps slightly less after extensive distribution, there is no point in which their positional value 
has diminished due to extensive dissemination in the market. The Apple iPhone interestingly blurs this 
distinction, however, as it is clearly considered positional in some circles and definitely enjoyed a certain 
cachet at its inception. As its use has become extremely widespread, however, its status seems to have lost 
some of its luster among early adopters, and the fervor for its progeny has somewhat cooled among the 
self-styled “hardcore Apple fans.” Even in the case of more “ordinary” two-sided positional goods, then, 
there might be a point at which market saturation triggers a loss of positional value and a reduction of the 
products’ value to mere utility and/or commodity levels. 
77 Id. at 1718-19.  
78 Id. at 1719.  
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to it.79 For instance, some of the value of owning a limited edition print lithograph by a modern 
master lies in the fact that only those who are “in the know” will recognize it, and recognize not 
just its intrinsic worth but also its market value. But some of its value also lies in the fact that it is 
a limited edition, and a very costly one at that—not only few can afford it, but only a few exist so 
only a few can own it. Ownership of such a work is limited to an exclusive few, and the owner 
can count herself in that elite group, above the hungry crowd. Exclusivity is the watchword and 
the hallmark of positional goods, and accounts for a good deal of their particular appeal. 
Fashion goods, especially those created by designers at the top of the fashion pyramid, are often 
two-sided positional goods. For instance, Hermes issued the Birkin bag, but deliberately limited 
its release to an extremely select list of clientele, many of whom proved eager to wait months, 
even years, for the right to purchase and possess a coveted, iconic item.80 Instantly recognizable 
by the fashion elite, the Birkin almost immediately became a signal of the carrier’s exclusive 
“insider” status. While a beautifully crafted item, the Hermes bag stood almost alone as perhaps 
the ultimate symbol of “belonging” among fashion’s innermost circle. Importantly, however, as 
the Birkin became widely imitated or quoted, in part by Hermes itself—which issued a line of 
handbags that incorporated elements of the bag, such as the small lock, the rolled handlebar, and 
the striking shape—and in part by knockoffs or outright counterfeits, the Birkin bag lost some of 
its luster, and the most fashion-savvy moved on.81 Thus, as the bag’s design became 
disseminated among, and familiar to, a wider audience, it lost status and prestige value among 
fashion’s first movers. The diminution of appeal among early adopters was, in one sense, 
                                                
79 Id.  
80 See Susanna Kim, Why Do These Hermes Bags Cost $70,000?, ABC (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/women-enter-luxury-hermes-chanel-handbags-collectors-
market/story?id=20321851 (noting that the waiting lists can span years). 
81 A diverting example can be drawn from the hit television series and movies Sex and the City, in which 
a playful episode was based entirely around the Birkin’s immense popularity. Sex and the City: Coulda, 
Woulda, Shoulda (HBO television broadcast Aug. 5, 2011). A main character in that show coveted, 
pursued, gained and then lost possession of the bag. Id. While this popular depiction certainly brought the 
Hermes brand further prominence, it is also arguable that it diminished the exclusive appeal of the Birkin 
as a “must-have” item, particularly for fashion’s most forward customers, who do not covet items that 
have trickled down to the consciousness of the hoi polloi. On the other hand, in global terms, the Birkin 
became even more popular among international consumers (especially in the Asian and Russian markets) 
who do want items that are instantly recognizable and, to many, desirable. This divided response 
demonstrates, in part, the diversity of consumer interests that the fashion industry must play to, and the 
challenges it faces in determining how to position its goods. 
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inevitable: fashion has always looked to its most distinguished designers to create strikingly 
original works whose very distinction lies in their fresh, new appeal. Such freshness, as in the 
case of any perishable, cannot last long, and is necessarily diminished by the usual pattern of 
widespread marketing, dissemination, consumption, and eventually the contempt that is so 
axiomatically bred by familiarity, staleness and overuse. 
The movement from prized insider possession to despised mass-market commodification is 
completely endemic to positional fashion goods, and is indeed central to their life cycle. Fashion 
insiders value the highest positional goods precisely because they confer status among those who 
are “in the know,” and because they signal that status in quiet, exclusive voices that can only be 
heard and appreciated among elite peers. When those positional goods are diffused among larger 
audiences, their ability to confer and confirm discriminatory taste is diminished, almost always 
fatally, and the elite early adopters of fashion lose interest and move on to the next, freshest good 
that awaits just ahead. This can occur whether the good is merely disseminated to a greater 
clientele or whether knockoffs, and even outright counterfeits, occlude the value of the original 
article. In this latter case, the dissemination of knockoffs and copies—of varying quality—may 
be said to “tarnish” the value and allure of the original good.82 But even barring copying, the 
mere diffusion of the good beyond the exclusive, and exclusionary, circles of the elite is enough 
to send fashion’s early adopters off and running in search of the new and as-yet undiscovered 
status-conferring good. Past the point of inflection, the fashion good has lost its positional value 
altogether, and fashion’s leaders must find new means of signaling their superior position vis-à-
vis the ordinary crowd. The next best design is poised to become the latest positional good, and 
its adoption yet again becomes the “in” symbol among the fashionista set. The cycle is reset, and 
the drive to situate oneself in the social hierarchy ensures that it will be run through yet again.83 
While consumption trends propel the fashion cycle, the low-IP equilibrium of fashion plays an 
important supportive role. The relative lack of industry-wide IP protection leaves ample room for 
                                                
82 Some commentators, such as Jonathan Barnett, have argued that such copies actually enhance the value 
of the original by showcasing the inferiority of the copy. Jonathan Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal 
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1381, 1384 (2005). The argument is hard, however, to substantiate.  
83 See DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (1979).  
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a wide reign of design appropriation and style dissemination. Because designs can be copied 
closely, and disseminated swiftly, the life cycle of a given fashion good will necessarily be brief. 
In the absence of protection against copying, even the most original designer piece will be 
imitated and diffused in short order; and its designer will be compelled to start work immediately 
on its successor, knowing full well that there is no time to rest on the laurels of success. Design 
copying limits the timeframe in which positional goods can maintain their status-conferring 
value, and its lack of protection under IP law ensures that copying will flourish apace. This 
“induced obsolescence” of fashion designs is familiar ground to designers and copyists, but also 
to fashion participants at all levels. On the one side, it impels designers to innovate and to try to 
keep ahead of the fashion curve with continual waves of new offerings. On the other side, it 
spurs elite clientele to scour the runways for the freshest, most prestigious fashion items, while 
the next tiers of consumers, not as exclusive but often as avid, follow in pursuit of the diffused 
versions that proclaim they are on trend. 
If copying were to be impeded by a high-IP regime, it is likely that the cycle of production and 
diffusion would be slower and less widespread, since original designers would have the means to 
check design copying by lawsuits, threatened or actual, and sanctions. This might be 
advantageous for top-level original designers, as their exclusive works might retain their 
positional value a while longer, perhaps until they were replaced by another fashionable objet du 
jour. On an industry-wide basis, however, the low level of IP in fashion might be quixotically 
advantageous, in that it erodes the positional value of any given work but increases the number 
of potentially positional works entering the marketplace. Moreover, the design copies that spring 
up in the absence of significant IP actually benefits fashion designers by accelerating the overall 
turnover and sale of fashion goods. Induced obsolescence coupled with a low-IP regime together 
make fashion one of the fastest moving creative industries and ensure that its cycle—in which 
goods continue to issue forth, be copied, and make way for the new—remains robust and 
immensely profitable on an overall scale. 
Low IP protections allows lesser copyists to recreate, or rework, expensive original designs, and 
to make them affordable for the more ordinary customer. From a consumer perspective, then, the 
dynamic of obsolescence coupled with a low IP regime has a distinctly utilitarian appeal: it 
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brings positional goods into the purview of a great many consumers, and underpins the existence 
of a huge mass-market in fashion. This arguably broadly benefits consumer welfare, if one 
believes that access to a broad range of affordable, trendy garments is inherently beneficial to 
fashion consumers, but at any rate it most likely expands the market for positional fashion goods, 
as well as increasing both turnover and sales in the industry. 
Design copies in fashion vary considerably in how closely they adhere to the original work. In 
the case of visible, and markedly inferior, imitation, the status-conferring positional value of the 
original good remains unchanged, and indeed unchallenged.84 In an ever-increasing number of 
cases, however, the copies are so skillfully rendered, and their distinctions so subtly guised, that 
they may not be discerned without very careful examination, and perhaps even then only with a 
certain amount of know-how in detecting the imitation.85 Significantly, the effect of these adroit 
copies is not merely upon the positional value of the original good, but also on the purchase of, 
and market for, new goods. 
Even in the low-IP regime of fashion, trademarks can be affixed to the original design and serve 
to distinguish it from its imitators. Trademark law affords protection to fashion brands and 
products, and to some extent curtails the rampant copying of creative works. Highly visible 
trademarks, featured on the outside of some garments and accessories, impede the outright 
reproduction and diffusion of original designs.86 Yet highly visible trademarks are not yet 
prevalent in the overall market of fashion goods. Most trademarks are hidden away inside 
garments and other products, and are not readily visible to the eye. Their unobtrusive placement 
can help blur the distinction between the original and the imitation, at least without the kind of 
careful inspection that most consumers tend to forego. This limits the ability of trademarks to 
impede design copying throughout the industry. 
                                                
84 Again, commentators such as Barnett would argue that copying can even enhance the value and status 
of the original, imitated goods. See Barnett, supra note 82, at 1384. 
85 Note ever-improving quality of knock-offs and counterfeit goods, especially those made by Chinese 
and other Asian manufacturers. See, e.g., Elizabeth Holmes, The Finer Art of Faking It, WALL ST. J.  
(June 30, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304791204576401534146929212.  
86 The rise in visible, even prominently displayed fashion trademarks has been argued to correspond with 
designers’ interest in thwarting design copying. Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 5, 
at 1723 & n.72. It may, however, also arise merely the increased importance of brand management, and 
the ever-growing value of major brands in the fashion marketplace. 
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While trademarks do not fully inhibit copying, they do of course serve a very useful purpose in 
the industry. A prestigious brand, such as Ralph Lauren, brandishes its trademark on its clothing 
to signify that its goods are at innovative, chic, high quality, and eminently desirable. While the 
firm has multiple tiers of labels, ranging from the highest end (“Ralph Lauren” and “Black 
Label”), to slightly lesser (“RL Collection”), to more modest mid-market (“Lauren”), all of its 
goods are positional to some degree, and the highest end of its goods have a distinctly exclusive 
cachet. The Ralph Lauren trademark helps keep the firm’s high reputation visibly and 
inextricably attached to its product, not just at the top level but throughout the brand. This 
secures the firm’s ability to charge premium prices for its wares. The only respect in which 
trademark does not protect the Ralph Lauren brand is in granting it exclusivity over its designs. 
If its designs are copied—as they have been rather extensively, to varying effect—trademark 
may not sanction the copies (unless, of course, the trademarked good is outright counterfeited). 
And Ralph Lauren cannot seek further protection, as no copyright law currently exists to prevent 
against straightforward design copying. Further complicating the matter is the fact that much of 
design copying is not outright reproduction, but rather derivative works that draw upon elements 
of the original work and then rework them, often imaginatively, in new guise.  
In the low-IP environment of fashion, no legal barrier stands in the way of creative borrowing 
and the imaginative reworking of original design. This openness allows, and perhaps encourages, 
a host of follow-on designers to borrow creatively from the most innovative names in the 
business, and to produce a plethora of variations on the original themes. These variations may be 
considered virtually new designs, and their appeal to the consumer seen to lie either in their 
differentiation or in their resemblance to the original work. Designers, well aware that consumers 
may have different preferences, are readily prompted to come up with a great many such 
variations in the hope that one or more will prove even more appealing than the original good. 
As variations, however, traces of the original good still linger, and the dissemination of these 
variations serves to diffuse the original good’s exclusive value and positional worth. The 
generation of these variations therefore drives off early adopters of the original work, those 
fashion elite who rely upon their exclusive goods to confer positional superiority, and sends the 
early adopters in search of new, yet-untouched products that can be theirs alone. The point is that 
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the availability of free appropriation, and the variations to which it gives rise, accelerates the 
fashion cycle and ensures that it will constantly be in flux. 
The rampant appropriation and creative reworking of original design, so visibly at large in the 
fashion industry, is only possible in a low- or no-IP regime, for it runs directly counter to the 
default rule under copyright law, which afford only the original designer the exclusive right to 
make, authorize, and exploit derivative works.87 Presumably, in a copyright-rich regime, the 
original designers of desirable fashion goods would devise their own derivative works, and 
thereby exploit more fully their rights in the underlying work.88 Why do they not do so in the 
present regime? After all, presumably these original designers are free to reproduce their own 
works “in house,” and to create their own variations on themes, at different price points and for 
different audiences. This would forestall their competitors from appropriating and exploiting the 
value in derivative or re-imagined works, and it would expose the designers to vast new 
audiences without intermediation. Most of all, it would allow the original designers to keep price 
discrimination among goods of varying originality and quality within their own firm, rather than 
diffusing value among market participants. Even barring the strictures of copyright against 
outsiders’ rights to make derivative works, why don’t original designers step into the breach and 
sell a variety of works in their own stead and on their own terms?89 
As earlier noted, some firms do pursue the strategy of creating reworked or variegated versions 
of their own works—that is, derived from their own designers and workshops—and sell those 
works to a broader market than only the highest end of the spectrum.90 Thus, they do practice 
single-firm price discrimination in the form of “bridge lines,” such as the many “labels” under 
which Ralph Lauren markets and sells its array of fashion merchandise. Some designers are 
                                                
87 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1734.  
88 Id. 
89 Barnett argues that original design firms might go so far as to sell cheaper, visibly inferior copies of 
their own goods at lower price points an to lower-end audiences. Barnett, supra note 82, at 1405-06. 
Barnett argues that high-end design houses are concerned with protecting their valuable brand, and fear 
tarnishing their brand through such self-imitation. Id. at 1406-07. However, even the best firms could 
devise new brands under which to release derivative goods. Fear of tarnishing alone, therefore, may not 
fully explain the strategic choices they make. 
90 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1724 (noting the incentive fashion firms have to adopt such 
a strategy).  
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cautious in pursuing this strategy, for fear that their brand’s identity risks being blurred, and their 
valuable trademark(s) risk tarnishing, with too much diffusion and not enough protection of the 
firm’s prestige.91 Yet many top-level fashion firms have rather successfully established lower-
tier bridge lines, and only in some instances have those bridge lines come to affect perceptions of 
the original design.92 
Bridge lines are one strategy by which design firms create multiple fashion “lines” within their 
own doors, using a form of vertical integration to keep control over the production, reproduction 
and distribution of their output.93 This enables top designers to knock off, or alternately to make 
various versions of, their original designs. The design firms are then able to sell their diverse 
wares at different price points—that is, to price discriminate among tiers of consumers.94 The 
bridge lines will incorporate and adapt elements from the highest, most exclusive lines, but they 
will generally feature lower price points, lesser quality of materials and construction, possibly 
more “mainstream” design variations that render the garment less obviously original but perhaps 
more readily wearable, and other characteristics that appeal to the consumers targeted at their 
level. Due to the more populist nature of bridge lines—and the concern that their “watered 
down” couture may erode the prestige of the original works from which they derive—designers 
will often sell bridge lines under different brand labels, such as “Lauren Collection” or “Armani 
Exchange,” and may also sell these products in different markets or venues.95 Thus, for example, 
the designer’s haute couture collection will be sold in a stand-alone store bearing the design 
                                                
91 Id. at 1724-25.  
92 This has occurred primarily in instances where the designer lost control of the original brand, either 
through sale or otherwise. One early illustration, often seen as a cautionary tale in the fashion world, is 
that of Calvin Klein, who sold his brand and name without retaining any rights of oversight or control. 
Gene Marcial, Inside Wall Street: Calvin Klein Is Making Warnaco Look Sharp, DAILY FIN. (Apr. 9, 
2010), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/04/09/inside-wall-street-calvin-klein-is-making-warnaco-look-
sharp.  
93 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1724-25.  
94 For example, Armani sells up to five distinct “lines” of its wares, including Armani, Emporio Armani, 
Black Label, and so forth, thereby strategically targeting different niches in the fashion market. See also 
id. at 1725.  
95 Id. 
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firm’s (or the designer’s) prestigious name, whereas a secondary collection may be sold at a 
mass-market department store.96 
It is unclear why relatively few designers resort to the use of bridge lines, and why more have 
not followed suit. The practice of partnering with mass-marketers, fraught as it is with the risk 
that the brand be tarnished by association, seems perhaps a shade less clear-cut, yet here too 
designers have entered the waters only warily, and only in very small number. In both cases, the 
ability of designers to differentiate their high-end original offerings and their mid-to-lower end 
derivative works is secured through the use of different brand names, release strategies, and other 
tactics. To be sure, some brand dilution may occur—Chanel, for instance, may never again be 
seen as fit to clad only a very exclusive few. But in this day and age, it is not clear that designers 
                                                
96 Designers may also capture the benefits of their own derivative works by partnering with outside 
vendors—including those that directly aim at the mass-market—in order to create a derivative line that 
increases both their sales and their recognition factor among a large consumer audience. See id. at 1757. 
This practice has come to have something of a perverse cachet among designers, in part because it has 
proven to be wildly, and somewhat unforeseeably, successful, and in part because it is seen as a one-time 
practice, a judicious effort to become a household name—but not one necessarily available to most 
households most of the time. Id. For instance, immensely prestigious designers, such as Isaac Mizrahi 
(who was among the pioneers of this practice), Missoni, Narciso Rodriguez, and so on, have joined the 
ranks of Martha Stewart and lesser fashion designers in creating one-time collections in collaboration 
with mass-market retailers such as Target and Wal-Mart. Id. Notably, these collections tend to be 
extremely limited in quantity—sometimes creating an artificially-imposed scarcity to ratchet up a sense of 
desirability and urgency—and may even sell out in a matter of hours. See, e.g., Charlotte Wilder, This Is 
Why the Internet Freaked Out About Lilly Pulitzer for Target, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://www.boston.com/life/fashion/2015/01/13/this-why-the-internet-freaked-out-about-lilly-pulitzer-for-
target/77K1GypB2rb0TOdpAmOBBP/story.html; Missoni Line at Target Creates Black Friday 
Atmosphere, S. BEND TRIB. (Sept. 18, 2011), http://articles.southbendtribune.com/2011-09-
18/news/30174032_1_target-stores-target-website-target-spokeswoman. Some even found their longevity 
of appeal extended through the valuable resale market of e-Bay, in which items may be sold at an even 
higher price than in the initial department store or mass-market release. See Sandra M. Jones, Target Hits 
It Big With Missoni Collection, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-13/features/chi-targets-website-crashes-after-missoni-launch-
20110913_1_target-hits-target-collection-target-corp. Consumers of these single-line, designer-label 
goods do not seem to mind that the goods are often of far lesser quality, construction, and durability than 
the original high-end works to be found in the designers’ regular collections. Consumers of the haute 
couture goods, for their part, do not seem to complain (audibly, at least) that the original designers are 
diminished in stature by their forays into the markets of the rank-and-file. Instead, the lines of “Missoni 
for Target” seem to be perceived as a forgivable lark, a playful gesture “de haut en bas” (from high to 
low), with the result that the original designs may even more coveted, by even more consumers than ever. 
See John Ewoldt, Cheap Chic, Luxury Didn’t Blend Well, STAR TRIBUNE (Jan. 5, 2013), 
http://www.startribune.com/business/185696602.html. This in turn may enhance the positional value of 
haute couture (although cf. the example of the Birkin bag and its appearance on Sex and the City, supra 
note 81), and may secure its exclusivity in opposition to the goods that are extended to the masses.  
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can pay the bills only by selling to haute couture clients: there just are not enough of those elite 
consumers to go around.97 While some designers do appropriate their own works, and sell 
derivative works through their bridge lines, the mystery is not that they do so, but that more do 
not do so, even as they see the success that their peers have had through the vertical integration 
of original and derivative works under a single design firm’s roof. 
Although designer bridge lines and partnerships with mass-marketers are still not very common 
practice, most high-end designers do not actively pursue copycats who appropriate their original 
designs in order to generate apparel and accessories that are mostly “variations on a theme.” This 
points to a conundrum at the heart of fashion’s low-IP regime. High-end designers cannot seek 
recourse to copyright law—which would block copyists from making and selling derivative 
works without the express permission of the original designers—and so cannot legally prevent 
imitation or appropriation of their work. This implies that they should seek to vertically integrate 
their original and derivative works in a single-firm strategy, so that they can bring appropriation 
and its rewards “in house,” thereby preempting at least some copying, and simultaneously 
profiting from as many permutations of their creative efforts as possible. Instead, however, these 
designers do neither: copying continues apace, and bridge lines remain fairly scarce. 
One result of this low-IP equilibrium in fashion is, as discussed earlier, a pattern in which top 
designers create original works for an exclusive, status-seeking clientele; follow-on designers 
appropriate and disseminate the works to lower-end markets, thereby rapidly diffusing the 
original designs and their style features; early-adopter consumers, repelled by seeing their 
fashion statements become commonplace, abandon the now-stale designer garments in search of 
the next avant-garde items; and the top designers are compelled to innovate to satisfy the 
demands of their restless clientele. The outline of the pattern now becomes clear: the fashion 
cycle’s engine churns rapidly, and its motor is design copying, or piracy. And fashion’s low-IP 
equilibrium is central to the pattern—perhaps, to extend the metaphor, it is the transmission 
system underlying the fashion cycle. For in a high-IP regime, designers would be able to inhibit 
copying by threatening or bringing actions on copyright infringement grounds against follow-on 
                                                
97 See, e.g., Constance C.R. White, Mizrahi, Designer Most Likely to Succeed, Doesn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
2, 1998) (noting that Mizrahi’s failure might have been due to the designer’s lack of a cheaper, secondary 
collections). 
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designers that appropriated their work. In the low-IP equilibrium of fashion, designers might 
forestall some copying by creating their own lines of derivative works, but they cannot thwart all 
the imitators that borrow their ideas and create similarly styled pieces. They can and do, 
however, innovate constantly in order to stay at the front of the fashion curve. 
The “piracy paradox,” as it has been dubbed, keeps the fashion industry in a state of ongoing 
creative churn.98 For this reason, it is arguably a positive stasis that keeps the industry vibrant 
and robust. At the same time, however, it is still plausible that certain designers of original 
works—those who are frequently, and perhaps slavishly, copied—can be harmed by free 
appropriation. In the absence of copyright law’s protections, the rents that they would otherwise 
gain from having exclusive rights to exploit and/or assign derivative works are lost to follow-on 
designers. Yet why might original designers still not protest the low-IP ecosystem of fashion? 
One explanation is that they may wish to reserve for themselves the right to copy others, in turn. 
That is, fashion cycles are notoriously hard to read, and trends equally hard to predict.99 An 
original designer whose work does not “take” one season may wish to jump on the bandwagon of 
a trend and appropriate the style of her rivals. Even the top designers, then, may wish to reserve 
the right to borrow or copy freely—and not to be impeded by cumbersome IP rights preventing 
them from reaping the fruits of their derivative labor.100 
One reality of the fashion industry is that appropriation and copying are virtually constants, at all 
levels of the fashion pyramid. There are several reasons for this unusual state of affairs. First, as 
in any field of creative endeavor, originality is scarce, and cannot be expected to appear every 
season, or at every collection. Second, fashion is bound to trends—that is, a great many sales in 
any given season can be linked to a particular trend, such as pastel-colored jeans (spring 2012). 
At the outset of a season, those trends may seem to be “in the air,” such that designers, 
merchants, fashionistas, and key industry figures (fashion magazine editors, among others) begin 
to discuss them widely, to issue items along those lines, and to push to establish the trend firmly 
                                                
98 See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5. 
99 As Raustalia and Sprigman put it, “in the current system, designers viewing their incentives ex ante are 
at least partially shrouded within a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.” Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 
1727 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (5th ed. 1973)).  
100 As Raustalia and Sprigman point out, “[i]f copying is as likely a future state as being copied, it is not 
clear that property rights in fashion design are advantageous for a designer, viewed ex ante.” Id.  
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among fashion’s many followers. Even among the early adopters, the purchasers of original 
designs, being among the first to spot, wear, and set a trend is considered highly desirable. 
Therefore, even top fashion designers may look to one another’s collections, trying to determine 
what will be the trend du jour, and possibly waiting to bring out their own on-trend versions—in 
other words, to appropriate.101 Thirdly, the practice of “homage” is well-established and 
approved in the fashion industry.102 While homage conveys reputational benefits to the original 
designer, it remains a form of free appropriation, however deliberate and respectful. Finally, 
fashion is an ancient and universal creative field. Its treasury of work is so vast, and increasingly 
so accessible to designers, that it is almost impossible to imagine that any design, however 
original, is completely new. Even new elements may be embedded in familiar contexts—and that 
itself is a kind of appropriation, although more attenuated, of course, than strict copying. How 
can the “wrap-around dress,” most recently made famous by Diane Von Furstenberg’s exquisite 
draping, be considered an “original design”? Wrap dresses can be seen to have existed 
throughout history, from the toga to the sari to the sarong to wrap-around skirts in the 1960s. 
While Von Furstenberg’s version might be distinctive enough to merit copyright, if fashion were 
to become a copyright-rich regime, it would be a challenge to establish that her iconic dress rose 
to the level of originality that copyright requires to extend its protection. The point is, fashion 
thrives on creative reworking—it is driven by appropriation, and it recognizes its debt by 
allowing designers to appropriate freely without harm.103 
                                                
101 A term of art sometimes used in the industry is “referencing.” 
102 For example, following the early, untimely demise of Alexander McQueen, more than one “homage” 
was created, directly citing his work or alluding to the breadth of his vision and his lasting influence on 
many designers, including some of his most notable peers. See, e.g., Copy-Kate Dresses, Repli-Kate 
Shows and More, WHAT KATE WORE (Aug. 28, 2011), http://whatkatewore.com/2011/08/28/copy-kate-
dresses-repli-kate-shoes-and-more/ (showcasing copies of Kate Middleton’s dresses designed by 
Alexander McQueen), ; Natalie Zutter, Snooki Sinks to New Lows by Ripping Off Deceased Designer 
Alexander McQueen With Her New Handbags, CRUSHABLE (Mar. 15, 2012). 
103 Randy Picker dissents from this key point. Picker, supra note 39, at 5. He argues that fashion copying 
primarily runs vertically, not horizontally—and typically in one direction, that is, lower-end designers 
copying those above them. Id.; see also , e.g.,‘Michael Kors Copies Everything!’ Roberto Cavalli Slams 
Fashion Industry for Failing to Call Out Fellow Designer on ‘Plagiarized’ Designs, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 
20, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2564053/Michael-Kors-copies-Roberto-Cavalli-
slams-fashion-industry-failing-call-fellow-designer-plagiarized-designs.html. Thus, for example, Target’s 
stable of designers will copy Dior, whereas Dior will not copy Target’s apparel; further, Dior will not 
likely copy its equal, such as Gucci. Id. I disagree. Dior and Gucci can indeed be seen to appropriate 
freely from one another—subtly, no doubt, but often clearly with regard to points of style and design. It 




 “Anchoring” is the process by which the fashion industry establishes an identifiable trend and 
then communicates that trend to its participants.104 The process is essential to the industry if it is 
to turn over its products successfully and repeatedly. Consumers must be made aware that a style 
has become fashionable, and then again when the style has passed out of fashion and the next 
style has taken its place. Anchoring secures the trend, and induced obsolescence ensures that the 
trend moves on. Together, these steps occur in the context of the stable, low-IP regime that 
fashion maintains. 
Anchoring is predicated upon the cycle of trends that lies at the center of fashion’s practices.105 
Trends, however, are hard to pin down. A season in fashion may begin with the launching of one 
or many potential trends, loosely defined as a set of styles coalescing around a discernible 
subject—a “look,” such as “safari chic,” a “theme,” such as “punk rock,” or a conceit,” such as 
the sophistication of the 1950s as portrayed by the television show “Mad Men.” These trends are 
informally shared among designers—sometimes seeming just to emerge concomitantly, but not 
concertedly, on multiple runway collections—but also may formally be discussed and promoted 
among industry participants, not just designers but retailers, editors, buyers, and the like. At 
times the consensus falls upon a trend, as some agreement is made that the trend will take hold 
                                                                                                                                                       
seems much more the case that fashion is a kind of free-for-all, in which many designers, at various 
levels, as well as fashion’s followers (i.e. magazines, editors, experts, and so on) often seem to be mulling 
similar ideas, and picking up on similar trends, at around the same time. These ideas may crystallize into 
an agreed-upon trend, such as pastel jeans in the Spring of 2012, and then the trend gets disseminated as 
widely as possible, until it’s the rare designer who doesn’t pick up on the trend (including latecomers, 
some of whom may even be high-end designers) and, say, issue their own version or interpretation of a 
pair of brightly colored jeans. See generally MARK TUNGATE, FASHION BRANDS: BRANDING STYLE 
FROM ARMANI TO ZARA (3d ed. 2012).  
 
Picker also argues that “legislation to protect fashion designs should be forthcoming then only if creators 
have more political power than the copyists. . . . I find that much less likely in the U.S., where Wal-Mart 
is vastly more important (and probably politically influential) than the entire high-end fashion industry.” 
Picker, supra note 39, at 5. This might be true, but the latest proposed legislation would seem to run 
counter to that intuition: the high-end designers certainly have at least some clout to get legislation in 
play; and while they probably have more clout than the smaller, independent designers, they still seem to 
have a lot. 
104 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1728.  
105 Id. 
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among consumers over the course of the season. That convergence of opinion is requisite for a 
trend to fall into place; also necessary, though, is the buy-in of those who are deemed 
trendsetters, not just in identifying but also in accepting the trend for their own. 
Design appropriation and copying are useful tools in the anchoring process. At the onset of a 
season, multiple style ideas, and possibly multiple trends, are floated by a range of designers. For 
a dominant trend to arise, a reasonable number of designers must rally around it and adopt its 
vernacular in their creative output.106 This lends coherence to the trend and emphasizes its wide 
acceptance in the fashion community. Appropriation and copying further anchor the stylistic 
themes and devices that are central to the given trend, thereby lending it substance and widening 
its familiarity among fashion’s consumer base.107 By repeating the theme and variations, copying 
does to a trend what Wagner does to a leitmotif—makes it instantly recognizable every time it is 
encountered. Trendsetters may have heard the trend first, and adopted it instantly, but at times 
they may circle back to pick it up in a newer manifestation. Trend followers, understanding the 
trend as it is trumpeted forth, follow in turn. Anchoring thereby enables fashion’s devotees to 
learn what is the trend of the season, to find it at their price point, and to consume it. Moreover, it 
enables them to learn when the trend has become passé, what the newest trend replacing it might 
be, and what to consume to be on-trend. The anchoring process is thus at once an essential 
source of information and a vital spur to consumption. 
C. Summary: The Paradoxical Effects of Low IP-Protection 
 
Fashion’s low-IP ecosystem gives leeway to widespread practices of appropriation and copying. 
This both enables and accelerates the cycle of fashion trends—from creation to adoption, 
diffusion, abandonment, and replacement by new trends. Due to the positional nature of its 
goods, fashion moves through the fashion pyramid—from the highest haute couture echelons to 
the middle ranks of consumers to the lower end of the mass-market—as though its value were 
passed from hand to hand. Consumers at every level of fashion, however they are able, are eager 
to follow the trends of fashion and discard them when a trend is deemed stale and “over” by their 
                                                
106 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1728-29.  
107 Id. 
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cohorts. Fashion-conscious consumers watch for the industry’s signals as to which trends are to 
be followed and when they are ripening, “red-hot,” and passe. Thus induced obsolescence and 
anchoring unite to propel fashion designs through a swift and tumultuous life cycle. The turnover 
that is innate to the industry is also extremely beneficial to the industry overall, as it stimulates 
consumers to purchase seasonal goods well beyond their actual utility or durability. The “luxury” 
of fashion is more democratic than it may sound, in that at almost every price level consumers 
can indulge their taste, and their appetite for trending items, and thereby express and sate their 
fashionable interest. Designers are benefited both by the ongoing sales of apparel that this high 
turnover represents, as well as by the creative stimulus of having an eager audience that is ever in 
pursuit of new wares. The result is that a rich ecosystem thrives in fashion without the aid of 
much IP protection, and to date remains remarkably stable politically.  
One caveat, noted by leading commentators in the field, is that while the entwined forces of 
induced obsolescence and anchoring are the underpinnings of a stable low-IP regime in fashion, 
they may not be the direct causal basis for low levels of IP protection in the industry.108 They 
have helped to keep the political equilibrium stable, at least to date, and they have contributed to 
the ongoing vitality of the industry despite the open appropriation that takes place regularly in 
the absence of IP barriers to design copying. These forces also have not affected every single 
creative act in the fashion world—certainly some designs, and perhaps designers, may be 
unmoved by fashion’s trends and cycles—but they do affect the majority of creative output in the 
industry, and certainly assist with the sales of that output to its consumers. 
It is also somewhat of an open question whether the low-IP regime is optimal for designers and 
consumers of fashion. If a formal high-IP regime were to prevail, it seems likely that the most 
creative designers would continue to innovate, but follow-on designers would be less motivated 
to appropriate and rework the original designs. Perhaps original designers would be able to 
charge an even higher premium for their apparel, secure in the knowledge that their designs were 
and would remain both unique and unreproducible.109 And perhaps follow-on designers would be 
                                                
108 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1733.  
109 This is the thrust of Randy Picker’s argument. See Picker, supra note 39, at 5.  
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compelled to turn their hand to more creative efforts in lieu of copying.110 What is unclear is 
whether, under these circumstances, this would be to the benefit or the detriment of the overall 
welfare of fashion’s designers and consumers alike. 
The only precedent that gives some insight into what might happen in a high-IP equilibrium is 
the historical evidence presented by the Fashion Originators’ Guild, which is mixed at best. In 
that instance, the guild created barriers to copying that, while not strictly legal, offered the 
functional equivalent of copyright’s private property rights scheme and its strictures (registration 
and monitoring among guild members; sanctions such as boycotts against identified copyists).111 
On the one hand, design copying112 did diminish under the Guild’s regime. It has even been 
argued, and there is some evidence, that the erstwhile copyists may have begun to create original 
designs—or at least they began to register their designs with the Guild, which presumably they 
could not do unless the designs showed some measure of originality. But was this socially 
optimal? Was the market for fashionable dresses constrained by the Guild’s property rights 
regime, or did the number of original higher-end dresses grow and the number of imitative 
lower-end dresses diminish, resulting in a net gain to the consumer base? The antitrust suit 
brought before the Supreme Court, ending the reign of the Guild, effectively halted such 
inquiries. But since that chapter was closed, fashion copying began anew, and the low-IP regime 
of fashion re-emerged to prevail to the present date. And not only has that regime proved to be 
stable, but the industry itself has proved to be ever more flourishing and profitable. Even as other 
creative industries have seen an astonishing surge in IP rights and protections, the fashion 
industry has built a rich ecosystem in a relative absence of IP. This is the real paradox at the 
heart of fashion—and its resolution lies in the nature of the industry itself. 
D. Alternative Explanations for Fashion’s Low-IP Equilibrium 
 
                                                
110 Id. 
111 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1696.  
112 This is limited to American designs—the Guild did not seem to concern itself unduly with the copying 
of European designs, which would be a rather interesting tangent, but is outside the scope of this paper. 
See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1734.  
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The American fashion industry is, by any account, extremely successful. It carries off its success 
in a low-IP equilibrium due to its rapid turnover and very robust sales. Both phenomena are 
driven by the twin engines of original output, issuing from high-level designers, and secondary 
reworking or copying, generated by lower level follow-on designers and firms. Designers at all 
levels of the fashion pyramid create successive trends that generate ongoing churn in the fashion 
market. Sales are distributed throughout the pyramid—greater per unit, but fewer in volume, at 
the top, and the inverse at the lower rungs—but overall, industry productivity and profitability 
remain at very high levels indeed. Thus, despite significant IP protection, fashion exhibits a 
remarkably stable ecosystem in which participants symbiotically co-exist, interact and create. 
There may, however, be additional (or alternative) explanations for the ongoing stability, both 
political and economic, of the fashion industry. Chief among these are the following: (i) 
Copyright law’s “useful articles” doctrine stands in the way of allowing copying to encompass 
fashion designs; (ii) The industry is reluctant or unable to come to agreement about changing 
extant laws; and even when it does organize and mobilize itself, as in the case of the I3P 
proposed legislation, the amount of controversy shows that the industry remains deeply divided 
about such systemic changes; and (iii) First-mover advantages, which privilege certain 
participants in the industry, work in favor of  the status quo and bolster a general acceptance of 
industry-wide copying and derivative work.113 
1. Copyright Doctrine as a Barrier 
 
The fashion industry has long been divided over whether or not to seek expanded IP rights and 
protection in its original works. Certainly, the recent proposed legislation indicates that there is 
consensus in at least one significant faction (significant in terms of lobbying power, at any rate) 
that would find greater IP coverage preferable to the present low-IP regime.114 But that faction, 
as well as the industry, must reasonably respond to a key doctrinal concern: Does the 
longstanding “useful articles” doctrine of copyright law immutably prevent the fashion industry 
from securing expanded copyright protection over its original designs? 
                                                
113 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1745-62.  
114 See infra notes 193-195 and accompanying text.  
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Two responses would argue against the useful articles doctrine as standing in the way of 
expanded copyright protection in fashion’s original designs. First, a precedent has been 
established that opens a path to expanded protection: in architecture, a field that parallels fashion 
in certain close regards, copyright has been extended to its creative endeavors where previously 
it was not accommodated.115 The analogy to architecture hints at an “end-run” around the useful 
articles doctrine in the fashion field as well. Second, the useful articles doctrine in copyright law 
has not deterred the extension of protection in certain other creative endeavors, such as the 
design of boat hulls and semiconductors, where such protection exists on a sui generis basis. If 
fashion industry participants were to seek extended copyright protection in original designs, such 
sui generis treatment might offer an avenue for obtaining particularized coverage irrespective of 
whatever proscriptions the useful articles doctrine might otherwise entail. 
2. The Useful Articles Doctrine 
 
In statutory terms, the Copyright Act grants exclusive rights in “original works of authorship” 
that are “fixed in any tangible medium.”116 One basic building block of fashion, the original 
sketch by a designer of a new design, is protected by copyright if it contains but a modicum of 
originality. Yet while the original design sketch—a two-dimensional rendition of the envisioned 
three-dimensional garment—is protected by copyright, the final product itself is not. Indeed, 
actually manufacturing the garment itself does not constitute “fixing” in a “tangible medium,” as 
might seem reasonable to imagine. Rather, and rather complicatedly, copyright’s useful articles 
doctrine denies the extension of copyright to garments based on original designs unless the 
expressive content is separable from the garment’s useful function.117 
                                                
115 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1745, 1749-50.  
116 17 USC § 102 (2012). 
117 The Copyright Act extends copyright protection to two-dimensional sketches of original fashion 
design. This protection, however, does not extend to the actual garments on which the design is based. 
This completely undermines the usefulness of the protection, however, as appropriation in fashion can 
easily be undertaken by copying from a sketch, a sample, or a garment itself. Under current U.S. 
copyright law, copying from a garment is not deemed the equivalent of copying from a design sketch—
although of course in a functional sense, they are one and the same. Raustalia and Sprigman suggest that 
“[a] relatively direct path to expanded protection for fashion design would change U.S. law to allow an 
infringement finding to be based on the underlying copyright in the design sketch. . . . Accordingly, even 
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Whereas copyright law’s useful articles doctrine protects original expression, its counterpart in 
patent law protects useful inventions—or, where design patents are concerned, novel ornamental 
designs. Further, copyright law only protects works that exhibit some modicum of creativity (and 
that have clearly not been copied), while patent law only protects useful inventions or novel 
ornamental designs that have never been produced. The difference between the “originality” 
standard in copyright and the “novelty” bar in patent is one of degree—the patent standard being 
distinctly more difficult to clear. 
Notwithstanding the functional/aesthetic distinction inscribed in copyright law, any given item 
can readily comprise both a utilitarian dimension in its usefulness and an expressive dimension 
in its original, artistic nature. Such an intertwining of characteristics has not necessarily barred 
the item from meriting copyright protection. In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether a lamp base made from a statuette could be copyrighted.118 The Court 
determined that the lamp base did indeed fall into the purview of copyright, pursuant to the 
Copyright Office’s protection, at that time, of “works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their 
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such as artistic jewelry, 
enamels, glassware and tapestries.”119 In accordance with the Mazer decision, courts have 
extended copyright law’s rights and protection to artistic jewelry,120 designs printed upon 
scarves,121 and dress fabric designs.122 Together, these decisions have generally afforded 
copyright protection to a range of useful articles that are both functional in nature and 
aesthetically appealing. 
Mazer and its progeny extended copyright to a previously unprecedented range of useful articles. 
In its turn, the U.S. Copyright Office issued regulations curtailing the range of articles falling 
under copyright law’s protections, stating that articles in which the “sole, intrinsic function . . . is 
                                                                                                                                                       
if the useful articles doctrine stood as a more substantial doctrinal barrier than we believe it to be, the 
fashion industry has an alternative path to protection.” Id. at 1746 n.108.  
118 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
119 Id. at 212-13. 
120  See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980). 
121 See, e.g., Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., 173 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
122 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
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its utility” would not be granted copyright even if it were “uniquely and attractively shaped.”123 
However, the Copyright Office did allow that if the shape of an article “incorporates features . . . 
which can be identified separately and are capable of existing independently as a work of art,” 
those features would be eligible for copyright.124  
In granting copyrightability only to useful articles bearing a “separable” expressive element, the 
Copyright Office distinctly limited the holding of Mazer, which broadly acceded copyright to 
artistically appealing useful articles.125 The Copyright Act, even to its current instantiation, still 
further narrows the copyrightability of useful articles. The Act denies copyright coverage to any 
article having “an intrinsic utilitarian function”126—which clearly encompasses more items than 
the Copyright Office’s regulation’s denomination of articles having a “sole intrinsic [utilitarian] 
function.”127 Further, the Act specifies that “[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful article 
is considered a useful article.”128 This stipulation reduces the likelihood that the utilitarian and 
expressive aspects of an article will be considered separable, thereby reducing, perhaps fatally, 
the likelihood of copyrightability of most useful items, however aesthetically appealing they 
might be. 
The Copyright Office, followed by the Copyright Act, successively narrowed the scope of 
copyright protection granted to useful articles as earlier articulated by the Mazer Court. 
Effectively, then, the IP protection of such useful articles has defaulted to the domain of patent 
law. Yet patent law, with its stringent standard of “novelty,” raises the bar to a level that a great 
many useful articles, whether aesthetically expressive or not, are not likely to clear. This policy 
choice has had profound implications in a range of creative endeavors, but nowhere is it more 
clear than in fashion, in which the functional nature of garments tend to be inextricably 
intertwined with their expressive elements and their aesthetic appeal. 
 
                                                
123 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959). 
124 Id. 
125 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1748. 
126 17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).  
127 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959) (emphasis added). 
128 17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2) (2012).  
Bhamati Viswanathan    CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 57 
E. A Side Note “Regarding Substantial Similarity” 
 
The policy choice regarding the copyrightability of useful articles is not necessarily irreversible. 
Under an alternate regime, original designers might secure exclusive rights to qualifying useful 
articles and any related derivative work, and designs that exhibited “substantial similarity” with 
the original design might be deemed to infringe upon the designer’s exclusive rights. 
Most courts agree that the “substantial similarity” test hinges upon the perceptions of the 
“ordinary observer.” The Seventh Circuit stated that the inquiry turns upon “whether the accused 
work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that 
the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible expression by taking material of 
substance and value.”129 The Ninth Circuit recognized that “a taking is considered de minimis 
[and therefore does not rise to the threshold of infringement liability] only if it is so meager and 
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the appropriation.”130 The Second 
Circuit is in accord with this line of reasoning, holding that “[t]wo works are substantially similar 
where ‘the ordinary observer, unless he has set out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to 
overlook them, and regard [the] aesthetic appeal [of the two works] as the same.’”131 These 
holdings, taken as a whole, suggest that the “substantial similarity” test poses a fairly low 
practical threshold for a finding of infringement. 
In the context of the fashion industry, adoption of a more expansive copyright in garments 
(which would otherwise constitute useful articles), and acceptance of the “substantial similarity” 
test for infringement would be bound to alter the landscape considerably. Significantly, much of 
the design appropriation and reworking that now pervades fashion would most likely be 
actionable, and might well be found infringing pursuant to the “substantial similarity” guidelines 
outlined by the courts above. The mere challenge of shepherding an array of fashion 
                                                
129 Atari v. N. Am. Philips, 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982).  
130 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 
594-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting “the relationship between the de minimis maxim and the general test for 
substantial similarity, which also looks to the response of the average audience, or ordinary observer, to 
determine whether a use is infringing”). 
131 Castle Rock Enter. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. 
Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1992).  
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infringement claims through the courts would likely entail major upheaval. But were these 
claims to result in large-scale findings of infringement, the entire practices of the industry would 
be disrupted and would require shaping anew.  
At the same time, however, like the “useful articles” standards, the “substantial similarity” 
measures could be cut to fit the fashion industry’s cloth. The test could be narrowed, for 
instance, to bring only exact line-by-line copying into its purview.132 This would align with the 
standards some courts have imposed in copyright infringement cases involving databases.133 
Thus, copyright could protect original fashion design, and could still allow some appropriation in 
the case of “substantially transformative works,”134 while limiting findings of infringement to 
items that exhibit too-close line-by-line copying. In effect, this approach would displace the low-
IP regime of fashion, opening the door to copyright protection, but restricting copyright 
infringement to a strict standard of copying rather than a more expansive standard of 
appropriation. This compromise would place fashion at a separate remove from truly high-IP 
creative regimes, such as the music, film and publishing industries. Rather, it would create a 
more moderate, or intermediate-IP regime. Such a qualified level of IP protection might be well 
suited to the fashion industry, with its longstanding traditions, and generally widespread 
acceptance, of design reworking and appropriation.  
F. How Congress Can Circumvent the Useful Articles Rule, Part I 
 
In the case of architecture, Congress and the courts have shown that the useful articles doctrine 
can be modified, without undermining copyright law’s substance, to lend copyright protection to 
a particular area of creative design and physical construction.135 Buildings, architecture’s main 
output, are readily analogous to fashion in that they can be based on original designs, but when 
                                                
132 The distinction between reworking and line-by-line copying is delineated by Suk and Hemphill. See 
Hemphill & Suk, supra note 2, at 1181-82 & n.136.  
133 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Met. Regional Info. 
Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 2d 691, 704-705 (D. Md. 2012) (citing 37 
C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(5)); see also Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1770 (discussing computer 
database protections).  
134 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1749 n.118. 
135 This is a relatively recent development, as architecture, like fashion, was basically marginalized by 
copyright law. Id. at 1749-51. 
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built assume a predominantly utilitarian function. Historically, original architectural blueprints, 
like fashion design sketches, were protected and could not be copied without infringing.136 
Buildings, on the other hand—even those erected on the basis of original blueprints—could be 
freely appropriated or copied without transgression.137 Further, a copycat architect could assess 
the dimensions and features of an already-existing building and appropriate freely from it, or 
simply copy it, without fear of being deemed to infringe upon the original architect’s work. 
Copyright would only protect the purely ornamental or decorative elements of the building, as 
long as those elements were perceived to lack utility and to be “separable” from the building 
overall.138 These minor decorative elements, however, were very much the exception in 
architecture to the general rule. 
In recent years, however, the historical lack of protection for architectural structures has been 
significantly reversed. In 1990, Congress amended the Copyright Act to allow copyright 
protection not just for blueprints but also for buildings themselves. Under the Architectural 
Works Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”),139 Congress extended the scope of copyright 
coverage to “architectural works,” broadly defined to include “the design of a building as 
embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or 
drawings.”140 In the AWCPA, the scope and parameters of protection for architectural works was 
somewhat more closely delineated, setting forth that “[t]he work includes the overall form as 
well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not 
include individual standard features.”141 
In enacting the AWCPA, Congress has clearly carved out a sui generis area of protection for the 
architecture field by defining “architectural works” broadly and extending them expansive 
                                                
136 Id. at 1750 (citing Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972); Herman 
Frankel Org. v. Tegman, 367 F. Supp. 1051, 1053 (E.D. Mich. 1973)). 
137 Id.  
138 Id. 
139 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104 Stat. 5133 
(1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
140  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
141 Id. In the legislative history of the Act, Congress states that the separability test of the useful articles 
doctrine does not apply to architectural works, and that “the aesthetically pleasing overall shape of an 
architectural work could be protected.” H.R. REP. NO. 735, at 6951 (1990). 
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copyright protection. Equally importantly, in so doing it simply eliminated the long-held, 
presumptive application of the useful articles doctrine to buildings constructed from original 
architectural designs. Were Congress willing, a parallel course could surely be made available to 
the creative field of fashion and its physical works, garments, constructed from original fashion 
sketches and designs. At present, a significant faction in the fashion world is mobilizing the 
impetus to persuade Congress to do so—that is, to define “fashion works” broadly enough to 
encompass their three-dimension manifestations as actual garments, and then to extend copyright 
protection to include those garments in its scope.142 If this effort succeeds, fashion too would 
overcome the presumptive obstacles of the useful articles doctrine, and not just its original 
designs but also its original garments would fall under copyright’s protective domain. 
G. How Congress Can Circumvent the Useful Articles Rule, Part II 
 
As in the case of architecture, discussed above, Congress has extended sui generis copyright 
protection to the creation of useful articles that would not otherwise, without special treatment, 
not qualify for such protection under the Copyright Act. Two areas of production, semiconductor 
“mask works” and boat hulls, offer instructive examples for such sui generis treatment. 
1. Semiconductors 
 
Congress carved out protection for semiconductor “mask works” under the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act (“SCPA”), which it adopted in 1984.143 In the semiconductor industry, “mask 
works” are “the stencils used to control the process of etching onto silicon wafers the circuitry 
that make up a microprocessor.”144 The production of mask works, and the transistor and layout 
design work that they represent graphically, are among the most valuable components to the 
semiconductor industry.145 Under the SCPA, a mask work is protected if it is fixed in a 
                                                
142  See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1751. 
143 Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 17 U.S.C.). 
144 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1752.  
145 Arguing for the protection of semiconductor mask works, Congress stated that the “appropriation of 
creativity” by those copying mask works would be a “devastating disincentive to innovating research and 
development.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 2-3 (1984)). 
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semiconductor chip and is original.146 Not only must mask works display originality, they also 
may not be “staple, commonplace, or familiar in the semiconductor industry.”147 Protection 
extends only to the works of U.S. nationals and domiciliaries,148 or to works first commercially 
exploited in the United States regardless of the nationality of ownership.149 Further, the SCPA 
requires that mask works either be registered with the Copyright Office or be commercially 
exploited as a condition of protection.150 
The SCPA grants owners an exclusive right in mask works pursuant to their fulfilling its formal 
statutory requirements.151 The protection runs for a ten-year period, and reserves to the owner the 
exclusive right “to reproduce the mask work by optical, electronic, or other means.”152 The 
exclusive right to reproduction is broad, and not only encompasses identical copies but also those 
that are “substantially similar” to the protected work.153 The SCPA also confers upon the owner 
the exclusive right to “import or distribute” a chip for which the mask work has been used in 
production.154 
2. Boat Hulls 
 
                                                
146 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(1) (2012)  
147 Id. § 902(b)(2).  
148 Id. § 902(a)(1)(A).  
149 Id. § 902(a)(1)(B).  
150 Id. § 904(a). The SCPA represents a “conditional” system of protection, that is, one that creates 
property rights only when the “author” of a mask work demonstrates—through commercial exploitation 
or registration—that protection is needed. Id. Pursuant to the SCPA, authors seeking protection of their 
works through commercial exploitation must register their works within two years, or protection will be 
terminate. Id. § 908(a). Prior to the ratification of the current Copyright Act in 1976, copyright law was 
similarly conditional, requiring authors to take specific steps, including registering their works and 
marking published copies with a copyright notice, in order to come under copyright’s protection. See 
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1752 n.131. The current copyright laws, by contrast, are 
“unconditional,” in that authors need not follow those steps, but rather gain copyright protection 
automatically upon the fixation of their original, expressive works in a tangible medium. See 17 U.S.C. § 
102(a).  
151 Id. § 905. 
152 Id. § 905(1).  
153 Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1753.  
154 17 U.S.C. § 905(2).  
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Not only semiconductor mask works have been extended sui generis protection: in 1998, 
Congress carved out sui generis design protection for owners of boat hulls.155 The issue came to 
the fore somewhat earlier, in 1989, when the Supreme Court, in its landmark decision Bonito 
Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, invalidated a state law that prohibited the process used by certain 
boat manufacturers to copy rival manufacturers’ boat hull designs.156 To protect owners against 
such copying, Congress enacted the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act (“VHDPA”),157 
contained within the broader purview of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.158 Under the 
VHDPA, boat hulls are protected by federal fiat, although in accordance with the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Bonito Boats, states are preempted by federal law from extending such 
protection.159 
As in the case of the SCPA’s protection of mask works, the VHDPA grants a ten-year period of 
exclusive rights in the design of boat hulls or, more precisely, in the “design of a vessel hull, 
including a plug or mold” used in the construction of a boat hull.160 Under the VHDPA, 
however, the exclusive protection is more constrained than under the SCPA, extending only to 
“original” designs.161 The VHDPA provides that “original” designs are “the result of the 
designer’s creative endeavor that provides a distinguishable variation over prior work pertaining 
to similar articles which is more than merely trivial and has not been copied from another 
source.162 The VHDPA extends the owner of such an original design the exclusive right to 
“make, have made, or import” any boat hull that incorporates the design in its work.163 The 
owner then has the exclusive right to sell or distribute the boat hull incorporating that original 
design.164 The VHDPA adds that it extends protection to any element of a boat hull design that 
                                                
155 See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1753. 
156 489 U.S. 141, 167-68 (1989). 
157 Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2905 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301-1332).  
158 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
159 489 U.S. at 168.  
160 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (2012).  
161 Id. § 1301(a)(1).  
162 Id. § 1301(b)(1).  
163 Id. § 1308(1).  
164 Id. § 1308(2).  
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“makes the article attractive or distinctive in appearance to the purchasing or using public.”165 
Moreover, it extends protection to elements of boat hull design that may be considered strictly 
utilitarian function.166 The VHDPA resembles the SCPA in having a strict set of formal 
requirements. For one, it mandates that original designs must be registered within two years after 
the design is made public, or the owner will forfeit protection.167 The owner must mark protected 
designs with a prescribed notice of protection.168 Omission of the notice will bar the owner from 
recovery against a potentially infringing party if the “undertaking leading to infringement” was 
begun by “before receiving written notice of the design protection.”169 
In sum, semiconductor mask works and boat hulls are two areas of creative work that have been 
granted a form of sui generis protection by Congressional act. In both cases, Congress has 
chosen to side-step the useful articles doctrine of copyright law, granting protection to and 
original expression that would not otherwise be covered, since it is typically comprised by a 
useful article. The exclusive rights granted in these works are very much akin to the protections 
granted by traditional copyright law. They could also be readily extended, in theory at least, to a 
range of other creative and original works, including fashion design and industrial design. As 
noted by Raustiala and Sprigman, among others, the VHDPA itself was originally written rather 
broadly to encompass general design protection.170 Raustialia and Sprigman suggests that the 
VHDPA might have served as a platform by which Congress could eventually extend protection 
to a wide array of industrial design.171 This would merely require Congress to alter the definition 
of “useful article” in the Copyright Act.172 
In the pending design piracy bill,173 this expansion of the “useful article” definition is precisely 
what is sought. The bill seeks to append “fashion design” to the term “design of a vessel” used in 
                                                
165 Id. § 1301(a)(1).  
166 See, e.g., id. § 1301(a)(2) & (b)(5) (noting that plugs are protected “regardless of whether [they have] 
an intrinsic utilitarian function”).  
167 Id. § 1310(a).  
168 Id. § 1306. 
169 Id. § 1307(b).  
170 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5. 
171 Id.  
172 17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2).  
173 H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006).  
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the VHDPA, and thereby to expand its general definition of “design.”174 The bill also seeks to 
append a three-year period of protection to the new design class.175 If the bill were to be ratified, 
Congress would yet again successfully circumvent the strictures of traditional copyright law, 
extending protection to original fashion, and perhaps even more broadly industrial, designs. This 
would further demonstrate that standard copyright law need not necessarily prevent original 
fashion designs from enjoying the exclusive rights and protections now shared by 
semiconductors and boat hulls.176 
3. Political Barriers 
 
As discussed above, copyright law may not present an insurmountable obstacle to the fashion 
industry gaining protection in original designs. Following the precedents outlined here, Congress 
can enact legislation that will effectively carve out IP protection for a favored industry, even if 
its creative products might otherwise be barred by standard copyright doctrine such as the useful 
articles rule. But other impediments to the protection of designs may prove more challenging. 
The political process of effecting change raises at least two significant concerns: collective 
action problems and the “rival rent-seekers” problem.177 In both of these cases, the political will 
to action may be thwarted by industry participants, or even interested outsiders.178 In the fashion 
context, the collective action problem lies primarily among the designers seeking design 
protection, while the rival rent-seekers problem lies among both designers and retailers. 
4. Collective Action Problem 
 
Collective action problems have been widely examined and outlined, most notably by Mancur 
Olson in The Logic of Collective Action.179 They arise when industry participants, such as 
                                                
174 Id. § 1.  
175 Id. § 1. 
176 Alternatively, as in the case of architecture, Congress could simply limit the scope of the useful articles 
doctrine and effectively arrive at the same results. 
177 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1755.  
178 Id. 
179 MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS  (1965). 
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fashion designers, cannot effectively organize themselves to lobby for, and bring about, 
change.180 The challenges of collective action often arise among industries with large 
constituents that are relatively decentralized.181 This is because, as Olson argued, small groups of 
tightly-knit members are typically more effective at organizing behind a mutually-held cause 
than larger, less cohesive groups.182 Smaller groups can lobby to effectuate policy proposals that 
they favor, or conversely to thwart proposals that they oppose.183 The individual members of 
these small clusters tend to have a significant stake in the policy position of their group, and their 
vested interest gives them a strong motivation to act and follow through on their actions.184 In 
contrast, the individual members of large, diffuse groups may have a small stake in the group’s 
overarching policy position, and therefore may not be inclined, or able, to bear the transaction 
costs arising from organizing and acting.185 Olson posited further that as the size of the group 
swells, the problems of incentives and transaction costs grows increasingly problematic.186 
High-IP industries that are relatively centralized and have dense concentrations among their 
participants are especially effective at rallying behind policies that maintain or increase levels of 
IP protection. Both the recording and motion picture industries, for instance, are very politically 
effective and powerful, due in part to the strength of their centralized representative blocs.187 In 
the recording industry, which is made up of a limited number of major producers, the central 
trade association, the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”),188 galvanizes the 
political resources and might of the industry. In the motion picture industry, also consisting of a 
limited number of major producers (and also a limited number of smaller producers), the 
counterpart of the RIAA is the Motion Pictures Association of America (“MPAA”),189 another 
trade association that wields considerable political sway. In both cases, the centralized industry 
                                                
180 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1755. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Thus, for e.g., consumers of certain commodities, like oil, constitute such an enormous group that they 
are unable to organize and lower high oil prices; while oil producers, who are both concentrated and 
limited in number, are successful at organizing and obtaining the price points they desire. 
187 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1755. 
188 See About RIAA, RIAA, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php?content_selector=about-who-we-are-riaa.  
189 See Our Story, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/our-story.   
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representatives actively work on behalf of their constituents, lobbying for political policies that 
their members agree will best advance their interests. Their effectiveness is amply demonstrated 
by the range of political victories they have notched, including the striking extension of 
copyright protection to the creative output of their respective industry members.190 
Does the fashion industry lack the ability to organize itself effectively, and does a political 
failing explain its stasis as a low-IP regime? If this were the case, the collective action problem 
would explicate the lack of copyright protection in fashion, rather than the doctrinal impediment 
of copyright law, or the lack of detriment caused by outright copying of fashion’s original 
designs in industry practice. In other words, the fact that designers have been unable to unite 
under a political banner would emerge as the main reason they could not gain copyright 
protection, even the designers considered it central to their shared interests and needs. 
The first objection to pinning the low-IP regime on collective action is that there is a strong trade 
association—similar in many key respects to the RIAA and the MPAA—that underlies the 
fashion industry. The Council of Fashion Designers of America (“CFDA” or the “Council”)191 
counts a significant number of key fashion designers in its roster,192 and represents their interests 
before Congress, the courts, and in the public regard.193 Most recently, it has been lobbying for 
IP protection under the aegis of the proposed legislation H.R. 5055, which would greatly expand 
copyright in American fashion design.194 While it has not noticeably galvanized the industry’s 
                                                
190 See, e.g., RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later; RIAA Presents Google with a Five Point Plan, 
DMCA FORCE (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.dmcaforce.com/riaa-presents-google-5-point-plan/; Eriq 
Gardner, SiriusXM Dealt New Blow in RIAA’s Lawsuit Over Older Music, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 
15, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/siriusxm-dealt-new-blow-riaas-741177; Larry 
Rohter, Record Industry Braces for Artists’ Battles over Song Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/arts/music/springsteen-and-others-soon-eligible-to-recover-song-
rights.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all&. 
191 COUNCIL OF FASHION DESIGNERS OF AM., http://cfda.com/.  
192 See Members, COUNCIL OF FASHION DESIGNERS OF AM., http://cfda.com/members. The Council’s 
board of directors is comprised of recognized designers such as Diane von Fustenberg, Michael Kors, 
Marcus Wainwright, and Vera Wang. Organization, COUNCIL OF FASHION DESIGNERS OF AM., 
http://cfda.com/about/organization.  
193 See, e.g., Katherine Boyle, Fashion Industry Testifies in Favor of Design Copyright Protections 
(Again), WASH. POST (July 18, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/style-blog/post/fashion-
industry-testifies-in-favor-of-design-copyright-protections-again/2011/07/18/gIQAd2MuLI_blog.html.  
194 See id.; H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006).  
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response to earlier legislation affecting fashion, it does not appear to have been impeded in any 
respect from lobbying activities.195 Yet it is evident that the CFDA has not, prior to the process 
that has brought the pending legislation before Congress, engaged in any important lobbying 
efforts.196 The absence of political activity on its part may indicate that the majority of industry 
members stand behind a low-IP regime, and do not in fact consider design copying to be 
significantly detrimental to creative output and robust growth in the industry as a whole. 
5. Rival Rent-Seekers Problem 
 
Collective action problems do not seem to undergird the lack of political mobility that the 
fashion industry has evinced until fairly recent date. As suggested, this might be due to a shared 
view in the industry that design copying does not pose enough of a challenge to original 
designers as to merit concerted action by the Council or other representative agents. Another 
possible explanation, however, is that there is no shared view in the industry, and that fractured 
interests prevent political action from being mobilized successfully. In other words, the industry 
may be divided among rival rent-seekers,197 the retail sector and the design sector, which have 
divergent views and preferences as to the proper level of protection. In this scenario, the retail 
sector might be found to have better cohesion and more political clout, and thereby be able to 
impede the design sector’s initiatives seeking the expansion of fashion design protection. It may 
be, then, that the retail sector has a marked preference for a low-IP system allowing it greater 
latitude to copy original designs and sell them to various market segments under differentiated 
strategies, fashion collections, and prices. The greater strength of the fashion retail segment 
would, under this explanation, supplant the efforts of its rival, the design segment, to lobby 
Congress in search of a higher-IP regime. 
                                                
195 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1756. In a slew of legislation dating from around 1980 to 
the present, Congress has broached the issue of design protection. Id. In many of these measures, apparel 
has been expressly exempted from protection. Thus, for instance, in the proposed “Industrial Design Anti-
Piracy Act of 1989,” protection was expressly disallowed for designs “composed of three-dimensional 
features of shape and surface with respect to men’s, women’s and children’s apparel, including 
undergarments and outerwear.” Id. (citing H.R. 3017, 101st Cong. § 1002(5) (1st Sess. 1989)). However, 
the legislative history of this proposed legislation, among others, does not show that the CFDA or other 
fashion industry representatives or agents lobbied or testified with respect to the application of the bill to 
fashion design. Id. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 1755.  
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The theory of rival rent-seeking is predicated on conflicting interests that divide and undermine 
the political willpower among industry participants.198 The case for such internal conflicts, 
however, is not so clear-cut in the fashion world. The retail sector includes not only retail firms, 
such as department stores and boutiques, but a fair number of designers as well. Some designers 
are retained in-house, and design collections under their own label that are then marketed by 
their affiliated retailer.199 Other designers remain independent, but are contractually hired to 
design “exclusive” collections that are likewise marketed by the retailer. In both instances, the 
interests of the retailer and the designer are wholly contiguous. There are exceptions, such as 
when retail firms sell “house label” or “private label brand” (“PLB”) garments, such as the many 
lines carried by Macy’s department store, particularly when the PLB garments use derivative 
designs based on others designers’ original works. Original designers whose works are thus 
copied may find themselves at odds with the retail firms in these cases, and may well wish for 
enhanced IP protection that would give them some recourse against having their original works 
copied and marketed at various retail levels. In other cases, however, even original designers will 
partner with retail firms to market their works to a large and increasingly appreciative audience. 
This practice has grown rapidly in recent years, and has been widely praised by designers and 
retailers alike. Thus, for instance, Target has partnered with a range of highly talented original 
designers, including Alexander McQueen, Missoni, and others,200 and its success has been 
mirrored by a range of retailers at various points in the fashion pyramid.201 Whether retailers 
offer private label brands by in-house designers or exclusive collections by partnered designers, 
the interests of these collaborating retailers and designers dovetail to such an extent that 
distinguishing their positions vis-a-vis appropriation of original designs becomes hard, if not 
impossible, to discern. 
                                                
198 See id. 
199 See id. at 1757. Examples of such arrangements are the exclusive collections offered by Issac Mizrahi, 
Luella Bartley, and Tara Jarmon through Target. Id.  
200 See, e.g., James Bickers, Missoni for Target Line Sells Out, Raises Questions, RETAIL CUSTOMER 
EXPERIENCE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.retailcustomerexperience.com/articles/missoni-for-target-line-
sells-out-raises-questions/; Amy Odell, Behold Alexander McQueen’s Target Line, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 20, 
2009), http://nymag.com/thecut/2009/01/mcqueen_for_target.html (noting the release of Alexander 
McQueen’s Target line on March 1, 2009). 
201 See Is Target Having a Brand Identity Crisis?, INSIDEFMM, 
http://fashionablymarketing.me/2012/01/target-designer-collaborations/ (noting that other mass retailers, 
such as Macy’s, Kohl’s, H&M, and Barney’s have designer collaborations and licensing deals).  
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Retail firms that either retain in-house designers or partner with outside designers for exclusive 
collections may have some incentive to protect their products from appropriation and thereby 
preserve their exclusivity. This might appear to weigh in favor of a high-IP system offering 
protections against original design copying. At the same time, however, retailers can also allow 
the designers of their garments to appropriate designs from others’ original designs, thereby 
bringing in-store collections into line with current trends and consumer preferences. Under 
fashion’s current low-IP regime, little stands as a bar to designer copying in any direction. In 
other words, the freedom to copy cuts both ways, and benefits retailers and designers at almost 
every level of the fashion pyramid. It may be challenging to ascertain precisely how much 
retailers actually favor a low-IP regime. To date, they have not voiced a strong position on any 
fashion-related policy proposals that have come before Congress. Only in the most recent 
instance of proposed legislation, H.R. 5055, have retailers expressed a modicum of concern over 
the standard of infringement, such that designs that do not closely copy original works will not 
be deemed to be infringing.202 This has not, though, been evinced by a united position expressly 
stated by retailers publicly or in Congressional hearings. 
Not all retailers retain designers to create the garments they carry; some may carry garments 
based solely on mass-marketed designs. These “pure” retailers may prefer to operate in a regime 
that does not penalize design appropriation.203 In a low-IP regime, pure retailers can strategize 
how best to optimize their sales inventory: on the one hand, they can repackage and resell goods 
based on original designs, and on the other hand, they can freely appropriate from or reproduce 
pre-existing designs and sell them as in-house brands.204 This enables retailers to follow the 
latest fashion trends at diverse price points and across a spectrum of consumer preferences. The 
open appropriation environment of a low-IP system thus affords retailers a great deal of retail 
flexibility, and can so be seen as a desirable attribute from the pure retail firms’ perspective. 
Indubitably, what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander: that is, the retailers engaged in 
copying may find their own garments reproduced by competitors, either at a peer level or lower 
in the fashion pyramid. Thus, for instance, Barney’s in-house label may copy the design of an 
original, trend-setting suit originally designed by Giorgio Armani, only later to find that Saks 
                                                
202  See supra note 200 and accompanying text.  
203 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1758.  
204 See id. 
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Fifth Avenue has reproduced the suit and marketed its version under the Saks in-house brand. 
This serial copying, as it were, may result in the sales of many copies of a trendy suit to 
consumers across the fashion spectrum. But from the point of view of the individual retailer, this 
implies that neither Armani, Barney’s, nor Saks will remain at the forefront of a trend for long. 
This limits the potential of any given retailer to retain any great degree of exclusivity in a given 
fashion trend, but it does allow retailers overall to jump on the bandwagon of a trend and enjoy 
derivative sales from its follow-on works. Some retailers may prefer a low-IP regime in which 
product differentiation is achieved via the protection of trademarks in brands and logos, but not 
as readily available to specific garments. Other retailers may prefer a system in which product 
exclusivity is maintained under a higher-IP framework. It is difficult to predict, ex ante, which 
system will be preferred by retailers across the fashion continuum, or whether there is a 
significant degree of variation in preferences among retailers. But for those retailers that prefer a 
strategy of differentiation that is predicated on exclusivity of design and style, no doubt a higher-
IP regime would serve the purpose. In today’s fashion environment, however, where widespread 
copying permeates the industry and practices of free appropriation and style “re-workings” are 
widely accepted, it would appear that the low-IP status quo is not only accepted but also 
approved by retailers and designers alike. 
6. First-Mover Advantage 
 
In fast-moving markets, innovators can sometimes garner such a significant market position that 
they effectively preclude competitors from gaining a strong foothold and challenging the first 
movers’ dominance.205 The advantage of a first mover can be so powerful that it greatly reduces, 
or even obviates, the need for high levels of IP protection to safeguard it against copying and 
appropriation at the hands of follow-on rivals.206 Thus, the first-mover advantage theory can 
offer a compelling rationale for how original creators and innovators can succeed and flourish 
even in a low-IP regime that does not promote the propertization of original works and does not 
enforce sanctions against appropriation or derivation based on original works.207 In the fashion 
landscape, original designers assume the role of first movers, creating styles that establish the 
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207 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1583-84 (2003).  
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most sought-after trends of the season. In order to be successful first movers, these designers 
must sell as many of their original works as possible before their designs are reworked or 
reproduced by follow-on designers, retailers, and imitators across the fashion spectrum. If they 
make a significant amount of sales—or if they sell even a limited volume of works, but at 
extremely high price points, as often occurs at the height of haute couture—they will 
successfully recoup their investment and make a profit from the originating designs. Irrespective 
of follow-on designs, which are most likely to appear in the market as soon as the innovative 
works are recognized as being trendsetters, the original designs will have more than paid for 
themselves. Thus, while the window of profit opportunity for original designers may be rather 
short,208 it can be highly lucrative, enough so to compensate for some rents lost to copycat goods. 
This advantage held by the most successful original designers may be sufficient to explain why 
they have not, at least until recently, taken significant issue with the low-IP regime that does not 
afford protection to their most creative fashion designs. 
Since first movers know they are bound to be imitated swiftly—particularly when their works 
prove to be commercially desirable—they rely upon the window of profitability that originality 
affords them before their imitators appear. The first-mover advantage is indeed predicated upon 
the timeframe in which the earliest appearing works are sold at a price high enough to clear their 
investment and clear a profit, and in which follow-on works cannot encroach upon these initial 
sales. But the fashion world does not divide so neatly along these lines: in much of its recent 
history, fashion vendors have had access to technologies that enable accurate, inexpensive, and 
extremely rapid copying.209 Garment manufacturing and distribution has also been rapid, due to 
fashion’s ongoing need to meet high consumer demand in very short order, and its pace has only 
been accelerating with improvements in logistics and its related technologies. But not only is the 
window short in fashion—it is also constantly shrinking.210 Improvements in technology are of 
course the most effective means of accelerating the fashion cycle. Copyists have ready access to 
                                                
208 See Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 5, at 1759 (noting that “[f]or the last quarter-century . . . the 
copying of fashion designs has been easy and fast”). 
209 Id. at 1759. Even in the case of the wedding of Grace Kelly, Princess of Monaco, the bridal gown was 
kept a carefully-guarded secret until the day of the event. See La Ferla, supra note 32. Yet within 48 hours 
of the highly publicized wedding ceremony, knockoff dresses reproducing with startling accuracy the 
gown’s every last detail appeared in department stores in the U.S. and abroad. Id. 
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better means of reproducing garment details, better means to disseminate their knowledge, and 
better means of delivering their derivative products to the ever-hungry market.211 It is virtually 
indisputable that the distance between original designs and follow-on works has been reduced to 
a sliver, and may well end in something that effectively approaches no distance at all.212 
The ever-shrinking distance between the emanation of original designs and follow-on copies at 
once reveals that the first-mover advantage in fashion was always relatively weak, and suggests 
that it is not likely to have been a significant benefit to original designers in the first instance. 
Moreover, as technology improves, any first-mover advantage will most probably be further 
compromised by enhanced means of reproduction and methods of distribution. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that if any original designers enjoy first-mover advantages, they will perceive it as being 
sufficient to protect their rights in, and profits gained from, the exploitation of their original 
designs. First-mover advantage would not, then, seem to explain fully fashion’s low-IP regime. 
Of course, even if first-mover advantage exists, and even persists, among the original designers 
of fashion, these designers might yet want to enhance their returns from the exploitation of their 
works with additional leverage in the form of IP protection.213 Such protection would strengthen 
the barriers to entry facing follow-on designers, who would be forced to create works that did not 
prove to be infringing or derivative. And IP protection would be especially effective with respect 
to garments that were not merely trendy but also had a more enduring market life. Therefore, the 
absence of appeal to IP protection among original designers requires further explanation than 
first-mover advantage alone. One possibility is that the costs of bringing about change through 
lobbying and legislative action is too daunting to original fashion designers, such that they prefer 
to funnel their resources into creating more innovative and frequently-changing designs. Since 
legislation can only promise protection under the law, another possible explanation is that 
                                                
211 Id. 
212 One possibility is that sketches of an original garment appear on the Internet and can be reproduced 
immediately, and in any volume, with the sole time lapse being determined only by the time it takes to 
manufacture and distribute the copied garment. Id. One might envision an online distribution of garment 
sketches as well, rather resembling the pattern catalogs of old (for e.g., Butterick’s), many of which were 
done on a mail order basis. In a more current parallel, one might consider e-books that are delivered to 
various terminals with stand-alone printers, which can be printed instantaneously, and in as many copies 
as needed, on demand. 
213 Id. at 1760.  
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original designers perceive the costs of pursuing such protections for original designs, and 
litigating for enforcement of those protections, as too onerously high.214 Yet while protecting 
designs under a high-IP regime does tend to come at a cost, in many industries that are no more 
lucrative than fashion, original creators do take recourse to such protective legal measures. Cost 
does not seem to be an obvious deterrent, and particularly not to those at the highest end of the 
spectrum, who are analogous to fashion’s original designers at the top of the fashion pyramid. In 
other words, it is not likely that cost alone keeps fashion’s first movers from bolstering their 
market advantage with enhanced legal protection. 
Recently, however, a consortium of some of fashion’s most successful, and arguably most 
original, designers has sought a change in fashion’s equilibrium.215 What may explain this 
sudden turn toward increased IP protection among fashion’s first movers? One possibility is that 
while first-mover advantage has remained more or less secured by the same group of original 
designers in fashion, its overall magnitude has changed over time, and has only recently reached 
a critical point. In other words, it is possible that changing technology has taken fashion to a 
tipping point, such that almost immediate reproduction, manufacturing, and distribution of 
garments is finally eroding any remaining space between originators and copiers. By closing the 
gap in the fashion cycle, copyists may also be diminishing the returns that original designers can 
gain from the first unveiling of their works. And by enhancing the quality of their reproductions, 
copyists may also be undermining the long-term appeal of the original designers’ works—at least 
some of which has traditionally been based in their claim to superior quality of production. These 
new elements, and a resulting shift in the fashion equilibrium, may be strong enough to drive 
designers to seek new IP protections, where previously the case for such protections was not seen 
as compelling enough to spur them to legislative action. 
The first-mover advantage theory ties in neatly with the pattern of trend-setting and induced 
obsolescence that drives the fashion cycle. When original designs issue forth from top designers, 
they circulate through the marketplace—beginning with fashion-forward consumers and 
continuing through to mass-market customers—and, like meteors falling to earth, lose some heat 
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as they approach. It is in their first appearance, then, that these designs are arguably most 
valuable, both in terms of commanding the highest prices and in terms of seeming most 
desirable. While not all original designs are pacesetters, of course, those that are will be snapped 
up within a very short timespan. In that short time, designers can best recover their often 
considerable initial outlay, reap a profit on the margins, and simultaneously secure their 
reputation for originality and trend-worthiness. Indeed, the reputational benefits that first-movers 
enjoy cannot be overstated. By creating an original work, or style, that becomes the seasonal 
standard-bearer, an original designer plants her stake in the fashion landscape and secures her 
place in the pantheon. The most innovative designers and their firms absolutely rely upon this 
step to establish the value and to grow the renown of their brand. Reputational value bolsters the 
strength of their trademarks and adds immeasurably to the selling power of their logos. The 
process may be lengthy—after all, firms like Chanel have matured into iconic brands over more 
than half a century—but it is essential and requires constant tending. Thus, while the fashion 
cycle is short and tumultuous, its “long tail” is prolonged and ultimately value-adding. Original 
designers will recoup their investment in the early and short window of trend-driven sales; but 
they will realize the rewards from their brand value only after their leadership status is secured. 
The window of opportunity for first-movers is critical to their advantage, and nowhere does this 
seem clearer than in the fashion industry. For one part, it benefits the original designers, as 
discussed above. It also yields a vital space in which consumers can evaluate the latest fashions, 
determine what is this season’s trending style or garment(s), and seek out either the original, 
haute couture version or the inevitable copies or re-workings that are sure to follow. In this time, 
trending items or styles often become identified in consumers’ minds with their fashion 
originators, such as Hermes’s Birkin bag,216 or the Azzedine Alaïa’s “bandage” dresses.217 In 
recent years, this window can seem very short: top designs are continually issued and shown at 
couture collections year-round; photographers, magazines, and now blogs, social media sites, 
and other interested observers very rapidly disseminate detailed descriptions, critiques, 
photographs, sketches, and other representations of the original works; follow-on designers are 
preparing their appropriations, almost simultaneously with these fashion conversations; and 
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consumers are poring through the host of information in order to determine just which fashions 
they “must” have and purchase for immediate use. And the speed of the fashion cycle only 
accelerates with new technologies, as has happened in many other industries as well. Thus, 
copying seems to approach near-instantaneous rates of reproduction, which leads to the question: 
when, if at all, does the ever-shrinking window cause copying to become more of a threat to, 
rather than a mere side-effect of, the production and exploitation of fashion’s original design? 
In theory, the simplest answer is that induced obsolescence requires some margin of time 
between the issuance of original designs and the appearance of their copies. If that margin is so 
small that original designers cannot sell their goods exclusively, and at a premium, then they will 
not be able to recoup their investments and make a profit. Recognizing this, original designers 
would feel they had no incentive to issue original designs regularly, and would instead resort to 
other strategies, such as continually re-issuing variations on older fashions, or just abandoning 
stylistic creativity altogether. This scenario would seem most to likely occur if copying were to 
become nearly instantaneous—which advances in technology would seem almost certain to 
allow. In recent years, technology has in fact made nearly instantaneous copying possible. Again, 
in theory, the mechanisms for immediate appropriation seem set in place. 
In practice, however, there is a critical reason why near-instantaneous copying has not threatened 
the creative and commercial fundaments of original design. The induced obsolescence of the 
fashion industry depends upon the existence of trends that arise season upon season and anchor 
stylistic preferences among consumers. These trends can arise across the industry as a whole, or 
in certain niches that then spread outward to reach a wider audience. They can be seeded by the 
leaders of fashion, or they can arrive somewhat organically, as a “look” that is carried by the 
enthusiasm of certain early adopters—not all of whom may be obvious standard-bearers.218 But 
in more than one case, these trends do not occur or crystallize overnight; rather, they require 
some time to disseminate and gain acceptance in the marketplace. Even the most assiduous 
follow-on designers cannot immediately predict or determine which trends will take hold of the 
                                                
218 One example is style-setters in Tokyo, Japan, known as Harajuku Girls, who have cobbled together 
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consumer imagination—that is, which will sell and which will flop. Their design appropriation, 
to be cost-effective, cannot occur without such a determination of the latest and most popular 
trends. There is a strong incentive among follow-on designers to wait until they can most 
accurately assess the trend-setting pieces that are to be re-worked and resold. Even original 
designers themselves must wait to see what consumers will gravitate toward and what they will 
leave on the shelves. This lag-time is critical, therefore, in trend-setting, but also in delaying the 
process of design appropriation. This lag also secures the first-mover advantage by virtue of 
ensuring that time must pass between the issuance of original designs, the establishment of 
trends, and the eventual appearance of copied or derivative works. This may well help to explain 
why fashion succeeds as a low-IP regime: its structure enables originators to thrive even where 
legal protections do not shield their works from appropriation. 
Even in the current era, when technological advances certainly enable near-instantaneous 
copying, the lag between original design, trend, and copies does seem to persist.219 This merely 
follows a long arc of fashion history, however, in which the window between phases seems to 
have been ever-shortening. Empirically, there is much evidence to show that copying was rife in 
much earlier times, and that copyists became ever more adept at reproducing designs through the 
technological advances in photographing, communicating, and manufacturing designs both on 
paper and in cloth. Not once but on several occasions, Congress has considered the legal 
protection of fashion, only to override its challenge and reject its necessity outright.220 Original 
designers have, for the most part, been quiescent as these challenges have been raised.221 Only in 
very recent years has the clarion call for IP protection of fashion been raised by a consortium of 
originators in the industry.222 They now contend that technological advances have made near-
instantaneous copying so profitable that copiers will appropriate even before trends have 
definitively emerged.223 If it is the case that copying has approached such immediacy, and that it 
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has impinged upon original designers to an unprecedented and irreparably damaging extent, then 
the low-IP regime of fashion may need to be reappraised and perhaps recalibrated. There is a 
need for empirical data in this regard, but changes in incentives through propertization remains, 
at best, an open and arguable question indeed. 
7. Innovation in the Context of Fashion 
 
Another possible rationale for fashion’s low-IP stasis may lie in the nature of innovation specific 
to the apparel industry.224 Broadly speaking, fashion is an industry that cannot look to either 
continuous innovations or improvements in product quality to drive demand.225 It therefore 
requires another mechanism to prompt consumer demand, induce the turnover of goods, and spur 
sales. The need for such inducements is even greater when taking into consideration the nature of 
fashion: its garments are ordinarily quite durable, and do not need to be replaced regularly due to 
simply being worn out and unserviceable. While apparel itself is essential, new apparel often is 
not (and of course much of its accompanying accessories usually even less so). Nothing, then, 
inherently necessitates product churn in the context of fashion. Yet the industry’s vitality 
depends upon consumers replacing their garments, however serviceable, and purchasing new 
items as often as possible. What then is the mechanism that drives consumer demand? It is the 
process of trend creation, and its dissemination across the fashion pyramid via appropriation, that 
moves the market. In short, piracy stokes fashion’s fires and keeps them burning year-round.226 
In comparing the features of fashion cycles to those of other creative industries, it becomes clear 
that innovation in the context of fashion is rather special. In electronics, for instance, innovations 
can be as important as the creation of a new device, such as the invention of the mobile 
telephone, or as minor as the addition of a new feature on a device, such as the emergence of 
ringtone choices that are carried on a mobile telephone. On occasion, electronic innovations can 
be so vital that they disrupt the market altogether and create entire new markets around them, as 
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in the well-known case of Apple’s portable devices.227 Technology affords many examples of 
“game changing” innovations—inventions that profoundly affect and shape the industry. Fashion 
has very few, if any, real equivalents. Perhaps the introduction of fashionable denim apparel for 
both men and women, and across the socioeconomic spectrum (as opposed to merely working 
attire), could be said to be similarly revolutionary. But another such example is hard to find, as it 
does not occur with any kind of frequency in fashion. Similarly, innovations that affect quality in 
electronics—reliability, size and portability, and so on—do not have much of a functional 
equivalent in fashion. Of course, there are some improvements in the quality of fashion goods, 
such as better manufacturing processes and greater availability of luxury materials due to 
globalized sourcing and distribution. But these do not offer the same significant impetus to 
consumer demand that quality improvements do in the industry contexts of technology and 
electronics. Simply, fashion does not, and cannot, rely on this kind of innovation to keep its 
market activity afloat. 
But while fashion does not have game-changing innovation, it does have the ability to present 
itself as ever-changing and newly appealing. The dynamism of the fashion industry is founded 
on its ability to market its products as seasonal, fresh, and continually desirable—not just on one 
occasion, but on multiple appearances. The corollary premise that fashion promotes is that 
consumers should want to pursue the freshest, most widely approved and sanctioned garments—
that is, what is on trend. But the trend, naturally, is by design finite and indeed short-lived, so 
that fashion’s consumers are not only constantly induced to purchase but also, simultaneously, to 
be seeking the next, newest items to pursue. The iteration of original designs by top designers 
begins the process, but securing those works by follow-on designers is what adds the seal of 
general sanction and approbation to the trend. This is the particular nature of fashion—and it 
may be the most powerful rationale supporting fashion’s acceptance of copying at the heart of 
the industry. The role that design appropriation plays in trend-setting and securing is likely 
recognized by designers as an integral part of stoking consumer demand. Possibly for this reason, 
designers have been loathe overall to pursue greater IP protection in the industry, which might 
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otherwise bring it on par with innovative industries like electronics and information technology. 
The low-IP stasis, then, rests on the understanding that innovation in the context of fashion is 
particularized and not truly comparable to certain other innovative industries. And as the 
industry’s vitality is integrally tied to appropriation, it must distinguish itself by maintaining the 
low levels of IP that best suit its own nature. 
There are two objections to the idea that the particular nature of originality in fashion functions 
best in a low-IP regime. The first one begins with agreeing, ex hypothesi, that original fashion 
design exists, and that it is generated by top-level designers with enough of a modicum of 
originality to satisfy the current copyright law requirements. It is also granted that such original 
design must somehow disseminate throughout the fashion pyramid through the process of 
widespread trend-setting and appeal to consumers’ purchasing instincts and desires. Haute 
couture alone, it must be recognized, does not a sufficient fashion market make; mass-market 
sales are where the bulk of profits lie, and where fashion sees its essential success. But what if 
such original design were to come under a high-IP regime, subject to copyright and reserving to 
its designers all the exclusive rights appertaining to copyrighted original work? 
One possibility under a high-IP regime might be that original designers would have far greater 
incentives not only to generate original work but also to create derivative works themselves and 
to capitalize on the gains from such derivation and, as it were, self-appropriation. Original 
designers might be motivated to create more tiered levels of apparel and goods, such as the 
varied brand lines discussed earlier.228 Another option, as also discussed,229 would be that 
original designers undertake to engage in more partnerships with retail firms and mass-
marketers, so that these derivative works could reach as broad and diverse an audience, at as 
wide a range of price points, as possible. The work of copyists—and importantly the rents that 
copyists secure under a free appropriation regime—would be captured by the original designers. 
It might seem only fair that original designers have the right to benefit from their own derivative 
and appropriated work, as would be the case under any standard high-IP regime. And perhaps 
follow-on designers, deprived of the rewards flowing from appropriation, would be stimulated to 
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engage in more original work themselves. In theory, this would appear to result in a net increase 
in originality throughout the industry. Further, it would square with the incentivization rationale 
of IP law, in which creativity is encouraged and rewarded by exclusive rights. Lastly, where 
appropriation and/or derivation occurred, it would appear to distribute the associated rewards to 
the superior claimant, the top designers whose originality dominates and drives the industry. This 
too fits under standard IP law doctrine, which includes among the rights it cedes to owners the 
right to make and benefit from derivative work.230  
One countervailing response to this objection is based in an observation of present-day practices: 
nothing thus far has prevented original designers from engaging in practices such as offering 
multiple lines of apparel under different brand names, partnering with retail firms or mass-
marketers, or otherwise creating derivative works or new items appropriated from their earlier 
original designs. As noted, increasing numbers of designers are availing themselves of these 
opportunities to take advantage of their work at multiple levels and in various venues. Moreover, 
even top designers have been known to circle back and create works that draw upon, or frankly 
copy, their earlier original designs.231 The practice of offering multiple iterations of a garment, 
even among haute couture designers, is well-established.232 Self-appropriation is accepted 
                                                
230 In essence, this is Randy Picker’s argument in Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts. See Picker, supra note 39, 
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copyright protection for original fashion design. 
231 For example, Coach created the “heritage” collection of bags that recreated and “referenced” their own 
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MAIL (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2072022/Cut-price-Karl-Chanel-
designer-launches-50-300-diffusion-line.html; Designers Launch Diffusion Lines, FASHION UNITED (Jan. 
10, 2012), http://www.fashionunited.co.uk/fashion-news/fashion/designers-launch-diffusion-lines-
2012011013795. See generally Robin Mellery-Pratt, Do Diffusion Lines Still Make Sense?, BUSINESS OF 
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industry practice, and readily allows top designers to benefit from derivative work based on their 
original design. In many instances, their most iconic work can have a very “long tail” indeed, 
and stretch its rewards over generations of retail and consumption. 
At the same time, however, designers could well expand their efforts in this direction. That they 
are not overwhelmingly eager to do so may indicate several considerations that may not rest on 
the putative harms of design copying. First, designers may be aware that too much derivative 
work can dilute the exclusivity, and hence the cachet, of their jealously-guarded name. Even as 
early as in the 1970s, such famous designers as Pierre Cardin discovered that selling secondary 
lines, often unfortunately of secondary quality, irreparably damaged the prestige of their brand 
and the sales of their highest-end goods.233 Thus, top designers may choose to allow lower-level 
designers to imitate their work, and yet maintain their distance from those works, thereby 
reinforcing their exclusive standing. Further, designers at all levels may at some point or other 
benefit from the open appropriation environment of fashion. While some top-level designers, in 
particular those who advocate for increased copyright protection of original designs, may offer 
examples of the harms caused by copying, they do not always discuss, or indeed acknowledge, 
certain less-obvious benefits that can accrue from open appropriation. These benefit are: (i) the 
freedom all designers enjoy to borrow from other designers, even among peers; (ii) the ability of 
all designers to participate in trends that emerge in a given season, which may entail copying, 
again even among peers; and (iii) the benefits that top designers may gain when their design 
becomes trend-setting and therefore widely consumed, including increases in sales of the original 
works. In toto, copying may well serve the industry from top to bottom, and the net aggregate 
return to the industry may well explain the persistence of the low-IP regime. 
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In the last 40 years, IP rights in academic work, such as scientific research and discovery, has 
seen an enormous growth in generation of work, management of rights, and allocation of 
rewards. More recently, the ownership of owns academic copyright has recently become a hotly 
contested issue in the higher education sector, due in great part to the disruption that the Internet 
has wrought on many areas of academic work, including teaching and learning, scholarship, 
preparation of courses and related materials, and other tasks and outputs. To analyze IP in the 
educational sector, one must begin with recognizing the transformation of the academic 
marketplace. The emergence of IP rights as a vital area in academic circles began with rights in 
patentable work. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was enacted to spur academic research and 
innovation, by allowing it to be patented and marketed for profit. Recognizing the value of such 
work at the outset, universities were quick to assert rights over patentable work, establishing 
sophisticated technology transfer offices to manage such rights and the revenues that might 
accrue from marketing of patented academic work. At the same time, faculty scholars strongly 
asserted their right to continue publishing their results, and in many instances reserved their right 
to share and collaborate in “upstream” scientific research. The division was made relatively 
clear: universities owned patent rights -- with the exception of certain spin-offs created by 
especially entrepreneurial faculty -- while faculty members maintained the right to publish, 
teach, own and control their scholarly work, such as articles, textbooks, and other written work. 
 
The division of IP rights in patentable academic work created a de facto allocation of rewards as 
well. On the institutional side, universities had the right to own and commercialize patentable 
scientific research and discovery (“R&D”). This reward of ownership also came with a strong 
measure of control, particularly when the patentable work was initially funded, in part or whole, 
by outside entities, such as venture partners, corporate sponsors, and so forth. Ownership and 
control, however, can challenge the culture of open sharing and collaboration that many 
academics feel is innate, and even necessary, to the “cultural commons” of higher education. 
Many scholars still dispute the value of commercialization of patentable academic work, when 
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such monetary potential is measured against the cultural values of education -- the sharing and 
dissemination of information, pedagogy, academic freedom, and so on. But at the same time, 
scholars cannot so easily dismiss the benefits that come from relinquishing patentable rights so 
that they may be monetized. Scholars whose work is patentable do gain considerable reputational 
benefits, access to grants and outside funding, as well as other desirable status-related rewards in 
their field. Moreover, the monetary rewards that can flow from patents enrich the university, 
which redound to their benefits -- witness the success of Gatorade at University of Florida, and 
the rewards it has yielded to the entire institution’s benefit. Monetization, therefore, can offer a 
reason for academics to compromise on IP rights -- and in a best-case scenario, the outcome can 
be described as win-win. 
 
On the copyright side, the division of IP rights with respect to the ownership and control of 
courses and related course materials has been far more quiescent until quite recently. Early cases 
involved disputes over academic copyright in lectures and lecture notes prepared by professors. 
Both well-established practice and state copyright law made it clear that professors were 
considered to own the rights in their lectures and lecture notes. The latter, i.e., the lecture notes, 
served to “fix” the lectures sufficient for copyright purposes, and thereby enabled the lecturer to 
assert copyright in his or her lectures and, naturally, courses. 
 
Courts granting faculty ownership and control over their lecture notes relied upon a doctrine 
known as the “teacher exception” (also sometimes referred to as the “academic exception”). 
Without the protection of the teacher exception, an argument could be made that faculty working 
for universities were employees of the institution under the common law of agency, and were 
therefore subject to the “work made for hire” doctrine that vested rights in their output to the 
institution. The “teacher exception,” however, as delineated by the courts, exempted faculty from 
the work made for hire doctrine on the grounds that academics were autonomous agents, whose 
professional lives were defined by academic freedom -- a high degree of independence from any 
institutional controls, enabling faculty to engage in free thought and expression that may be 
considered essential to advancing scholarship, teaching, and learning -- and that faculty were 
therefore the owners of copyright in their work. All this became thrown into question by the 
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, which was silent on the issue of teachers’ rights, and 
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did not codify the judge-made exception into statutory law. Since the promulgation of the Act, 
courts have not clearly spoken on whether or not the teacher exception survives to date. 
 
Why, then, has copyright in courses become a hot-button issue now? As in the case of patentable 
academic work, the commercial potential of courses has driven the debate. The emergence of the 
Internet, and its ability to make online education -- or distance learning -- viable and active on a 
scale previously unheard of, perhaps unimagined, has opened up new vistas for the commercial 
potential of academic courses. Distance education allows universities to disseminate courses to 
vast audiences, and in theory at least, to charge supplementary fees for such courses. The spread 
of online courses has seemed to promise new profits for cash-strapped institutions. At the same 
time, another trend in education is the ongoing increase in hiring of permanent adjunct 
professors, rather than tenure-track faculty, to teach courses. “Adjunctification,” as it is known in 
higher education circles, tackles the expense side of the ledger, while monetization of courses 
affects the revenue side. But do adjuncts function more as independent contractors than as 
employees of an institution? The trade-off seems to be one of decreased autonomy, and likely 
decreased academic freedom, but increased mobility, agency, and ability to circulate on the open 
marketplace. Should adjuncts, if they are indeed independent contractors, be exempted from the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine not due to the “teacher exception,” but rather due to their status as 
non-employees? And if so, do they have a stronger right to claim copyright in their work? 
 
The first case that brought copyright in courses to the fore was not one involving an adjunct, 
however, but one involving a famous faculty member at Harvard Law School, Professor Arthur 
Miller. The Miller dispute made waves in academic circles in part due to a dawning awareness 
that distance education was burgeoning, and institutions had better respond quickly by making 
their “land grab” much as had been done in the early days of patent’s commercial promise. 
Universities did so respond, on several counts. First, many chose to establish online ventures, 
either individually or collaboratively, seeking to gain a “first-mover advantage” in the online 
marketplace. Second, most issued comprehensive copyright policies, or contractual agreements 
with faculty, usually asserting institutional ownership of copyright related to courses their faculty 
offered at the university. And third, as in the case of Professor Miller, most chose to make it 
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clear that they would defend the institutional right to assert copyright in courses and related 
work. 
 
Interestingly, however, even the most entrepreneurial universities failed to take into account one 
reality of the marketplace, academic or otherwise: for a seller to succeed, there must be a willing 
buyer on the other side. Virtually every distance education venture established by traditional 
universities failed to recuperate its startup costs, primarily because the buyers just were not there: 
the online courses were generally massively undersubscribed, and any groundswell of interest in 
general education seemed elusive, not to materialize in actual course participants. In other words, 
the gold rush mentality that sought to make copyright in courses the new ground for monetary 
success met up with the reality of the marketplace. Courses suddenly seemed only valuable in the 
context of a degree-granting program, whether educational or vocational. And concomitantly, the 
tussle over copyright in courses went quiet again. 
 
Almost at the same time as the diminution in the distance education gold rush, a few entities, 
most notably MIT, were exploring an “open source” alternative to for-profit online learning. The 
OpenCourseWare project was the most ambitious in scope, and in many ways the innovative 
leader in the emergence of free online courses, available to all, known as “Massive Open Online 
Courses” (“MOOCs”). MIT’s project was primarily underwritten by a very large funding grant, 
as well as by its institution’s deep endowment. In certain other cases, such as Coursera, edX, and 
Udacity, institutions may partner with venture capitalists, philanthropists, government support, 
and other outside sources, to fund startup, maintenance, and expansion costs. Some MOOCs 
offer programs that may award a “certificate of accomplishment”, but most still offer only credit 
or non-credit courses, while none to date terminate in a degree. 
 
If MOOCs offer primarily free courses online, why would course copyright continue to matter? 
The most powerful answer at present is that their business model is still evolving, and institutions 
are still keenly interested in trying to monetize them. Various commercially interesting options 
have been raised, including: (i) A tuition model, under which students pay the originating 
institution for course credit; (ii) a cross- or up-sell model, under which course materials, such as 
videotaped lectures, are freely available, but ancillary services such as assignment grading, 
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access to social networks and discussions, and so on are fee-based; and (iii) a spin-off/licensing 
mode, under which the course, parts of the course, or customized versions of the course are sold 
to institutions or businesses for their internal use; or use of the MOOC platform itself is licensed 
for institutional use. Under any of these business models, monetization of the courses offered 
would benefit the copyright holder in the course, and might yield further benefits upon 
exploitation of derivative works or use. 
 
The emergence of MOOCs is being heralded as a major part of disruptive innovation in the 
higher education sector. It is in particular one aspect of the separation -- the “unbundling” -- of 
the goods and services offered by the modern university, and sold to its customers in either a full 
menu, such as a terminal degree program, or a la carte, such as an individuated course. This 
draws into question, however, what is valued at the university, and not just what has (monetary) 
value. Is it the degree, as the “freemium” model -- which gives away the course content and 
retains the value in the final imprimatur of a degree -- that has value? Is it the instruction by a 
professor to a class of students, and if so, does it matter if the class consists of a handful of 
students meeting face-to-face or an audience of asynchronous, invisible learners connected by 
technology? Is an instructor the creator of a course, or merely its vessel for delivery? Does she 
have control of her work, and ownership rights in it, or does she transmit it and relinquish it to 
the institution at which she teaches? What goal does copyright in education serve? As the 
Constitution provides, it is intended to “promote progress of science and the useful arts.” Does 
vesting copyright in a particular entity or person make a difference to the promotion of progress 
in education? The standard argument in favor of granting the “limited monopoly” that 
intellectual property affords is that without its incentive, creators will not be able to recuperate 
their investment costs of creating, let alone make a profit from the fruits of their labor. Granting 
copyright in courses and related materials, if such can be sold and exploited via online learning 
ventures, should surely further the purpose that lies behind the grant of intellectual property 
rights. What is unclear, however, is who should hold those rights in the brave new world of 
distance education, and whether copyright can be allocated in a balanced way that serves faculty, 
both itinerant and fixed, as well as institutions, both established and new. These important 
normative questions are not answerable by black-letter law. Thus, we need to work through the 
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implications of how we as a society want to address these conflicts and contradictions and shape 
the law to changing circumstances and technology.  
 
In this chapter, I address the complicated issues surrounding ownership of copyright in academic 
work with a survey of its treatment in the courts, both prior to and following the enactment of the 
Copyright Act of 1976. I show that the narrow “teacher exception” to the work-for-hire doctrine, 
which normally governs the ownership of work done in the employment context, has been 
carved out by practice and policy, but not codified into law. The status of the teacher exception is 
therefore unclear, and may not survive challenge in the courts. Due at least in part to this 
ambiguity, I show that higher education institutions are taking care to draft contractual policies 
and agreements that allocate copyright ownership rights and rewards in courses and related 
course materials. I examine several university policies that exemplify the distribution that most 
institutions now agree on, in which course ownership is claimed by universities, while support 
and resources for course creation, sometimes with additional compensation, is accorded to 
faculty. Finally, I discuss the future of academic copyright ownership in the context of the 
burgeoning online education market. I argue that in early stages, the expenditure of university 
resources in starting distance education programs may justify institutional ownership of 
copyright. However, as universities continue to move toward a business model that entails the 
increased hiring of adjuncts -- free agents who far more closely resemble independent 
contractors than university employees -- they may be compelled to reconsider their ownership in 
courses pursuant to the agency law contours of the work-made-for-hire doctrine, and to return 
copyright ownership to the academic creators who will take their work into the academic 




A. Early Spaces of Commercialization in University Patents 
 
Copyright ownership in the university has moved away from its sedate, well-established past to a 
more contested territory with mutable borders. This development is relatively recent, but has 
accelerated in the past decade or so since the wide-scale adoption of the Internet. The driving 
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force of this change is the increasing commercialization of academic work, especially intellectual 
property. Technology transfer offices have long exploited the profit potential of commercially 
viable scientific research and discovery, and patentable academic work has been one of the 
earliest spaces of the commercialization and monetization of academic work. 
 
Until recently, commercialization in U.S. universities has grown in the wake of congressional 
legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,1 that gave universities the ability to patent and license 
scientific inventions and discoveries to corporate entities and partners.2 One example is that of 
Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical company and producer of genetically engineered crops, 
which agreed to fund $25 million of basic research at the University of California at Berkeley’s 
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology.3 In exchange, Novartis retained the the first right to 
negotiate one-third of the department’s discoveries, even if the research was government-
funded.4 Novartis also retained two of the five seats on the department’s research committee.5 
This agreement, according to some observers, was unprecedented, and gave rise to broadly held 
concerns over academic freedom and the free exchange of ideas in the university setting.6 As one 
scientist maintained, “this deal institutionalizes the university’s relationship with one company, 
whose interest is profit.”7 Following on this scenario, similar arrangements have arisen in the 
academic world. It is increasingly common, for instance, for university scientists to negotiate to 
retain stock options and other incentives that might affect the impartiality of their research.8 
Moreover, companies may require scientists to keep research in secret for longer than they might 
otherwise normally do so, delaying publication or even discussion of their work, to such an 
extent as may stifle the community of sharing that has traditionally been the norm in the 
university-driven sciences.9 Some studies have also found that industry-sponsored research has 
                                                
1 Officially the Patent and Trademark Law Amendment Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (1980). 
2 See David Bollier, The Enclosure of the Academic Commons, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18 
3 Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 2000, at 39, 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/03/press.htm. 




8 Id. at 41 
9 Id. at 41-42 
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produced more industry-beneficial conclusions than research that is not funded by industry10 -- a 
conclusion that casts no small cloud on the commercialization of academic science. 
 
The emphasis on commercialization of patents has shifted in recent years to a concern that such 
profit-driven motives are spilling into other areas of academic creation, including work that may 
be open to copyright. Professor James Boyle, for example, fears that the concentrated 
privatization of scientific research will lead to “creators [being] prevented from creating,”11 as 
the availability of material in the public domain is diminished or impinged upon by private nets 
being cast around basic research and discovery.12 Others feel argue that “the classical view of 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake [has been] supplanted by the public-service mission of 
‘knowledge for use.’”13 But the fear that speaks specifically to copyright in academic work is not 
only a fear of utility, rather than learning, becoming the driver of instruction and learning. 
Rather, it is a fear that the intellectual endeavors of professors are being commodified, managed 
as intellectual property by institutions’ administrative arms, and marketed with an overriding 
profit motive in view. Thus, for instance, after passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, the 
University of California System (the “UC System”) focused its attention on its existing central 
office for all of the universities, known as the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Office, and 
transformed it into the Office of Technology Transfer.14 Individual campuses were then given the 
choice to create their own technology transfer and licensing offices, with some “provid[ing] 
management for commercializable software.”15 Not until 1988 did the UC System create a 
University of California Task Force (the “UC Task Force”) to consider the need for a specific 
Copyright Office, which could address more comprehensive issues of ownership in courses that 
                                                
10 Id. at 42. Mildred Cho, a senior research scholar at Stanford’s Center for Biomedical Ethics found that 
98% of papers based on industry-sponsored research reflected favorably on the drugs examined, as 
compared with 79% of papers based on research not funded by industry. Id. 
11 Press & Washburn, supra note 3 at 48.  
12 Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP PROBS. 289 (2003); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure movement and the Construction of 
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 33 (2003);  LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE 
NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY (2004). 
13 Steven Andersen, IP 101 Research Partners Face Culture Clash, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 
1999, at 1. 
14 University of California, “Institutional,” Universitywide Taskforce on Copyright: Report and 
Recommendations (Oct. 1999), at 4 [hereinafter UC Taskforce on Copyright]. 
15 Id. 
Chapter 2: Education Viswanathan 
 90 
might be used for distance learning or other market-driven projects.16 In other words, the UC 
System began to shift from the general management of intellectual property to a more 
concentrated focus on profit-making academic work, not just in kinds of patentable work but also 
in various forms of copyrightable work. 
 
On the technology transfer side, the profits to be made from academic work are impressive. The 
Association of University Technology Managers estimates that in one year 189 North American 
universities (US and Canada) reaped $1.5 billion from royalties and licenses.17 In part, this 
implies that universities are capitalizing upon academic research, inventions and discoveries 
before they can reach the public domain, and perhaps before they can even reach publication.18 
This raises important questions concerning nature of not only scientific research, but also 
scientific norms, research sharing, publication, tenure, and other key components of academic 
work.19 
 
In the 1990s, the advent of academic courses offered via distance learning only augmented some 
of these key concerns. At this time, not only universities but also businesses, including some 
profit-driven educational ventures, saw and seized upon the commercial potential for education 
disseminated online to a new, burgeoning audience of students. Some of the early efforts in this 
new online space were collaborative; however, they often resulted in battles over the 
commercially viable intellectual properties underlying the courses. For instance, unauthorized 
commercial note-taking emerged as an early issue, and universities quickly learned to use the 
                                                
16 Id. 
17 Maureen Farrell, Universities That Turn Research Into Revenue, Forbes, (Sept. 12, 2008, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/12/google-general-electric-ent-tech-cx_mf_0912universitypatent.html 
18 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. 
L. J. 611 (2008); see also David C. Mowery, Richard R. Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, & Arvids A. 
Ziedonis The growth of patenting and licensing by U.S. universities: an assessment of the effects of the 
Bayh-Dole act of 1980, 30 RESEARCH POL. 99 (2001). 
19 See Press & Washburn supra note 3. See also Bronislaus B. Kush, Funding can blur line between 
research and business; Many institutions and journals are worried about conflicts, TELEGRAM AND 
GAZETTE Apr. 6, 1998, at A6, (noting results of zinc lozenges as helping to cure the common cold 
indicate that the researcher held stock in the company that made the zinc lozenges: “After the stock 
soared, the researcher sold his shares and made $145,000.”) 
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law to protect themselves, and their faculty’s output, through such measures barring 
unauthorized third-party note taking as state legislation, cease and desist letters, and litigation.20 
 
As early as 1988, David Noble wrote: “During the last two decades campus commercialization 
centered upon the research function of the universities, but it has now shifted to the core 
instructional function, the heart and soul of academia.”21 This change in institutional focus, 
according to Noble, is spurred by technology industries and corporations “looking for subsidized 
product development and a potentially lucrative market for [instructional hardware and 
software],” which leads to a “fundamental transformation of the nature of academic work and the 
relationship between higher educational institutions and their faculty employees.”22 This 
commercial thrust is mirrored by for-profit companies, which require faculty to assign them 
copyright as part of their terms of employment, under a business model -- rather than university 
tradition -- in order to make their distance learning projects both operational and profitable.23 
 
More recently, the profit potential of distance learning and other technology-driven works have 
come to the attention of the higher education sector, which has spurred an interest in 
copyrightable classroom. This creative work, deriving from teaching, research, and writing, is 
now the contested territory of intellectual property ownership in traditional non-profit institutions 
and for-profit ventures alike. As one journalist, upon speaking with online education consultants, 
has noted, “[t]his idea of wrestling academic control from the faculty is at the heart of many 
                                                
20 A number of law review articles address issues of distance learning, including: Nicolas P. Terry, Bricks 
Plus Bytes: How “Click-and-Brick” Will Define Legal Education Space, 46 VILL. L. REV. 95 (2001); 
Chanani Sandler, Comment, Copyright Ownership: A Fundamental of Academic Freedom, 12 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 231 (2001); Stephanie L. Seeley, Are Classroom Lectures Protected by Copyright Laws? 
The Case for Professors’ Intellectual Property Rights, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 163 (2001); James Ottavio 
Castagnera, Cory R. Fine, & Anthony Belfiore, Protecting Intellectual Capital in the New Century: Are 
Universities Prepared?, 2002 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10 (2002); Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, Distance 
Education and Intellectual Property: The Realities of Copyright Law and the Culture of Higher 
Education, 16 TOURO L. REV. 981 (Spring 2000); and Jon Garon, The Electronic Jungle: The Application 
of Intellectual Property Law to Distance Education, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 146 (Spring 2002). 
21 David F. Noble, Digital Diploma Mills - The Coming Battle over Online Instruction: Confidential 
Agreements Between Universities and Private Companies Pose Serious Challenge to Faculty Intellectual 
Property Rights, 45 CAUT BULLETIN (Sept. 1998), 
http://www.cautbulletin.ca/en_article.asp?ArticleID=2417. 
22 Id. 
23 Nobles’ articles illustrate university and for-profit connections in the online sector, often at the expense 
of faculty. 
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business models.”24 One such consultant, Bob Tucker of InterEd online education, led Arizona 
State University’s initiative to build its online program outside the scope of faculty oversight, in 
order to run the online venture as a business model, but also specifically to avoid “the enormous 
bureaucratic red tape” that faculty participation would necessarily entail.25 Many other 
universities, including UCLA, New School for Social Research, and Columbia University, have 
engaged in distance learning projects as well.26 Some of these institutions have considered the 
Arizona State model in their ventures, but it remains to be seen whether they, too, will seek to 
exclude faculty oversight in their pursuit of education in the online space. 
 
B. Software and Digital Media 
 
The changing nature of the academic marketplace may well trigger more contentious claims -- if 
not litigation -- over copyright ownership in faculty-created work. As noted, universities once 
tended to refrain from challenging ownership in faculty work at least in part because there was 
no expectation that such work would become commercially marketable.27 Only in the area of 
technology transfer, where valuable patents have always been commercially viable, have 
universities looked to reap significant sources of revenue from academic intellectual property.28 
But while most universities’ technology transfer offices have concentrated their efforts on 
owning and harvesting marketable patents, some are now looking to potentially lucrative 
                                                
24 Joshua Green, Superstars Online, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Oct. 23, 2000, available at 
http://www.prospect.org/print/v11/22/green-j-3.html. 
25 Id. 
26 An early example of distance learning was Fathom, a joint venture between numerous prominent 
institutions to offer online courses. Fathom was conceived as a route to monetizing online education, but 
eventually disbanded when it failed to attract a sufficient volume of students. Participating institutions 
included Arizona State University, Columbia University, the BBC, UCLA Extension, University of 
British Columbia, University of San Diego, University of Washington, Concord Law School, Syracuse 
University, University at Buffalo, University of California Extension, Berkeley, University of Michigan-
Flint, American Film Institute, the British Library, the British Museum, Cambridge University Press, 
London School of Economics, the Natural History Museum, New York Public Library, RAND, the 
Science Museum, University of Chicago, and University of Michigan. See Course Providers, FATHOM at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20020829013101/http://fathom.com/about/course_providers.jhtml. See also 
the University Alliance, which includes Jacksonville University, Regis University, Saint Leo University, 
University of South Florida, Villanova University, and eArmyU (the U.S. Army), Homepage, 
UNIVERSITY ALLIANCE, http://www.universityalliance.com (last visited Feb. 28, 2015).   
27 See Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work in a 
Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 239 (2004). 
28 See Id. 
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copyrights to add value to their IP portfolios.29 As one commentator puts it, “[t]he ownership of 
academic work, non-patentable work, is now on the table as a negotiation item between faculties 
and their employing universities.”30 
 
The main driver of change is simply that faculty members are creating more copyrightable works 
that potentially have substantial commercial value.31 For instance, university departments of 
science and engineering have created pioneering software that underpins both the Internet and 
the economy the Internet sustains.32 Some digital media, also often generated by universities, 
such as online content and databases, may have substantial commercial value.33 Most germane to 
the point, universities are increasingly focused on growing both online courses and the digital 
materials (including lectures, class notes, platforms, and so on) on which these courses are 
based.34 Distance education, an industry experiencing exponential growth in both for-profit and 
not-for-profit sectors, relies upon such digital educational materials for its very existence.35 At 
the same time, many traditional universities have sought to stay competitive with distance 
education providers by offering online courses and utilizing or distributing digital course 
materials, while incurring minimal additional costs to their institutional budgets.36 When 
                                                
29 See Arti K. Rai, University Software Ownership and Litigation: A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1519, 1525 (2009) (“[I]n contrast with biotechnology, where copyright is not available, universities can 
use software copyright to achieve revenue goals); Scully, at 229, 231, 259 
30 Scully, supra note 27, at 260. 
31 See Id. at 239 (explaining how this changed, and how circumstances differed “before the arrival of 
digital distribution by the Internet ten years ago” [that is, ten years prior to the article’s publication in 
2004]). 
32 See Id. at 257 (outlining the development of the “information economy,” in which “[w]ealth could now 
be more easily created from the acquisition, manipulation, and dissemination of information through 
computers and the Internet than from the manufacture and distribution of tangible goods like razors and 
race cars”). 
33 See Gregory Pryor, Sachin Premnath, and Joseph Rosenbaum, Commercial Risks and Rewards of 
Social Media Phenomenon, Int’l L. Office (Feb. 18, 2010) 
34 See Morgan, Glenda, Faculty Ownership of Digital Course Materials, 5 TEACHING WITH TECH. 
TODAY (Jan. 25, 2000). 
35 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT AND DIGITAL DISTANCE EDUCATION 20-23 
(1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON COPYRIGHT]; Michael Klein, The Equitable Rule: Copyright Ownership 
of Distance-Education Courses, 31 J.C. & U.L. 143, 146-7 (2004).   
36 See REPORT ON COPYRIGHT, at 22-24 (“One major benefit of [online education] is that educational 
institutions have the costs of expensive distance education defrayed by their corporate partners...and often 
gain access to the latest research of leading academics as reflected in their curriculum”); Klein, supra note 
35 at 148-49 (providing examples of several universities that offer distance education courses in 
conjunction with for-profit ventures); Scully, supra note 27 at 231. 
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universities can couple such course offerings with proprietary software, social network 
platforms, and other digital media, they can strengthen their competitive advantage and stay 
ahead in the commercial educational marketplace. 
 
C. Lectures and Lecture Notes 
 
One area of copyrightable academic work that predated the emergence of technology such as 
software, the Internet, and digitization is the ownership of lectures and lecture notes created by a 
professor for a specific course. This was an early area of litigation in the academic sector, a 
notable fact given that litigation in the area of copyright ownership of scholarly work has been 
remarkably sparse. There are two rather obvious reasons for the relative lack of published 
opinions in the field. First, universities generally prefer not to resort to litigation, particularly 
against their own faculty members.37 The academic world tends to favor internal resolution of 
disputes, thereby avoiding both internal discord in the community and outside attention to its 
concerns.38 Second, the vast majority of educational institutions now preempt potential disputes 
over copyright ownership through the careful preparation of faculty policies and guidelines, as 
well as employment contracts.39 Virtually every university has sought to meet today’s 
intellectual property challenges by drafting policies that specifically address the allocation of 
ownership rights in the work created by its faculty.40 Third, and lastly, a relative lack of 
commercial value in copyrightable academic work has mostly relegated such disputes to a back-
burner status. Unlike the evident potential value of patentable work, copyrightable work has 
never seemed to hold out the promise of riches for either institutions or faculty. Although the 
                                                
37 Nathaniel S. Strauss, Anything But Academic: How Copyright’s Work-For-Hire Doctrine Affects 
Professors, Graduate Students, and K-12 Teachers in the Information Age, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 
n.10 (Fall 2011) (citing WENDY S. WHITE, WHAT TO DO WHEN YOU GET A SUBPOENA OR A LEGAL 
NOTICE OR COMPLAINT? (2010)). 
38 See CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102 (2001).  
39 See Jed Scully, The Virtual Professorship: Intellectual Property Ownership of Academic Work in a 
Digital Era, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 257 (2004). 
40 See Ashley Packard, Copyright or Copy Wrong: An Analysis of University Claims to Faculty Work, 7 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 275, 294-99 (citing Laura G. Lape, Ownership of Copyrightable Works of University 
Professors: The Interplay Between the Copyright Act and University Copyright Policies, 37 VILL. L. REV. 
223 (1992)). 
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academic sector does have something of a reputation for in-fighting over seemingly insignificant 
rewards,41 until quite recently copyright has not typically been one of the disputed domains. 
 
Lectures and lecture notes were likewise not subject to dispute for a significant span of time. As 
in the case of a professor creating copyrightable work such as a book, article, or monograph, 
deeply-seated academic tradition and widespread belief in the academic community generally 
held that the work belongs to the professor who creates it.42 However, even prior to the Internet, 
copyright ownership debates did arise over the unauthorized publication of lecture notes by third 
parties not associated with the originating faculty member or university. 
 
A preliminary concern with lectures and lecture notes was fitting them into the purview of 
copyright law in the first place. Two points of contention needed to be cleared: “creativity” and 
“fixation.” In order to be copyrightable, the Copyright Act provides that a work must have some 
modicum of creative originality and be fixed in a tangible form.43 While relatively low, the 
creativity threshold is important.44 As one commentator, Professor Elizabeth Townsend-Gard,45 
illustrates: “a multiple choice or essay test would, in most circumstances, meet the two 
requirements. However, if a teacher prepares an answer sheet that has the student circle either the 
‘T’ or the ‘F’ for twenty-five questions, in all likelihood the answer sheet would not be 
copyrightable, because two columns with ‘T’ and ‘F’ in them would not meet the minimum 
                                                
41 As the famous Columbia Political Science professor William Stanley Sayre once noted “academic 
politics is the most vicious and bitter form of politics, because the stakes are so low.” Alan L. Otten, 
Politics and People, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20 1973 at 14. This quote is often attributed to Henry Kissinger. 
See A Humanist at the Humanities, THE NEW REPUBLIC, 8 (Aug. 20, 1977)( “The republic of learning and 
letters works by squabbling—especially bitter squabbling, Henry Kissinger used to say, because the 
stakes are so small.”). 
42 See, e.g., MCSHERRY, supra note 37. 
43 17 U.S.C. § 102(a): “Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression… Works of authorship include the following 
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, 
including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) 
architectural works.” 
44 The originality requirement is relatively easy to meet, requiring only “a slight amount [of originality] to 
suffice.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
45 Professor Townsend is an Associate Professor at Tulane Law School.  
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qualifications for creativity or originality.”46 As Professor Townsend-Gard further points out, 
“the policy behind this makes sense: if one teacher owned the copyright on that type of answer 
sheet, that one teacher could prevent everyone else from using that form, because having a 
copyright allows the owner to control the reproduction and distribution of the work, the creation 
of derivative works, the distribution of copies, and the public performance of the work.”47 Under 
the idea-expression dichotomy of copyright law, a copyright protects the expression of a creative 
work, but does not create the ideas expressed within said work.48 Thus, if the teacher in the 
above example were to create an essay test, rather than a multiple-choice test, the phrasing and 
language of the essay questions -- that is, the art of creation -- would be protected, while the facts 
and ideas expressed would not.49 In other words, if another teacher were to use the same ideas as 
those in the test, her essay test would not be found to infringe on the original work. However, if 
her expression of those ideas were to resemble too closely the original, her essay test might not 
be considered infringing under copyright law. 
 
Lectures and lecture notes, typically prepared for a specific class by a professor, are likely to 
meet the originality requirement. In cases where the lecture is “canned,” or offered many times 
without variation, even among professors -- for example, a bar review lecture that follows a 
highly fixed format and structure, and that may not vary even in phrasing over several years -- 
there may be some debate as to originality. But again, a relatively low modicum of originality 
would be sufficient to pass muster for most university professors and the class lectures they 
individually prepare and present. 
 
                                                
46 Elizabeth Townsend, Legal and Policy Responses to the Disappearing "Teacher Exception," or 
Copyright Ownership in the 21st Century University, MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 209, 222 (2003).  
47 Id. at *222. See also, 17 U.S.C. § 106 
48 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954)(“ Unlike a patent, a copyright gives no exclusive 
right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”) 
49 Townsend, supra note 46, at 222. See also, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b): “In no case does copyright protection 
for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or 
embodied in such a work.” 
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Lecture and lecture notes, however, are less clear-cut than exams on another front, as they do not 
on their face meet the “fixed” requirement of copyright law.50 A professor who seeks to 
copyright her lecture must render it in a fixed, tangible form.51 If she writes out her lecture in a 
document, or if she creates written lecture notes, those written versions are protected by 
copyright.52 If she creates audio or video recordings of her lecture, these versions may also be 
protected by copyright.53 If the professor authorizes students to tape-record her lecture, the tape 
recordings will be deemed to fix the lecture sufficiently to establish copyright in the live 
version.54 However, the permission she grants to the student in making the audio- or vide-
recorded copy of the lecture does not transfer any kind of ownership rights in the copyright to the 
student.55 The professor alone retains the rights to reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform the 
lecture elsewhere.56 The student, on the other hand, retains ownership only of the audiotape or 
the videotape itself; she has no rights in the content of such recordings.57 
 
                                                
50 Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976, courts had ceded ownership of lectures to the lecturer. Kenneth D. 
Crews, Instructional Materials and ‘Works-Made-for-Hire’ at Universities: Policies and Strategic 
Management of Copyright Ownership, in THE CENTER FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW HANDBOOK 
19 (Kimberly M. Bonner, ed., 2006). 
51 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
52 Lecture notes, even if unpublished works, are still protected by statutory copyright. The term of 
copyright begins from the moment of the lecture notes’ creation and lasts for the life of the author plus 
seventy years. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Professors Claiming Copyright Over Their Lectures, TECHDIRT 
(Oct. 6, 2009, 9:33 A.M.), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20091005/0207136420.shtml (citing the 
Harvard Office of General Counsel’s assertion that lecture notes, and the lectures themselves by extension 
are copyright and owned by the professor). See also Faulkner Press, L.L.C. v. Class Notes, L.L.C., 756 F. 
Supp. 2d 1352, 1357 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that a professor’s practice questions were protected by 
copyright and rejecting defendants fair-use predicated summary judgment motion). 
53 See generally Id. See also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) 
54 The whole question of whether teachers own their own creative work could be seen to begin, or at least 
to come to general attention, with the issue of teacher ownership in lectures and lecture notes. The earliest 
iteration of the question was whether a student, audience member, or third party could transcribe and print 
the notes from the lecture, and then disseminate them to others. In an important early case on this matter, 
the court found that only the lecturer held the copyright in the lecture, and not those who were merely 
taking down the lecture notes. See Williams v. Weisser, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. App. 1969). 
55 See 17 U.S.C. § 202: “Ownership of a copyright… is distinct from ownership of any material object in 
which the work is embodied.” One possible way of heading off any problems at the onset would be to 
allow a recorded copy of the lecture to be made by a third party, on the condition that she transfer the 
recorded copy to the instructor upon completion of the course. This would give the instructor a recorded 
copy of her own course, and would establish copyright in lectures if an issue were to arise at a later time. 
See Townsend, supra note 46, at 223 n.66. 
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 202, discussing ownership of copyright as distinct from ownership of a material object. 
57 Id. 
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The issue of ownership in lecture notes was established in an early case involving academic 
work, in which the court granted the right to control both lecture notes and professionally-
generated lecture notes to the professor who created the original, underlying lecture.58 This 
expanded to allow courts to grant faculty ownership in lecture notes and other copyrightable 
works, under the court-made doctrine known as the “teacher exception.” Ownership afforded 
faculty members the fundamental grounds for their professional roles: (i) the autonomy requisite 
to academic freedom; (ii) the ability to produce material without outside interference or input 
regarding content; (iii) the control to determine when a work should be published (both in the 
subjective sense as to when the author believes the work to be ready, and in the objective sense 
as to the timing of the stages that lead up to publication); and (iv) the ability to take lectures and 
deliver them to students at another university when the faculty member taught elsewhere, either 
temporarily or permanently.59 
 
The expansion of the “teacher exception” was widely seen as encompassing academic 
scholarship, publication, and creativity as a whole. Thus, it was generally agreed that academic 
faculty owned their creative works, whether they be made for the classroom, during working 
hours, or as a part of ongoing scholarship. Ownership of such academic work, afforded by the 
“teacher exception,” gave faculty members certain rights and privileges: (i) the freedom to take 
their work with them, and to use their work at other universities; (ii) the right to make alterations, 
new versions, and new creations from the initial works; and (iii) the right to make profits from 
their scholarly works, such as textbooks, monographs, or other publications. 
 
This understanding was thrown starkly into question, however, by the promulgation of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, and it is far from clear, how such treatment of lectures will fare under 
cases that may be brought subsequent to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. Recent 
history has shown that some well-established practice may be under challenge, both by courts 
and by litigious institutions seeking to protect their own intellectual property portfolios.60 At the 
                                                
58 See Sherrill v. Grieves, 57 Wash. L. Rep. 286 (D.C. 1929). 
59 Townsend, supra note 46 at 211 
60 There has been some dispute over whether third parties can market course lectures and notes. UCLA, 
for instance, has filed lawsuits to protect the lectures, while other California State University and other 
University of California schools have sent cease and desist letters to note taking companies such as 
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same time, however, institutions value copyright in lectures highly enough to lobby for 
protection against copying and commercial exploitation of professors’ lectures by unauthorized 
third parties. In response to such lobbying, for instance, California passed legislation prohibiting 
the unauthorized sale of lecture notes to such commercial note-taking companies as Versity.com, 
Study24-7.com, Studyaid.com, and StudentU.com.61 All of these sites ceased to operate by the 
end of 2002, due to a combination of legislative efforts such as California’s, cease and desist 
letters issued by various institutions such as Yale University, and a subsequent lack not only of 
profitability but also of long-term viability.62 
 
D. Courses: Beginning of the Academic Copyright Era 
 
Lecture notes, however readily transcribed and disseminated, may have represented an early 
foray into staking out copyright claims in course ownership. But like Cliff Notes, or other forms 
of “short-cuts” available to students, their dissemination and use is not likely to pose a serious 
threat to academic activity and its intrinsic value. Only students already taking a class are likely 
to avail themselves of note-taking services; and this means that students have already paid for the 
class, and both the institution and the faculty have garnered the profits of their attendance. The 
value of note-taking services might diminish the professor’s ability to monetize her own 
transcription of lecture notes, should she choose to do so, but those are the only lost profits that 
may be held to the account of such third-party services. Thus, while vigilant to the potential for 
undermining class attendance that transcription services raised, universities were not especially 
inclined to see their sale of lecture notes as more than marginally challenging to the university 
business model based on the monetization of classroom attendance by degree-seeking students. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Versity.com, NoteUtopia, and NoteHall, raising questions as to the Universities’ perspective on the 
ownership of the lectures themselves. Jonathan Alger, Classroom Capitalism, ACADEME, Jan.-Feb. 2000; 
Erica Perez, Colleges Crack Down on Selling, Sharing Notes, CALIFORNIA WATCH, (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/colleges-crack-down-selling-sharing-notes-14744. . 
61 Editorial: Lecture Notes Will Protect Students from Illegitimate Services, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, 
September 28, 2000; Sharon Jayson, Online Notes Debate; College Lecturer Split Over Propriety of Free, 
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, March 26, 2000 at B1 (“StudentU.com has 1,300 notetakers on more 
than 80 campuses. Study24-7.com claims a presence at more than 300 colleges and universities through 
the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.”) 
62 Stephane L. Seeley, Are Classroom Lectures Protected by Copyright Laws? The Case for Professors’ 
Intellectual Property Rights, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 163, 165 (2001) (citing Ambika Kumar, Shut Down: 
Universities Fight the Online Notes Phenomenon, THE CHRONICLE, Sept. 6, 2000). 
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The first real challenge, then, arose in the early days of the Internet, with a dispute that occurred 
so publicly, and that involved such esteemed parties, as to send a shot across the bow of 
academic institutions across the U.S. In 1998, the prominent Harvard Law School professor 
Arthur Miller elected to record a series of videotapes of his famous lectures on Civil Procedure. 
He then entered into a contractual arrangement with Concord Law School, a for-profit and 
wholly-online institution, for the delivery of the Civil Procedure lectures in an online course.63 
Perhaps understandably, Concord highlighted the connection by prominently advertising the 
courses as “taught by Harvard Professor Arthur Miller.”64 Harvard strongly objected, and voiced 
their objection primarily on the ground that university policy prohibited its faculty from teaching 
at outside educational institutions without express permission being first granted by the 
administration.65 No doubt the dilution of their brand name may have added a significant 
dimension to their outrage, but Harvard did not so explicate in making their stand.66 Miller 
argued, in response to Harvard’s objection, that the course merely consisted of a series of 
“canned,” videotaped lectures -- and that at any rate he owned the copyright in the lectures he 
produced, and was therefore free to dispose of them as he chose. Ultimately, the parties resolved 
the dispute out of court, and Miller was compelled to refrain from offering the courses at 
Concord.67 Further, Harvard hastily called a meeting of faculty and administration, at which it 
was decided that any professor seeking to teach a course outside the precincts of Harvard must 
first obtain the approval of the appropriate oversight body of administrators to receive clearance 
for such an action. The dispute over copyright was raised, but not resolved. Still, it was clear that 
academic copyright was not solely in the hands of a professor who created and taught a course. 
 
The attention the Miller dispute garnered brought to the forefront the increasing stakes in the 
distance education arena.68 As another renowned Harvard Law School professor, Alan 
                                                
63 See Amy Dockser Marcus, Seeing Crimson: Why Harvard Law Wants to Retain One of Its Star 
Professors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A1. 
64 Id. See also Professor Miller’s “About the Lecturer” on the Concord Law School site, available at 
http://www.concordlawschool.edu/lecturer/arthur-miller.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). 
65 Marcus, supra note 63, at A1. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 See Id. (explaining that Professor Miller’s sanctions would be no more than that issued by Harvard 
university); see also Klein, supra note 35, at 192 (discussing the innate friction arising from Harvard’s 
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Dershowitz, pointed out at the time, “[w]hat distinguishes the Internet [from other forms of 
distance learning] is the number of zeroes. The money is so overwhelming that it can skew 
people’s judgment.”69 But money was not the only sticking point that the Miller dispute 
highlighted. Issues of course ownership and control were equally paramount. As yet another 
famous Harvard professor, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., pointedly said, “I’ve been teaching the same 
course -- for 23 years. I’ve taught at Yale, Cornell and Duke, too, and when I moved to a new 
university nobody said to me I couldn’t take my course with me because the university owned 
it.”70 The assertion of faculty ownership, then, was clearly linked from the onset to a sense of 
academic autonomy and control. The advent of distance education, reflected in the Miller 
dispute, not only served to underscore an inevitable clash between traditional and non-traditional 
educational institutions using the Internet to educate and disseminate instructional materials. 
More remarkably, however, it vividly illustrated the persistence among almost all stakeholders in 
higher education -- faculty, administrators, publishers, and even students -- a profound and 
lingering conviction that professors above all own the academic work that they create.71 Of 
course, this belief, while widespread, may not be true. In fact, the law is far from clear as to 
whether or not the professor owns her course outright, be it taught in traditional academic bricks-
and-mortar classrooms or in virtual electronic venues. But the idea of the academic creator is 
central to the question of copyright in coursework, and its origins as revealed in the Miller 
dispute persist and color the debate to the present day. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
policy requiring faculty to seek and secure administrative permission, usually from a dean, prior to 
serving as an instructor or consultant at an Internet-based institution) 
69 Marcus, supra note 63 at A1. 
70 Id. at A1 
71 Cf. Pub. Affairs Assoc. Inc. v. Rickrover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 605 (D.D.C. 1959), rev’d on other 
grounds, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated, 369 U.S. 111 (1962) (“Many scientific articles 
published in technical journals are written by scientists employed by private concerns and their employers 
generally encourage such activities. No one would contend that the copyright on such articles would 
belong to the employer”) 
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E. Ownership of the Electronic Course72 
 
The Miller dispute opened the door for discussion of copyright among universities and their 
faculties. The exponential increase in online education that ensued in the following years, 
however, opened the floodgates to the ever more important question: Who owns an electronic 
course: the professor or the institution s/he works for?  
 
The question of ownership of electronic courses has been controversial since at least the late 
1990s for several reasons: (i) The overall growth of distance learning; (ii) the amount of human 
and technical resources needed to develop even a single distance course.73 An institution of 
higher education can easily spend many thousands of dollars to produce even a single distance 
education course.74 Further, multimedia course materials, including Internet materials, have 
become increasingly prevalent and appealing to institutions and students alike. The accessibility 
of these materials has led some institutions to attempt to “package” their courses and course 
offerings, and to seek to profit by marketing them to other institutions.75 
 
The central reason for change, aside from start-up costs, is that while courses as stand-alone units 
were never seen to have lucrative potential, they suddenly seemed to become commodities that 
could be sold for a profit with the aid of digitization. Now, the financial viability of courses and 
related materials as stand-alone products that might be sold for profit -- triggered by the 
remarkable growth of distance education via the Internet -- has completely changed the higher 
                                                
72 For general reference, see STEVEN A. ARMATAS, DISTANCE LEARNING AND COPYRIGHT: A GUIDE TO 
LEGAL ISSUES, pp. 336-350 (2009); THE CENTER FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW HANDBOOK 19 
(Kimberly M. Bonner, ed., 2006); .EDUCAUSE, WHAT CAMPUS LEADERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
MOOCS (2012), available at https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/PUB4005.pdf;  PAMELA BETH LEVINE 
& MARTHA G. RUSSELL, COURSE RIGHTS IN CYBERSPACE: OWNERSHIP ISSUES IN ONLINE EDUCATION 
(2012), available at http://mediax.stanford.edu/pdf/MXoct2012CourseRights.pdf; Mark F. Smith, Kristine 
Anderson Dougherty, & Gary Rhoades, Negotiating Virtual Space, 53 in  THE NEA 2011 ALMANAC OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION. 
73 See Florence Olson, The Promise and Problems of a New Way of Teaching Math, CHRON. OF HIGHER 
EDUC., Oct. 8, 1999.  
74 See Sarah Carr, Is Anyone Making Money on Distance Education?, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 16, 
2001. 
75 See Lisa Guernsey and Jeffrey R. Young, Professors and Universities Anticipate Disputes Over the 
Earnings from Distance Learning, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 5, 1998. 
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education landscape.76 Suddenly, the consideration of ownership of copyright in courses has 
become a pressing, and hotly contested, matter. Moreover, the dispute is exacerbated by what 
appears to be a complete reversal of long-standing policy: faculty were traditionally considered 
to retain ownership of the fruits of their academic labors, including courses, related materials, 
notes, and so on. Any royalties flowing from their academic work were ceded to faculty as well, 
and were widely considered a means of supplementing faculty salaries, encouraging research and 
scholarship, and enhancing academic reputation and standing.77 Faculty ownership of copyright 
in courses, it seemed, was established practice -- but not one that affected the institutional 
balance with any immediate financial impact (indeed, this may be why the practice was so 
readily established). 
 
The growth of distance education, however, challenged this equilibrium with a single factor: the 
profit motive. Courses that were offered in a single institution could be transported to a single or 
multiple venues -- virtual venues, with increasingly large audiences -- or they could be 
“packaged” and sold to commercial entities for dissemination [as they saw fit]. With this 
potential income stream in sight, universities began to claim ownership of courses, especially in 
cases where the faculty member drew upon substantial institutional resources to produce the 
course materials and offer the course. Thus, for instance, the use of technical support, such as 
server time, licensed software, instructional designers, programmers, and graphic specialists, 
might be required to undergird a course.78 This would likely be deemed to entail a “substantial 
use of resources,” as set forth in the copyright policies of many institutions.79 
 
                                                
76 A recent market report estimates the value of the worldwide E-Learning market will reach $51.5 billion 
as of 2016, with a 7.9% growth rate expected from 2012-2016. DOCEBO, E-LEARNING MARKET TRENDS 
& FORECAST 2014-2016 REPORT, 8 (2014), available at 
https://www.docebo.com/landing/contactform/elearning-market-trends-and-forecast-2014-2016-docebo-
report.pdf.  
77 See Laura N. Gasaway, Drafting a Faculty Copyright Ownership Policy, THE TECH. SOURCE, 
Mar./April 2002, at 3. 
78 See ARMATAS supra note 72 at 336-337. 
79 One university has defined “substantial use of resources” as sue of its “laboratory, studio, audio, 
audiovisual, video, television, broadcast, computer, computational or other facilities, resources and Staff 
or Students which: (i) falls outside of the scope of the faculty member’s normal job responsibilities or (ii) 
entails a faculty member’s use of such resources not ordinarily available to all faculty members.” See THE 
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, COPYRIGHT POLICY 5 (2005), available at 
www.my.gwu.edu/files/policies/CopyrightPolicyFinal.pdf. 
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Universities might counterweigh their claims to ownership of copyright in courses by offering 
faculty compensatory relief in institutional commitments, release time, or supplemental 
payments for course development.80  Additionally, universities might justify their claims by 
arguing that institutional ownership was preferable to individual ownership for commercial 
reasons: the university is better positioned to evaluate the commercial potential of courses, to 
market courses, and to manage the income flow related to the sale and dissemination of courses 
to distance learning ventures.81 But of course while the compensations and justifications may 
make sense on a quid pro quo basis, they hardly serve to resolve the issue of ownership of 
copyright in courses -- rather, they merely support an institutional preference of ownership. 
 
Does copyright law finally resolve the question of who owns copyright in courses and course 
materials, whether the given courses stand alone or are disseminated online? The answer may be 
a qualified yes (albeit with a necessary evaluation of the facts on a case-by-case basis). On a first 
examination, resolution of the copyright ownership issue will be determined by a three-pronged 
analysis, namely whether: (i) the instructor is an employee or independent contractor of the 
institution; (ii) the work in question was produced inside or outside the scope of a person’s 
employment; and (iii) any other type of writing, contract, institutional policy, or charter governs 
the relationship between the instructor and her institution. Each of these factors, as well as an 
overview of the current law, is examined below. 
 
II. COPYRIGHT LAW 
A. Works Made for Hire 
 
In general, the author is the creator of the work, that is, the person who expresses an idea in a 
fixed, tangible medium.82 The law allows two or more authors to be deemed joint authors, and 
therefore co-owners of the work’s copyright, when they prepare their work “with the intention 
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”83 
                                                
80 This is the model that the Penn Online Contract follows. See PENN ONLINE CONTRACT (on file with 
Author).  
81 See Gasaway, supra note 77 at 3. 
82 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).  
83 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
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The law makes an exception to this general authorship rule under the doctrine of “work[s] made 
for hire.”84 Under that docrine, the “author,” and therefore owner of the copyright, is the 
employer or person for whom the work was prepared.85 
 
The determination of whether a work is a work made for hire has important ramifications, 
including rights regarding: (i) copyright duration86; (ii) renewal rights87; (iii) termination rights88; 
and (iv) possibly the right to import certain goods bearing the copyright.89 As such significant 
rights are at stake, the determination of what constitutes a work made for hire is paramount. 
 
B. Congress’s Two-Part Definition 
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 establishes two situations under which a work is a “work made for 
hire”: (1) A work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment; or (2) a work 
specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a 
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the 
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a 
work made for hire.90 
 
The Copyright Act further defines two terms -- “supplementary work” and “instructional text” -- 
which are of particular interest to universities and their faculty.91 A “supplementary work” is a 
                                                
84 Id.Id. 
85 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000). The creator may still own the copyright if there is a written agreement. Id. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the ownership of copyright by the employer, rather than the 
employee, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 242 (1903), which held that 
advertisements produced by several employees belonged to the employer. 
86 Copyright ownership lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). In 
the case of a work made for hire, copyright ownership lasts ninety-five years from the first publication of 
the work or 120 years from its creation, whichever comes first. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c). 
87 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000). 
88 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000). 
89 Klein supra note 35 at 155. 17 U.S.C. § 601(b)(1). 
90 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
91 Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright Issues in Online Courses: Ownership, Authorship and Conflict, 18 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 13 (2001) (“One of the pertinent statutory categories is 
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work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose 
of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, commenting upon, or assisting in 
the use of the other work, such as forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, 
tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, 
appendixes, and indexes.92 An “instructional text” is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work 
prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.93  
 
Importantly, however, the Act does not provide definitions for “employee” and “within the scope 
of his employment.” In light of this statutory ambiguity, a determination of whether a work is a 
work made for hire must examine and establish the relationship between the interested parties. 
Absent specific Congressional directive, the courts have offered their interpretation of 
“employee” and “within the scope of his employment.” 
 
The framework to determine an “employee” in a work-for-hire relationship emerges in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.94 In Reid, the Community 
for Creative Non-Violence (“CCNV”), a Washington, D.C.-Based organization dedicated to 
eradicating homelessness in the United States, hired James Earl Reid, a sculptor, to produce a 
statue dramatizing the plight of the homeless.95 The statue was to be displayed at the 1985 
Christmastime Pageant of Peace in Washington, D.C.96 The parties agreed that the project would 
cost no more than $15,000, not including Reid’s services, which he offered free of charge.97 
However, the parties did not enter into a written agreement; and neither party mentioned the 
issue of copyright ownership of the finished work.98 Reid worked on the statue, called “Third 
                                                                                                                                                       
‘an instructional text,’ and thus there is the possibility that online courses in their entirety could be 
considered works made for hire under this specific provision [provided the parties can enter an express 
agreement]”) 
92 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 Cong., 2d Sess., at 121 (1976), reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5737: The concept is intended to include what might loosely be called 
‘textbook material,’ whether or not in book form or prepared in the form of text matter. The basic 
characteristic of ‘instructional texts’ is the purpose of their preparation for ‘use in systematic instructional 
activities,’ and they are to be distinguished from works prepared for use by general readership. 
93 Id. 
94 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
95 Id. at 730.  
96 Id. at 733. 
97 Id. at 734. 
98 Id. 
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World America,” at his studio in Baltimore, MD. Members of CCNV periodically visited Reid’s 
studio both to check on his work and to coordinate CCNV’s construction of the sculpture’s base, 
as agreed by the parties.99 Reid accepted most of CCNV’s suggestions and directions.100 After 
the completed piece was delivered to Washington, CCNV paid Reid the final installment of the 
agreed-upon price, attached the sculpture to its base, and displayed it.101 To this point, the parties 
had never discussed copyright in the sculpture. They then simultaneously filed competing 
copyright registration certificates.102 CCNV sued Reid in federal court for return of the sculpture 
Third World America and for a determination of copyright ownership.103 
 
The Supreme Court in Reid began its determination of ownership with an inquiry into whether 
Third World America was “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his 
employment” under 17 U.S.C. Section 101(1).104 The Court looked to the common law of agency 
to make its determination, in light of the Copyright Act’s abstention from defining either 
“employee” or “scope of employment.”105 In its examination of whether a hired party is an 
“employee” under the common law of agency, the Court considered thirteen factors: (i) the 
hiring party’s right to control the matter and means by which the product is accomplished; (ii) 
the skill required; (iii) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (iv) the location of the work; 
(v) the duration of the relationship between the parties; (vi) whether the hiring party has the right 
to assign additional projects to the hired party; (vii) the extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; (viii) the method of payment; (ix) the hired party’s role in hiring 
and paying assistants; (x) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; (xi) 
whether the hiring party is in business; (xii) the provision of employee benefits; and (xiii) the tax 
                                                
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 735. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 738. 
105 Id. at 741, 751. 
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treatment of the hired party.106 While assessing each of these considerations, the Court 
nonetheless advised that “no one of these factors is determinative.”107 
 
Upon making its assessment, the Court found that Reid “was not an employee of CCNV but an 
independent contractor.”108 Moreover, the Court found CCNV could not satisfy the requirements 
for a commissioned work under § 102(2).109 Absent a work for hire exception, the Court held 
that CCNV was not the “author” -- and therefore not the copyright owner -- of the sculpture 
Third World America,110 and affirmed the Circuit Court’s order remanding the case to district 
court, in order to determine whether CCNV and Reid were joint authors -- and thereby co-
owners of the copyright -- insofar as they prepared the statue and its installation “with the 
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary 
whole,” as provided  under Section 101 of the Copyright Act.111 
 
C. Defining “Scope of Employment” 
 
In Reid, the Supreme Court deliberately limned the contours of the first prong of the statutory 
definition of works made for hire -- that is, work prepared by an “employee.” It did not, 
however, address the second prong of the definition -- that is, whether the work was made by the 
                                                
106  Id. at 751-52 (internal citiations omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, §§ 220(1), 
220(2) (1958). 
107 Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. But see Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that some 
factors often have little significance in determining whether a party is an employee, while other factors -- 
such as the right to control the manner and means of creation, the skill required, the provision of 
employee benefits, the tax treatment of the hired party, and the right to assign additional projects -- will 
almost always be relevant and should be given more weight “because they will usually be highly 
probative of the true nature of the employment relationship.”). See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B](2004) (“[T]he major factor in determining whether a work 
is for hire is whether the employer had the right, whether or not exercised, to supervise and control the 
putative employee.”) 
108 490 U.S. at 752. 
109 Id. at 753. 
110 Id. See also Nimmer, supra note 106. 
111 On remand, the district court held that: (i) Reid is the sole author of the sculpture and that he has sole 
ownership rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106 with respect to all three-dimensional reproductions; (ii) CCNV is 
the sole owner of the original copy of the sculpture; and (iii) both parties are co-owners of all Section 106 
rights with regard to two-dimensional reproductions.) Comm. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, CIV.A. 
86-1507, 1991 WL 415523 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 1991). 
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creator “within the scope of his employment.”112 To address that question, federal courts stepped 
once more into the breach, turning again to the common law of agency to give the term of art its 
proper measure.113 In so doing, courts have developed a three-pronged test to determine whether 
employees are acting within the scope of their employment when creating a copyrightable 
work.114 The three prongs are: (i) whether the work is of the type that the employee is employed 
to perform; (ii) whether the work occurs substantially within authorized work hours and space; 
and (iii) whether the work’s purpose, at least in part, is to serve the employer.115  
 
The case of Marshall v. Miles Laboratory, Inc.,116 is especially instructive with respect to 
copyright ownership in the context of the “scope of employment.” In Marshall, the district court 
held that an article written by an employee of a laboratory was prepared within the scope of his 
employment and that, therefore, the employer laboratory owned copyright in the article.117 On 
one side, the employee argued that he had written the article in question at home, he had not been 
instructed to write the article, and he received no additional compensation for writing it.118 On 
the other side, the employer responded that the employee researched the article while at work, 
the employee discussed the article with one of the laboratory’s scientists (who was ultimately 
made a co-author) while at work, and the employer reimbursed the employee for expenses he 
incurred while presenting the article at a symposium.119 The Marshall court, while concluding 
that employer Miles Laboratory owned the copyright, pointed out that the employee’s job 
description included the development, summarization, and reporting of “information about 
advances in technology” to the employer.120 
 
                                                
112 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
113 See Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3 (D.N.J. 1995); Roeslin v. Dist. of Columbia, 921 F. Supp. 793 
(D.D.C. 1995). 
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). 
115 Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 7; Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 797-98. 
116 647 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (N.D. Ind. 1986) 
117 Id. at 1331. 
118 Id. at 1330. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1331. 
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D. Distance Education Courses as Works Made for Hire 
1. Faculty Members: “Employees” Under the Work-Made-For-Hire Doctrine? 
 
a. Maybe Not… 
Should faculty members be considered “employees” under the work-made-for-hire doctrine? It is 
arguable that they are not employees, but rather acting independently. This position centers upon 
one critical factor: the manner and means of production.121 First, academic autonomy is 
fundamental to the field: faculty select “their own research goals, procure their own funding, 
determine their research strategy, and choose the format through which their findings are 
expressed.”122 The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”), in adopting its 
Statement on Copyright in 1999, articulates this position clearly: “in the case of traditional 
academic works…the faculty member rather than the institution determines the subject matter, 
the intellectual approach and direction, and the conclusions. This is the very essence of academic 
freedom.”123 The AAUP acknowledge that the employer institution may reasonably claim 
ownership of work created by faculty in only three exempted categories: “special works created 
in circumstances that may properly be regarded as ‘made for hire,’124 negotiated contractual 
transfers, and ‘joint works’ as described by the Copyright Act.”125 
 
Another feature of academic autonomy arguing against regarding faculty as employees under the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine is how their work is generated: typically, the university is not the 
motivating force behind a professor’s work.126 As one commentator asserts, “since professors do 
not create scholarly works for the universities that hire them, but rather to advance their own 
interests (future employment, enhancement of reputation), their scholarship does not fit the 
                                                
121 Reid, 490 U.S. at 751. 
122 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
590, 603 (1987). 
123 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON COPYRIGHT (1999), at 
http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/Spccopyr.htm [hereinafter AAUP Statement on Copyright] 
124 Id. Included in this category are works created as a specific requirement of employment or as an 
assigned institutional duty, for example, reports prepared by a dean, or by the chair or members of a 
faculty committee. 
125 Id. 
126 Dreyfuss supra note 112, at 597. 
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intended meaning of a work made for hire.”127 Alongside the “advancement of their own 
interests,” commentators have also noted that professors are further motivated to strive for 
“proof[s] of excellence” that will secure their reputation, retention, advancement, or general 
marketability128 -- and these goals far bypass any purported requirement or need to create 
copyrightable works for their employer. 
 
Professional autonomy is also central to the argument at least one commentator has made 
regarding university-faculty relations. Professor Robert A. Gorman, of The University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, asserts that the work-made-for-hire doctrine is predicated upon an 
employer-employee relationship that presumes “the accountability of a subordinate to a 
superior,” and that such a predicate “cannot be transplanted to academic writings.”129 Professor 
Gorman, reasoning that faculty are therefore not employees pursuant to the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine, puts forth several specific examples of faculty autonomy: professors select the subjects 
of their work; professors select the views about the subject that they present to the reader; 
professors decide the opinions and their expression in their work; and informed readers do not 
identify professors’ views with those of their affiliated university.130 
 
Taking into consideration other factors detailed by Reid, the location of the work may also 
suggest that faculty should not be deemed employees. Faculty may readily create courses, 
whether online or not, on home computers and related software. Further, they may incorporate 
material developed either while working at other institutions, while working as a consultant, or 
through other outside activities.131  
 
Further evidence of faculty autonomy is advanced by Professor Roberta R. Kwall of DePaul 
University College of Law, who argues that faculty are not employees for work for hire purposes 
                                                
127 Pamela A. Kilby, The Discouragement of Learning: Scholarship Made for Hire, 21 J.C. & U.L. 455, 
468 (1994). 
128 James B. Wadley & JoLynn M. Brown, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teachers, Copyrights, 
Work-for-Hire and a New Washburn University Policy, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 416 n. 102 (1999). 
129 Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Conflicts on the University Campus: The First Annual Christopher A. 
Meyer Memorial Lecture, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y OF THE U.S.A. 297, 302 (2000). 
130 Id. at 302-03. 
131 Kwall, supra note 91, at 18.  
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on the ground that faculty have the freedom to hire assistants and determine work hours.132 As 
she states, “most faculty members probably enjoy total discretion in the selection of research 
assistants, and in deciding when and how long to work.”133 
 
Another factor suggesting that faculty are not employees under the work-made-for-hire doctrine 
is the right faculty have to assign additional projects. Universities do not typically assign 
scholarship to professors, “and it is doubtful whether they could do so without also invading a 
professor’s academic freedom.”134 
 
Further, the not-for-profit status of universities may effectively preclude their being deemed a 
“business” under a close interpretation of the Reid factors. In a potentially telling parallel, the 
Court in Reid specifically stated that CCNV itself -- a nonprofit, unincorporated association -- 
was “not a business at all.”135 
 
The AAUP likewise contends that universities and their ilk are not typical businesses. In its 
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the AAUP asserts: “institutions of 
higher education are conducted for the common good and not to further the interests of either the 
individual teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search 
for truth and its free exposition.”136 
 
The argument that the university-faculty relationship does not fall conformably under the work-
made-for-hire doctrine is not predicated upon Reid and agency law alone. Several scholars have 
put forward policy and constitutional grounds as underpinning their stance. Professor Kwall, for 
instance, argues that the policy behind copyright law promotes the AAUP’s position that 
universities are not a traditional “business.” Consonant with the AAUP’s assertion in its 
                                                
132 Id. at 17. 
133 Id. 
134 Kilby, supra note 121, at 466. 
135 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989). 
136 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, available at http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-
academic-freedom-and-tenure [hereinafter AAUP Statement on Academic Freedom]. 
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Statement, she asserts, “all educational institutions have the dissemination of information and the 
advancement of knowledge as their primary goals.”137 
 
Similarly, other scholars look further into the traditional role of faculty members and the well-
established policies of the academic sector to bolster their contention that faculty do not fit 
squarely under the definition of “employee” under the principles of work made for hire. Corynne 
McSherry, the Intellectual Property Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, raises both 
policy and precedent to argue that “traditional scholarly works” that spring from “independent 
academic effort” are generally not considered works for hire; and the majority of professors have 
been considered to own copyright in the work they produce in the course of their employment.138 
The very presumption of faculty ownership of copyright in faculty-generated work itself is 
offered as evidence that faculty and their institutions do not commonly consider the creation of 
copyrightable courses to be within the scope of employment.139 Once more, the professional 
autonomy and authority of faculty members is argued to support this position. As Professor J.H. 
Reichman notes: “to equate a general duty to write with a duty to produce specific work for a 
university distorts the nature of academic employment and downgrades the professorial rank to 
that of an ordinary staff member.”140  
 
Another commentator, attorney Pamela A. Kilby, argues that encompassing faculty-generated 
work in the work-made-for-hire doctrine is outright unconstitutional. She argues: “it is outside 
the scope of Congress’ power under the Copyright Clause to vest rights of authorship in a party 
who is not the motivating factor that brought the work to light. To do so would inhibit, rather 
than promote, the progress of science.”141 Kilby further argues that “the university employer 
generally is neither the motivating factor nor the creative spark behind the creation of professors’ 
                                                
137 Kwall, supra note 91, at 20. See also Wadley & Brown, supra note 122, at 419: “[I]n academia...the 
creation of economically valuable copyrightable works is clearly subordinated to the goal of the 
dissemination of information” 
138 CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 102, 107 (2001).  
139 Kilby, supra note 121 at 467. See also Wadley &  Brown supra note 122, at 403, 404 (noting that the 
parties’ presumed intent and expectations are to have certain work, including lesson plans, exams, lecture 
notes, and letters of recommendation, fall outside the work-made-for-hire doctrine). 
140 J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright 
Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 674 (1989). 
141 Kilby supra note 121, at 457-58. For expansion of this analysis, see id. at 469-74. 
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work.”142 She then asserts that bringing academic work under rubric of work for hire principles 
would constitute a violation of the First Amendment by “impos[ing] an undue burden on 
academic speech -- a burden that is not justified by the government interests that the law is meant 
to advance.”143 In concluding, Kirby alludes to the principles of academic freedom to underscore 
her position: “the prospect of a university using the copyright law to stifle unorthodox or 
politically incorrect speech strikes at the very heart of First Amendment values.”144 
 
b. But They Probably Are... 
In opposition, some commentators consider the thirteen-factor test of Reid and conclude that 
faculty members should indeed be considered employees of their respective institutions under the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine of the Copyright Act.145 As Corynne McSherry argues: “professors 
could be considered employees under work-for-hire doctrine because they are treated as 
employees for tax purposes, receive benefits, use materials and equipment provided by the 
employer, and cede substantial control in the hiring and remuneration of their assistants to their 
employer, the university.”146 With respect to the development and dissemination of online 
courses, and in particular the large up-front expenses that such endeavors typically demand, two 
Reid factors are particularly relevant: the right to control the manner and means of production, 
and the source of instrumentalities and tools. Numerous commentators analyze these 
considerations in the context of online courses, and thereby conclude that faculty members may 
be found to be employees creating works made for hire under the Copyright Act.147 
 
Universities shoulder the costs of establishing and supporting distance education programs in 
four major areas: (i) course design; (ii) course delivery; (iii) faculty development; and (iv) 
                                                
142 Id. at 473. 
143 Id. at 458, 483-85. 
144 Id. at 475. 
145 MCSHERRY supra note 138, at 107.  
146 Id. See also Todd F. Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They “Works Made for Hire” Under the 1976 
Copyright Act?, J.C.& U.L. 485 (1982-83); Gregory Kent Laughlin, Who Owns the Copyright to Faculty-
Created Web Sites?: The Work-for-Hire Doctrine’s Applicability to Internet Resources Created for 
Distance Learning and Traditional Classroom Courses, 41 B.C.L. REV. 547, 569-72 (2000); Wadley & 
Brown, supra note 122, at 426. 
147 See, e.g., Townsend, supra note 44; Crews, supra note 49; Gasaway, supra note 76;  Springer, 
Intellectual Property Legal Issues For Faculty and Faculty Unions, AAUP.ORG (Mar. 18, 2005), 
http://www.aaup.org/issues/copyright-distance-education-intellectual-property/faculty-and-faculty-
unions-2005. 
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student support.148 Course design entails defining the learning objectives, organizing the 
materials to be covered, assembling resources such as text and research sources, and designing 
interactive, graphically rich student assignments.149 Course delivery and support requires 
investment in the technological infrastructure, including the course-delivery software that makes 
the course content accessible to students and instructors, and technical support for users.150 
Faculty development includes both direct costs, such as the use of new technological tools to 
redesign courses for dissemination online, as well as indirect costs, such as faculty release time, 
and possible adjustments to faculty salaries, promotion, and tenure policies.151 Student support 
includes access to library materials, as well as advising, registration, financial aid, and career 
counseling.152 To provide just one example, the University of Wisconsin at Madison provides 
students engaged in distance learning courses advising services, admissions, registration, 
bookstore services, and technical assistance via the Internet, e-mail, fax, and telephone.153  
 
As under the “manner and means of production” analysis above, universities may also lay a 
strong claim to controlling the “source of instrumentalities and tools” element also derived from 
the Reid test. First, universities provide faculty with the tools typically required for scholarly and 
instructional work, including office supplies and equipment, photocopiers, computers, printers 
and other technological resources, research aides, travel expenses, and registration fees for 
                                                
148 Jane Sjogren & James Fay, Cost Issues in Online Learning: Using “Co-opetition” to Advantage, 34 
CHANGE 52, 53-54 (2002).. 
149 Id. See also MCSHERRY, supra note 138, at 108 (arguing that if the university staff is greatly involved 
in designing a website for the course, the university will have a legitimate claim to copyright in the site 
because it “substantially controls” the production of the work). Further, the university may have a still 
stronger claim to copyright if it chooses to sell its website to a distance education provider, leaving the 
originating faculty member without the ability to rework the material she prepared. Id. 
150 See Scott Carlson, A Patent Claim That Could Cost Millions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 7, 2003, at 
A35 (Acacia Research Corporation, the owner of certain patents involving streaming, or the storage and 
transmission of digital sound and video on the Internet, threatens infringement actions against universities 
with which it does not have a license agreement. Acacia’s usual license fee is two percent of the revenue 
earned from courses using its technology for dissemination). 
151 Sjoren & Fay, supra note 141, at 54. See also Simon, supra note 146, at 504. Simon observes that 
universities may offer faculty a reduced teaching load to provide extra time for scholarship, research and 
writing. Another such schedule adjustment is the provision of a one-year sabbatical with pay. Both 
illustrate the “control of means and manner of production by the institution. “The university would not 
offer such free time unless publication or research is expected.” Id. 
152 Sjogren & Fay, supra note 141, at 54-55. 
153 Glenn C. Altschuler, The E-Learning Curve, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, Section 4A, at 13. 
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scholarly conferences.154 Distance education courses may require additional technological 
investments and technical support. Most faculty members rely on technology in a variety of 
ways: they use their university’s online services to conduct research, the university’s computers 
to generate work, the university’s servers to store their work, the university’s Internet connection 
to disseminate the work, and the university’s information technology staff to assist their work.155 
Illustrative is the “electronic classroom” M.B.A. program at the University of Arizona, which 
connects its classes based in Tucson to a classroom in Santa Clara, California, and features a 
system of two videoconferencing rooms leased by the university for a fee of $17,00 per 
month.156  
 
Accompanying the provision of technological “instrumentalities and tools,” universities extend 
the support, and underwrite the expense, of technical staff to assist with the creation and 
maintenance of online courses. Among these support staff are computer programmers, video 
crews, support staff, script writers, graphic artists, and photographers.157 It has been estimated 
that an institution serving approximately twenty-thousand students will require a staff of twenty 
to thirty technicians to support the institution’s communications infrastructure.158  
 
It is evident that universities must invest significant resources in creating, implementing, and 
maintaining online course programs, and with ever-increasing demand, even more resources may 
be required in expanding online offerings. This institutional output buttresses the argument that 
the university does indeed control the manner and means, and instrumentalities and tools, of 
                                                
154 Simon, supra note 146, at 504. See also Wadley & Brown, supra note 122, at 426 (noting that 
“teachers create copyrightable works...using the instrumentalities of the employer such as paper, pens, 
computers, printers, and other resources….”). 
155 Laughlin, supra note 146 at 571 
156 Florence Olsen, Videoconferencing With Some Life to It: The U. of Arizona Finds That Pricey 
Technology Attracts Distance-Education Students, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2003, at A24 
157 See The University of Texas System, U.T. System Intellectual Property Policy in Plain English, 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, available at 
http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/IntellectualProperty/IPpolicy_english.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015). 
158 Diane Lynch, Glenn C. Altschuler, & Polley McClure, Professors Should Embrace Technology In 
Courses...and Colleges Must Create Technology Plans, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 18, 2002, at B16. 
See also C.B. Crawford et. al., Quality and Growth Implications of Incremental Costing Models for 
Distance Education Units, 13 ONLINE J. OF DISTANCE LEARNING ADMIN (Spring 2010) (exploring the 
validity of various proposed approaches for modeling the costs of distance education programs).  
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production. One such online effort, for instance, known as AllLearn, is the now-defunct distance 
education venture, supported by Oxford University, Stanford University, and Yale University, 
which expended between $10,000 and $150,000 to produce each of its approximately fifty 
courses.159 Fairleigh Dickinson University approximated that it would expend in the range of $12 
million to complete a five-year implementation of its online program, under which all of its 
students would be required to take at least one distance education course per year.160 Taking 
another tack, MIT has projected a total cost of nearly $100 million, over a seven-year period, to 
implement its innovative OpenCourseWare project, which makes all MIT courses available for 
free, and to anyone interested (that is, not just MIT students), over the Internet.161  
 
Consideration of other factors derived from Reid also lend support to the argument that faculty 
members are employees in the distance education context. The “skill required” element of Reid, 
for instance, suggests that faculty who may not have the skills required to publish their works 
online without assistance will draw on university resources for necessary technical support, 
bolstering the notion that faculty members are employee. While some faculty may have 
independently developed the technological facility needed to create online courses and materials, 
many faculty still depend on institutional information technology, personnel, and librarians to 
produce their “Internet-published works.”162 
 
The “location of the work” factor of Reid also operates in favor of the argument that faculty may 
be deemed employees under the work-made-for-hire doctrine. Faculty members not only tend to 
perform a substantial share of their work, if not all, at their university offices, but they also are 
likely to create online work on university computers, and to store and disseminate such work 
using university servers.163 Such on-site work also enables the faculty member to have ready 
                                                
159 Scott Carlson, Alliance Backed by Oxford, Stanford, and Yale Offers Courses to the Public, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 6, 2002, at A47.  
160 J. Michael Adams & Michael B. Sperling, Ubiquitous Distributed Learning and Global Citizenship, 
THE PRESIDENCY, Winter 2003, at 35. 
161 Florence Olsen, MIT’s Open Window: Putting Course Materials Online, the University Faces High 
Expectation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 2002, at A31.  
162 Laughlin, supra note 146, at 570. 
163 Id. at 571. 
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access to university staff dedicated to online projects, such as video producers, computer 
programmers, and website designers.164 
 
The “assignment of additional projects” is a Reid factor that is particularly relevant in the online 
context. With respect to standard courses and research, universities do not commonly assign 
specific topics or dictate course parameters. But in the case of online work, universities may 
need to centralize and control course offerings, and therefore may be more likely to assign the 
courses that faculty must teach. They may also be more likely to mandate the generation of 
specific, web-based course materials.165 This assignment of additional projects may further bring 
faculty into the purview of the work-made-for-hire doctrine. 
 
Likewise, the “duration of relationship” element of Reid indicates that faculty may be employees 
under work for hire principles. Employer institutions and their faculty members, barring a few 
exceptional cases such as visiting professors and fellowship scholars, typically seek to establish a 
long-term relationship that is not delineated by, or in any respect subject to, the completion of a 
particular copyrightable work.166 
 
The Reid factors regarding method of payment, assistants, benefits, and taxes further point to the 
status of faculty members as employees under the work for hire provisions. Virtually all full-time 
faculty members receive salaries, rather than hourly wages.167 Some faculty also receive 
additional remuneration for online work. “The method of payment can be especially suggestive 
of an online course being considered a work for hire in those instances where a university awards 
a faculty member a particular amount of money to create an online course.”168 Universities also 
typically hire and compensate graduate and research assistants.169 The vast majority of 
universities also provide faculty benefits, such as health care, insurance, pension, and tuition 
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wavers or reductions for faculty and their dependents.170 It is also standard university practice to 
withhold federal and state income taxes, as well as FICA taxes, from faculty compensation.171 
 
Lastly, under the Reid factor that inquires whether the work “is part of the regular business of the 
hiring party,” it can be argued that institutions of higher education are in the business of 
educating students, which may include the provision of online courses and related materials.172 
Universities may also be said to be in the business of generating and disseminating scholarly 
research. Professors “create many of these works to enhance their own productivity or quality of 
work, much the same way as any employee working in commercial, labor or service jobs.”173 
Notably, the AAU appears to offer some support for this interpretation. In its report on academic 
intellectual property, the AAU Task Force observes that while the central mission of a research 
university is “to create, preserve, and disseminate knowledge through teaching and research,” the 
creation and dissemination of knowledge is “a collective enterprise at the university…. 
Individual faculty members as well as the School itself are part of a larger enterprise, and this 
must be recognized along financial as well as other dimensions.”174 
 
2. Developing Online Courses: Within the “Scope of Employment?” 
 
a. Yes, Under Typical Faculty Contracts 
In Marshall v. Miles Laboratories, Inc., the court looked to the employee’s job description as a 
crucial means of determining the scope of his employment.175 On similar grounds, a court 
considering the matter in the academic context might reasonably conclude that a standard faculty 
contract or agreement comprises the development of courses, including online courses, and that 
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such courses therefore fall within the scope of the faculty member’s employment.176 At least one 
commentator argues that the production of such work falls squarely under the terms of the 
Copyright Act: “Without an explicated right to the copyright of materials prepared or developed 
under the auspices of the employer, arguably the faculty members statutorily is an employee 
working within the scope of employment and waives any right to retain copyright ownership of 
any materials developed.”177 This holds for written materials as well. The late Professor Todd 
Simon, of Kansas State University, argued that in the great majority of universities, faculty 
members are expected to publish scholarly works, such as books, articles, or monographs, within 
their area of expertise; and such publications “are expected to meet standards both of quality and 
quantity, and occasionally, frequency.”178 His argument further contends that: “the explicit and 
implicit agreements in the typical faculty employment agreement today support the idea that 
scholarly writing is within the course of employment as anticipated by the [Copyright Act].”179 
 
Professor Simon highlights certain features of these agreements that are explicitly provided in 
standard faculty employment contracts, such as the requirement that a professor teach a certain 
number of subjects or courses (i.e., a given courseload), and that a professor engage in research, 
writing, and scholarship in her field.180 Thus, scholarly writing can be argued to fall within the 
scope of the faculty member’s employment. Other contractual provisions that support this 
position include (i) compensation packages that are predicated upon a certain degree of scholarly 
enterprise; (ii) promotion and evaluation materials that require faculty to show they have spent 
significant time undertaking research, creative, and professional activities; and (iii) the provision 
of secretarial support, computer facilities and services, and library resources to facilitate 
scholarly productivity.181 
 
Often more implicit features involving the production of scholarly work are found in the 
employment agreements between institutions and their untenured faculty. As Professor Simon 
points out, “publishing the results of scholarly efforts is peculiarly important to junior faculty 
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members, because, usually, a professor must publish to gain tenure at all. Whether the tenure 
publication requirement is express or not, every new faculty member knows he must ‘publish or 
perish.’”182 
 
Other commentators look to the history and philosophy of the work-made-for-hire doctrine to 
support their argument that online courses fall within a faculty member’s scope of employment. 
Two commentators, for instance, adopt this stance: “‘scope’ is defined to include only those 
works of a sufficient degree of importance to both parties to make the ownership of the copyright 
a likely object of dispute. In most cases...the works that should emerge from such an inquiry will 
likely be those in which the employer has a strong economic interest.”183  
 
b. No, Under the Academic Exception...But Is the Exception Still Good Law? 
The “teachers exception,” or “academic exception,” is a court-created doctrine that carves out a 
narrow ground for allowing faculty to retain copyright in the works they produce without falling 
into the parameters of the works-made-for-hire doctrine. This exception was developed under the 
Copyright Act of 1909, but it is not clear whether it survived after the enactment of the 
Copyright Act of 1976.184 Although the Copyright Act of 1909 provided that the “the word 
‘author’ shall included an employer in the case of works made for hire,”185 it did not define the 
terms “works made for hire” or “employer”; and in cases involving academic disputes, courts 
defined the terms narrowly so as to exclude academics from the doctrine’s purview.186 
 
A seminal state court case on this ground is Sherrill v. Grieves, in which an instructor who taught 
military sketching, map reading, and surveying to the U.S. Army wrote a textbook on these 
subjects.187 Prior to publishing the textbook, Sherrill gave the U.S. military permission to print a 
pamphlet incorporating the section he had produced on military sketching.188 The defendants 
published an allegedly infringing work, and, when sued, argued that Sherrill did not own the 
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copyright because his efforts constituted a work for hire.189 The court held that Sherrill did 
indeed own the copyright, reasoning that while he was was employed to teach the subject 
contained in the pamphlet, he was not “obligated to reduce his lectures to writing.”190 
 
In another important state court case that also supports the teacher exception, Williams v. 
Weisser,191 an anthropology professor at the University of California at Los Angeles sued under 
California common law copyright to prevent a commercial publisher of class notes from 
transcribing and publishing the oral lectures that he had delivered in his class.192 In defending its 
transcriptions of the class notes, the defendant publisher argued that copyright in the professor’s 
lectures was owned by the university under the work-for-hire doctrine.193 The court held that 
Williams, and not the university, owned the common law copyright in his lectures.194 
 
Did the “teacher exception” carved out under common law copyright survive the enactment of 
the 1976 Act? On the one hand, dicta from an important Seventh Circuit decision seems to 
indicate that it is reasonable to consider it still extant. In Hays v. Sony Corp. of America,195 two 
public high school teachers who taught business classes wrote a manual on the operation of the 
word processors used at the school at which they taught.196 The school district later purchased 
new word processors from Sony, and asked Sony to modify the teachers’ manual to render it 
compatible with the new equipment.197 Sony complied with the school district’s request, and 
created a manual that directly incorporated sections of the teachers’ original manual into its 
text.198 Upon discovering the use of their work, the teachers sued Sony on grounds of copyright 
infringement.199 The district court held that the manual constituted a work made for hire, and that 
                                                
189 Id. at 686-87. 
190 Id. at 687. 
191 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). 
192 Id. at 543. Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, common law copyright protected unfixed and/or 
unpublished works. See Lape, supra note 38, at 235 n.42. 
193 Williams, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 543. 
194 Id. at 542, 546. 
195 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988). 




Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 123 
its copyright was therefore owned by the school district.200 The Seventh Circuit court dismissed 
the case on procedural grounds, for want of timely appeal.201 However, in dicta, while the court 
acknowledged that the manual did constitute a work made for hire under the 1976 Copyright Act, 
it also stated that “the reasons for a presumption against finding academic writings to be work 
made for hire are as forceful today as they ever were.”202 The Hays court further noted that “a 
college or university does not supervise its faculty in the preparation of academic books and 
articles, and is poorly equipped to exploit their writings, whether through publication or 
otherwise.”203 
 
In light of the Hays dicta, some commentators consider the common law-derived “teacher 
exception” to survive to date, exempting the work of professors from falling into the category of 
works made for hire.204 As Professor Russ VerSteeg states: “Judge Posner’s dicta in 
Hays…illustrates the judiciary’s reticence to accept the work-for-hire doctrine at face value in an 
educational context.”205 Another commentator bases the argument for survival of the teacher 
exception on policy grounds. Among these policy grounds are: academic freedom; the 
expectation of faculty that their salaries will be enhanced by earned royalties; and the expectation 
of faculty that they have the freedom to move to other institutions and recreate their courses.206 
 
On the other hand, and despite the Hays dicta, it is more likely that the teacher exception has not 
survived the promulgation of the Copyright Act of 1976. One point is that the Williams decision 
is no longer viable precedent because the Copyright Act, under Section 301, preempts state 
common-law copyright.207 In other words, Section 301 of the Act “washes away the Williams 
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rule.”208 Another, broader point is that the revisions to the Copyright Act that were made 
between 1909 and 1976 strengthened the common law presumption that employees own the 
copyright to the work of employees by requiring a writing, signed by both parties, to rebut the 
presumption that ownership vests in the employer.209 
 
Another critical case, also issued by the Seventh Circuit, underscores this position. In Weinstein 
v. University of Illinois,210 a pharmacy administration professor at the University of Illinois at 
Chicago brought a lawsuit over the publication of a scholarly article concerning a clinical 
program for practicing pharmacists.211 Plaintiff Weinstein sued his co-authors, university 
administrators, the university, and its trustees, claiming that the publication of the article with 
revisions, and with his name listed third among the three co-authors, deprived him of property 
without due process.212 The court, reading and interpreting the university’s copyright policy, held 
that Weinstein, along with his co-authors, owned the copyright to the article in question.213 The 
university’s copyright policy stated, in part, that its faculty and staff members retained copyright 
in works they produced as authors, except in situations where the work was created “as a specific 
requirement of employment or as an assigned University duty.”214 The Seventh Circuit Court in 
Weinstein observed that absent this policy, the Copyright Act’s works-made-for-hire provisions 
would be “general enough to make every academic article a ‘work made for hire’ and therefore 
vest exclusive control in universities rather than scholars.”215 
 
The opposite problem from that of the work-for-hire provisions of the Copyright Act potentially 
encompassing too much academic work in its scope would be that the teacher exception might be 
expanded to encompass too much academic work in its scope. Some commentators have noted 
this concern, and have indicated that the potential for overly-broad exemption of academic work 
from the work-made-for-hire doctrine might unfairly privilege faculty ownership of academic 
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work, at the expense of universities that may expend costly resources to enable its production. As 
Professors Wadley and Brown from Washburn University argue: “although undoubtedly 
warranted at the time, the [teacher]...exception may be so broad that it would likely exclude all 
the works produced by the faculty and staff employed within an educational context from the 
work-for-hire doctrine and, as a result, may unfairly discount any legitimate claims to authorship 
the academic employer may have.216 
 
 Two federal decisions, both issuing from Colorado, demonstrate that such a concern is a real 
one, and may well be indicating that courts are moving away from, if not outright jettisoning, the 
teacher exception. In Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District,217 a veterinary 
professor prepared course materials “on his own time with his own materials,” however the court 
held that the course materials were works made for hire, and therefore owned by the university, 
because the creation of the courses was “fairly and reasonably incidental to his employment.”218 
In University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,219 two professors at the 
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center were contracted to perform studies on patients’ 
absorption of iron from a multivitamin produced by American Cyanamid.220 The professors 
published an article regarding the results of the study in a medical journal.221 The plaintiffs -- the 
University of Colorado Foundation, the University of Colorado, the Board of Regents of the 
University of Colorado, and the two professors -- together asserted that the regents “are quite 
obviously the owner, because the Article is a ‘work made for hire’ by the coauthors done within 
the scope of their employment.”222 In other words, the plaintiffs asserted -- and the defendants 
and court agreed -- that the professors’ article was a work made for hire.223 The court also agreed 
that there was no evidence to rebut such ownership.224 
                                                
216 Wadley & Brown, supra note 122, at 431. 
217 Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain Coll. Dist., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d, 208 F.3d 908 
(10th Cir. 2000).  
218 Id. at 1307. 
219 880 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D. Colo. 1995), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 196 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
220 Id. at 1390. 
221 Id. at 1391. 
222 Id. at 1400 (quoting from Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief Supporting a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
at 29 n. 55). 
223 Id. at 1400 
224 Id. 
Chapter 2: Education Viswanathan 
 126 
 
The status of the teacher exception, then, is unresolved. As one commentator rightly observes, 
“what is clear is that without an explicit statutory foundation the exception can no longer simply 
be assumed.”225 Ambiguity is rife with respect to academic work. “No clear definition for 
traditional scholarly work exists.”226 Equally importantly, no clear distinction exists between 
“independent academic effort” and “collaboration” between faculty members and their 
institutions. This ambiguity is only heightened in the context of expensive and complex 
endeavors such as the creation of online courses and course materials, which often require 
extensive university resources supporting the faculty -- such resources including the provision of 
staff, computers, and software -- to enable the development, use, and dissemination via new 
media for teaching.227 Finally, as Professor Georgia Harper of the University of Texas concludes, 
“the mixed holdings of these cases indicate that [university] policy probably is the best way to 
resolve the ambiguity.”228 
 
3. So, Who Owns Copyright in the Electronic Course? 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that at present copyright in faculty work will most often be found to 
belong to the university, on the basis of the following factors: (i) the definition of works-made-
for-hire under the Copyright Act of 1976; (ii) the Supreme Court’s holding in CCNV v. Reid, and 
the thirteen-factor test the Court sets forth to determine what constitutes a work-made-for hire; 
and the federal courts’ definition of the “scope of employment.” Nonetheless, as some 
commentators contend, it may still remain an open question how a court will rule when deciding 
whether the copyright in a specific scholarly work rightly belongs to the faculty member who 
produced it or to the institution at which it was created and which may have supported its 
creation. As one commentator notes, perhaps wryly, “while four of the thirteen factors weigh in 
favor of the faculty member and four of the factors weigh in favor of the university, the 
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remaining five factors have equities on both sides.”229 Professors Wadley and Brown of 
Washburn University add: “the reality is that some works may involve a level of university 
involvement from which one might infer an intent to treat it as made-for-hire, whereas other 
works may not warrant such a determination. In the former case, the work should be included 
within the scope of the doctrine and in the latter case, it would not be included.”230 
 
To resolve the ambiguity, and to stave off potential disputes, university policies and collective 
bargaining agreements are now being carefully drawn to delineate “brighter boundaries of 
ownership,” particularly with respect to distance education courses and materials.231 Many of 
these agreements concentrate upon a key Reid factor -- the manner and means of production -- 
which specifically assess faculty members’ use of institutional resources in the creation of their 
work. “University policy statements and collective bargaining agreements are reposing in the 
institution ownership of faculty-authored works for which the university provides an 
extraordinary measure of equipment, facilities, staff assistance or compensation.”232 As the 
growth of distance education continues, it remains to be seen whether the institutional support of 
online work will require further clarification of copyright ownership in university policies and 
agreements, and in faculty buy-in to such delineations of copyright in their academic work. 
 
III. MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF COPYRIGHT POLICY233 
A. Competing Ownership Interests 
 
The ambiguity that remains inherent to copyright law in the educational sector, as outlined 
above, leaves open the question of question of who owns copyright in academic works. This 
question is only exacerbated by the ever-accelerating race to develop online courses. Academic 
courses and related course materials do not seem to fit squarely into already-existing policies on 
intellectual property. On the one hand, courses and materials are arguably analogous to 
textbooks, prepared and most often owned by professors, and to which universities will rarely 
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claim ownership rights. On the other hand, courses and materials are also arguably analogous to 
inventions, such as scientific or technological innovations, to which universities typically claim 
the patent rights and at least some, if not all, of the associated licensing income.234 As a result of 
these competing “visions” of the nature of academic coursework, faculty and institutions are able 
to lay opposing, and often contentious, claims over the ownership of online courses and their 
related materials. 
 
For their part, faculty members proffer practical and policy reasons for claiming ownership in 
courses. In sheerly practical terms, they consider the potential monetary value that their courses 
may yield, and feel that if it is possible, it should by right be theirs.235 But equally, faculty are 
concerned that if they cede ownership of the course and its related online materials, they will 
perforce cede control over both course content and dissemination of the course -- including the 
manner of distribution, revisions, and derivative works -- which in turn would ultimately 
compromise their academic freedom.236 The cornerstone tenet of academic freedom, as 
articulated in the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure by the 
American Association of University Professors, is as pertinent today as it was when written: 
“Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of results, subject to the 
adequate performance of their other academic duties.”237 As one commentator has explained, 
“[f]aculty copyrights are being constructed as badges of autonomy, independence, and 
control.”238 
 
Finally, faculty argue that the development of courses and related digital materials is particularly 
arduous and labor intensive. Developing and adapting the course for new technologies, 
maintaining online platforms and/or chat rooms, responding to asynchronous emails from course 
participants, and so forth, require effort that can far exceed the ordinary scope of faculty 
responsibilities. While sometimes remunerated by universities, this work can be uncompensated 
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if it is seen as merely part of the ordinary course of a professor’s duties. Many faculty will argue 
that the additional labor can and should be compensated by the rewards that flow from 
ownership of the online courses that they prepare and maintain.239 
 
But from another perspective, universities, too, have a powerful interest in claiming ownership in 
the courses they offer.240 This interest is commonly monetary, particularly when the institution 
has incurred the costs associated with creating, developing, and disseminating the course and its 
materials online.241 Ohio State University, for instance, raised this concern when it began 
requiring its graduate students to submit their doctoral dissertations electronically, so that the 
dissertations might be posted and made available online.242 Ohio State had historically held some 
IP rights to dissertations and other graduate student work in the sciences, in large part because 
university grants and equipment sustained the bulk of graduate research and underwrote its 
scholarship.243 Drawing analogy to the practice in the scientific disciplines, the dean of the 
Graduate School at Ohio State asserted that the university likewise held an ownership right in the 
scholarly work of graduate students in the humanities.244 The dean supported his claim by adding 
that graduate students would produce their scholarly work in order to fulfill an academic 
requirement, and often while being employed as salaried teaching assistants or receiving 
assistance such as scholarships, funding grants, awards, or other forms of support.245 
 
Universities are also wary about possible future ramifications of courses offered online. As 
former president Graham B. Spanier of Pennsylvania State University stated: “universities may 
                                                
239 ARTHUR LEVINE & JEFFREY C. SUN, BARRIERS TO DISTANCE EDUCATION 4 (2002).  
240 See Lape, supra note 40 at 264-65 (“The interest taken by universities in faculty copyright is primarily 
monetary, as demonstrated by the universities’ interest in holding copyright in technologically complex 
work….”).  
241 Laughlin, supra note 146 at 561.. 
242 Scott Carlson, Students Oppose Ohio State’s Plan to Put Dissertations Online, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., May 30, 2003, at A33. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. Ohio State’s policy caused some faculty members to raise concerns regarding the intellectual 
property rights of their students. As one professor said, “[o]ur concern is whether this [policy] is going to 
take control of the copyright out of the hands of the student and into the hands of the university.” 
245 Id. 
Chapter 2: Education Viswanathan 
 130 
see some of their faculty developing software for other educational institutions, who in turn sell 
it, perhaps in competition with the home institution’s program.246 
 
One way in which institutions and faculty try to clarify and resolve these competing interests is 
to include carefully delineated copyright ownership provisions not only in their faculty 
handbooks and manuals but also in their employment contracts. For instance, in 2002, the 
Massachusetts Society of Professors, the union that represents the faculty of the greater 
University of Massachusetts system, began negotiations with the university to determine and 
spell out rights and responsibilities in distance education courses.247 While some of the union’s 
demands, such as limiting student enrollment in online classes to fifteen students, was subject to 
lengthy negotiation, the ownership of courses was surprisingly easily settled.248 The 
administration willingly granted faculty members the right to retain ownership in, and control 
over, the online courses and their related materials.249 Along similar lines, in 2003, the state 
university system in New Jersey was subject to negotiation among the member institutions and 
the faculty union. 
B. Intellectual Land Grab: Cultural Commons vs. Micropayments 
 
Outside the academic sector, the copyright ownership debate has been much contested, 
encompassing in its scope every imaginable creative industry. In music, litigation has been 
brought against the Girl Scouts of America,250 seeking to require the organization to pay 
royalties for the songs its members sing around the campfire, and the Recording Industry of 
America has brought thousands of copyright infringement lawsuits against Internet users who 
freely download songs on the Internet.251 In film, a band of independent film producers has 
fought against a ban imposed in 2004 by the Motion Picture Association of America on sending 
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DVDs to voters for annual film awards.252 As one journalist has noted, “[i]n less than a decade, 
the much-ballyhooed liberating potential of the Internet seems to have given way to something of 
an intellectual land grab, presided over by legislators and lawyers for the media industries.”253 
One can  legitimately expand the comment to include all the creative industries as well. 
 
The push-back to this “intellectual land grab” has been swift and strong. On one side, a coalition 
of scholars, activists, and interested stakeholders are seeking to reform copyright law, arguing 
that the recent efforts to increase copyright protections across the board, while allegedly aimed at 
fighting copyright infringement and piracy, will ultimately erode the public domain and 
undermine society’s ability to create and share ideas. Perhaps the best-known proponent of the 
“free culture” movement, Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard University, has long invoked 
Thomas Jefferson as the intellectual forebear of this societally-oriented position.254 Professor 
Lessig and his fellow free culture reformers support allowing individual creators only a limited 
time to profit exclusively from their intellectual property,255 as is consonant with the intellectual 
property provisions of the Constitution. The free culture advocates “stress that borrowing and 
collaboration are essential components of all creation and caution against being seduced by the 
romantic myth of the ‘author’: the lone garret-dwelling poet, creating masterpieces out of thin 
air.”256 Thus, they argue, a limited period of exclusivity for the creator is all that is warranted; 
once the limited copyright has lapsed, the work would go into the cultural commons, part of the 
great shared public domain.257 
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possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”). 
255 See LESSIG, supra note 12. See also Boynton, supra note 250 at 42, 43. 
256 Id. at 42 
257 See LESSIG, supra note 12. 
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Advocates of strong copyright respond by arguing that the individual creator’s incentives and 
compensation for creation are integral to the Constitutional protection of intellectual property 
rights. On this view, “permission culture” would better serve all its constituents, including 
creators, collaborators, and users.258 In permission culture, consumers purchase leases to artistic 
works, affording them restricted access to, and use of, copyrighted creative works, such as 
books, songs, films, and so forth.259 The permission culture model may be most readily 
exemplified by Apple’s iTunes music store, through which consumers may download songs -- 
with somewhat restricted access260 -- for somewhere between $0.99 and $1.39 each.261 Such a 
leasing model may also be expanded, with the aid of sophisticated digital rights management 
technology. For instance, one proposed business plan allows a consumer to “play a song on [her] 
computer for one price; and transfer it to [her] MP3 player for a slightly higher fee.”262 
 
Some legal scholars find greater policy justification for the “micropayments” scheme of the 
permission culture than the cultural commons landscape of the free culture movement. For 
instance, Professor Jane Ginsburg of Columbia University Law School argues: “Copyright 
cannot be understood merely as a grudgingly tolerated way station on the road to public 
domain….Much of copyright law in the United States and abroad makes sense only if one 
recognizes the centrality of the author, the human creator of the work. Because copyright arises 
out of the act of creating a work, authors have moral claims that neither corporate intermediaries 
nor consumer end-users can (straightfacedly) assert.”263 Building upon this position, Professor 
Paul Goldstein of Stanford University Law School suggests the broad scope that creators’ rights 
and rewards may span: “the logic of property rights dictates their extension into every corner in 
which people derive enjoyment and value from literary and artistic works….copyright should 
extend into every corner of economic value where the cost of negotiating a license is not 
insurmountably high.”264 
                                                
258 See Boynton, supra note 250 at 42. 
259 See Boynton, supra note 250 at 42-43 
260 For example, a song from iTunes may only be downloaded onto five devices upon any one purchase.  
261 See infra, Chapter 3.  
262 See Boynton, supra note 250 at 45. 
263 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1063, 1068 (2003) 
264 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 178-79 
(1994). 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 133 
 
A middle ground between the cultural commons and permission culture positions -- one which 
seeks a compromise between the rights of creators and the interests of users -- also has its 
advocates. Professor William Fisher of Harvard University Law School has proposed a 
compensation scheme that draws upon the traditional compulsory licensing model of music 
composition, in which composers are paid when their works are recorded or performed.265 Under 
Professor Fisher’s compulsory licensing proposal, a central office would register all works 
capable of being transmitted online, such as music, film, and books.266 This central office would 
monitor the number of times a work is accessed and used, and then compensate the creators 
based on the frequency of usage.267 A fifteen percent tax would be collected from the sale of 
devices that are customarily used for copying and storing music, such as blank CDs, MP3 
players, and CD burners -- and these tax revenues would pay for the creators’ compensation.268 
Professor Fisher has estimated that this proposal would raise $2.4 billion, but critics have 
contended that the amount is insufficient when compared to the estimated $11 billion in revenue 
that is made by the music industry in the United States alone.269 Another such licensing 
arrangement, following Professor Lessig’s proposal, is the “Creative Commons License”, which 
allows authors to reserve certain rights while waiving others under four basic agreements that 
can be mixed and matched: (i) securing attribution when their work is used by someone else; (ii) 
denying use of their work for profit without permission; (iii) preventing alterations to their work; 
and (iv) permitting use of their work only if the new work is offered to the public under the same 
terms.270 
C. Reason to Compromise: “Show Me the Money” 
 
A major reason that faculty members and institutions compete over copyright ownership of 
courses is that they consider the online distribution of courses in distance education venues to 
hold the potential for great profit in the commercial market. As Professor Alan Dershowitz of 
                                                
265 WILLIAM FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 
(2007); see also Boynton, supra note 250 at 45; Ethan Smith, Can Copyright Be Saved?, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 20, 2003, at R1. 
266 FISHER, supra note 265; see also Boynton, supra note XX at 45 
267 This is the model employed by the Spotfiy. http://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/. 
268 FISHER, supra note 265; see also Boynton, supra note XX at 45; Lohr, supra note XX at 5 
269 FISHER, supra note 265. 
270 See LESSIG, supra note 12. See also Id. 
Chapter 2: Education Viswanathan 
 134 
Harvard University Law School has pronounced, “what distinguishes the Internet from 
everything else is the number of zeroes,” “the money is so overwhelming that it can skew 
people’s judgment.”271 Yet according to Professor Lessig of Stanford University Law School, 
only about two percent of all works protected by copyright continue to produce revenue for the 
owners of their copyright.272 Thus, a disconnect may exist between the stakeholders in the 
educational copyright debate -- particularly institutional administrators and faculty members -- 
so that a compromise may be struck between free access to copyrightable courses and materials 
and a system of micropayments to remunerate the creation, maintenance, and dissemination of 
such courses and materials online. 
 
Both sides should be instructed as well by actual real-life examples of online distance education 
ventures that have failed to generate profits for their participants, irrespective of the copyright 
ownership of courses so disseminated. Early on, while investigating the potential capacity for 
revenue that online courses might represent, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”) 
commissioned a study by consultants Booz Allen Hamilton (“Booz Allen”). The Booz Allen 
study concluded that little to no market would exist for offering MIT courses online for a fee.273 
Soon thereafter, MIT decided to make the primary materials from its courses available online for 
free; eventually, this would evolve into their world-famous Open Course Ware project, in which 
all of MIT’s courses would be systematically uploaded to their site and offered for free to the 
greater public.274 Thus, MIT found renown for its visionary project to open its education to all 
comers, while not wasting its resources chasing an elusive profit motive in online courses. 
 
MIT was fortunate, or wise, enough to avoid the fate of some of its peer institutions, which 
remained persuaded that distance education would open up vistas of yet-untapped riches. In 
January 2003, Columbia University announced that it would close Fathom, its for-profit 
distance-learning venture that had been created with the express purpose of selling Internet-based 
                                                
271  Amy Dockser Marcus, Seeing Crimson: Why Harvard Law Wants to Reign In One of Its Star 
Professors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1999, at A1. 
272 Amy Harmon, Debate to Intensify on Copyright Extension Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2002, at C1. 
273 Olsen, supra note 154 at 31. See Charles M. Vest, Why MIT Decided to Give Away All Its Course 
Materials Via the Internet, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 2004, at B20. 
274 See About OCW, MIT OPENCOURSEWARE, http://ocw.mit.edu/about (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) 
(detailing this history and principles of the OpenCourseWare project).  
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courses and seminars to the public.275 Columbia had opened Fathom in 2001 with twelve 
partners -- including the London School of Economics and Political Science, the University of 
Chicago, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution -- and with a hefty investment of $14.9 
million.276 But at the close of its business, the Fathom venture had netted a mere $700,000 in fees 
from other institutions and from sales revenue.277 This mirrored New York University’s 
(“NYU”) similar loss a few years ealier. NYU closed NYUOnline in November 2001, three 
years after being heralded as the first large nonprofit university to create a for-profit venture 
intended to sell Internet-based courses.278 The sudden deflation of the “Internet bubble” soon 
thereafter abruptly finished off NYU’s plans to pursue investment in developing and marketing 
its courses in any kind of for-profit venture.279 
 
Still another cautionary tale is found in the online ventures undertaken by the School of 
Management at the State University of New York at Buffalo (“SUNY Buffalo”). In the fall of 
2001, the business school at SUNY Buffalo ended its Internet-based MBA program after only 
thirty-five students enrolled in its two pilot courses.280 Enumerating the costs associated with 
such a venture, Howard G. Foster, then assistant dean for academic programs at the business 
school, pointed out that “[e]ach course has to have an instructor, a graduate assistant, technical 
people to be there in case the connection breaks down, as well as someone to design the 
course.”281 In order to recover these costs, the business school at SUNY Buffalo would have 
needed to charge approximately $23,000 for the two-year program, or more than double the in-
state tuition rate at the time for their traditional MBA program, a prohibitive increase.282 In this 
same era, other large distance-learning ventures, including Virtual Temple and United States 
                                                
275 Scott Carlson, After Losing Millions, Columbia U. Will Close Online-Learning Venture, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 17, 2003, at A30. 
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Open University, were compelled to close their doors.283 This only served to highlight “the 
immaturity of the e-learning market and the risks that await the commercial online ventures of 
traditional institutions.”284 
 
The case against profitability of distance-learning ventures is not closed, however. Indeed, some 
studies have suggested that offering online courses may be a break-even proposition, or may 
even generate profits. The Pew Grant Program in Course Redesign has funded thirty technology-
based ventures whose objective is to maintain or increase quality while reducing costs.285 Some 
of the program’s results have indicated that institutions may yield an average savings of 41% -- 
and in some cases as high as 86% -- through the careful design and restructure of resources for 
learning environments.286 Further studies undertaken by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in 2000 
examining the financial costs and potential profitability of distance learning at six universities -- 
Drexel University, Pace University, Penn State University, Rochester Institute of Technology, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of Maryland University College 
-- concluded that most of the universities under study were at least close to the break-even 
point.287 
 
IV. CAMPUS COPYRIGHT POLICY AGREEMENTS 
A. List of Shared Rights, In Writing 
 
Aside from the issue of whether online academic courses will generate profits, universities and 
faculty alike are best served when they have put in place clear and well-delineated copyright 
                                                
283 See, e.g., University Business, What Went Wrong with AllLearn?, UNIVERSITY BUSINESS (Jun 2006), 
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agreements that respect the various stakeholders’ rights and allocate their responsibilities and 
rewards. As academic copyright has been at play for well over a decade now, many institutions 
have established policies that can serve as models for such copyright agreements. Provisions 
governing the allocation of ownership, control, and income rights related to courses are proving 
essential to the development of distance learning, whether undertaken for profit or offered in an 
open source model. Following are the significant points that academic copyright agreements 
elucidate. 
 
In accordance with the Copyright Act, academic copyright agreements are reduced to writing.288 
The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) and the American Association of 
Universities (“AAU”) agree on the importance of putting policies in writing. In its Statement of 
Copyright, the AAUP states: “[i]t is…useful for the respective rights of individual faculty 
members and the institution -- concerning ownership, control, use, and compensation -- to be 
negotiated in advance, and reduced to a written agreement.”289 Likewise, the AAU’s Intellectual 
Property Task Force’s recommendation for policy development for intellectual property and new 
media states that “[t]he university should have a formal written policy (one that is easily 
available for review by members of the community) that describes clearly the bases of 
distribution of revenues derived from new media content.”290 
 
The written agreement should delineate not only copyright ownership but also the rights and 
methods for using a work. This approach is advocated by Georgia Harper, senior counsel at the 
University of Texas System and a national expert on copyright. As she explains, sound copyright 
policies address “the use of others’ copyrights and the creation, ownership, and management of 
institutional copyrights.”291 Such policies, then, address who owns the works and who has the 
right to use and exploit them.292 As Harper sums up, “a policy that recognizes and focuses upon 
                                                
288 17 U.S.C. 204 
289AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, STATEMENT ON COPYRIGHT (1999), at 
https://www.aaup.org/report/statement-copyright [hereinafter AAUP Statement on Copyright] 
290 See AAU Framework, supra note 177. 
291 Harper, supra note 221 at  6.  
292 Id. at 7 
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the parties’ interest in a work, rather than just on who owns the work, will better serve 
everyone’s needs.”293  
 
Harper’s position is equally espoused by Beryl Abrams, associate general counsel of Columbia 
University, who believes in separating copyright ownership and control. As he has stated: “there 
is a legitimate basis for separating copyright ownership from control, and use and distribution of 
any revenues that arise from commercialization of a work. If those different ideas are addressed, 
I’m not sure you have to really come down firmly and say that any new media works are 
necessarily works for hire.”294 
 
Two commentators from Washburn University have similarly posited that copyright policies 
may not necessarily conform to the strict contours of the Copyright Act, but may instead meet 
the reasonable expectations of institutions and faculty in order to fulfill the purpose of the 
copyright laws. As they state: “[a]voiding any blanket application of the work-for-hire doctrine 
would reinforce the parties’ normal and legitimate expectations regarding the ownership of 
particular works as well as promot[e] the larger policies of copyright law and academic freedom 
which favor information dissemination.”295 
 
Generally, academic institutions’ copyright agreements regarding copyright in courses that may 
be offered through distance education programs address the following concerns: 
   - definitions of the property incorporated in the policy; 
   - delineation of copyright ownership, particularly defining what is considered a work for hire 
by specifying which works are within or outside a faculty member’s scope of employment; 
   - rights to distribute the work, and the allocation of any resulting profits; 
                                                
293 Id. at 9 
294 Coping with Copyright in the Digital Age, Trusteeship, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 28, 32. See also AAU 
Framework. Note that an important distinction exists between the ownership of intellectual property and 
the allocation of returns derived from the licensing or sale of that property 
295 Wadley & Brown, supra note 122 at 420. See also Michele J. Le Moal-Gray, supra note 20 at 1032. 
As LeMoal-Gray states: “[w]hile still recognizing the legal bases of ownership, colleges and universities 
that wish to maintain a traditional academic culture will, most likely, provide for faculty members to 
retain ownership of their instructional materials. Through the use of well-crafted, collaboratively 
developed, contracts or license agreements, faculty would own their work, while still providing the 
institution with flexibility in the manner in which the courses were offered. Id.  
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   - rights to future use; 
   - rights to derivative works; 
   - licensing rights; 
   - rights of fair use, including specific time limits on future use; 
   - rights of distribution; and 
   - the recommendation, or requirement, that the parties enter contracts that clarify ownership, 
control, and the right to revise, commercialize, and create derivative works.296 
 
Institutions have learned that specifically drafting agreements governing the allocation of 
academic copyrights is essential, even when well-established patent policies are already in place. 
Illustrative of this fact is an incident that arose in 1988 at Princeton University. A committee on 
intellectual property at Princeton suggested that electronic courses were most analogous to 
computer programs, and should therefore be governed by the university’s patent policy, under 
which the university has the right to claim ownership over intellectual property (i.e., patents) 
created with its resources.297 Professors in the computer science department objected to this 
characterization, arguing that it would give the university control over extensive online materials 
used in their courses.298 An open letter, signed by fourteen faculty members, stated that “the 
proposed policy has potentially far-reaching effects that will inhibit, rather than encourage, the 
production and dissemination of new knowledge.”299 In response, the Princeton intellectual 
property committee changed tack, and suggested establishing a new policy for online courses 
apart from copyright and patent policies.300 
 
B. Work Made For Hire Redux: Statutory Language and Substantial Control 
 
In crafting their copyright policies and agreements, academic institutions focus on the issue of 
ownership. This compels them to articulate a clear response to the open-ended question posed by 
the Copyright Act: what is a work made for hire in the academic context? 
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As previously discussed, the Copyright Act articulates a two-pronged test to determine whether 
an author’s work constitutes a work made for hire.301 Under the second prong, a university’s 
copyright policy may unambiguously designate a faculty member’s work as a work made for hire 
when it is “specially ordered or commissioned for use” in one of nine specific categories. The 
enumerated categories that are most pertinent to higher education are: (i) a contribution to a 
collective work; (ii) a supplementary work; (iii) a compilation; and (iv) an instructional text.302 
Contingent to this designation is the requirement that the parties “must expressly agree in a 
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.”303 
 
In less clear-cut circumstances, any determination of copyright ownership is subject to 
interpretation of the first prong of the work-made-for-hire provision of the Copyright Act: “a 
work prepared by an employee in the scope of his or her employment.”304 Some policymakers 
strongly suggest that universities are best served by drafting their copyright policies with an 
initial presumption that faculty have ownership in their work. This policy preference does not 
align perfectly with existing law, which offers a reasonable case for universities asserting 
copyright ownership in faculty work, particularly with regard to distance education courses. 
However, advocates for faculty ownership of copyright argue that traditionally faculty are 
privileged with respect to copyright ownership in the work they create. Further, they argue, 
“what is essential is that the university allocate to itself only those aspects of the copyright in 
which it truly has an interest.”305  
 
Among these policymakers, the AAUP, in its Statement On Copyright, clearly advocates for a 
presumption of faculty ownership. It states: “it has been the prevailing practice to treat the 
faculty member as the copyright owner of works that are created independently and at the faculty 
member’s own initiative for traditional academic purposes. Examples include class notes and 
syllabi, books and articles, works of fiction and nonfiction, poems and dramatic works, musical 
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and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, and educational software, 
known as ‘courseware.’ This practice has been followed for the most part, regardless of the 
physical medium in which these “traditional academic works” appear, that is, whether on paper 
or in audiovisual or electronic form…. this practice should therefore ordinarily apply to the 
development of courseware for use in programs of distance education.”306 Notwithstanding this 
pronouncement, however, the AAUP does recognize that the university may fairly claim 
copyright ownership in work created by faculty that falls into three categories: (i) special works 
created in circumstances that may properly be regarded as “made for hire”; (ii) negotiated 
contractual transfers; and (iii) “joint works” as described in the Copyright Act.307 
 
In contrast, the AAU’s Intellectual Task Force argues in its AAU Framework for the 
“management” position in recommending that “the university should own the intellectual 
property that is created at the university by faculty, research staff, and scientists with substantial 
aid of its facilities or financial support.” 308 The AAU Framework defines “substantial aid” to 
include “intellectual, financial, and reputational capital.”309 
 
Many universities, while acknowledging the AAUP’s perspective, adopt the AAU’s position 
when fashioning their copyright policies.310 For example, as seen in a survey from as early as 
1990 involving seventy research universities revealed that in forty-two of the policies 
universities claimed ownership of faculty work when there had been “substantial use” of 
university resources.311 Sixteen of these forty-two policies, however, excluded the use of certain 
common resources from consideration, including libraries, offices, salaries, classrooms, 
laboratories, and secretarial aid.312 
 
C. Protecting Specific Faculty Rights 
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Even when a university claims the copyright to online courses, individual faculty members who 
created and developed such courses may retain significant rights and privileges. The AAUP, in 
its Statement on Copyright, recommends that at a minimum faculty retain “the right to take credit 
for creative contributions, to reproduce the work for his own instructional purposes, and to 
incorporate the work in future scholarly works authored by that faculty member.”313 With respect 
to distance education courseware, the AAUP suggests that faculty members also retain rights 
over future use, “not only through compensation but also through the right of ‘first refusal’ in 
making new versions or at least the right to be consulted in good faith on reuse and revisions.”314 
At least one commentator, Professor Robert Gorman of The University of Pennsylvania Law 
School, has expressed agreement with the AAUP position: “should it be determined that 
ownership of courseware lies with the university, [policies or agreements] can expressly reserve 
to the faculty member any number of important rights, both economic and ‘moral’: to share 
future royalties, to be given due credit on the courseware, to have the right of first refusal if the 
lectures are to be updated in later years, and to have the right to use the material in the 
professor’s own courses and publications.315 
 
One example that highlights many of the provisions enumerated by the AAUP is the University 
of Michigan’s copyright policy. While some works are owned by the university, faculty still 
retain an interest in the use of such works and in receiving credit for participation in such 
works.316 Moreover, faculty employed by the university retain the right of first refusal with 
respect to proposed new versions of their work.317 
 
The University of Washington’s copyright policy allows a faculty member to retain the right to 
revise a course she has created. Its policy provides that “as long as the author...remains an 
employee of the University, the author may: (a) request reasonable revisions of the materials 
prior to any instance of internal use, or (b) ask that the materials be withdrawn from internal use 
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if revisions are not feasible.”318 Consonant with these provisions, as one commentator notes, a 
faculty member may retain the right to demand credit for her work or, alternatively, to have her 
name removed as the creator if she disagrees with revisions made by the institution.319 
 
Some copyright policies protect the rights of departing faculty members who, upon changing 
institutional affiliations, seek access and use of the courses they created and taught. Two means 
of providing for such rights are licenses and royalties. As defined by the copyright policy of the 
University of California at Berkeley, licenses are “a contract in which a copyright owner grants 
to another permission to exercise one or more of the rights under copyright.”320 The same policy 
defines royalties as a “payment made to an owner of a copyright for the privilege of practicing a 
right under the copyright.”321 
 
One option, which follows certain long-standing policies of academic publishers, allows a 
departing faculty member to receive a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use her work in 
classes she teaches at her new institution.322 Alternatively, the original institution may retain 
authorship and copyright in the course, but at the same time negotiate a license for use with the 
faculty member’s new institution.323 The license may contain a variety of faculty rights. For 
instance, the Michigan Policy provides that its departing faculty members “have the right to be 
consulted in good faith on reuse and revisions (e.g. for online instructional materials or 
courseware).”324 
 
It is always the case that faculty members and institutions can enter into contractual agreements 
on many, if not all, of these provisions. For instance, the UW Policy allows the university to 
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retain the right to continue to use a faculty member’s work internally after she leaves the 
institution, “unless the author/producer and the University agree in writing on special conditions 
for subsequent internal use of the materials and the procedures for their revision.”325 Pursuant to 
provisions in the UW Policy, faculty members can only secure full protection for their work if 
they obtain an agreement stating that their works are not considered works made for hire and are 
not produced in the course of employment.326 
 
D. Protecting Specific University Rights 
 
Customarily, even when parties agree that a faculty member owns copyright in her course, the 
university that provides her supporting resources retains some measure of control over the course 
materials. As at least one commentator has indicated, if the university provides an “extraordinary 
measure of creative or financial input,” it may reasonably negotiate to secure reimbursement 
from, or a continuing share in, royalties; or it may negotiate to obtain a license to revise, update, 
and use the materials within the institution, without paying royalties.327 Some institutions prefer 
reimbursement over licenses to use, as reimbursement can minimize contentious negotiations 
among parties. However, other institutions will opt to negotiate licenses to use, which afford 
access to any income generated by continuing use of the underlying materials.328 
 
In the realm of academic patents, the technology transfer offices of many universities commonly 
reserve a “shop right” in patentable materials, while dividing royalties among the institution and 
the creative faculty member.329 The shop right doctrine of patent law allows an employee to 
retain rights in the underlying patent, while the employer is entitled to use the patented device, 
process, or invention to the extent necessary for business purposes.330 Commentators such as 
Professor Gorman are in favor of using a shop right approach with respect to academic 
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copyright.331 However, such an analogous use of the shop right doctrine has been rejected in 
other creative industries. For instance, employees in the motion picture and music industries, in 
which copyrights can retain their value for many years, proposed including shop rights in the 
Copyright Act.332 Such proposals, however, were expressly rejected by Congress.333 
 
Notwithstanding the discouraging examples of the film and music industries, several policy 
reasons argue in favor of allowing an institution to retain a shop right in online materials created 
by its faculty. One such reason is the protection of student expectations in the availability of 
courses and course materials. On this ground, institutions have good reason to retain a 
“perpetual, non-exclusive license to use of the videotapes, computer files, or other media 
comprising the distance learning program.”334 Another such reason is the protection of the 
institution’s interest in the event that a faculty member departs for another institution. On this 
ground, and as proposed by the ACE Distance Education Report, institutions reasonably receive 
a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use the work for instruction, with possible restrictions on 
commercialization of the work.335 
 
The AAUP is a proponent of allowing universities to retain a shop right to online courses that 
were initially costly to develop.336 The AAUP suggests that the institution may reasonably 
require reimbursement for “unusual financial or technical support,” irrespective of allocations of 
copyright ownership among the interested parties.337 It proposes that reimbursement may be “in 
the form of future royalties or a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use the work for internal 
educational and administrative purposes.”338 
 
                                                
331 Gorman, supra note 129, at 308-309. 
332 H.R. Rep. No. 1733, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5737. 
333 Id. 
334 Laughlin, supra note 146, at 580. 
335 ACE Distance Education Report, at 5. As noted, this closely adheres to the traditional model of 
academic publishers. 
336 AAUP Statement on Copyright. These costs might include computer support, library, secretarial, and 
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One example of a shop right provision is found in the University of California at Berkeley’s 
Policy on Copyright Ownership, in the section regarding the release of university rights. It states: 
“[t]he University may release its ownership rights in copyrighted work to the originator(s) when, 
as determined by the University: (a) there are no overriding or special obligations to a sponsor or 
other third party and (b) the best interests of the University would be so served. Such release of 
ownership rights must be contingent on the agreement of the originators) that no further effort 
on, or development of, the work will be made using University resources and that the University 
is granted a free-of-cost, nonexclusive, worldwide license to use and reproduce the work for 
education and research purposes.”339 
 
In a provision that bears close resemblance to a shop right, one commentator has proposed 
establishing a right of “teacher inception” in a work created by a faculty member pursuant to her 
teaching duties and on her own initiative, rather than at the institution’s instigation.340 The right 
of teacher inception, which may be provided either in individual contracts or in collective 
bargaining agreements, grants the institution a “nonexclusive, nontransferable, royalty-free 
license to use the copyrightable works for nonprofit educational purposes.” 341 The teacher then 
would hold all other copyrights. 
 
Finally, institutions typically own their web servers, and seek to protect their interests in such 
web servers. In this regard, it is common practice in university copyright policies to stipulate that 
all information and files saved on the server become property of the university.342 
 
E. Additional Contract Provisions 
 
First and foremost, universities’ comprehensive copyright policies delineate ownership rights 
and protect vital faculty and institutional interests. These policies also clarify the terms and 
                                                
339 Berkeley Policy, Section VII 
340 VerSteeg, supra note 205, at 410-11. 
341 Id. at 411 
342 Todd D. Borow, Note, Copyright Ownership of Scholarly Works, Created by University Faculty and 
Posted on School-Provided Web Pages, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 149, 165 (1998). 
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conditions of ownership, and specify the allocation of any returns that may flow from the 




Universities customarily grant licenses when they commercialize an online course, typically by 
selling the course to another institution or on the open market. Illustrative are the license 
provisions in the copyright policy of the University of Washington. The University of 
Washington Copyright Policy, specifying the licensing rights of faculty members, states: 
“[l]icensing or sale of...materials for external use shall be preceded by a written agreement 
between the University and the author or producer specifying the conditions of use, and 
including provisions concerning the right of the author or producer to revise the materials 
periodically, or to withdraw them from use -- subject to existing agreements -- in the event 
revisions are not feasible.”343 
 
At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (“MIT”), licenses play a key role in the creation of 
the OpenCourseWare project, in which MIT is placing all primary materials of its courses online, 
and making them available to the general public for free.344 Faculty involvement in the project is 
voluntary and those faculty members who participate in the project sign a licensing agreement 
that allows MIT to distribute their course materials on the OpenCourseWare website, but the 




As in the case of licenses, royalties come into play when universities commercialize an online 
course. In such cases, the AAU’s Intellectual Property Task Force recommends that the “long-
                                                
343 UW Copyright Policy, Section 2.D.2.b. 
344 Olsen, supra note 154 at A31. See also Charles M. Vest, Why MIT Decided to Give Away All Its 
Course Materials via the Internet, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 2004, at B20; About OCW, MIT 
OPENCOURSEWARE, http://ocw.mit.edu/about (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
345 Id. 
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standing custom” under which faculty members receive and retain royalties on their courses 
“whether distributed in print or electronically... should not change.”346 
 
The University of Washington divides royalties between itself and its faculty when it sells 
noncommissioned materials developed by professors. As explicated in the UW Copyright Policy: 
“a sharing of royalties and income is appropriate because of the author’s provision of creative 
efforts on the one hand and the University’s provision of salary, facilities, administrative support, 
and other resources.”347 
 
The University of California at Berkeley addresses licenses and royalties together, stating: “[t]he 
university may assign or license its copyright to others. Royalty or income received from such 
transactions may be shared with the originator(s) of such works, as determined by the 
appropriate Chancellor, Laboratory Director, or Vice President, taking into account the 
originator’s contribution, the University’s costs, any provisions imposed by sponsors or other 
funding resources, and any other applicable agreements concerning the copyright.”348 
 
The University of North Texas grants royalties to its faculty members when their courses are 
taught by other professors at that institution.349 The amount of a given royalty depends upon, 
among other factors, the amount of technical assistance provided by the university; but a faculty 
member may receive up to 8% of the tuition paid by a student who takes the course when another  
professor teaches it.350 The creative faculty member also receives 50% of the license fee paid by 
another institution to use the course.351 
 
3. Early Disclosure 
 
                                                
346 AAU Framework, Section II. 
347 UW Policy, Section VIII. 
348 Berkeley Policy, Section VII. 
349 Jeffrey R. Young, At One University, Royalties Entice Professors to Design Web Courses: At North 
Texas, Online Education Pays Off -- Literally -- For Faculty Members and Departments, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., March 30, 2001, at A41. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. It is perhaps noteworthy that the institution charges students supplemental fees to pay for the 
faculty member’s royalty. 
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 Some copyright policies include an early-disclosure provision that requires faculty members to 
inform the dean or chair of their department that they are developing online material.352 This 
disclosure may be particularly useful if the faculty member intends to sell the work, and/or when 
the faculty member is receiving outside funding to pay for the development of the work.353 
 
One example of an early-disclosure provision can be found in the Carnegie Mellon Copyright 
Policy, which states: “[t]he creator of any intellectual property that is or might be owned by the 
university under this policy is required to make reasonably prompt written disclosure of the work 
to the university’s provost, and to execute any document deemed necessary to perfect legal rights 
in the university and enable the university to file...applications for copyright registration when 
appropriate. This disclosure to the provost should be made at the time when legal protection for 
the creation is contemplated, and it must be made before the intellectual property is sold, used for 
profit, or disclosed to the public.”354 
 
Comprehensive copyright policies at universities often include other important provisions, 
including: (i) Joint Works; (ii) Time Limits; (iii) Dispute Resolution; (iii) Conflict of Interest; 












                                                
352 See AAU Framework. 
353 Id. 
354 Carnegie Mellon, Copyright Policy, Section 4-1. Note: This policy is in transition as of March 1, 2015.  
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CHAPTER 3: MUSIC 
 
INTRODUCTION: RISE OF USER-GENERATED CONTENT  
 
Since the advent of the Internet, digital technology has transformed the way that music users 
listen, consume, and otherwise interact with music content. One feature of this digital era is the 
rise of websites that contain user-generated content (“UGC”), which has added complexity to the 
broader debates regarding music copyright today.1 This has been referred to in shorthand as Web 
2.0, or the “explosion of blogs, social networks, and video-sharing sites [that have] allowed any 
Internet user to become a journalist or filmmaker or music star.”2 These technological resources, 
including websites such as YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook. enable users to create and 
distribute a variety of content, such as original works, commentary and criticism, and creative 
derivations or re-interpretations of existing  works.3 
 
The vast majority of websites that enable and host UGC are popular among users, but struggle to 
become profitable in the beginning. In 2009, for instance, Facebook announced that it had 
become cash flow positive yet not profitable.4 It took another four years for the social media 
platform to become profitable.5 YouTube also has a long road to attaining profitability.6 The 
                                                
1 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated 
Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841 (2009); David E. Ashley, Note, The Public as a Creator and 
an Infringer: Copyright Law Applied to the Creators of User-Generated Video Content, 20 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 563 (2010).  
2 The Good, the Bad, and the Web 2.0, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July 18, 2007),  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118461274162567845.html?mod=Technology. 
3 See generally Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, YouTube UCG, and Digital Music: Competing Models in the 
Internet Age, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 431 (2010).  
4 Id. at 432 (citing Douglas MacMillan, Facebook Climbs Toward Profitability, BUSINESS WEEK (Sept. 
15, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/techbeat/archives/2009/09/facebook_climbs.html). 
5 See, e.g., Joshua M. Brown, Facebook is Profitable, Despite What You Hear, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR 
(July 26, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/The-Reformed-Broker/2013/0726/Facebook-is-
profitable-despite-what-you-hear; Steve Hargreaves, Facebook Profit Soars, CNN (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/01/29/technology/facebook-earnings/. 
6 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 432-433 (citing Richard Waters & Matthew Garrahan, Google Says 
YouTube on Track for First Profit, FIN. TIMES (July 17, 2009), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b4d81bde-
72f8-11de-ad98-00144feabdc0.html). But see Patrick Seitz, Google’s YouTube Likely as Profitable as 
Netflix, INVESTOR’S BUS. WEEKLY (May 19, 2014), http://news.investors.com/technology-click/051914-
701377-goog-youtube-as-profitable-as-nflx-researcher-says.htm. 
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revenue shortfalls, however, are belied by the sweeping scope among users, including not only 
viewers but also creators of content. Among viewers, user-generated websites are emerging as 
increasingly powerful locales for the sharing and consumption of content. In terms of 
viewership, for instance, YouTube reported over one billion users, as well as 6 billion hours of 
videos viewed in 2014.7 Similarly, Facebook demonstrated impressive membership in the last 
dozen years or so,8 stating that it logged more than 1.39 billion monthly active users in 2014,9 
leading to its market valuation reaching as high as $200 billion.10 In terms of creative use, the 
statistics of Web 2.0 and the major UGC websites are equally impressive: the estimated total 
number of creators of content on such websites grew from 83 million in 2008 to 115 million in 
2013.11 
 
Despite the increasing dominance of the largest UGC websites, viewership rather than 
profitability remains the current illustration of their strength, as well as a clear indicator of user 
interest in creating and sharing content via their channels. Generally, of course, profitability 
serves as a strong measure of company success and industry vitality. But unusually in this case 
the growth of UGC websites highlights a different aspect of the music industry: their emergence 
has spurred enormous changes in the creation and distribution of music, and as a result a 
transformation of music industry business models that is as permanent as it is ineluctable. The 
rise of Web 2.0 has had a profound effect on cultural industry business models, particularly due 
to the fact that UGC often appropriates, interprets, imitates, or simply contains a range of 
copyright-protected content. Music was one of the first and foremost industry sectors to 
                                                
7 Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 60 Amazing YouTube Statistics, DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS, 
http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/youtube-statistics/ (last updated onJan. 2, 2015). But see Arewa, 
supra note 3, at 432 (noting that, in January 2010, YouTube had over 112 million U.S. users and 6.6 
billion views in only that month).  
8 See generally Arewa, supra note 3, at 432-433. 
9 Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Forth Quarter and Full Year 2014 Results (Jan. 28, 2015), 
available at http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=893395. 
10 Tim Bradshaw, Facebook Market Value Tops $200bn, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecc0f050-37a3-11e4-bd0a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3SVPxSllj. 
11 Paul Verna, User-Generated Content: More Popular than Profitable, EMARKETER DIGITAL 
INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 2009), http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Emarketer_2000549.aspx?utm_ 
source=IABInsights&utm_medium=TextReportUserGenerated&utm_campaign=IAB0508&aff=IABInsi 
ghts. 
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experience this phenomenon,12 in which record numbers of users gained access to broad swathes 
of musical works for various purposes, such as dissemination, critique, and/or creative re-use. 
Peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file sharing among younger music users offers one widespread example of 
such practices, which precipitated a large-scale transformation—and some would contend 
devastation—of the recording industry.13 The changes in user consumption practices led by the 
initial P2P ventures such as Napster, Grokster, and their progeny were widespread, and did not 
end with the court-driven demise of several of the larger sites. In part, imitators such as 
BitTorrent came to replace the initial contender, continuing to the present day to offer a venue 
for file sharing, some of which may well infringe on existing copyrights.14 But user patterns and 
preferences were profoundly shifted in part by the changing digital landscape and the potential 
for cultural access that it unlocked. Other cultural industries, such as entertainment and media, 
have taken note of these changes, and along with the music industry continue to argue that P2P 
file sharing remains a critical obstacle to improving their sustainability and growth.15 However, 
the critique of online music sharing does not account for changes in both the competitive 
business environment and the culture at large, including the patterns, practices, and preferences 
that users have come to express through the mediated venues of online websites. Likewise, other 
cultural industries would be better served by more closely considering the example of shifting 
user behaviors in the music arena, in order to understand better how cultural production has been 
transformed and even now continues to be subject to exploration, innovation and reform. 
 
The changing shape of the music industry reflects broader trends that have affected many other 
cultural industries, including film, publishing, television, cable and music. Many of these 
industries are also controlled by large conglomerates, which may have multiple stakes in the 
                                                
12 Arewa, supra note 3, at 433 (citing Simon Frith & Lee Marshall, Making Sense of Copyright, in MUSIC 
AND COPYRIGHT 1, 3 (Simon Frith & Lee Marshall eds., 2d ed. 2004) 
 
13 See id.  
14 See generally Glyn Moody, Why the Supreme Court’s ‘Grokster’ Decision Let to More, Not Less, P2P 
Filesharing, TECHDIRT (Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111122/06353116873/why-
supreme-courts-grokster-decision-led-to-more-not-less-p2p-filesharing.shtml. 
15 See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 30, 2008), 
https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later (detailing the Recording Industry Association of 
America’s efforts to end filesharing through P2P networks); see also Robert Pasbani, METALLICA’s Kirk 
Hammett: “Piracy Destroyed the Music Industry” But He’s Learning to Embrace It, METAL INJECTION 
(Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.metalinjection.net/latest-news/metallicas-kirk-hammett-piracy-destroyed-the-
music-industry-but-hes-learning-to-embrace-it.  
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creative fields.16 Music stands to impart vital lessons to these cultural producers, who are only 
now coming to recognize and adapt to changing patterns of behaviors among the various 
stakeholders in the creative market, including industry players, end users, and creators. These 
learning experiences naturally extend to the purview of copyright. Traditionally, dominant 
business models among cultural firms, particularly during the pre-digital era, relied upon 
intellectual property as a means of controlling content under copyright, and thereby controlling 
revenue streams flowing from copyright’s protections.17 In the pre-digital era, to a large extent, 
control was at least partially predicated upon industry players’ privileged and exclusive access to 
technologies and business structures that undergirded the creation, reproduction and distribution 
of content.18 The unauthorized access, use, reproduction, and appropriation of cultural content in 
pre-digital times, while not unheard of, remained relatively limited due to the lack of tools 
available to its consumers.19 In the digital era, to the contrary, new technological tools make 
access and use of content far more available to the average end user.20 The Internet has proved a 
truly disruptive force that radically alters the balance between those who generate and own 
cultural content and those who consume it. As a result, the digital era has had a profound and 
lasting impact on cultural production and the business models of cultural industry participants.21 
 
Copyright regulates both the creation and distribution of creative works, among others, as well as 
the display and performance of such works.22 The digital era has ushered in technological 
innovations that fundamentally challenge the framework and implementation of copyright itself. 
Borrowing, appropriation for transformative purposes, and other practices that steer perilously 
close to copying are well-established practices across many creative cultural sectors.23 Sharing 
                                                
16 See generally Arewa, supra note 3, at 433 (citing DAVID HESMONDHALGH, THE CULTURAL 
INDUSTRIES 1 2 (2007)). 
17 Id. at 433-34. 
18 Id. (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 69 (2008)).  
19 See, e.g., Robert van Ooijen, Music Piracy in . . . the 1980s, HAVE YOU HEARD (Jan. 21, 2011), 
http://haveyouheard.it/music-piracy-in-the-1980s/ (discussing piracy in the era of cassette tapes).  
20 See generally Glyn Moody, 30 Years of the CD, of Digital Piracy, and of Music Industry Cluelessness, 
TECHDIRT (Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121018/10023520751/30-years-cd-
digital-piracy-music-industry-cluelessness.shtml. 
21 Arewa, supra note 3, at 434 (citing JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 111 (2001)).  
22 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2012). 
23 See Arewa, supra note 3, at 434 (citing Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical 
Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 571-72 (2006)). 
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and copying of existing works, particularly for personal use, have likewise been long accepted 
practices in these same sectors. Yet intellectual property policies and practices have not fully 
accommodated the full range of these collaborative, sharing and creative practices. The digital 
era, in enlarging the scope of the problem, also serves to highlight the pressing need for 
copyright to reconsider its recognition of new user practices, preferences, and creative urges.24 
 
The music landscape has been fundamentally altered on both the creation and the distribution 
side of the aisle. On the distribution side, as mentioned, the Internet has afforded creators and 
users alike an increasing number of new avenues for the dissemination of content.25 The alternate 
channels for distribution are liable to impinge upon pre-existing distribution channels that were 
established prior to the advent of the digital era, and that were intended to serve as exclusive, and 
generally commercially oriented, means of distribution.26 The tension arising between these 
highly distinct distributive venues continues to spark conflicts between uses that were once 
deemed personal—and therefore typically outside commercial industry scrutiny and control—
and those that are seen as primarily commercial, such as the exploitation of copyrighted content 
for revenue.27 Thus, for example, the long-established practice of making “mix tapes” as a means 
of sharing music among friends—which finds a loose analogy in the ripping of CD mixes—
becomes more problematic when music tracks are not only copied and shared among a few 
friends but rather among an entire website of users, known and unknown to the originator of the 
mix. 
 
But interestingly, it is not only the music distribution side of the equation that has been altered. 
On the creation side, the newly gained access to a host of resources has often been accompanied 
by new incorporation of music’s “building blocks” in contemporary creative works. For instance, 
artists have experimented with “sampling” prior works; DJs are mixing various short excerpts of 
music tracks in dance mixes and medleys; and many artistic hopefuls online are bringing their 
                                                
24 See generally Arewa, supra note 3, at 434. 
25 Id. at 462 (“Technological changes on the distribution side have also proven to be disruptive, 
fundamentally compromising many existing business models.”). 
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 472 (“[B]ehaviors that were commonplace in earlier eras, such as personal private copying, are 
increasingly demonized and characterized as impermissible or illegal, or as piracy.”).  
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own interpretation or transformation of earlier musical pieces.28 This movement is by no means 
completely novel: to an important extent, creative and transformative use of music existed in the 
pre-digital era, particularly in niche and collaborative communities that emerged and grew 
outside the reach of major cultural industry firms.29 Artistic and cultural movements such as 
punk, hip house, and rap generally had their roots and their earliest audience well outside the 
purview of the corporate industries.30 In some instances, these artistic movements were later 
incorporated into the mainstream of music, commercialized within established business 
structures, and brought into the industry’s scope of control.31 The industry intervention, and its 
subsequent intermediation, afforded these artistic movements and communities access to wider 
audiences and to larger-scale commercialization.32 The process, which continues to date, still 
relies upon cultural industry firms to intermediate the transition of subcultural, underground 
movements to a more centralized and commercial culture.33 But today, digital era technologies 
are beginning to take an ever-increasing part in the process of bringing subcultures into the 
mainstream—and in so doing, may take an ever-larger share of the role that cultural industry 
players formerly had to themselves.34 The elision of music creators, producers, distributors, 
owners, and users is coming to a pivotal point in the making of music, which in turn is leading to 
collisions between spheres of operation and influence that were, in the past, kept separate and 
distinct in many respects.35 Equally importantly, while contributions on UGC websites were once 
likely to vary considerably with respect to the quality of production and other features, they are 
likely to improve, thanks to the increasing availability of technologies that enable the creation of 
                                                
28 Mashups and remixes became very common in the 2000s, leading to questions about whether such 
works violate copyright. See generally Elina Lae, Mashups—A Protected Form of Appropriation Art or a 
Blatant Copyright Infringement?, 12 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31 (2012).  
29 Arewa, supra note 3, at 434-45. 
30 Id. at 434 (citing MATT MASON, THE PIRATES DILEMMA: HOW YOUTH CULTURE IS REINVENTING 
CAPITALISM 16, 21 (2008); Andreana Clay, Keepin’ It Real: Black Youth, Hip-Hop Culture, and Black 
Identity, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1346, 1348 (2003)). 
31 Id. (citing M. Elizabeth Blair, Commercialization of the Rap Music Youth Subculture, in THAT’S THE  
JOINT!: THE HIP-HOP STUDIES READER 497, 497 98 (Murray Forman & Mark Anthony Neal eds., 2004); 
Dario, The Subcultural Group of Hardcorepunk: Sociological Research of the Group Members Social 
Origins and their Attitudes to Nation, Religion, and the Consumer Society Values, 6 FACTA 
UNIVERSITATIS: PHIL., SOC. & PSYCHOL. 67, 68-69 (2007) (noting the commercialized of punk music)). 
32 Id. at 435. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. (citing MASON, supra note 30, at 6) 
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high quality content with vastly improved production values, some of which approach a 
professionalism comparable to that once achieved only by music’s record labels.36 
 
In the context of these sweeping changes to cultural creativity and its associated business 
practices, the role of copyright law has become increasingly contested and fraught.37 Prior to the 
digital era, the scope and duration of copyright were notably expanded, based in part on vision of 
copyright grounded in property rhetoric which, according to commentators such as Neil Netanel, 
tends to prioritize the individual entitlement over the broader public interest.38 The property 
rhetoric underlying copyright’s expansion was bolstered by the business realities that saw 
cultural industry firms hold the reins of control over the creation and distribution of most 
creative content. The ecosystem of music in the pre-digital era did have some critical points of 
contention, such as that associated with the advent of new technologies allowing widespread 
copying and distribution of music, such as the introduction of the piano player and piano rolls.39 
Yet the emergence of digital technologies, catapulting a far greater number of music industry 
participants and consumers into the fray, has challenged the delicate balancing act of copyright, 
and its central business practices and norms, to an unprecedented degree.40 
 
Digital era innovations have made content increasingly accessible to end users, in increasingly 
compact, affordable, and high quality forms, such as digitized compact discs (CDs) and digital 
video discs (DVDs).41 Further innovations, such as the compression of digital files in formats 
such as the MP3 have reduced the storage space required to hold such files, enabling users to 
accumulate more content with greater ease.42 Compressed digital formats facilitate the copying 
and dissemination of files, which may carry music, films, audio recordings, and other cultural 
content.43 While some critics have argued that the sound quality of compressed MP3 files may be 
                                                
36 Id. 
37 Id. (citing JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS 
MUSICAL CREATIVITY 4 (2006)) 
38 Id. (citing NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHTS PARADOX 7 (2008)).  




43 Id. at 463 & n. 25 (“A list of twentieth century technologies that have facilitated copying might include 
the Xerox machine, VCR, various tape player technology ranging from 8-track tape cartridges to DAT, 
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compromised,44 many digital music consumers have shown that they are prepared to sacrifice 
some amount of quality in exchange for greater convenience and quantity available at a 
reasonable price.45 The widespread adoption of these technological tools has enabled 
nonprofessional music users to make and distribute digital copies with relative ease, and at very 
low cost, thereby exacerbating the impact of copying on the music industry and its pre-digital era 
business models.46 
 
The new music landscape reflects the profound disruption to existing assumptions and practices 
that prevailed throughout the industry prior to its digitization.47 In response to this disruption, 
established industry players have leaned heavily on copyright law as both a defense and a ground 
for attack against digital era business competition, on the one hand, and changing user practices 
and preferences, on the other hand.48 But disruption alone may not suffice as a reason for legal 
intervention, primarily because disruption may represent a key feature of entrepreneurial 
innovation, whether undertaken individually or effected on a collective scale.49 Further, the 
ability to confront and master the challenges of disruption may represent a critical factor in 
business success.50 Copyright law must take the disruptive nature of innovation into account 
when mediating content ownership and access in the cultural industries, particularly as many 
begin to confront similar challenges to those faced by the music industry in the immediate past. 
To a great extent, the cultural industries have played a major role in shaping the contours of 
modern copyright law, which has yielded highly complex copyright rules and practices51 that 
                                                                                                                                                       
digital file formats such as MP3 (MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3), MPEG-2, MPEG-4, and devices to play 
digital file formats such as MP3 players, DVD players, and CD players.”). 
44 See id. (citing Robert Levine, The Death of High Fidelity, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 27, 2007),  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080701220047/http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/17777619/the_deat
h_of_high_fidelity/print). 
45 See id. (citing Paul Rubens, Sound of Music, BBC (Nov. 29, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/4052123.stm). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 437. 
48 Id. at 436-37. 
49 Id. at 437 (citing CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATORS DILEMMA, xi-xxi (2003); JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 132 (1942)). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. (citing LITMAN, supra note 21, at 29; AM. UNIV. SCH. OF COMM., CTR. FOR SOC. MEDIA, THE 
GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE CONFUSING: USER-GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.ilrweb.com/pfdocu ments/ilrpdfs/CSM_report_Good_Bad.pdf). 
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reflect, to a significant degree, the accommodation of industry needs, concerns and priorities.52 
Music most clearly reflects this layering of complex copyright law and copyright ownership, as 
well as the prevalence of arcane, complicated regulatory and licensing structures that are difficult 
for the average consumer of culture to navigate, let alone master.53 
 
I. DIGITAL MUSIC AND DIGITAL ERA BUSINESS MODELS 
 
Digital music file-sharing garnered significant attention in the creative industries for two reasons. 
First, the rise in digitally enabled sharing of music tracks occurred just as sales of music CDs (or 
bundled music tracks) underwent a precipitous decline.54 Further, the use of technology to copy 
and disseminate musical works was the first notable example of massive content sharing in the 
creative sector.55 As such, it gave notice to other content-rich industries—such as movies, 
television, newspapers and media, book publishing, and so on—that the technologically-enabled 
onslaught of user-sharing had arrived, and was likely here to stay. 
 
A. Decline in music sales linked to infringing activities 
One of the primary reasons that the digital era in music garnered such attention was the stark 
report of declining music sales that immediately followed the wide-scale adoption of Napster and 
its fellow peer-to-peer music-sharing networks.56 In 2008, thirty-three percent of music tracks 
                                                
52 Id. (citing LITMAN, supra note 21, at 23 (“About one hundred years ago, Congress got into the habit of 
revising copyright law by encouraging representatives of the industries affected by copyright to hash out 
among themselves what changes needed to be made and then present Congress with the text of 
appropriate legislation.”)). 
53 Id. (citing AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING (3d ed. 2002); Lydia Pallas Loren, 
Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 675 (2003)). 
54 Id. at 440. The extent to which these two phenomena were causally related shall be explored in this 
paper. 
55 For an overview of the history of technological advances in music and the expansion in music piracy, 
see Glyn Moody, 30 Years of the CD, of Digital Piracy, and of Music Industry Cluelessness, TECH DIRT 
(Oct. 19, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121018/10023520751/30-years-cd-digital-piracy-
music-industry-cluelessness.shtml.  
56 Id. (citing Marie Connolly & Alan B. Krueger, Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE 669, 707 (Victor A. Ginsberg & David Throsby 
eds., 2006); Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed, Swan Songs?, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/opinion/01blow.html?ref=opinion; Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The 
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were digital tracks, while the number of CDs purchased declined by seventeen million.57 Overall 
music sales fell by thirty percent between 2004 and 2009.58 This trend continues to date.59 Music 
audiences are increasingly inclined to listen to music through various digital media forums, 
including file sharing, social network sites, and online music services.60 While some of these 
digital venues are legitimate purveyors of music, others promote unauthorized sharing and 
downloads. The prevalence of such infringing activities is indisputable: by one measure, taken in 
2008, the industry representative IFPI estimated that ninety-five percent of all music tracks 
downloaded were appropriated by users who did not pay for the downloaded content.61 The 
disparity between legitimate and illegitimate music listening is likewise astonishing. To 
illustrate, consider that, while authorized single downloads of music tracks increased by twenty-
four percent between 2007 and 2008, reaching 1.4 billion downloads,62 and by ten percent in 
2009,63 reaching 1.5 billion downloads, the unauthorized download and sharing of music tracks 
in 2008 reached an estimated 40 billion files.64 The recording industry has vigorously argued that 
the unauthorized downloading and sharing of digital music tracks is the primary factor 
contributing to the music industry’s decline.65 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Record Industry’s Decline, ROLLING STONE (June 28, 2007), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/the_record_industrys_decline). 
57 Id. (citing Press Release, The NPD Group, Continued CD Sales Declines in 2008, but Music Listening 
and Digital Downloads Increase (Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter NPD Press Release], available at 
http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_090317a.html). 
58 Id. (citing IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2010, at 3 (2010), 
www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2010.pdf).  
59 Christopher Morris, Album Sales Continue Decline, Music Streaming Rises in 2014, VARIETY (Jan. 6, 
2015), http://variety.com/2015/music/news/album-sales-continue-decline-music-streaming-rises-in-2014-
1201394229/ (noting the nine percent decline in album sales in 2014 and that an eight percent decline was 
registered in 2013). 
60 Id. (noting a fifty-four percent increase in digital music consumption).  
61 Arewa, supra note 3, at 440 (citing IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009, at 3 (Jan. 2009) [hereinafter 
IFPI Report 2009], http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009.pdf). 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. (citing Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An 
Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2007); see also Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative 
Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1, 24 (2008)). 
Chapter 3: Music Viswanathan 
 160 
B. Misunderstanding the source of competitive advantage in media; Bundling tracks into CDs; 
Decline in bricks-and-mortar retail music stores 
 
Major music industry players continue to draw a straight-line causal connection between file 
sharing online and decline in industry-wide sales. This asserted causal connection is a mainstay 
of the lobbying efforts, legal strategies, and policy measures that the recording industry embraces 
and promulgates, principally by its chief representative, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (“RIAA”).66 This reasoning, however, has been vigorously disputed by a number of 
leading copyright analysts, whose empirical studies and commentary suggest that the root causes 
of the music industry’s declining sales are far more complex, and therefore challenging to 
resolve, than mere online activities such as file sharing.67 Some commentators argue that there 
are many features of the digital era that might have been better understood, managed, and 
adapted to by major music industry players, and that greater flexibility and innovation in existing 
industry business models and strategies might have ameliorated the industry’s overall positioning 
in recent times.68 It seems highly plausible that online music downloads are not the sole, or 
perhaps even the primary, force precipitating the decline in record sales. Other factors may 
include the decreased ability of industry players to bundle music tracks into compilations, such 
as albums or CDs, thereby compelling users to purchase entire albums that include songs they 
might not want in order to obtain the songs they would actually like to buy. Further, market 
saturation of CDs, as well as a real decline in available physical retail locations where users can 
purchase music, are also major factors that hamper sales vitality in the music sector.69  
                                                
66 Arewa, supra note 3, at 440.  
67 See id.at 440-41 (citing Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on 
Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1, 3 (2007)).  
68 See id. at 441 (citing JONATHAN A. KNEE, BRUCE C. GREENWALD & AVA SEAVE, THE CURSE OF THE 
MOGUL:  
WHATS WRONG WITH THE WORLDS LEADING MEDIA COMPANIES 35 (2009) (“In media, particularly  
since the advent of the Internet, misunderstanding the source of competitive advantage often leads 
managers to inadvertently construct bridges for competitors when they think they are actually 
strengthening the moat.”); id. at 85 (“The Internet may be somebody’s friend most notably, the consumers 
of media but it is not the friend of incumbent media companies.”)). 
69 See id. (citing David Hesmondhalgh, Digitalisation, Copyright and the Music Industries, in 
UNPACKING DIGITAL DYNAMICS: PARTICIPATION, CONTROL AND EXCLUSION (Peter Golding & Graham 
Murdock eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), available at 
http://www.cresc.ac.uk/publications/documents/wp30.pdf; Ethan Smith, Sales of Music, Long in Decline, 
Plunge Sharply, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB117444575607043728-lMyQjAxMDE3N 
zI0MTQyNDE1Wj.html). 
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C. Changing models for other media and content-rich industries 
 
The digital file sharing of music tracks, made possible by a host of online networks, gave rise to 
a key change in user practices, experiences, and expectations: the immediate availability of 
virtually all recorded music, at low to no cost, became the recognized standard and norm.70 This 
major shift in the understanding of music consumers had a profound, and likely irreversible, 
impact upon the economic value of music.71 It exerted a downward pressure on the price that 
users were and are to this day willing to pay to own or access music.72 It affected the unit of 
music that is marketable, breaking down the bundled tracks of CDs to the individual song or 
performance track.73 And it brought sales of music tracks—even at relatively modest prices, such 
as a dollar per song—into direct, often fatal, competition with online downloads of such tracks at 
the one price that is impossible to beat—free.74 As important as the economic shift was a 
normative shift: many users came to expect that music should be free, and to demand that music 
copyright owners justify the price, even any price, at which music might be sold.75 Further, even 
perfectly reasonable justifications such as the importance of compensating musicians for their 
labor, keeping music production sustainable, and paying a “fair” amount for creative effort and 
output, have not met with sufficient buy-in among music consumers and listeners to reverse the 
persistence of illegal file sharing.76 This may indicate that the normative shift is permanent, or 
that it may not be countered with reason alone. 
 
It is now apparent that changes in consumer behavior and industry business practices across the 
music sector set the stage for similar patterns of change in other content-rich industries. In the 
music context, the ability of digitally savvy users to gain access to entire libraries of works—on 
an immediate, low- or no-cost basis, and without intermediation (other than technology)—has 
                                                
70 Id. at 441. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 442. 
73 Id. at 470. 
74 Id. at 454. 
75 Id. at 454-55. 
76 See On Artist Compensation, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION, 
https://futureofmusic.org/issues/campaigns/artist-compensation. 
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totally changed user expectations.77 Similarly, the access of online users to a huge range of 
media sources—including media materials available in print or via wire services, such as 
newspapers, magazines, and news alerts, which were formerly available only for purchase (or 
through libraries, which had earlier purchased them)—has altered user expectations, to the point 
where users now expect media resources to be available instantly, completely, and almost or 
entirely cost-free.78 This widespread availability of media online, while quite possibly a boon to 
consumers, has nonetheless had the devastating effect of undermining the entire business models 
of providers, including the vast majority of newspapers, wire services, and other media outlets.79 
Indeed, since the advent of the Internet, newspapers and other providers have struggled to find 
new business models that once again entail users paying for content, advertisers paying for ad 
placement, and sales generating revenue as was unequivocally the case for so long.80 The user 
expectations that content will be readily available at little to no cost clearly reflect the new 
realities of a post-digital era, in which the Internet efficiently and inexpensively allows the 
creation, production, distribution, and appropriation of a vast array of content, sometimes via 
unauthorized means or infringing practices (for example, the unlawful sharing of copyrighted 
content via P2P networks such as BitTorrent). Taken in conjunction, these new user expectations 
and technological innovations have delivered a major blow to content-rich industries. Many 
industry participants, from music to publishing to media to other fields, have found that their 
ability to control the pricing of their content-based products, as well as their ability to protect the 
uses of their copyright-protected materials, are significantly undermined by these digital era 
transformations.81 And to date, no creative industry has yet been able to muster a decidedly 
viable response to the challenges of the new Internet-enabled reality. 
 
                                                
77 Arewa, supra note 3, at 441-42. 
78 Arewa, supra note 3, at 470-71 (explaining similar impact on the press). 
79 Id. at 441 (citing Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: Its War!, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2009, at 112, 
available at  
http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2009/11/michael-wolff-200911; SUZANNE M. KIRCHHOFF, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.S. NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 1 (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40700.pdf (“The U.S. newspaper industry  is  in  the  midst  of  a 
 historic  restructuring,  buffeted  by  a  deep  recession  that  is  battering  crucial  advertising  revenues, 
 long-term  structural  challenges  as  readers  turn  to  free  news  and  entertainment  on  the  Internet, 
 and  heavy  debt  burdens  weighing  down  some  major  media  companies.”)). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
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The digital music era has found its counterpart, on at least as large a scale, in the digital video 
field.82 Among the major technological drivers of these changes have been the advent of the 
Internet, the expansion of online bandwidth, and the availability of BitTorrent technology.83 
These features have enabled the sharing and distribution of even the large-sized video files that 
require extensive bandwidth to be conveyed.84 As in the case of music file sharing, users of video 
files have learned to expect fast, cheap, and plentiful access to digitized content, while industry 
members have striven to respond with increasingly protective measures and lines of defense. One 
distinguishing factor in the case of media industries is that they have been alerted to the pitfalls 
of changing technologies and user practices and expectations precisely by the earlier example of 
the recording industry’s digital musical experience. Indeed, it is this experience that the media 
industries are seeking to learn from and, where possible, avoid.85 While initial areas of dispute 
over media file sharing involved UGC on sites such as YouTube, further conflicts have arisen 
over P2P sharing of video files.86 Clashes between users and industries have been accelerated by 
technological advances, such as the enhanced bandwidth capabilities mentioned earlier.87 But 
they also point to innate and ever-growing disparities between the legal and social constructs that 
prevailed in earlier pre-digital eras and the laws, practices and norms that have now evolved in 
these wholly digital times.88 
 
D. Copyright Law vs. Norms 
 
At present, copyright laws and user practices and norms co-exist in uneasy tension, a state that 
some have argued has been exacerbated by the innovations and the widespread reach of the 
Internet.89 Copyright is always subject to differing, and often competing, interpretations of the 
contours of individual ownership, on the one hand, and collective sharing, collaboration, and to 
some extent rights in copying, on the other hand. The digital era highlights these battles, in part 
due to the scope of practices that technology enables, the potential impact on copyright 
                                                
82 Arewa, supra note 3, at 439.  
83 Id. at 442.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
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ownership and its attendant rewards, the changing patterns of behavior and preference that it 
engenders, and the shifts in norms that it may cause to emerge.90 Many industry participants, 
especially in culturally rich fields such as music, describe a growing gap between copyright law 
and real world uses of content that are copyrighted or otherwise protected by intellectual 
property laws.91 These industry advocates point to a noticeable lack of compliance with 
copyright law that appears widespread in practice and growing in acceptance among content 
users.92 They argue that the disparity between protection and misuse calls for more stringent 
copyright laws that are more strongly and uniformly enforced.93 In contrast, other industry 
participants and observers have argued that if changes in user behavior and norms are driven by 
new technologies have begun to crystallize, their predominance would be better addressed by a 
thoughtful re-calibration of copyright law that takes into account the realities of the present 
day.94 They further propose improved consideration of industry-wide strategies and business 
models, which not only account for but also accommodate and respond to the preferences and 
patterns of consumption that users express through their digital interactions, purchases and 
creative output.95 These debates clearly highlight a central question: how should copyright law 
operate in this transitional digital era, and further, to what extent should the law account for, and 
perhaps adapt to, widespread practices that may previously have deemed to border on, or to 
constitute, noncompliance. Current industry approaches strongly advocate a “zero tolerance” 
policy of strictly curtailing any and all practices that are deemed noncompliant, even if such a 
policy may itself skirt the edge of restricting practices, such as personal use, that were previously 
considered “gray area” yet were deemed acceptable.96 The digital age has heightened these 
                                                
90 Id. at 434. 
91 Id. at 443. 
92 Id. (citing John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 3 UTAH L. 
REV. 537, 539 (2007)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. (citing John Schwartz, Report Raises Questions About Fighting Online Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,  
2004, at C2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/01/technology/01rights.html (“The 
entertainment industry’s pursuit of tough new laws to protect copyrighted materials from online piracy is 
bad for business and for the economy, according to a report . . . by the Committee for Economic 
Development.”); DIGITAL CONNECTIONS COUNCIL, COMM. ECON. DEV., PROMOTING INNOVATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF DIGITAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at x (2004), 
available at www.scrawford.net/display/report_dcc_new.pdf (“[T]he ultimate solutions to the problem of 
digital piracy are new business models.”)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 472. 
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disputes, but it may have had the unintended effect of making both sides adopt somewhat more 
polarized positions.97 Nonetheless, both sides must recognize that the normative considerations 
may not be overlooked, but rather merit a central position in any resolution that is to be reached. 
 
E. Digital Rights Management 
 
Music is one among an array of cultural industries that has found its business model profoundly 
challenged by unauthorized copying and distribution of its content via the Internet. The recording 
industry, among the earliest to confront such large-scale activities, launched an early offensive 
based in technological innovation to thwart the digital threat.98 The development of digital rights 
management (DRM) and technological protection measures (TPM) were undertaken by the 
recording industry as a digital means of contending with an essentially digital problem.99 The 
industry adopted TPM technologies with the express intent of preventing unauthorized access to, 
and use of, digital works via complex DRM systems that were to be borne by all digitally 
recorded music.100 It quickly became apparent, however, that both DRM and TPM could, in 
almost all cases, be circumvented by technologically sophisticated users.101 Moreover, a large 
amount of music not bearing DRM-based protection had already been made available, and vied 
with protected tracks in the music marketplace. DRM also met with a great deal of strongly 
vocalized resistance among music listeners.102 This has proved an almost immediate public 
relations catastrophe. Thus, while the recording industry initially fought actively to deploy DRM, 
it soon found that technologically protective measures did little to stave off the downward spiral 
of the industry’s performance as a whole.103 In the end, many of the major record labels chose to 
permit distribution of authorized DRM-free digital music.104 The fact that music listeners did not 
approve of DRM, found it relatively easy to circumvent, and protested effectively against DRM-
protected music lead to a significant development in the music industry: the recording industry 
heeded customer demand, and responded by eliminating DRM protection from much of its 
                                                
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 443. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 445.  
103 Arewa, supra note 3, at 445. 
104 Id. at 444. 
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digitally recorded music.105 Such an accommodation was singular, and revealed an industry that 
was clearly struggling to deliver a viable product to its audience without fatally compromising its 
business model and goals.106 
 
F. RIAA Lawsuits 
 
As the music and other cultural industries have come to feel increasingly beleaguered by user-led 
forays into cultural appropriation, protection of their properties has correspondingly come to be 
seen as an essential means of securing their long-term vitality. The cultural industries, led by the 
music sector, have focused on copyright protection—via technological measures, on the one 
hand, and legal enforcement mechanisms, on the other hand—to safeguard rights and access to 
digitized cultural content such as music, films, image, and printed works. These protective 
measures include the enactment of laws that make it illegal to develop and use devices that 
circumvent TPMs.107 Such anti-circumvention preventions are codified in recent legislation, 
including the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.108 In addition to promoting 
various forms of TPM, such as DRM, and lobbying for expansive copyright laws favorable to 
industry interests, the music industry in particular has pursued two other strategies toward 
protecting its properties. One strategy has been undertaken on the public relations front: the 
pursuit of an aggressive education campaign that draws a moral and economic equivalency 
between digital file sharing on the one hand and theft and similar crimes against physical 
property on the other hand.109 Some critics of contend, however, that this strategy is hopelessly 
compromised by the historical practices of the music industry itself, which has arguably been 
                                                
105 See Adam Pash, RIAA Says DRM is Dead, LIFE HACKER (July 20, 2009), 
http://lifehacker.com/5318289/riaa-says-drm-is-dead. 
106 Arewa, supra note 3, at 444 (citing Nicola F. Sharpe & Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing 
Fair? Navigating the iPod DRM Controversy, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332, 343 (2007)). 
107 Id. at 445-46; see also RIAA v. The People, supra note 15.  
108 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as  
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
109 Arewa, supra note 3, at 445; see also Sean F., MPAA, RIAA to Target Schoolkids with Anti-Piracy 
Education, DIGITAL DIGEST (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.digital-digest.com/news-63795-MPAA-RIAA-
To-Target-Schoolkids-With-Anti-Piracy-Education.html (noting that “[o]ne lesson likens copyright theft 
to cheating on assignments”). The RIAA also has a website dedicated to materials teachers and parents 
can use to educate children about intellectual property theft. MUSIC RULES, http://music-
rules.com/teachers.html.   
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built on a culture of large-scale and often ill-compensated appropriation.110 In the words of one 
commentator, “The ability of the recording industry to define appropriate moral behavior with 
any degree of credibility is, however, significantly undermined by the past history of the industry 
and the ways in which the industry has, in the eyes of many, exploited a wide range of artists.”111 
 
The attempt by the music industry to characterize digital file sharing as “theft” or “piracy” has 
proved largely unsuccessful.112 It has also been paired with another strategy to protect content: 
the pursuit of aggressive litigation based on copyright infringement lawsuits, which may likewise 
be considered to have mixed success at best.113 Initially, the recording industry focused on 
pursuing litigation against technology companies that made digital music and file sharing 
technologies available to the music consumer.114 Subsequently, in the period from 2003 to 2008, 
the recording industry and its principal lobbying arm, the RIAA, turned its focus to litigation 
targeting individual users.115 The spate of lawsuits instigated by the RIAA represented a 
concerted attempt by the music industry to equate digital file sharing with theft and other illegal 
crimes against property. While the recording industry’s litigation strategy sought to convince 
users collectively that file sharing is simply a form of theft, it was also intended to instill in 
individual users a fear of potential legal actions and the threat of potentially ruinous damage 
awards.116 
 
                                                
110 Arewa, supra note 3, at 444. 
111 Id.   
112 See Jon Healy, File Sharing or Stealing?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2008), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oew-healey18feb18-story.html#page=1; Matthew Yglesias, Piracy is 
a Form of Theft, and Copyright Infringement is Neither, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2011/12/15/piracy_is_a_form_of_theft_and_copyright_infringem
ent_is_neither.html. 
113 See RIAA v. The People, supra note 15.  
114 Arewa, supra note 3, at 444 (referring to the landmark cases of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), 
and Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
115 Id.  
116 Arewa, supra note 3, at 445 (citing David Kravets, File Sharing Lawsuits at a Crossroads, After 5 
Years of RIAA Litigation, WIRED (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/proving-file-
sh (noting that the RIAA “admits that the lawsuits are largely a public relations effort, aimed at striking 
fear into the hearts of would-be downloaders,” but that the RIAA believes that “the lawsuits have 
spawned a ‘general sense of awareness’ that file sharing copyrighted music without authorization is 
‘illegal’”)). 
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As noted, both prongs of the music industry’s strategies to defend its intellectual properties—the 
RIAA’s consumer education efforts and its legal actions first against file-sharing technologies 
and further against individual file sharers—have yielded dubious success at best. Several results 
point to the questionable outcome of the recording industry’s approach: (i) an overall increase in 
digital file sharing activities since the various strategies were initiated;117 (ii) survey results 
indicating that most music users do not appear to equate file sharing with theft;118 (iii) notable 
public relations damage to the RIAA and the music industry in the perceptions of its 
consumers;119 and sustained opposition, both among users and commentators, to the industry’s 
attempts to characterize digital file sharing as the moral, economic and legal equivalent to 
theft.120  To illustrate just one of these outcomes, opposition to the characterization of digital file 
sharing as theft has been both vocal and colorful—for instance, several parodies of RIAA anti-
piracy videos have been widely circulated and popularly acclaimed.121 
 
The RIAA litigation strategy has proven successful insofar as it has enabled the RIAA to garner 
substantial settlements against individual infringers. For instance, the RIAA has obtained 
settlements averaging $4,000 from legal actions it has taken against more than 30,000 alleged 
infringers.122 Moreover, in recent years, the RIAA has also succeeded in gaining at least a few 
jury verdicts in favor of the recording industry. For instance, in October 2007, a jury verdict was 
made in favor of the recording industry.123  In the initial trial, a jury award was made of 
$222,000, based on an award of $9,250 per song for each of the songs found to have been 
                                                
117 RIAA v. The People, supra note 15 (“However, virtually all surveys and studies agree that P2P usage 
has grown steadily since the RIAAs litigation campaign began in 2003.”).  
118 Arewa, supra note 3, at 445 (citing Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of 
Infringement, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, paragraph 6, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_5; Jared Moya, Canada Survey: File- Sharing the New 
Normal ZEROPAID.COM, Mar. 20, 2009, 
http://www.zeropaid.com/news/10059/canada_survey_filesharing_the_new_normal/). 
119 Id. (citing Erika Morphy, RIAA Abandons Mass Lawsuit Strategy in File-Sharing War, ECOMMERCE 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/65590.html?wlc= 1254543930). 
120 Id. (citing Jon Healey, Op-Ed., File Sharing or File Stealing?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2008),  
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-healey18feb18,0,5092348.story). 
121 Id. (citing Finlo Rohrer, Getting Inside a Downloaders Head, BBC NEWS, June 18, 2009,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8106805.stm). 
122 Id. at 446 (citing Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007, at C1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/business/media/05music.html). 
123 Id. 
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illegally copied.124 In a second trial in the same case, a second jury also ruled for the recording 
industry, and awarded a total of $1.92 million in damages, or $80,000 per song for each of the 
songs involved in the trial.125  The jury in the second file sharing case awarded the four record 
labels total damages of $675,000, pursuant to the alleged file sharer’s admission of having 
downloaded and distributed thirty songs.126127 
 
Yet while proving successful against individual infringers, the RIAA litigation strategy cannot be 
called an undeniable success.128 One strike against it, as mentioned, is the enduring unpopularity 
of litigation amidst music listeners—which, it must be recalled, is the RIAA’s target audience 
and consumer base. Even the RIAA seems to have recognized this negative effect, and has even 
gone so far as to concede that it has “created a public-relations disaster.”129 Another equally 
important strike is that the RIAA has not for the most part been able to bring key allies, such as 
the main Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”), to join in its actions against potential infringers.130  
 
In 2008, the RIAA sought to enlist the aid of ISPs in blocking Internet access for those potential 
infringers seeking to make music available online.131 It also signaled that it would move away 
from relying upon litigation strategy as the primary weapon in its arsenal against online music 
downloading and distribution—perhaps thereby suggesting the costs of the litigation strategy 
ultimately outweighed its benefits.132 
                                                
124 Id. The Copyright Act provides that infringers are liable for either actual damages and profits or 
statutory damages that may range from $750 to $30,000 per infringing act, and up to $150,000 per 
infringing act in cases involving willful infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). 
125 Arewa, supra note 3, at 446 (citing Music Labels Win $2 Million in Web Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2009, at B2, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/business/media/19music.html?scp=1&sq=Rasset&st=cse).  
126 Id. (citing Denise Lavoie, Jury Awards $675K in Music Downloading Case, MSNBC (July 31, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32236444/ns/technology_and_science-security). 
127 Universities and colleges have acceded to RIAA demands and have helped them enforce legal action 
against their students. See, e.g., Katherine Mitchell, Burned: Students Hit with RIAA Suits, MICH. DAILY 
(May 20, 2007), http://www.michigandaily.com/content/burned-students-hit-riaa-suits. 
128 See RIAA v. The People, supra note 15. 
129 Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at 
B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html. 
130 Arewa, supra note 3, at 446 (citing Greg Sandoval, Six Months Later, No ISPs Joining RIAA Piracy 
Fight, CNET NEWS (June 3, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10256481-93.html). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
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This last tactic might also indicate recognition by the RIAA of the underlying business and 
cultural realities that it must confront in this new digital era. Owing only in part to online music 
sharing, sales of music in the industry—primarily of CDs, but also of individual song tracks—
continued to fall,133 even despite widely followed litigation by the recording industry. These 
declining sales point to the challenges faced by longstanding and core industry business models. 
RIAA litigation could not perforce have a real effect upon the wider patterns of industry change, 
and likely served to deflect vital attention from the more profound and systemic problems arising 
from changing patterns of music use and consumption by its user base. It is not only notable that 
the recording industry’s reputation has been damaged, possibly irrevocably, among certain 
users.134 It is also vital to understand that the industry has betrayed a lack of comprehension of its 
users’ relationship to music, their interests, and their demands. 
 
Today, cultural consumers often have access to sophisticated technologies and well-established 
networks that gain them access to music in hitherto-unimaginable ways. Consumers are able to 
participate in the distribution of music via online networks, with respect to both sharing and 
receiving an enormous array of content.135 Further, some users may have access to sophisticated 
technologies that offer them control over the actual creation of content, such as recording and 
production, which may approach a level of professionalism that was formerly unavailable 
outside the purview of the recording industry itself.136 These technological mechanisms, now 
firmly mastered by many determined and sophisticated users, have radically undermined the 
privileged access that cultural industry firms once held over the control, distribution, use, and 
creation of cultural content.137 
                                                
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 447 (citing to Posting of Jennifer Rice to CORANTE BRANDSHIFT BLOG, Law of Causality,  
http://brandshift.corante.com/archives/2005/05/18/law_of_causality.php (May 18, 2005) (“The backlash 
against the RIAA is the best case study of what happens when you try to forcibly change customer 
behavior. Customers will do whatever they want to do. If you can’t create a really compelling reason for 
them to change (other than passing laws to make their actions illegal), then give them another option  that 
is more of a win-win. RIAA should stop fighting the inevitable and work towards a more realistic 
objective: ensuring a revenue stream for musicians regardless of distribution method.  Sure, it requires 
more creative thinking. But it s better than being hated.”)). 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 447-48.  
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Unprecedentedly, then, the relationship of users to cultural content has been transformed by 
profound changes in the technological landscape. These changes are paralleled by a relative loss 
of control among cultural producers, of which music provides the first and foremost example.138 
Clearly the music industry was reluctant to recognize, let alone adapt to, such overarching 
changes with shifts in its business models, strategies and practices. One fundamental mistake 
illustrating the problem was the recording industry’s inability to react swiftly and positively to 
market signals. First, its customers began to download individual digital music files, thereby 
indicating that they preferred to consume “unbundled” music in the form of single tracks, rather 
than music “bundled” into already-compiled CDs.139 Rather than reaching an agreement among 
record producers, the industry dragged its feet until Apple intervened and compelled a joint 
arrangement, to its immediate and ongoing benefit.140 Then its customers indicated that they 
were interested in digital music files that were DRM-free, or “unlocked”, which would enable 
them to use their legitimately-purchased music in a variety of ways (for e.g., copying on various 
devices, making “mix” tapes or CDs for personal use, and so on), as had been standard industry 
practice.141 In response, the music industry first refused to provide such a product, and then 
chose to pursue litigation against its customers, rather than to make such a product readily 
available.142 Still further, customers indicated that they would likely download music on 
legitimate music sharing services that “filtered” illegally downloaded songs, as technology might 
make possible. Rather than encouraging the development of such sites, the music industry opted 
to sue start-up companies that had built the underlying filtering technology that might have made 
them viable.143 This essentially forced start-ups out of business, and put an end to promising 
filtering technologies that may otherwise have presented real, legitimate alternatives either to the 
Napster progeny, on the one hand, or the Apple iTunes behemoth, on the other. 
 
                                                
138 Id. at 436-37. 
139 Id. at 441 & n.51. 
140 Id. at 449-50. 
141 Id. at 443-44. 
142 See RIAA v. The People, supra note 15. 
143 See, e.g., Steve Knopper, Pandora, RIAA’s Legal Fight Could Have Drastic Effect on Artists, 
ROLLING STONE (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/pandora-riaas-legal-fight-
could-have-drastic-effect-on-songwriters-20140425. 
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In all these respects, the music industry evinced a remarkable refusal to meet consumer demand 
with responsive and forward-looking business practices. The industry likely added to its own 
problems by dragging its feet, only increasing the likelihood that unauthorized downloads of 
music would continue on a virtual black market. Again, the industry resorted to litigation 
strategies targeting the use and sharing of digital music files, seeking relief via statutory damage 
provisions in copyright that permit plaintiffs to recover damages of $750 to $150,000 per 
infringed work without showing actual damages.144 Such statutory damage awards, which some 
commentators have described as “frequently arbitrary, inconsistent, unprincipled, and sometimes 
grossly excessive,”145 have also been regarded with a range of negative responses among music 
users, the industry’s consumer base.146 The lack of any pivotal strategy other than litigation also 
deprived record labels of a vital early opportunity to create a legitimate online music sharing 
service. Rather than collaborating to create an independent service, the record labels only 
acceded to arrangements that allowed the Apple iTunes music store to sell their content to 
consumers online. This not only gave Apple an enormous, and ultimately unshakeable, early 
mover advantage, but also allowed Apple to tether consumers to its devices, compelling users to 
purchase music within the Apple universe, subject to its terms, pricing, and overarching business 
model. The result has been striking: while the pricing of individual tracks remains singularly low 
and fixed—thereby depriving record labels of any potential profits from price discrimination and 
varied pricing—the vast majority of content sales continues to be made via Apple. Moreover, 
Apple itself is able to cross-subsidize the low value it ascribes to content with the pricing of its 
associated hardware devices, thereby locking in high margins on hardware sales, which stands 
only to Apple’s competitive advantage. In other words, through their reluctance to come to a deal 
amongst themselves, members of the record industry have effectively shut themselves out of the 
ability to effect the prices of their most valuable asset: their content. 
 
G. YouTube and UGC 
 
                                                
144 Arewa, supra note 3, at 447-48. 
145 Id. at 448 (quoting Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 441 (2009)). 
146 See, e.g., Jared Moya, ‘Free Jammie’—Mother Who Lost to the RIAA Seeks Help, ZERO PAID (Oct. 9, 
2007), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/9047/free_jammie__mother_who_lost_to_the_riaa_seeks_help/. 
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YouTube offers music an alternative model for how to adapt to the challenges of changing 
technology in the cultural industries. Note also that it is tremendously popular, completely free, 
and easy to use.147 YouTube, a free video-sharing site, has become the established market leader 
among video and movie websites. The scale of its relevance was signaled by the purchase of 
YouTube by Google in 2006 for a staggering $1.65 billion.148 YouTube has emerged as an 
important cultural force, capable of having a measurable impact on cultural, social, and even 
political sectors.149 Yet YouTube, unlike its more traditional counterparts in the cultural 
industries, does not rely primarily upon business models that derive licensing revenues—
revenues that are generally fixed—from content. Rather, YouTube is built upon a business model 
that derives advertising revenues—revenues that generally increase as traffic to its website 
increases—from its content.150 The dynamism of the YouTube stream of revenues, based as it is 
upon monetization of viewer participation, is a key feature of the site. There is some argument 
that the YouTube business model, however dynamic, may also be limited in its revenue growth 
potential, due in part to flat advertising rates on the Internet generally, and in part to its own high 
operating costs.151 YouTube itself seems well aware of these concerns and is expanding its 
business model accordingly.152 Following on the model of Apple’s digital music forays, 
YouTube is actively seeking to enter partnerships with various content providers,153 to strengthen 
its leadership position among video websites and to ensure that its audience both grows and 
comes to depend upon it for a wide range of increasingly diverse content. Already, YouTube has 
                                                
147 Arewa, supra note 3, at 449 n.97 (quoting Michael Driscoll, Comment, Will YouTube Sail into the 
DMCA's Safe Harbor or Sink for Internet Piracy?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 550, 562 
(2007)).  
148 Arewa, supra note 3, at 448 (citing Press Release, Google Inc., Google To Acquire YouTube for $1.65 
Billion in Stock (Oct. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/google_youtube.html).  
149 Id. YouTube has played an increasingly important role in politics, culminating with the 2008 elections. 
See The YouTube-ification of Politics: Candidates Losing Control, CNN (July 18, 2007), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/07/18/youtube.effect/index.html?eref=rss_tech; Nikki Schwab, In 
Obama-McCain Race, YouTube Became a Serious Battleground for Presidential Politics, US NEWS 
(Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/campaign-2008/articles/2008/11/07/in-obama-mccain-race-
youtube-became-a-serious-battleground-for-presidential-politics. 
150 Arewa, supra note 3, at 448.  
151 See Quora, How Much Did it Cost YouTube to Stream Gangnam Style?, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2012/10/29/how-much-did-it-cost-youtube-to-stream-gangnam-style/. 
152 Arewa, supra note 3, at 448-49. 
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created an innovative and functional space for video viewing and sharing, which has been 
adopted by an enormous and ever-growing user base.154 
 
II. BLACK MARKETS, LEGAL MARKETS, AND BUSINESS MODELS 
 
A. Black Market as Expression of Customer Preference 
 
The music industry, as has been characteristic of many of the cultural industries, has resisted 
recognizing generational shifts in the patterns and practices of music consumption among its user 
base.155 Technologically sophisticated users have been able to develop “black markets” in music, 
entailing the pervasive yet unauthorized appropriation and dissemination of copyright-protected 
content.156 In so doing, these users reveal a marked generational shift in music consumption, and 
at the same time demonstrate a newfound control of content that was not previously possible.157 
But the emergence of new user-generated markets in music may also be seen as an expression of 
preference among younger music consumers. First, by disaggregating music compilations into 
single digital music tracks, users expressed a clear preference for consuming individual songs 
rather than entire CDs.158 Second, by making “mash-ups”, “sampling,” and other creative re-
workings of musical works, users expressed a novel interest in gaining control over the use and 
re-use of original content.159 And third, in bypassing conventional music retailers and other 
intermediaries, users expressed their determination to obtain music as directly as possible, and at 
the lowest prices that might be obtained or devised.160 
 
                                                
154 Id. (citing Driscoll, supra note 147, at 552 (“The reasons behind YouTube’s tremendous popularity are  
probably due to several factors. First, YouTube’s site is completely free. Second, the site is easy to use.   
Third, its servers hold videos that are in high demand, including infringing videos.” (footnote omitted))). 
155 Arewa, supra note 3, at 449.  
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 470.  
159 Id. at 439.  
160 Id. at 471.  
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B. Resistance to Change by Music Industry 
 
The emergence of a “black market” in music—including, but not limited to, Napster and its 
progeny—heralded important changes in user preferences, and should have signaled to the music 
industry that changes to its business model were pressing if not overdue. Yet quite to the 
contrary, the initial response of the music industry was hostility to the advent of the Internet, 
resistance to market forces, and entrenchment in its established positions and practices. These 
views were, perhaps surprisingly, openly expressed.161  
 
Arguing along similar lines as Valenti, many players in the music industry actively sought to 
eliminate markets that were demonstrably popular among younger, technologically savvy 
users.162 As one forward-looking industry participant, Gerry Kearby, founder of Liquid Audio, 
an early Internet music venture, noted, recording industry executives at Sony and its peers were 
forthright in stating their opposition to online ventures, including the licensing of music content 
online.163 Kearby compared music industry members expressing their reluctance to change to a 
similar example of historic industry recalcitrance, characterizing them as “in effect, buggy-whip 
manufacturers, trying to keep the auto at bay as long as they could.”164165 And this position was 
shared among other major cultural industry players as well. For instance, in May 2009, in a panel 
discussion on the future of film-making, Michael Lynton, Chief Executive Officer of Sony 
Pictures Entertainment, summed up the film industry’s fundamental agreement with the anti-
Internet viewpoint, stating:  
I’m a guy who doesn’t see anything good having come from the Internet . . . , 
[which has] created this notion that anyone can have whatever they want at any 
given time. It’s as if the stores on Madison Avenue were open 24 hours a day. 
                                                
161 Jack Valenti was the head of the Motion Pictures Association of America and lead the movie industry 
during a time when technological changes were challenging the industry. See generally Richard Corliss, 
What Jack Valenti Did for Hollywood, TIME (Apr. 27, 2007), 
http://content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1615388,00.html. 
162 Arewa, supra note 3, at 449. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 450.  
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They feel entitled. They say, “Give it to me now,” and if you don’t give it to them 
for free, they’ll steal it.166 
 
1. Apple’s Business Model 
 
The resistance among recording industry participants to the advent of the Internet has extended 
to an array of business and legal decisions resonating to the present day. One of the earliest 
examples is the drawn-out negotiations among the major recording labels and Apple regarding 
licensing agreements for online content to be offered through the Apple iTunes Music Store.167 
Yet while slow to enter into agreements with Apple, music content providers have proved 
relatively unsuccessful in creating new digital music business initiatives—perhaps thereby 
offering another suggestive instance of their inability to come to terms with the online music 
business model.168 Other early examples show recording industry players seeking recourse from 
all available legal means to suppress the emergence of online music markets that might 
potentially compete with their core business models.169 And one further example is the 
successful attempts by recording industry players to quash legitimate Internet music ventures that 
might feature innovative “filtering” technology designed expressly to thwart illegal downloading 
of appropriated content. 
 
Taken together, the acts and statements of the music recording industry reveal its open 
resistance, if not outright hostility, to profound changes in technology, content distribution and 
control, as well as the user experience. These views percolated throughout the industry’s 
established business practices, and presented a critical early impediment to the record labels’ 
attempts to create and integrate new business models across the industry. It may have been 
virtually inevitable, then, that technology companies, such as Apple—rather than content 
providers, such as the major record labels—came to exploit the early-mover advantages that 
                                                
166 Id. (quoting Irin Carmon, Memo Pad: Uniqlo Nabs Deyn...Bad Internet...Classic Martha..., WWD 
MEDIA (May 15, 2009), http://www.wwd.com/media-news/fashion-memopad/memo-pad-uniqlo-nabs-
deyn-bad-internet-classic-martha-2136751?page=2). 
167 See Tim Arango, Despite iTunes Accord, Music Labels Still Fret, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/business/media/02apple.html;  
168 Arewa, supra note 3, at 450.  
169 Id. 
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were waiting to be reaped in the digital music arena. Indeed, by aggressively pursuing the 
licensing of music content for online distribution, Apple quickly and decisively gained a leading 
market share through its iTunes Music Store, a position that has not been successfully challenged 
to date.170 
 
Yet the even dominance of technology companies such as Apple has not yet wholly eliminated 
competition among the diverse participants and business models in the digital content sector. 
One illustration of this phenomenon is that creative artists have begun to seek new, alternative 
business models for sharing and distributing their work online. These efforts may in part be seen 
as a concerted response to the limitations of the recording industry’s established business 
models, including plummeting sales of CDs and individual songs. But they may also be seen as a 
burgeoning interest among musicians in reaching out to their user base without the intervention 
of third-party intermediaries. Thus, for instance, artists such as Radiohead and Nine Inch Nails 
have begun to distribute music over the Internet, either at no cost at all or at a price determined 
by their users.171 
 
2. Hulu and YouTube 
 
The slow response of the music industry to the changed landscape of the digital age, and the 
consequent loss of market position by music content providers, may prove instructive to other 
cultural industries, including book publishing and film production.172 These sectors are seeking 
to adapt their business models to accommodate the distribution of cultural content not only 
through physical channels, such as brick-and-mortar retail stores, but also via electronic delivery, 
such as entertainment and retail websites. The online retail model is relatively straightforward, 
and involves the sale of content on such sites as Amazon, Barnes and Noble, Netflix, and so on. 
The establishment of entertainment websites such as Hulu, a joint creation of NBC and Fox173 
                                                
170 Arewa, supra note 3, at 450.  
171 Arewa, supra note 3, at 450.  
172 Arewa, supra note 3, at 450.   
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that offers video content online, represents the concerted effort of cultural producers to tap into 
burgeoning audience demand for creative content.174 
 
3. Legal Responses: Suit against YouTube 
 
Like YouTube, Hulu relies mainly upon an advertising-based revenue model, while offering 
content for free. Industry concerns regarding the use of the Internet to disseminate content has 
given rise to legal responses to the success and scope of the websites’ activities. Thus, for 
instance, content providers continue to challenge YouTube and its users on legal grounds, 
claiming that they engage in infringing activities by posting copyright-protected materials on the 
YouTube website.175 Numerous legal actions have been brought against YouTube in which 
plaintiffs assert that copyright infringement has occurred with respect to content that users have 
uploaded, viewed and distributed on the YouTube website.176 These actions may be most costly 
when the major content providers become involved. For instance, a lawsuit brought by Viacom 
in 2007 against YouTube and Google sought $1 billion in damages.177 While Google won a 
summary judgment motion in June 2010, Viacom appealed the court’s ruling.178 The decision 
was reversed in part in 2012, and the parties once again appealed.179 The parties settled before 
the second appeal was decided.180 These ongoing challenges to YouTube, Hulu, and other online 
entertainment sources continue to reveal the efforts that content providers are making to straddle 
two goals that seem hugely paradoxical, if not outright incompatible: on the one hand, protecting 
their valuable assets and sustaining their revenue streams, while on the other hand,  satisfying 
                                                
174 Id. 
175 Arewa, supra note 3, at 451.  
176 See, e.g., Tur v. YouTube, No. CV064436, 2007 WL 1893635, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007)  
(denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a case where a photographer claimed copyright 
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177 Arewa, supra note 3, at 451. 
178Id. (citing Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Google 
Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-CV2103), 2007 WL 775611).  
179 See Viacom v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Viacom v. YouTube, 940 F.Supp.2d 110 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Viacom International, Inc. et al v. YouTube, Inc. et al, DOCKET ALARM, 
https://www.docketalarm.com/cases/New_York_Southern_District_Court/1--07-cv-
02103/Viacom_International_Inc._et_al_v._Youtube_Inc._et_al/ (providing docket information for the 
case and noting the case was terminated on April 29, 2013).  
180 See Jonathan Stempel, Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube Lawsuit, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/18/us-google-viacom-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318. 
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their insatiable customer base, who has come to regard content as readily available, [mutable], 
and on offer at no or very little cost. 
 
4. Lack of Clarity in Parameters of Copyright Doctrine—Particularly with  
Respect to UGC and YouTube 
 
Sites such as YouTube, MySpace, and others, which offer their audiences access to music, 
videos, and other entertainment, may host a broad range of works, including UGC, which is 
actively uploaded by site participants. The array of works and activities that YouTube spans is 
extremely broad, and may well give rise to claims on the part of content owners that copyright 
infringement is not infrequently involved in their generation and dissemination. Such challenges 
to UGC practices and works serve to emphasize an inherent lack of clarity in the law with 
respect to the role that users play in both consuming and creating content.181 This lack of clarity 
is only exacerbated by the related ambiguities that blur the parameters of copyright doctrine, 
including the range of permitted personal uses of copyrighted works,182 the scope of fair use,183 
and similar carve-outs to the standard protections that copyright affords. These fluid “gray areas” 
in copyright law, subject to judicial re-working, leave users who are interested in both 
consuming and creating content uncertain as to their rights and restrictions they face when 
engaging with content online. Moreover, they expose even the most dynamic sites, such as 
YouTube and its ilk, to potential challenges by aggrieved content owners who are vigilant in 
seeking to protect their copyrighted assets.184 While in many cases it is only appropriate to 
require content-sharing services to patrol their borders, it may also impose an onerous burden on 
new start-up ventures that are eager to explore innovative venues that enable creation, sharing, 
                                                
181 Scholars emphasized the lack of an appropriate conception of user role as a main impediment in 
enforcing copyright protections. See Arewa, supra note 3, at 452 n.114 (citing Julie Cohen, The Place of 
the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 374 (2005) (“Copyright should recognize the 
situated, context-dependent character of both consumption and creativity.”)). 
182 See id. (citing Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1872 (2007) (placing 
readers, listeners, viewers, and the general public in copyright through the lens of personal use)). 
183 See generally Mary W.S. Wong, “Transformative” User-Generated Content in Copyright Law: 
Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075 (2009).  
184 See generally Steven Seidenberg, Copyright in the Age of YouTube, AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 2, 2009), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/copyright_in_the_age_of_youtube (discussing the suit 
brought by Universal Music Group against a mother who used Prince’s song “Let’s go crazy” as a 
background music in a 30-second home video of her toddler).  
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distribution and other uses of creative content. The toll this takes upon innovation may not be 
measurable, but nor is it negligible. 
 
5. Legal Responses: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
Technological measures restricting the use of content—even acceptable and previously protected 
personal use or fair use—complicate the situation vis-à-vis cultural production.185 The Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) 186 extends ISPs a potential safe harbor from liability for 
copyright infringement if certain statutory provisions are met.187 Under Section 512 of the 
DMCA, ISPs are granted safe harbor upon “expeditiously” removing any materials from their 
servers pursuant to a copyright owner notifying them in good faith that the materials are 
infringing.188 Under this same provision, no further legal action is required to prompt removal of 
the offending material.189 
 
The DMCA procedures for the removal of allegedly infringing materials by ISPs has been 
characterized by commentators as “an insufficient check on overreaching” that “creates an 
unacceptable shortcut around the procedures that are needed to decide whether speech is actually 
infringing.”190 It has also been argued that the copyright owners wielding Section 512 as an 
aggressive means to thwart supposedly infringing activities may have a further negative 
consequence of creating a chilling effect that may actually hinder the creation of new works.191 
These controversial DMCA takedown procedures have increasingly been challenged in court by 
users. In 2007, plaintiff Stephanie Lenz brought a legal action against Universal Music Group, 
alleging that the company issued a DMCA takedown notice to YouTube despite knowledge that 
                                                
185 Arewa, supra note 3, at 452. 
186 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
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use of the allegedly infringing song in her video was in fact a non-infringing fair use.192 In 2010, 
a California district court granted Lenz partial summary judgment, further permitting Lenz to 
pursue a claim for damages against Universal Music Group under DMCA Section 512(f).193 
 
C. Need for Middle Ground Solutions; Need for All  
Parties to be Represented at the Table 
 
UGC is emerging as a newly innovative part of the digital sphere. But UCG also highlight 
significant “gray areas” in copyright law that have not yet been resolved, owing in part to 
dissenting positions held by diverse stakeholders in the copyright industries.194 A baseline 
middle-ground solution offering guidelines for user generation, control, and distribution of 
digital content, as well as regulation of the digital arena, would likely best serve to clarify these 
gray areas and thereby to ensure that online innovation and institutions are able to emerge and 
grow.195 At the same time, however, as in other areas of copyright law, the lack of adequate 
representation of diverse stakeholders, including users actively involved in UGC, has tended to 
hamper the development of fair and well-balanced agreements regarding the digital use of 
cultural content.196 On one occasion, during discussions regarding proposed principles governing 
the use and treatment of UGC, commercial market participants openly recognized the lack of 
representative content owners and creators at the table.197 These industry members, which did 
not include YouTube among their ranks, would be unlikely to consider or accommodate the 
needs of participants who were absent, unable to contribute obvious gains to their benefit, or 
otherwise relatively powerless.198 This lack of representation among interested parties is hardly a 
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new phenomenon in copyright law, as some commentators have noted: Jessica Litman, for 
instance, has painstakingly traced the tendency of copyright law to take shape through industry 
pressures and intensive political lobbying efforts that have culminated in pro-industry legislative 
changes.199 But the new centrality of the technologically savvy user, who exerts an 
unprecedented range of control over cultural content, may open a new chapter in the history of 
creative copyright. Indeed, as copyright continues to grow in importance to ordinary users, the 
day may yet come when users en masse seek to establish a critical place at the bargaining table 
so that they can shape copyright law in more balanced, representative and creative ways.200 
 
III. THE DIGITAL ERA AND THE COSTS OF COPYING 
 
A. The Monetization of Content: Revenue Harvesting and  
Intellectual Property Value  
 
1. Valuable Asset Model: Maximizing Revenues  
Derived from Intellectual Properties 
 
Cultural industries such as the music sector today count their intellectual properties as their most 
valuable assets. The premium placed on cultural output valuation has grown ever more pervasive 
in connection with the rise of the digital era, giving additional authority to what one 
commentator has called the “valuable asset models” of culture in intellectual property.201 
Valuable asset models “treat content as a valuable asset to be monetized through extraction of 
maximum amounts of revenues.”202 While cultural properties have certainly seen important 
growth in their market value overall, their increasing prominence is also driven by fundamental 
changes in the economic, social and business landscape worldwide. In the last quarter-century or 
so, cultural industries—including entertainment, information, and the arts—have gained 
enormous market share, and have become among “the most highly valued and discussed 
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businesses in the world.”203 Thus, in the post-digital era, the “valuable assets model,” and its 
emphasis on the maximization of value derived from intellectual property outputs and other 
intangible assets, has become a primary concern of businesses and policymakers alike.204  
 
While assessing intellectual property assets is generally a useful business practice, it, like many 
such business models, retains its functionality only insofar as it accurately assesses and accounts 
for prevailing economic conditions. This is a real pressure point as far as a number of cultural 
industries are concerned. Many cultural industry firms have based valuations of their intellectual 
property assets on the industry licensing strategies, practices and outcomes of earlier pre-digital 
times.205 Whether such valuations are viable and sustainable is a matter of great debate in light of 
the changes in the business and cultural environment that emerging technologies continue to 
spur. At the forefront of such change are technological innovations that have made possible 
significant reductions in the costs of both copying and distributing cultural content, factors that 
have in turn contributed to an overall decline in the market value of content.206 These 
technological innovations have also served to reduce dramatically the value-add proposition of 
many industry intermediaries207—such as record labels in the music industry—and thereby to 
exert further downward pressure on the value of cultural content. 
 
2. Apple’s Business Model 
 
Yet even as some industry intermediaries have lost their centrality, new intermediaries and 
industry participants have emerged to generate newfound value propositions. In the music 
industry, for instance, the demise of Napster and its progeny left open the opportunity for Apple 
to create the innovative online iTunes music store that proved immensely popular in its 
inexpensive sales of individual music tracks.208 Yet from the start, Apple premised the business 
model of its online music sales not on profits driven by sales of music tracks, but rather on cross-
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subsidies of its hardware by such music sales.209 In other words, Apple created an ongoing 
business model that sells music content, but does not rely on profits from such sales: rather it 
generates the bulk of its profit from the hardware devices, and supporting software, that 
organize, play, and distribute the music content that is sold.210 
 
The music industry can look to the Apple iTunes model as a positive example of cultural 
industry production and distribution that generates profits from the sales of both content and 
supporting distribution devices and mechanisms that make such content available to consumers. 
By making music recordings available and accessible to a great many consumers, and by 
offering such music at a price that most consumers find reasonable (based on their willingness to 
purchase music at such a price), Apple accomplishes two purposes: it secures its place as a key 
intermediary in the music marketplace, and it demonstrates a willingness on the part of 
consumers to pay for their music consumption. The success of Apple iTunes thereby offers at 
least one useful data point in the valuation of music content as a given intellectual property asset 
in the portfolio of music industry firms.  
 
B. Shifts in User Expectations with Respect to Prices; Music Industry Players’ Refusal to 
Recognize and Accommodate Such Shifts 
 
At the same time, however, Apple’s relative success must be considered in the greater context of 
the music landscape. Just prior to the development of iTunes, peer-to-peer music sharing services 
such as Napster emerged to make music readily available to listeners not merely on a low-cost 
basis, but for free. While Napster was not able to withstand court challenges, it marked the 
beginning of the emergence of many such peer-to-peer networks such as BitTorrent that persist 
to this day. These networks, affording the exchange first of music, then of videos, television 
clips, and so on, gave rise to a vital shift in consumers’ understanding of the cultural 
marketplace: that is, users came to develop both the belief and the expectation that content 
should be readily accessible, available and inexpensive or, in many cases, free.211 These new 
consumer expectations with respect to the pricing of content amount to a transformative force in 
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the market for cultural products.212 Significantly, these expectations are not typically factored 
into the business models, or the value propositions and assumptions that such business models 
are predicated upon, that were developed by many cultural industry players prior to the 
emergence of the online consumer experience. The music industry’s initial reluctance to 
recognize that users would flock to sites offering free music downloads reflects the beginning of 
this divergence between industry understanding and actual consumer behavior. The recording 
industry’s subsequent refusal to accommodate user preferences and expectations by creating 
online services offering single music tracks at a modest price—a logjam only broken by the 
forceful intervention of Apple, a technology company—is similarly illustrative of the industry’s 
insistence on adhering to conventional, yet now outmoded, business plans and practices. 
 
In the early days of the digital era, music industry participants were compelled to come to terms 
with the fact that some of their content may have diminished in value—the CD, for instance, 
would likely never be marketable again with such success as the industry had known.213 As such 
pre-digital assumptions were overturned, the music industry came face-to-face with the reality of 
a new marketplace, in which products were disaggregated and sold at plummeting prices in 
seemingly ever-declining amounts.214 Upon consideration of the newly configured landscape, 
music industry leaders began to contemplate various changes to their core strategies. For one 
part, record labels began actively searching for new revenue streams not directly drawn from 
recorded music.215 The so-called “360 contract” became increasingly touted as an innovative 
source of multi-tiered revenues, drawing profits from the sale of concert tickets, band-related 
merchandise, and other ancillary products and services relating to live music performance.216 
Newer business models are building upon musicians’ websites to create interactive experience, 
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foster band (and “brand”) loyalty, and so on.217 Also musicians giving away music for free as a 
loss leader, to get listeners acquainted with their work, offer special tracks for loyal fans, bring 
people to their concerts, and so forth.218 
 
The innovative music market strategies described above, while drawing revenues from music 
performance, do not tap into music recordings, the primary intellectual property assets owned by 
the major music industry players, record labels. These industry participants, upon realizing that 
the value of certain recorded works might be at risk, began to seek out innovative ways to 
capitalize upon new uses of their owned content.219 The valuable asset model is predicated upon 
the idea that owners of cultural materials will exercise their intellectual property rights in order 
to maximize value, first by controlling the uses of their content and further by monetizing, to the 
fullest extent possible, the revenue streams flowing from such uses.220 In the music industry, the 
apparent diminution in the value of certain recorded works has led major industry players to 
consider new channels for deriving revenue streams from their properties.221 By seeking to 
institute pay-per-use systems wherever possible, music content owners are attempting to 
maximize the value of their assets by eliminating any uncompensated uses of content over which 
they have ownership or control.222 Some commentators have argued that these elevated levels of 
value maximization of cultural content stands in stark contrast to earlier eras, in which copyright 
law was “leakier” and afforded greater latitude to lawful noncommercial uses, such as private 
personal use.223 But content owners in creative industries, including the music industry, would 
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almost certainly counter that they are compelled to seek new revenue streams to compensate for 
losses they have sustained in the wake of many of the content uses, both infringing and licit, that 
have undermined their fundamental business model and profitability. 
 
C. Additional Revenues: Song Samples/Previews on iTunes 
 
Music industry firms are not only seeking to eliminate uncompensated uses, but are also striving 
to develop new, additional revenue streams deriving from uses for which compensation is 
already being made. In 2009, for instance, the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (“ASCAP”), Broadcast Music, Inc. (“BMI”), and other performance rights 
organizations (together referred to here as the “PROs”)—all of which [are licensing 
organizations designed to] collect performance-based royalties on behalf of music composers, 
songwriters and publishers—joined forces to lobby Congress for changes in uses of portions of 
their content.224 These PROs considered the use of thirty-second samples or previews of their 
music to constitute unfairly uncompensated uses of their content, for which they should be duly 
compensated.225 The use of these samples or previews has been most prevalent in the Apple 
iTunes Music Store, which allows listeners to hear such thirty-second extracts of musical works 
prior to their determining whether or not to purchase the entire piece.226 
 
The PROs, which serve as the main representatives of music publishers and composers, are 
seeking payment of performance royalties for music samples or previews as one means of 
developing and exploiting alternate revenue streams to offset losses of revenues their members 
have withstood in this digital era. But their constituents are likewise seeking compensation from 
other sources in the broader entertainment and cultural industries. With respect to previews and 
samples offered through the iTunes Music Store, music publishers are asserting a claim to 
performance royalties not only when iTunes song samples are played, but also when music, 
movies, and television shows are sampled, previewed or downloaded. These music publishers 
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argue that playing previews, downloading content, and other such activities constitute a “public 
performance” that commands compensation above and beyond royalties or fees that have already 
been paid for the use of such materials. However, these industry players are already compensated 
for the use of content for which performance royalties are now being asserted. For instance, 
synchronization fees are levied on music that is incorporated into movies and television shows; 
performance royalties are commanded for the use of music in public film and television 
screenings; and mechanical license fees are charged for musical downloads.227 Copyright owners 
are entitled to receive mechanical license fees whenever their musical compositions are played 
on a “mechanical” device such as a CD, record, or tape, or used in certain digital formats.228 
 
D. Additional Revenues: Royalties from Radio Broadcasts Of Music 
 
But music publishers and composers comprise only one subset of the music industry, and they 
are far from alone in searching out new alternative sources of profitability. In an effort to expand 
their revenue streams, the recording industry lobbied Congress in 2008 to enact legislation 
granting it the right to receive royalties from radio stations that broadcast its music, arguing that 
“broadcasting music without payment is akin to piracy.”229 These performance royalty payments, 
which would be made in addition to royalties already paid to record labels, would offer 
supplemental sources of revenue that the recording industry contends would also create parity 
among transmitters of broadcasters—not just terrestrial radio, but satellite, cable and Internet 
radio as well.230 
 
The position of the record labels is based on a perceived discrepancy in the division and 
collection of music royalties. Recorded music typically gives rise to two separate and distinct 
copyrights: (i) copyright in the musical composition, including music and lyrics, which is usually 
held by the composer, songwriter and/or music publisher, and (ii) copyright in the recorded 
performance of the work, or the “sound recording”, which is generally held by recording 
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companies.231 Under current law, broadcast radio stations are required to pay performance 
royalties to owners of copyright in the musical composition (that is, composers, songwriters, 
and/or publishers), but are not required to pay performance royalties to owners of copyright in 
the sound recording (that is, record labels).232 In contrast, other broadcast stations, including 
Internet music stations (“webcasters”) and cable and satellite radio, are required to pay 
performance royalties both to owners of musical compositions and to owners of sound 
recordings.233 The payment by webcasters of royalties related to performance rights is 
administered under a statutory licensing framework.234 The treatment of radio broadcasting, 
therefore, is treated as a sui generis exemption to which the recording companies object. They 
argue, therefore, that “fairness” would require terrestrial radio stations to pay them sound 
recording royalties whenever their songs are broadcast on the air. 
 
1. Counter: Do Away with Sound Recording Rights for Webcasters  
 
One counter-argument to the recording industry’s position is that music webcasting may in fact 
point the way to restricting, rather than expanding, the royalties that copyright owners can extract 
from music compositions they own.235 Due to the relatively recent development of Internet 
technologies (and the expansion of Internet bandwidth), music webcasters tend to be start-up 
ventures, such as Pandora, Rdio, and so on, and as such bear competitive disadvantages with 
respect to traditional radio broadcasters that are long-established in the field. However, Internet 
webcasters that broadcast music—and their counterparts in satellite radio—argue that their 
growth are unduly handicapped by having to pay performance royalties both to composers and to 
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sound recording copyright owners.236 As noted above, traditional radio stations that broadcast 
music do not have to pay such performance royalties to sound recording copyright owners.237 
This disparity, webcasters contend, creates an inherently inequitable system, in which the 
playing field is skewed in favor of established players at the expense of innovative new entrants 
seeking market share.238 Representatives of music webcasters, arguing against stalwart members 
of the recording industry, make the case that royalty rates for webcasters may critically 
undermine innovation and development in the online music industry.239 They further argue that 
this does a disservice to the consumer base of music listeners, particularly those who are 
technologically adept and eager to gain access to music and culture via the Internet.240 
 
E. Additional Revenue Streams: Ringtones on Cellular Telephones 
 
In further attempts at garnering royalty-related revenues for the music publishers and composers 
they represent, PROs have also challenged innovative communicative technologies other than the 
Internet. In 2009, ASCAP, one of the two largest PROS administering music performance rights 
and related royalties, brought a legal action against Verizon Wireless, arguing that its members 
should receive public performance royalties for ringtones.241 In its suit, ASCAP made the novel 
claim that each time a musical ringtone is played on a Verizon Wireless cellular telephone, it 
constitutes a “public performance” of the musical work, thereby requiring performance rights to 
be compensated.242 It bears noting that these public performance rights would be required in 
addition to the mechanical license fees that Verizon was already paying to the ASCAP members 
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holding rights in the musical works played as its ringtones.243 The Second Circuit rejected 
ASCAP’s reasoning, stating unequivocally that, “even when the downloading of a ringtone is 
considered as the first link in a chain of transmissions, it does not qualify as a public 
performance.”244 Nonetheless, the Verizon ringtone case remains an example of a legally-based 
business strategy on the part of music industry firms in the post-digital era that are intent on 
maximizing revenues from their intellectual property assets, even in addition to royalties they 
may already receive for the use and re-use of their copyrighted material. 
 
F. Markets for Cultural and Entertainment Assets 
 
The maximization of rights and related revenues in valuable intellectual property assets has seen 
particular growth in many cultural and entertainment sectors. The idea that such assets should be 
optimally harvested has become a paradigm giving rise to new markets in intellectual 
properties.245 Three critical developments reflect the powerful hold this paradigm has taken in 
these IP industries: (i) markets for cultural and entertainment have expanded; (ii) investment 
markets increasingly take account of the market value of intellectual property assets; and (iii) 
trading markets for intellectual property are emerging and growing.246 As a result, cultural and 
entertainment firms, in music and other sectors, place enormous value in their content as core 
assets vital to their success. As General Electric, parent to NBC-Universal Studios, stated in its 
2006 annual report: “Entertainment assets are highly valued by investors.”247 And as Viacom 
likewise stated: “Our digital assets are becoming an increasingly important aspect of our 
business.”248 
  
Market value in intellectual property assets is fostered by the emergence of firms that specialize 
in creating liquid markets for intangible assets, such as Ocean Tomo.249 Similarly, markets in IP 
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assets have expanded with the introduction of transactions involving the securitization of royalty 
streams from copyrighted works.250 Yet another instantiation of IP market value is the emergence 
of bond issuance transactions in intellectual properties. For instance, in 1997, the renowned 
musician David Bowie raised $55 million by issuing “Bowie Bonds,” asset-backed bonds 
collateralized by future royalties from twenty-five albums he recorded before 1990.251 While 
Bowie was the first popular artist to issue bonds backed by royalties from his copyrighted works, 
a number of musicians followed suit, including musicians Marvin Gaye (estate), James Brown, 
and Rod Stewart.252 Music market bond issuance transactions have also backed by the work of 
various songwriters, composers and music catalogs.253 Commentators have noted that the 
creation of markets in intellectual property assets has likely contributed to interests among music 
industry players in strengthening intellectual property rights in valuable intangible assets.254 
 
G. Control Mechanisms 
 
Battles over music copyright in the digital era reveal an interesting dichotomy: while new 
technologies like the Internet allow users expanded access to music content, they also enable 
copyright owners to increase control over such content.255 DRM, for instance, extends a measure 
of control over content that has not precedent in earlier eras.256 And the continued use of DRM 
protection in some cultural content reflects one technological means of control; and although 
circumvention may, in theory, be an option, it is a costly and time-consuming one that may lie 
out of the reach of many ordinary users. But tight control over content, however unpopular 
among users—who for the most part, it must be recalled, constitute paying consumers of cultural 
products—remains highly desirable to content owners seeking to protect their valuable 
intellectual property assets and related revenue streams. As these properties appreciate in value, 
their copyright owners consider technological controls to be among the weapons in their strategic 
arsenal that secure revenue streams, and perhaps even make new revenue streams more 
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attainable. Some cultural and entertainment industry members laud the rise in IP valuations and 
the increased strength of IP content controls as together creating new potential for industry-wide 
gains, or “the prelude to a new golden age of media.”257 As one industry giant, the News 
Corporation, described it in their 2006 Annual Report, “[t]echnology is liberating us from old 
constraints, lowering key costs, easing access to new customers and markets and multiplying the 
choices we can offer.”258 
 
1. Pre-Digital Control = Control of Creation and Distribution 
 
Since digital technologies have transformed the cultural landscape, many industry firms have 
naturally looked to technology for control mechanisms that enable them to preserve and enhance 
the value of their copyrighted materials. But content control may be, and indeed has been, 
achieved without recourse to technological measures. The history of the music industry reveals 
that industry participants have long exerted control over the creation, distribution and re-use of 
musical works, and over the creators themselves who originated these works.259 
 
Historically, the music industry has been rife with contractual arrangements that reveal critical 
asymmetries in the bargaining power of various parties, resulting in systemic inequities in the 
allocation of intellectual property rights and economic rewards.260 Generally creators, for 
instance, have had relatively less power than recording industry firms, although some 
hierarchical disparities of power among creators have occurred. Illustrative are music industry 
business models that prevail at present, under which the highest-ranked popular musicians earn 
more than seven times as much from concert ticket sales than from record sales royalties,261 
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despite the fact that aggregate revenue from records exceeds aggregate revenue from concert 
performances by a factor of about five to one.262 
 
The historic treatment of musicians with respect to the allocation of music rights and the award 
of music revenues continues to date, and finds close parallels in many other cultural industry 
business structures, such as film and television, publishing, and so on. To some extent, it also 
throws into question the incentive narrative on which intellectual property law is predicated. 
Some commentators have suggested that it also reveals a divide between perception and reality 
in cultural production and its underlying valuable assets model: “while the ideology of copyright 
law might be to protect the artists, the reality of the music business is that such rights are, in 
effect, exercised by their publishers and record companies.”263 In the case of the music recording 
industry, control over creation and distribution was, and remains, a central feature in its business 
models and strategies for profitability.264 
 
IV. DIGITAL ERA DISRUPTION: THE INTERNET AND LOW COST DISTRIBUTION 
 
A. Technology, Copying, and Dissemination: Copyright in the Age of Digital Reproduction 
 
1. Technology and Copyright in History: White-Smith  
 
The history of modern music, dating even to the start of the twentieth century, attests to a 
longstanding connection between technology and music copyright. An early example is the 1908 
case of White-Smith Music Publishing Co.  v. Apollo Co.,265 in which the Supreme Court 
scrutinized the newly-popular “piano rolls”—mechanized recordings of music to be played on 
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automatic player pianos266—to determine whether piano roll technology created “copies” within 
the meaning of the extant copyright act.267 At the heart of the matter was an underlying 
uncertainty as to whether or not the copyright act extended to recorded music.268 The emergence 
of new player piano rolls and recording technologies, first heralded as innovations in the music 
industry, had rapidly come to threaten the sheet music industry, comprising a great many music 
copyright owners including composers and music publishers.269 
 
Alarmed by the inroads that sales of recorded piano rolls were making on sheet music returns, 
the concerned music composers and publishers petitioned Congress to give them an exclusive 
right to block the manufacture or sale of any “‘appliance especially adapted’ mechanically to 
record music compositions.”270 In opposition, piano roll manufacturers objected to the proposed 
legislative measures. Their concern, however, was not limited to the prospect of being compelled 
to share revenues in the sale of music with composers and publishers. Rather, they were most 
threatened by the growing market power of the Aeolian Company, which was financing the 
White-Smith litigation271 and which, in advance of the impending litigation over mechanical 
license rights, had purchased large blocks of rights from major music publishers.272 
 
In White-Smith, the Supreme Court found that piano rolls did not constitute copies.273 In the 
following year, Congress adopted the Copyright Act of 1909, creating a statutory basis for the 
mechanical rights that had been sought by music composers and publishers.274 At the same time, 
and partially to curtail Aeolian’s market power, Congress imposed a compulsory license upon 
mechanical license rights in music.275 The compulsory license stipulated that when copyright 
owners licensed their music to one piano roll or record company, they would be required to make 
music licenses available to any other company seeking to make its own piano roll or to record a 
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version of the music composition(s) at issue.276 These latter interested parties would in turn be 
required to pay copyright owners a statutory mechanical license fee, fixed by Congress at that 
time at two cents.277 
 
The parallels between the concerns of music industry players in the White-Smith era and in the 
present-day digital era are evident: as new technologies emerge to challenge established business 
practices, industry participants strive to protect their revenue sources by seeking recourse in 
changing copyright laws.278 Often the disputes may be framed as the disruptiveness of new 
technologies, and demands may be made to restrict or shut down these innovative devices. But 
other strategies may involve efforts to shape copyright law to maximize the interests of those 
petitioning for its protections. White-Smith is but one in a line of cases and statutes that consider 
changing technologies that enable, facilitate or may even revolutionize reproduction and ask 
whether they should be left to grow, possibly transforming the industry unforeseeably, or instead 
reined in, possibly keeping the industry stable but at the cost of innovation.279 
 
The end of the twentieth century, which earlier ushered in White-Smith and the subsequent 
generation of the mechanical license right, later saw new technologies for music reproduction 
expand both in scope and in reach to new audiences. These technologies had several distinct and 
novel advantages: (i) copying became far easier and faster, both individually and en masse; (ii) 
copying became more accessible to the average user (including not only music composers and 
performers but also listeners and sharers); (iii) copying became better, as the development of 
digital file formats greatly enhanced the potential for anyone, amateur or professional, to create 
high fidelity copies with a minimum of degradation in quality; and (iv) copying en masse 
became more ubiquitous, as the Internet compounded the effect of digital file format 
compression by allowing multiple copies to be disseminated inexpensively and universally. 
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Technologies that make copying cultural content relatively easy, at least on a small scale, have 
certainly existed for some time. Piano rolls offer just one example of such “mechanical” 
copying; more recently, the advent of tape recorders, CD burners, DVDs, and similar recording 
devices offer ready means to copy content. The digital era, however, has thrown a spanner in the 
works by introducing digital file formats that allow users to make copies that are almost 
indistinguishable from original recordings, and to disseminate those copies on an unprecedented 
scale. Copying needs no longer to be restricted to older practices of making a single copy for 
individual, private use. One highly significant ramification of this development is the 
decentralization of established intermediaries in the music production process. Such a process of 
disintermediation has profoundly affected the copyright balance and forced industry players to 
come to terms with, and adapt to, changes in the industry that have ensued.280 On the one hand, 
incumbent industry participants have been compelled to consider these real shifts in business, 
technological, and cultural forces, and to reflect such changes in new business strategies and 
plans.281 Despite their fears of cannibalizing core business revenues by responding to 
innovation,282 music industry participants have been made to realize that without such 
dynamism, they stand at risk of becoming peripheral to music production and distribution. But 
on the other hand, emerging intermediaries have found new opportunities for growth, particularly 
when their business models are well positioned to capitalize on these critical changes in 
technologies, with respect to both cultural production and dissemination.283 And lastly, 
participants in the music sector who were previously unable to gain access to means of cultural 
production, distribution and control have gained a newfound visibility, as well as the potential to 
tap into innovative technologies to achieve their goals. Composers, musicians, performers, and 
their audiences have all seen new opportunities to participate in cultural production, in ways that 
were unimaginable just a generation ago. 
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B. Digital Era Piracy: The Meaning and Significance of Unauthorized Uses 
 
1. “Piracy”; Strategic Use to Advance Maximum Monetization of Content 
 
Increasingly, cultural industry players place the intellectual properties they own at the center of 
their business models and strategies. These business models characterize copyright-protected 
works as critical valuable assets to be monetized to the maximum extent possible, under the sole 
control of the copyright owners. They are further predicated on the idea that a pay-per-use or 
“metering” system extracts the maximum value of content by proscribing, and therefore 
eliminating, uncompensated use of cultural properties.284 In tandem with this business strategy, 
owners of copyrighted cultural materials have adopted a legal framework that likewise advances 
their interests. The legal strategy that cultural industry firms embrace involves characterizing any 
use of a copyrighted work that may be deemed an “unauthorized use” to amount to cultural 
“piracy.”285 The linguistic trope that links allegedly unauthorized use to “piracy” is a widely 
debated feature of the twentieth-century copyright debates,286 and vividly reveals a strategic 
decision to target all viable uses of cultural materials, not only with a view to controlling but also 
with an overriding interest in exploiting such uses for maximum profit. 
 
2. Focus on User Behavior: Unauthorized Use vs. Fair Use 
 
The “piracy” trope also reveals a new point of focus in the battle over control and exploitation of 
copyrighted materials: that is, user behavior in relation to such works. It is fairly clear that the 
expansion of access to copyrighted work that innovative technologies enable has given rise to an 
increase in unauthorized uses of copyrighted works that infringe the exclusive rights of copyright 
owners. An equally likely outcome is that at least some of these unauthorized uses merit 
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compensation to copyright owners.287 What remains hotly contested is which particular use 
constitutes an infringement rather than a fair use; and whether, and to what extent, a particular 
use that is deemed infringing should require a corresponding compensation to the copyright 
owner of the underlying work.288 Several commentators have observed a diminution in the scope 
of fair use, coupled with a shrinking definition of “personal use”, that would suggest a trend in 
copyright law toward the characterization of many digital practices as constituting unauthorized 
uses. Apparent increases in the scope of unauthorized use, as opposed to fair use, may be 
magnified by the impact of legislation resulting from aggressive industry strategies to tackle 
digital practices. For instance, some commentators argue that application to the DMCA may 
powerfully curtail or even annul the reach of fair use in the digital context.289 
 
3. Actual Effects of Unauthorized Use: How Much Does Substitution Effect Trump 
Sampling Effect 
 
Copyright owners typically assert that unauthorized uses deprive them of just compensation for 
use of their creative work. However, it is arguable that the actual effect of unauthorized uses on 
owners’ compensation is proportionate to the extent to which such unauthorized uses substitute 
for, or displace, what would otherwise have been purchases of the copyrighted content. With 
respect to music—a creative field that has had ample opportunity to experience uncompensated 
uses of content, especially where digitally obtained—the displacement effect is debatable. Some 
studies suggest that unauthorized uses of digitized music have completely undermined normal 
compensation patterns in the industry, causing steep declines in music sales, losses to recording 
labels and artists, and other negative economic effects on music industry participants.290 These 
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studies substantiate the prevalent view among many music industry players that digital 
technology has directly deprived copyright creators and owners of their rightful compensation. 
But at least one opposing study suggests a more complex scenario: it finds that there is no direct 
relationship between digital file sharing and the decline of record sales in the music sector.291 
 
The empirical study cited above, showing a statistically negligible impact of digital music 
downloads on record sales, supports the position of commentators who argue that digital 
technology alone does not simply cause unauthorized downloads to increase and music owners’ 
compensation (derived from record sales) to decrease.292 They argue against the proposition that 
the “substitution effect” predominates in music: that is, many users repeatedly choose to make 
digital music downloads illicitly and at no cost, rather than properly purchasing music, thereby 
detracting from music sales and depriving content owners of their rightful returns.293 The 
substitution effect has been charted by several studies that find a link between unauthorized 
music downloads and decreases in recorded music sales.294 Rather than targeting the 
displacement of music sales, these commentators consider the prevalence of the “sampling 
effect” in music: that is, at least some users opt to make digital music downloads in order to 
sample music as part of a purchasing process, one that involves listening to music and selecting 
pieces that they will eventually decide to buy.295 In support of this proposition, commentators 
point to studies showing that unauthorized downloaders of music may in fact purchase more 
music than average users, suggesting that the sampling effect may come into play in their 
activities and eventual purchasing patterns.296 
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Overall, the extent to which digital music downloads directly contribute to declines in music 
sales depends in large part on whether, and to what extent the substitution effect trumps the 
sampling effect.297 But the relative impact of these factors is notably difficult to ascertain. 
Copyright owners will argue that the substitution effect clearly predominates in the music sector. 
Yet at least one study, while focusing on the Canadian music industry, has found that the 
sampling effect may prevail over the substitution effect.298 The real impact of digital music 
downloads may remain shrouded, at least pending more accurate means of determining how 
music users’ practices shape outcomes in the industry. But a critical regard of the impact of 
digital technology on music is necessary, and may best be expressed by commentators who 
suggest that the root causes of declining music sales are complex, involving a broad swath of 
business and economic factors that affect music sales, prices, and owners’ compensation. 
 
V. THE INTERNET AND SHARING: DIGITAL ERA USES AND GENERATIONAL 
SHIFTS 
 
A. Changing Use Patterns/Practices 
 
In music, as in other creative fields, cultural intermediaries continue to make concerted attempts 
at obtaining and exerting increased control over content protect by copyright. These efforts 
strikingly mirror historic practices by cultural intermediaries over the control of content.299 Some 
of these intermediaries are also similar to their predecessors in the ideological defenses they posit 
as grounds for exerting such control. But just as earlier accounts were predicated on an idealized 
narrative of musical practices, present-day accounts as well are liable to reflect a distorted view 
of earlier user practices and how they have come to change and evolve. These latter narratives 
fail to account for real cultural shifts, ushered in by digital era technologies, that are 
accompanied by equally powerful shifts in access, use, and participation across all sectors of 
music audiences. Likewise, business models and copyright enforcement strategies have been 
slow to recognize and respond to changes in user patterns and practices in the Internet era, both 
in music and in other entertainment sectors. 
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B. New User Practices: Unbundled Music 
 
Music offers one of the most vivid illustrations of changing user patterns and practices. Earlier 
recording and playback technologies, such as records albums, cassettes, and CDs, essentially 
compelled listeners to purchase music that had been recorded in a particular sequence, and then 
to replay that music in the given sequential order. A dramatic change, offered with greatest 
success by Apple (i.e., the Apple iTunes Store and the tie-in Apple devices of the iPod and its 
progeny) came to allow the purchase of individuated music “tracks,” or songs that had been 
disaggregated from sequential recordings.300 Apple managed this feat by bringing record labels 
together at the bargaining table and eventually facilitating an agreement among the major record 
labels.301 The agreement allowed Apple to sell a vast amount of copyrighted music content on its 
new iTunes Music Store, thereby operationalizing the sale of individual music tracks and 
transforming the entire music marketplace.302 The resounding popularity of the iTunes Music 
Store is evidenced by its staggering sales figures: in 2009, over 220 million single music tracks 
were downloaded on iTunes alone.303 These figures are compounded by Apple’s competitors, 
such as Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and so on, many of which now make music downloads 
equally accessible. In sum, 1.26 billion digital music tracks have been sold in 2013.304 
 
1. Unbundled Music: Objections from Some Artists; But Overall a Success 
 
Digital music has allowed the sale of unbundled music to become common practice. Not all 
industry participants, including some artists and record labels, have been unequivocally 
supportive of these developments. For instance, several prominent artists, including Pink Floyd 
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and AC/DC,305 have voiced strong objections to the disaggregation of their albums, even going 
so far as to bring lawsuits seeking to preserve the sale of albums in their original, sequential 
form.306 In the case of Pink Floyd, brought in 2010, the lawsuit proved successful: the U.K. High 
Court ruled that Pink Floyd had the right to approve sales of its music in any configuration other 
than the original album form.307 But even these measures have not had an appreciable impact on 
the current practices of music audiences:  the sale on single songs on iTunes, Amazon, and 
similar sites remain strong, and continue to be the prevailing channels for music sales today.308 
 
The Apple example has been heralded as the single most innovative force for change in the 
music industry. While preceded by technologies such as Napster that enabled the disaggregation 
of music, Apple singlehandedly compelled both the separation of music into digital tracks and 
the legitimate sale of such tracks via negotiated agreements among owners of copyrighted music 
content.309 Apple further advanced this new model for the music industry by developing the iPod 
and its progeny, devices that not only facilitated the consumption of single songs but also offered 
new approaches to such consumption. Among such innovations is the iPod “shuffle” function, 
which enables users to listen to all or some segments of digital music tracks that are contained on 
an iPod in a random, shuffled order. The shuffle function has, like iTunes itself, proven 
immensely popular among audiences and critics alike.310 But taken together, these new 
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technologies and features have unmistakably changed the user experience with respect to the 
purchase, consumption, access, and experience of music. Digital technologies almost certainly 
make unbundled record albums and freely available single song tracks more widely available 
than did bricks-and-mortar record stores. At the same time, however, licit digital download sites 
face a host of competitive venues and practices, including wholly legal music “streaming” via 
digital radio, as well as peer-to-peer music-sharing networks that mimic Napster and, like their 
predecessor, may infringe music copyrights either willfully or negligently. Thus, while digital 
downloads now dominate the music marketplace, the blend of legal and illicit venues and 
practices has unclear, yet likely overall negative, consequences for music industry sales and 
revenues.311 The overarching conclusion, at any rate, is clear: digital music technology has 
transformed user consumption patterns indelibly, and the transformation has an impact on 
existing business models that prevail throughout the industry. 
 
C. Analogous Industries: Video Clips (Film); Aggregated  
News Content (News) 
 
Music is by no means the only cultural industry to have been transformed by innovative 
technologies. One instance of radical disaggregation of content in the film industry is the video 
clip, popularized by users of YouTube and similar websites.312 The video clip allows users to 
select, and possibly to share via online uploads, a segment of video content. Highly popular sites 
such as YouTube offer a great many users the opportunity to gain access to these video clips. 
The communities of viewers created by YouTube may be enormous, and their active engagement 
in so-called “clip culture” reflects its ongoing, and growing, appeal.  The rise of video-clip 
sharing reveals that the film industry has been revolutionized along similar lines to the music 
industry, with respect both to how users gain access to cultural content and how much content 
they actually experience and consume.313 
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Similar trends may be observed not only in culture and entertainment but also in media and 
journalism. Print journalism, for instance, has been affected by trends toward the disaggregation 
of content that are similar to those found in music. Prior to the digital era, individual newspapers 
primarily served particular regions (with a few national exceptions, such as the New York Times 
and the Wall Street Journal), and were printed in formats intended for continuous, sequential 
reading and consumption. Services such as the Associated Press (“AP”) and Reuters aggregated 
news that could be broadly disseminated; and syndication offered content that likewise could be 
dispersed to various markets. Nonetheless, most newspapers remained primarily localized, 
distinct, and over time sustained their brand value.314 The digital era has ushered in new 
possibilities for a broader and more diffuse use of news content that is no longer limited to 
specific newspapers and their websites. Broadly speaking, digital technology has encouraged 
much news consumption to migrate from print sources to the Internet. This movement has 
contributed to a critical erosion of revenue, if not readership, throughout the newspaper 
industry.315 Aggregation sites such as Google News or Newser and news feeder services such as 
Really Simple Syndication (“RSS”)316 offer users direct access to news content that had 
otherwise been available through individual newspaper websites.317 Individual online blogs that 
incorporate news and information from various sources also enable users to consume such 
content without recourse to newspapers, whether print or online.318 These trends have altered 
user preferences as well: as one commentator notes, “though readers want news, they do not 
necessarily want it from a traditional paper, and are using multiple sources.”319 None of these 
sources, however, contribute to the revenue of traditional newspapers: in fact, by directing users 
away from newspaper websites, they even deprive newspapers of critical viewership, or 
“eyeballs.”320 The reduction in newspaper website visitors is devastating to the industry, in large 
part due to the fact that advertisers, which have long been newspapers’ greatest and most stable 
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sources of revenue, base their advertising rates on the number of visitors (“eyeballs”) that a 
newspaper can deliver to the advertiser.321 The Internet, therefore, is clearly responsible for 
undermining the entire traditional business model of the newsprint industry; and its effects on the 
industry today are as unmistakable as they are entrenched and unimaginably hard to change. 
 
The devastating impact of the Internet on the traditional business model of the newspaper 
industry has been driven in part by shifting user preferences and patterns of content access and 
use.322 But once such user practices are changed, they may prove extremely hard to dislodge or 
even re-direct. Newspapers have struggled, for instance, to persuade online readers to pay for 
content, whether via traditional subscription models or per-article metered payment plans.323 For 
the most part, online newspaper paywalls have not succeeded in preventing readers from gaining 
access to news content; nor have they persuaded readers en masse to resume paying for 
content.324 To the contrary, a great many news readers continue to find easy recourse in the 
multiple outlets afforded by the Internet, some of which have been described above. 
 
Traditional news content providers are increasingly aware of the threat to their industry, and to 
journalism in general, that these changing patterns of news consumption represent. In response to 
this perceived crisis, some news providers are looking to intellectual property rights challenges 
that they hope will defend existing business models325. Thus, for instance, the Associated Press 
(“AP”) brought suit against All Headline News (“AHN”), a U.S.-based wired service, asserting 
copyright infringement and “hot news” misappropriation claims.326 Despite the outcome of this 
and similar intellectual property cases involving news and journalism industries, the outlook for 
protection of news on copyright-based grounds is generally unpromising. Present day reality, 
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with its vast and unwieldy diffusion of news across the Internet, would alone weigh heavily 
against our striving to return news content to its original sources and/or providers alone. It seems 
much more likely that incumbent business models in the news industry will be compelled to 
change. But how they will change, and how they will regain their revenue-generating properties, 
remains to be seen. 
 
D. Creative User Practices 
 
The digital era has affected the music industry from top to bottom, changing virtually every 
aspect on the production side, from creation to compilation to dissemination, as well as on the 
consumption side, from listening to purchase to use and re-use. Music industry firms have 
struggled to come to terms with the disaggregation of music that technology makes possible: first 
by trying to preserve the album format of sequential songs, then by struggling to agree on terms 
of licensing rights, sales and pricing of individual music tracks. The industry has also fought to 
stave off incursions against its revenue streams by Internet downloading and peer-to-peer music 
sharing, at least some of which comprise illegal and infringing practices. 
 
Aggressive copyright lawsuits, and public relations attempts at raising user awareness of 
copyright infringement and its related costs, are strategies that the music industry has wielded—
with disputable degrees of success—to thwart free music copying and promote licit music 
purchasing. A large part of the problem with these tactics, however, is that changes in user 
practices are liable to drive changes in user preferences and perceptions. The popularity of peer-
to-peer sharing of digitized music tracks gave rapid rise to a shift in user perceptions: the idea 
that music could, and perhaps should, be available readily and at no cost, became deeply 
entrenched in the early generation of Internet audiences, and seems to persist to the present day. 
Among many listeners, the idea that such uses constitute copyright infringement, often at great 
cost across the industry, does not appear to be paramount in their understanding, let alone 
reflected in their behavior. Moreover, the perceived heavy-handedness of music industry 
lawsuits seeking broad damages to compensate for the costs of copyright infringement, coupled 
with the often overtly admonitory tone of public relations campaigns against music “piracy,” 
seems to have failed to shift user perceptions and practices. For the most part, music listeners 
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seem to remain unswayed by these clarion calls for change: some listeners still seek new peer-to-
peer networks that offer free music sharing; some turn to Internet radio for music streaming; and 
some continue to buy music tracks on a variety of music services. Overall, however, the decline 
of music sales since the advent of the Internet offers certain evidence that the music industry’s 
copyright-based efforts have not gained much traction in the market. 
 
E. Access and Control 
 
Another problem with the use of copyright-based lawsuits, public awareness campaigns 
regarding infringing acts, and other strategies based in wielding control via intellectual property-
related avenues, is also driven by digital changes that afford both new possibilities for access and 
potential for control.327 The Internet grants ready access to an unprecedented range of cultural 
resources, such as music archives, clips, recordings, and so on, that may offer a creative user a 
vast array of building blocks for creating new musical works. Early generations of Internet users 
have discovered innovative ways of building on this rich cultural domain, including new musical 
techniques such as sampling, quotation, mixing, and so forth. These new creative expressions 
tend to prevail among younger users and creators, revealing a generational shift that has yet to be 
fully embraced and adapted to by cultural providers in music and other fields.328329 It is likely 
that, over time, the music industry will come to terms with digitally sophisticated users, both by 
accepting their user base and through bringing such users into the ranks of their management and 
leadership. These steps may lead to greater openness in new creative practices and perceptions of 
copyright’s role with respect to some of these practices. Even today, a certain recognition that 
copyright law may require some restraint with respect to cultural “quoting” has begun to 
emerge.330 The extent to which a culture of openness and sharing can co-exist with robust 
copyright protections still remains in dispute, however, and its borders are likely to remain 
contentious even as creative access and borrowing push the boundaries of culture’s norms. 
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A countervailing force to access, however, is control. That is, the unparalleled access to cultural 
resources that music listeners and users now enjoy is bounded not only by resistance on the part 
of copyright owners, but also by new possibilities of control over such resources as a whole.331 
New technologies expand the range of tools that copyright owners may use to control access to, 
and use of, their copyrighted materials. On the one hand, such control mechanisms may be 
helpful in checking unwarranted uses of copyrighted material, particularly those uses made 
without proper attribution, compensation of copyright owners, and/or without heed to their 
overall negative effect on content-rich industries.332 On the other hand, the expansion of such 
controls may be problematic, as in certain cases of overly broad restriction of uses of content that 
have historically been considered both legitimate and normatively acceptable.333 
 
Controls of content that are over-reaching may have a pernicious effect on creative output by 
impeding users’ legitimate access to a rich cultural domain. But such attempts at enforcing rigid 
controls are also injudicious in their underlying characterization of a host of user activities as 
“piracy,” irrespective of whether such activities involve permissible behavior, such as gaining 
access or copying of materials for personal and private use. This broad-brush approach to 
characterizing creative user activity as “piracy” can hinder the critical differentiation among 
behaviors that might rightly be deemed infringing and those that might be perfectly valid.334 
Moreover, when coupled with technological controls that do not distinguish between such 
divergent behaviors, the over-broad sweep of these restrictions runs counter to current copyright 
doctrine and threatens the careful balance between rights and restraints that copyright law 
constantly strives to calibrate and sustain. Still worse, a campaign against a range of content uses 
paired with an arsenal of strict controls may serve to lock up creative resources and practices that 
might otherwise contribute to a fully realized creative realm, both in individual users’ creative 
experiences and in the greater cultural landscape. 
 
F. New Choices for Users and Creators 
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Above all, digital era technologies have expanded the array of choices available to cultural 
creators and users alike.335 Musical offerings, for instance, have been disaggregated into single 
units that are available to users in various digital formats (such as MP3 and other compressed 
formats), rather than being pre-packaged by record labels into composite, single-format (i.e., 
recorded) albums.336 This enables users to exercise greater choices over their consumption of 
music, with respect to format, means of listening and purchase, and devices used for access to 
music. Moreover, it gives follow-on creators greater access to music on which they may choose 
to build their own creations, via such digital mechanisms as Garage Band and other online 
applications.337 The technological and business innovations that have arisen in the digital era also 
have also expanded the ability of users and creators to express their preferences via the choices 
that they make when consuming music and other cultural content. During the digital era, for 
instance, many users have implicitly expressed a preference for ease of access and use of music 
to the quality of musical sound reproduction, as evinced by the resounding popularity of devices 
that convey music in an MP3-compressed format, such as the Apple iPod players and similar 
devices. The emerging dominance of MP3-based devices has been to some extent driven by new 
entrants in the music marketplace, whose innovative products have proven appealing across 
music audiences. At the same time, once audience appreciation allowed the MP3 player to gain 
significant market share, yet another set of entrants have been able to offer newly innovative 
products or to offer key improvements on existing products, such as a host of applications that 
enhance the music listening and consumption experience. 
 
In similar fashion, music creators have been able to disintermediate their original works, and to 
expand the range of choices that lie within their purview.338 Prior to the digital era, only a very 
few creators had the option to disseminate their music without recourse to the powerful 
distribution agency of record industry labels. The advent of online music distribution has 
afforded more creators the ability to seek alternate channels for producing, marketing, and 
selling their output.339 While at present most music creators have not fully tapped the potential of 
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the Internet for direct outreach to their audiences and consumers, there appears to be some 
impetus in the direction of such disintermediation. For instance, many musical talents begin by 
seeking audience recognition among Internet audiences, rather than seeking to sign a contract 
with music agents at the outset of their careers.340 Others are seeking to distribute music directly 
to audiences via Internet sales of digital tracks or CDs.341 Another interesting new strategy has 
been mapped by the heavy metal band Iron Maiden, which freely allows “piracy” of its music, 
and then chooses the sites for its live performances based on the locales that have evinced the 
greatest piracy of their music. This strategy allows the band to profit more from live 
performances, sales of merchandise, and other ancillary revenue sources, rather than from sales 
of music tracks alone. As a whole, these strategies reflect a growing sense that music creators 
may flex their muscles through the independent agency granted them by digital means.  
 
G. Lack of New Business Models 
 
Prevalent in cultural sectors such as music is the understanding that the Internet has opened new 
avenues for the creation and dissemination of original works, in ways that have the potential to 
empower both users and creators of cultural content. However, it does not appear that this 
understanding has extended to the development of innovative business models that accommodate 
and adapt to the emerging landscape of cultural production. Owners of copyrighted cultural 
content, in the music industry and elsewhere, are generally continuing to adhere to traditional 
business practices: in music, for instance, record labels continue to seek out new talent, to enter 
into standard contracts with their artists, and to protect their copyrighted works from 
encroachments, whether perceived or real. Some changes have been made on the margin, for 
instance with respect to music marketing: several record labels now take advantage of the 
Internet to generate recognition for upcoming artists.342 Similarly, some record labels may offer 
online sales of their artists’ CDs, and even on occasion single tracks, both in conjunction with 
live performances or events and on a stand-alone basis. But these steps arguably do not represent 
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innovative business models; rather, they seem to be standard practices that have been translated 
wholesale into digital form, such as generating word-of-mouth buzz, offering direct sales, and so 
on. It is possible that changes in technology may drive changes in the music industry, as occurred 
with the advent of Apple and its music-related devices. In such a case, however, the music 
industry will again be playing catch-up with technology, and may find itself at a similar 
disadvantage to that which it faced vis-à-vis online music sales of digital tracks. For the cultural 
content industries, the rear-guard position may lead to a further disintermediation that gives 
creators and users still more agency over their works, and possibly even greater power over the 
copyright in cultural works. 
 
Digital technologies in cultural realms such as music afford users and creators alike the ability to 
generate, transform, and disseminate content in both original and varied forms. These abilities 
are neither wholly new nor unique to the digital era: they existed in earlier times and were made 
possible by earlier techniques. Musical manipulation, for instance, occurred as simply as the 
recreation of folk tunes by interested composers—Bartok, Mahler, Dvorak, and countless others 
are famous for their cultural appropriation of folkloric works.343 Musical dissemination occurred 
as simply as the conveyance of early American music by a host of artists from genres such as 
R&B, blues, country, rock and folk music—the Rolling Stones, Eric Clapton, and many other 
mainstream artists are known to have drawn from the great repository of American roots 
music.344 One difference today is that such uses are intermediated, and for the most part 
facilitated, by technology. Another difference is that copyright law interjects debate as to when 
such recourse to creative resources may be authorized or unauthorized, and whether the scope of 
such recourse may be expanded or contracted for the overall greater good. But even debates over 
the import and scope of copyright law are often grounded in earlier debates that still remain 
compelling regarding the centrality and value of culture and its institutions, the appropriate uses 
of cultural resources by would-be creators, and the benefits and drawbacks to democratization of 
culture in our society.345 Such debates reflect, to a certain degree, the strong interest that cultural 
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arbiters have in defining and shaping both culture and its creation. When tied to one of the 
fundamental goals of copyright law—to foster and incentivize creation—debates over the digital 
era, while divided and fraught, are critical to the construction of a system that rewards creators 
and benefits users. But when such debates become mired in defenses of a system intended to 
bolster traditional business practices on the part of inflexible industry stalwarts, they become less 
defensible, protecting threatened revenue streams via rigid application of copyright law rather 
than conceiving innovative revenue-building practices that keep copyright evenly balanced 
between owners’ rights and users’ freedoms. 
 
CONCLUSION: ADDING VALUE IN THE DIGITAL ERA 
 
A. Need to Recognize “Black Markets” in Music 
 
Copyright in the digital era has yet to be shaped to foster new business models that accommodate 
and adapt to current technological realities and cultural changes. Music offers a powerful 
illustration of the stasis that a vital industry is in the midst of experiencing, in spite of almost two 
decades of profound disruption. Although some shifts have already altered the contours of its 
landscape, the music industry continues to stand by its standard responses: litigation against any 
incursions into copyrighted work, and a campaign against all but the most restrictive user 
practices of listening, purchasing and access for creative re-purposing. In the music context, 
copyright merely offers a defensive strategy for thwarting non-conventional “black market” uses 
of music, even if such a strategy might hinder uses that would otherwise be considered 
acceptable under traditional policies and norms. Yet to the contrary, music industry players 
might well find it more profitable to recognize the existence of such “black markets”, and to 
perceive such markets as strong indicators of user preferences, interests and desires. At an earlier 
critical juncture in the music industry’s trajectory, this would have meant scrutinizing file 
sharing services such as Napster, acknowledging that music listeners were interested in listening 
to individual song tracks rather than entire compiled albums, and seeking a price point at which 
music consumers would be willing to pay for such tracks. Today, this might entail a closer 
scrutiny of music streaming, sharing, and creative music composition such as sampling, mix-ups, 
and so on, and seeking business models that drive compensation to copyright owners for a viable 
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share of such activities. In terms of copyright law, this would likely also involve elucidating 
more finely-tuned distinctions between authorized and unauthorized uses of cultural materials, 
and basing determinations of which uses are truly infringing on an application of copyright law 
that is better calibrated to today’s realities and practices. 
 
B. Need to Support Sequential Innovation 
 
Copyright law comprises multiple goals, including but not limited to giving incentives to the 
broadest possible range of creators to generate the broadest possible range of creations that will 
contribute to a rich sociocultural domain. Activities such as borrowing, collaboration, sharing, 
and appropriation generally serve to foster sequential innovation, a norm in the creation of much 
original copyrightable work. These activities must be accommodated as fully as possible by 
copyright law, which calls for the careful assessment of the potential value of creative works, 
including those that are built on sequential or cumulative innovation. Such sequential innovation 
may, however, give rise to an information asymmetry: uncertainty about the value of follow-on 
innovation, which in turn may give rise to holdout problems.346 For this reason, technological 
change may necessitate greater openness of access, particularly when it serves to provide 
building blocks for future innovation among creators, but also when it drives changing practices 
and norms among users. One example from music, while relatively minor, is illustrative: music 
sampling, in which snippets of a work are offered to users through services such as iTunes—
allowing them to listen to a short segment prior to downloading and purchasing the work—is 
increasingly becoming a standard feature in sales and purchasing practices. Music publishers, 
upon becoming aware of the popularity of sampling, have been seeking remuneration even for 
the snippets that are offered for listening via previews. The practice of sampling, however, now 
allows users to listen to music prior to being required to purchase the music, and presumably 
encourages users to listen to a range of choices without the commitment of payment until they 
have chosen the work that they wish to own. Essentially, sampling not only facilitates user 
purchasing decisions, but also drives changes in user practices and experiences. The very 
question of remuneration for samples, therefore, must be considered in the context of innovative 
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changes in the music industry. And similarly, the conception and interpretation of rights in 
sampling snippets must be considered—and questioned—in such a context as well. 
 
C. Need for Changing Business Practices 
 
Changing technologies, especially when achieved on a sweeping scale, may necessitate novel 
business strategies and adaptive business practices undertaken on an industry-wide basis. The 
advent of the Internet has enabled a host of changing cultural practices, including the creation of 
UGC, allowing users to participate actively in the production and dissemination of musical 
content—roles which once lay exclusively in the purview of music industry publishers and other 
professionals. At the same time, the rise of UGC as a creative social undertaking encourages 
users to engage actively with earlier cultural offerings and to reshape them in myriad original 
ways. These new user approaches to creativity, both past and evolving, underscore the 
importance of maintaining a rich public domain that offers access to the building blocks of 
culture, in music and in many other creative arts.347 
 
It is critical that the music industry respond to evolving user practices such as UGC with 
approaches that are tailored to the digital era. The recent history of such innovative responses as 
the iTunes Music Store, online music streaming services, and so on, reveal the potential power 
still held by the industry with respect to tapping into user preferences and deriving profit from 
well-conceived products that satisfy user needs. Notwithstanding these examples, however, the 
music industry has at times appeared intransigent, slow-moving, and even obstructive in its 
response to changing demands. For instance, the challenge presented by Napster did not drive the 
industry to create a competitive peer-to-peer sharing network that might enable the legitimate 
exchange of music with properly devised control and metering mechanisms. Rather, the industry 
rose en masse, via its representative agency, the RIAA, to thwart and actively pursue follow-on 
P2P sites, and to block all such activities with little regard to whether or not the totality of their 
practices were infringing or permitted. Further, lawsuits pursued by the RIAA against individual 
users—while possibly valid, even viable, in asserting infringing activities—have often seemed to 
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present a suboptimal approach to new user behaviors, at once alienating users and failing to 
change fundamental user behaviors, perceptions and norms. 
 
A far more successful, and indeed profitable, approach to adapting to the new realities of a 
digital world would likely entail a fundamental reconfiguration of music industry practices, and 
possibly a transformation among industry participants themselves. For instance, new industry 
players, such as online music agents are beginning to emerge, offering a direct nexus between 
talented artists, online music delivery services, and interactive audience sites. These agents are 
similar to traditional industry representatives in some of their practices, but are not always 
formally associated with the major record labels. This enables them to engage in direct online 
marketing, and to sign artists to more flexible, individualized contracts. Newer contractual 
arrangements, such as the “360 contract,” give artists a modest royalty from their recordings, but 
give them a greater share in ancillary sales, such as related merchandise, ticket sales at live 
performances, and so on.348 More flexible approaches to reaching profitability in the music 
industry are also beginning to prevail with respect to music dissemination, purchasing and 
pricing. For instance, streaming services allow users to listen to music online at various price 
points: in the Pandora model, listeners may opt to listen to music along the lines of traditional 
radio—listening for free, with intermittent advertisements—or at a “premium” level, listening to 
music for a small cost but without ad interruptions.349 Some music, such as Spotify, services 
permit users to listen to music, and then to purchase songs as they wish.350 While iTunes has set 
a relatively low bar as to the pricing of songs, some online music subscription services continue 
to experiment with pricing terms, offering, for instance, an “all you can eat” subscription service 
that invites users to pay a flat-rate monthly subscription fee that allows users to download as 
much music as they choose.351 
 
While some of these business models, as well as those still to emerge, may require pricing and 
other contractual terms that are lower than those associated with pre-digital era standards—and 
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thereby create ongoing pressures to achieve profitability—they are also more likely to succeed in 
the newer digital economy than outmoded practices that do not account for user preference and 
new usage norms. Similarly, new normative efforts, such as efforts to persuade contemporary 
music listeners, consumers and creators that legitimate, non-infringing uses of music are fair 
practices that reward original creators—and that only certain gray area uses are tolerable with 
respect to both originators and follow-on creators—must also be vigorously pursued by music 
industry players. Persuasion, rather than prosecution, has already been seen to be more effective 
in bringing music audiences into the fold, and will likely lead to users accepting the terms of 
payment that their consumption will inevitably require. But such efforts must be joined with a 
scrupulous consideration of the fine divide between authorized and unauthorized uses of musical 
works. Some unauthorized uses, while perhaps touching upon copyright infringement, may be 
more productively deemed acceptable with respect to novel creation and relatively harmless in 
terms of cost to the originator. Sampling of works, for instance, when used as a means of 
enticing new listeners to purchase works, may serve as an example of such a gray area practice 
that is at once useful and relatively cost-free. One vital way to meet the challenges of the digital 
area, therefore, is to prioritize which uses are and should be authorized, to determine which 
unauthorized uses truly present the greatest threats to the viability of the industry and its 
participants, and to make determinations regarding follow-on uses with regard to these 
distinctions. The music industry has been slow to agree that the delicate balance must be 
calibrated anew, in order to meet the challenges of the present digital day. But it is only by 
developing such distinctions among practices, and by shaping new business models predicated 
on a better understanding of user demands and preferences, that the music industry can regain its 
vitality and relevance to modern culture, and thereby begin to regain the grounds of its ongoing 
profitability and eventual growth. 
 
D. Need for Changing Legal Frameworks 
 
As the digital era changes business contexts, it is bound to alter the legal framework of 
intellectual property rights as well. The operation of copyright in the music sector has always 
been subject to alteration: the early advent of written music, followed by the emergence of 
recorded music, for instance, necessitated first a grant of copyright in original musical works and 
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then a more complex scheme of rights in recorded works, “covers” of works by non-originating 
artists, and so on.352 As in the case of complex recordings in other creative sectors, such as 
recorded films, increasing sophistication in technology, coupled with increasing ease of personal 
access and use, virtually mandated re-negotiations of copyright’s parameters. These changes 
drove such cases as the Betamax dispute, in which the Supreme Court determined that personal 
non-infringing use would remain a protected practice.353 More recently, it has been driving 
disputes in the copyright arena over a range of music practices, such the scope of legitimate 
online downloads, sampling practices, rights in ringtones played on cellphones, fair use of music 
extracts, and many others. These disputes call attention to the pressing need for an ongoing 
process of accommodation, negotiation, and recalibration of rights that are more contextually 
suited to new technologies and the practices they engender. 
 
One controversial response to emerging technologies, newly competitive business practices, and 
changing user practices has been a strong effort on the part of music industry participants to 
lobby for increases in legal control over content, as well as approval of technological controls 
that further lock up content and meter its use. These efforts are in large part driven by copyright 
holders who remain convinced that stricter copyright measures will allow them to recover the 
maximum possible returns from as many forms of access and use of content as possible. Yet 
revenue maximization, while an understandable goal of copyright owners, fails to take into 
account the interest of users in having access to a rich range of cultural products, both for 
listening pleasure and at times for creative use. When the cost to copyright holders of access to 
their content is relatively minor, and the potential benefits to content users may be great, merely 
defaulting to strict copyright enforcement may not result in a net enhancement of welfare, 
despite the potential for some lack of rent maximization. In the case of music sampling, for 
instance, a rich genre of musical creativity—wherein new artists made use of snippets or 
melodies drawn from prior works—the strict enforcement of copyright led to licensing issues, as 
the cost of seeking permissions for each snippet proved too costly or onerous to the sampling 
artists. The disputes over sampling effectively put a halt to the creation of the nascent genre, 
which many consider a diminution of contemporary music’s creative output.  
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The early demise of music “sampling” suggests that thwarting emerging musical movements is 
suboptimal because it may close off future innovations that are unknown, as in the analogous 
case of sequential innovation in culture, technology and elsewhere. Similar to business practices, 
copyright policy and regulations, must be responsive to social and cultural changes and leave 
room for novel, experimental explorations of musical works and styles. On occasions when 
experimentation draws upon earlier cultural resources, copyright should weigh the effect on 
copyright holders of the access and use that newer creative efforts may entail against the need for 
such efforts to be realized and fostered. The balancing act of copyright is paramount when taken 
in the greater context of cultural production, as in the case of music which has repeatedly shown 
that musical innovation is often predicated on reference to prior artists and their works. 
“Standing on the shoulders of giants,” as Bertrand Russell put it, may call for the artistic liberty 
to speak directly to, or to quote, or to riff on, one’s cultural predecessors. In the context of music, 
user practices in the current digital era reflect the tradition of cultural quotation, and show that it 
is thriving and contributing to new cultural production. While artistic copyright holders may see 
such practices as a threat to their profitability and viability, they may in turn choose someday to 
draw upon their peers in creating new copyrightable materials. This can only happen if music 
copyright remains flexible and recalls that access and use of prior materials is as much a priority 
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In this section, I consider the primary commercial concerns that always preoccupy creative 
content industries, but are exacerbated by disruptive innovation and the competitive pressures it 
imposes in new and increasingly complex ways. I then suggest some equally important concerns 
that the content industry should also weigh into the balance but that may elude its full 
recognition for various reasons, such as lack of value given to intangible and unquantifiable 
goods, an inability to pinpoint and therefore easily articulate shared values and norms (for 
instance, academic freedom), a resistance to commodification (or to admitting that 
commodification is occurring), uncertainty about the parameters of professional work (for 
instance, engaging in open source endeavors that may or may not be institutionally sanctioned), 
or just plain oversight. Drawing on the earlier industry case studies, I conclude by examining 
some of the features of these challenges and considering how they play out in the disrupted 
landscape with which the creative content industries are confronted. 
 
I. WHAT ARE THE CONTENT INDUSTRIES AFRAID OF? 
 
A. Unfair Skewing of the “Innovation Lottery” 
 
Creative industries are faced with the common conundrum that underlies the rationale for IP 
protection: whether the risks they assume in creating new works will be satisfactorily 
compensated by adequate returns.1 The nature of creative work, however, tends to raise the 
threshold of risk, in that its audiences are often taste-driven and taste is notoriously hard to 
predict. Fashion and music, for instance, are but content-rich industries that must gauge the 
receptivity of their audiences to new output, and that rely for commercial viability on popular 
                                                
1 William M. Kandes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 
325, 333 (1989); Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2000).  
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appeal. Making matters more complicated, these and other creative industries must constantly 
issue new works, as audience tastes continually gravitate to fresh and original creations. In less 
volatile fields, such as education, taste may be somewhat less of an arbiter of preference, and 
may be less subject to change. But even in these fields, consumers are constantly seeking new 
outputs, and sometimes new outlets, for the works these industries produce. They may also 
substitute criteria of taste with equally subjective notions of quality, experience, value, and 
associative goods2—such as the benefits of interchange with members of the creative 
community—for assessing whether the industry’s offerings are worth their while. 
 
In order to remain commercially viable, then, creative content industries must play the 
“innovation lottery” game for high stakes.3 This calculus is compounded when technology 
transforms an industry’ landscape in various ways: for instance, it can open up entire new 
venues, facilitate new means of production, alter delivery streams, and fundamentally change 
consumer and user practices.  
 
1. High Fixed Costs of Production 
 
For the major content producers (such as media and entertainment companies, record labels, 
newspapers, or educators), making content will always be an expensive proposition. In the music 
industry, for example, finding and producing the next big act in pop or rock music still costs a 
record label a significant initial outlay, coupled with the usual uncertain payoff.4 The high fixed 
costs of production must be at a minimum recouped and preferably exceeded if music producers 
are to remain profitable and commercially viable in the long term.5 The need to clear their 
margins can lock music producers into certain business strategies and positions, such as being 
                                                
2 Henry Hansmann, Higher Education as an Associative Good (Yale L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 231, 
Sept. 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=192576. 
3 See generally F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3 (Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First, eds. 2001). 
4 See NAVIGATING THE MUSIC INDUSTRY: CURRENT ISSUES & BUSINESS MODELS 183-201 (Dick 
Weissman & Frank Jermance, eds. 2003); see also Death of the Middleman, LIVING ECONOMICS,  
https://livingeconomics.org/article.asp?docId=278. 
5 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of 
Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 295-96 (2002).  
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 222 
compelled to sell their product at certain price points or levels of magnitude (that is, needing to 
produce best sellers or hits that generate a certain volume of sales or downloads), relying on 
advertising support, being beholden to certain outlets for release such as radio broadcasting, 
searching for the greatest possible venues for release of new product, actively pursuing new 
revenue sources such as ringtones and music licensing royalties (such as seeking royalties for 
recordings played in smaller venues, including restaurants, gyms, and so on), seeking to 
monetize merchandising and ancillary rights, seeking to lock best-selling artists into long-term 
contracts, and a host of other business choices that are calculated to maximize the returns from 
music production in order to offset its considerable costs at the outset. 
 
The commercial motivations that underpin the music industry, due in no small part to its high 
fixed production costs, are not in the least uniformly negative: they can spur pro-competitive 
behaviors, foster profit maximization, amply reward talented creators and diligent producers, and 
perpetuate the generation of new content that satisfies consumer demand. At the same time, 
however, these factors taken as a whole arguably lock the industry into a paradigm that is fixed 
in certain requirements, such as compelling a high volume of sales and licensing, focusing 
attention on immediate rewards as opposed to nurturing developing talent over a longer career, 
and so on.6 Aside from the effect that these necessities may have on the quality and nature of 
music that is being produced (for instance, it may induce producers to favor high-selling acts, 
and may even encourage a certain uniformity of product that is bland yet satisfying to mass 
audiences7), the need to clear high fixed costs may well constrain the traditional music industry 
to a model of production and commercialization that is open to challenge in the new Internet-
driven economy. 
 
The mandates of traditional music production are not liable to change anytime soon. But 
technology is opening up new realms of content production to more innovative and nimbler 
generators of content, who are creating output that is less expensive to produce and deliver, yet 
still satisfying to music audiences and consumers. This is posing a direct challenge to the 
established industry which is only likely to escalate as newer, more savvy musicians emerge with 
                                                
6 See NAVIGATING THE MUSIC INDUSTRY, supra note 4, at 275-299. 
7 Lenika Cruz, In Music, Uniformity Sells, ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/01/in-music-uniformity-sells/384181. 
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greater awareness of the Internet and increasing abilities to tap its resources and tools for 
creating, mixing, editing, releasing, and delivering music product to audiences everywhere. 
 
There are several instances in which new artists have shown they can ably use technology to self-
produce, self-promote, and self-market. Justin Bieber, a hugely popular young musician (at the 
time of this writing), wrote recorded his own songs, and then uploaded video clips of his 
performances on the Internet video file-sharing site YouTube.8 He developed his name 
recognition to such an extent that he was signed by a major record label, which now produces his 
music commercially.9 Bieber’s initial efforts at self-promotion saved upfront costs for the record 
label, which did not have to make an initial outlay to make, package, market or nurture the artist. 
But Bieber did eventually sign with the label.10 Other artists, such as independent musician 
Ingrid Michaelson, also found recognition through Internet self-marketing, but did not 
subsequently sign with a record label.11 Rather, she created her own recording company, and 
until very recently has self-marketed her own music.12 Other musical acts, such as the heavy 
metal band Metallica, relies primarily on direct sales of music online, streaming, and live ticket 
sales to sustain themselves.13 The band assumes much of the costs of production, which are 
greatly reduced by technology.14 Recently, Metallica announced that it had re-purchased 
copyrights in its earlier catalogue and that it intends to be solely responsible for the 
dissemination of that previously recorded work.15 16  
                                                
8 See Desiree Adib, Pop Star Justin Bieber is on the Brink of Superstardom, ABC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Weekend/teen-pop-star-justin-bieber-discovered-
youtube/story?id=9068403. 
9 See Monica Herrera, Justin Bieber—The Billboard Cover Story, BILLBOARD (Mar. 19, 2010), 
http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/959001/justin-bieber-the-billboard-cover-story. 
10 Id. 





 16 Similarly, in the case of journalism, newspapers have traditionally made large outlays, primarily on 
labor (journalists, foreign correspondents, etc.) and printing costs. Technology enables their new 
emerging competitors to occupy the news space via online dissemination, rather than through print media. 
Online blogs, websites, portals, newsfeed services, and so on can either generate their own work at lower 
costs (pooling resources, volunteering, etc.) or aggregate the news sources, and put out a competitive 
product at a lower cost of production. Particularly where such online sources are reputable (for example 
Politico, ScotusBlog, or Slate) and cost nothing or next-to-nothing to use, they offer real competition and 
direct challenge to the business model of traditional journalism. See infra Chapter 6, subsection IV.E.3.  
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 224 
 
In the case of education, production costs are also high, fixed, and relatively immutable.17 
Consumers (that is, students and the parents who usually financially support their education) 
typically want and demand the presence of real-space institutions to mediate and direct their 
education. Such institutions are extremely expensive to operate and maintain, and their 
educational model is based on charging high prices (that is, tuition plus fees and room and board) 
to compensate for those high costs. Again, the Internet disrupts this model by presenting a 
divergent model of production that has the potential to be commercially viable without requiring 
large and ongoing production costs. The online educational model reduces such costs 
dramatically, in part by eliminating real-space constraints, and in part by achieving economies of 
scale by teaching more students in more concentrated courses and programs.18 Most online 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have tended to entail major start-up costs, at least up to 
present.19 Once such costs are allocated, however, they may be expended over time, amortized, 
offset with budgetary or operating earmarks, or separately funded.20 If and when MOOC 
programs become easier to reproduce, and eventually more self-sustaining, initial production 
costs are likely to drop, and ongoing costs will stabilize, and self-sustaining models may be 
contemplated.21 As these cost savings begin to occur, and as their development is undertaken by 
less-than-traditional institutions (such as for profit institutions and start-ups), it is possible that a 
new business model with much lower costs of production, much greater volume, maybe lower 
quality (maybe not), and at a much cheaper price, becomes a new paradigm for education 
delivery to a certain segment of the market.22 
                                                
17 See, e.g., Rita Kirshstein & Jane Wellman, Technology and the Broken Higher Education Cost Model: 
Insights from the Delta Cost Project, EDUCAUSE REV. (Sep. 5, 2012) 
http://www.educause.edu/ero/article/technology-and-broken-higher-education-cost-model-insights-delta-
cost-project.  
18 See Alistair Inglis, The Changing Costs of Delivery of Distance Education Programs, in HANDBOOK OF 
DISTANCE EDUCATION 507, 509-13 (Michael Grahame Moore, ed., 3d ed. 2013). 
19 See supra Chapter 2, subsection II.A.3-4. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 The probability of MOOCs competing with traditional institutions will most likely occur when they 
culminate in degrees or credentials that are accepted by the higher education sector (such as accrediting 
institutions) and, perhaps more importantly, the job market. See Kevin Carey, Here’s What Will Truly 
Change Higher Education: Online Degrees that are Seen as Official, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/upshot/true-reform-in-higher-education-when-online-degrees-are-
seen-as-
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2. Devaluation of Content 
 
Innovative technologies can throw the value proposition of revenue-producing content into 
question. While new revenue streams may be available, they are not necessarily immediately 
recognizable. But when realized by competitors to traditional content producers, they confront 
the industry with the possibility of transformation of the commercial landscape, the road map to 
profitability and sustainable long-term growth. Music offers a sharp example of the potential 
technology can have for devaluing content and thereby undermining traditional sources of 
revenue. Online file-sharing services enabled users to copy music files, which are shared freely 
and often illicitly among innumerable users, at no cost. Such file sharing evades payment for the 
use and reuse of music tracks to both artists and copyright holders. In so doing, it decreases 
revenues across the industry.23 While the exact amount of the decline in music sales is debated in 
music circles,24 many agree that such music “theft” is rampant.25 Another consequence of such 
sharing is a new pattern among users who have come of age at the same time as the emergence 
of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing. These users are comfortable with file sharing as a practice, and 
some are unwilling to consider the ramifications of having access to creative works for free. 
Indeed, many express an outright reluctance ever to pay for creative content. This represents not 
only a devaluation of present content but also a real threat to the value of future content among 
new user bases. While alternative revenue streams, such as live performance ticket sales, and 
merchandise sales, may compensate for these losses, the depreciation of the value of recorded 
copyrighted material that remains significantly at risk.26 
                                                                                                                                                       
official.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=MostEmailed&version=Full
&src=me&WT.nav=MostEmailed. 
23 See ROBERT NEUWIRTH, STEALTH OF NATIONS: THE GLOBAL RISE OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 86-
113 (2011). 
24 Indeed, some believe concerns are inflated and do not reflect healthy changes in the world of content. 
See, e.g., LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY, 143-55 
(2008). 
25 Ku, supra note 5, at 273. 
26 The film and television industries are facing a similar threat of devaluation of content via 
technologically-enabled file sharing as well. For instance, film, TV, and video content are uploaded daily 
onto online sharing sites and networks, such as YouTube, BitTorrent, and others. Only some of these sites 
screen for illegally shared content, and some openly state that the illicit sharing of popular creative works 
is not their concern. 
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Education is also seeing a threat to the devaluation of its content. MOOCs represent free content 
in this sector, which is available to all interested users. At present, MOOCs do not threaten the 
value proposition of education, if such value is defined as primarily inhering in a degree-bearing 
program for which tuition is paid. MOOCs are not presently offered on a for-credit basis, and 
therefore cannot even contribute to a degree-bearing program; they are stand-alone courses taken 
primarily for interest only.27 But pressure on universities may soon lead to some of those courses 
becoming creditworthy, whether for course credit, transfer credit, credit toward degree 
completion, or even en masse as a degree.28 These developments would no doubt exert 
downward pressure on traditional education prices, even while universities remain compelled to 
sustain online programs due to various factors, such as popular demand, the need for cheap 
lecture courses, the desire to stay current with educational trends, and an internal interest in 
pedagogical innovation. As in the case of music, free MOOCs may reshape users’ expectations, 
behaviors and norms. Learners may become increasingly convinced that education can and 
indeed should be cheap, easy, limitless, and in certain cases free. With the emergence of new 
possibilities in monetizing MOOCs, such as networking, job placement, or certificates, it may be 
the case that MOOCs introduce a new model for commercial viability that does not depend on 
tuition for viability but rather on a panoply of offerings, both instructional and vocational.29 If 
realized, this would be a ground-breaking change to the entire sector, suggesting that it is not 
only the value of the university’s content that is placed at risk by the evolution of MOOCs—the 
educational value-proposition as a whole may come under challenge.30 
                                                
27 See supra Chapter 2, subsection II.A.3-4. 
28 Id. 
29 On the cost-effectiveness of distance education, see Insung Jung & Sung Lee, Cost-Effectiveness of 
Online Education, in HANDBOOK OF DISTANCE EDUCATION 521, 521-33 (Michael Grahame Moore, ed., 
3d ed., 2013). 
30 In the publishing sector, the borrowing and lending of e-books in lending libraries, while analogous to 
the activities of traditional libraries, allows new opportunities for private users to copy and disseminate 
copyrighted written materials on a far greater scale. One can imagine online P2P file-sharing sites for e-
books that may eat into e-book sales. As in the case of digital music, such copying would be cheaper, 
easier, faster, and could be distributed to large audiences.  
 
Journalism is facing similar challenges arise with respect to changing user practices and preferences that 
lead to the substitution of some newsprint for free online materials. This change is enabled and supported 
by the emergence of blogs, group sites like Talking Points Memo, Politico, The Huffington Post, and so 
on, which are generally produced at lower costs than traditional media. See infra Chapter 6, subsection 
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Fashion design is also confronted with challenges to the market value of its original content. 
Even though not protected by copyright, fashion designs are challenged by the possibility of 
immediate copying that can be enabled by technology, which undermines the industry churn on 
which fashion relies.31 Haute couture, valued by wealthiest customers due to its exclusivity, is at 
its peak value particularly when it first hits the runways and may be purchased only on bespoke 
basis. But technology allows rivals of original designers the means to photograph, reproduce, and 
disseminate copies of haute couture creations with incredible fidelity, rapidly, and accuracy.32 
This drastically undermines the window of exclusivity on which original designers depend.33 
Such copies are so high-quality and virtually indistinguishable from originals that they 
undermine the value of owning originals that have the look and feel of the best goods, further 
undermining the value of elite and/or luxury goods.34 In a world where everything can be swiftly 
copied, distributed, and discarded if not immediately popular or trendy, the key process of 
establishing fashion exclusivity, a means of signaling what is at the top of the market, becomes 
cloudy and unreliable. Similarly, the vital function of price signaling, notably pricing exclusive 
goods to commandeer stratospheric prices only available to select customers, becomes less 
effective and less efficient. This can prove detrimental to the industry as a whole, which is based 
                                                                                                                                                       
IV.E.3. The support for such online sources may be a mix of private funds, cheap labor, and venture 
capital funding. The challenge is also exacerbated by the ease with which such sites, as well as individual 
readers, can copy and re-distribute articles that traditional print media companies post on their own 
websites, via the simple tool of deep links make materials available to users at no cost. The use of links to 
published materials offers an end-run around any means of compensation print media companies might 
pursue; and it presents a clear free rider problem to these entities. See Connecting to Other Websites, 
STANFORD UNIV. LIB., http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/website-permissions/linking/. Further, the 
loss of dues-paying readership, particularly subscribers and newsstand purchasers, is currently posing a 
real threat to newsprint, magazines, and other traditional media companies. Traditional newspapers and 
news sources, even as venerable as the New York Times, struggle with dropping subscription rates, which 
makes them lose vital advertisers and so makes them less sustainable. Finally, user practices can once 
more be seen to change, as readers increasingly refuse to pay for material that is placed behind paywalls; 
only in the exceptional case, such as the Wall Street Journal, has the existence of paywalls actually 
proved effective. See infra Chapter 6, subsection I.B.4. In the case of journalism, some future revenue 
streams may emerge, such as the monetization of ad streaming online, tie-ins with live events (HuffPo 
symposiums, TED talks, etc). But the devaluation of the content of journalism itself does not lend itself to 
such obvious solutions. 
31 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property 
in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1759-60 (2006); see also supra Chapter 1, subsection III.G.6. 
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
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in, and relies upon, trickle-down effects of signaling and churn. Rapid copying and large-scale 
dissemination by knock-off designers and brands is facilitated by new technology, such as 
undetectable cameras that can take high-resolution photographs of runway designs, graphic 
design software that can recreate original designs, and Internet channels that can market and 
disseminate knock-offs. These and other technologically facilitated practices together serve to 
undermine traditional fashion designers’ hegemony in the market, particularly at the high end of 
the consumption spectrum.35 
 
Original designers may still have some means of retaliating, or of forestalling losses by changing 
their marketing strategies and other business practices. For instance, one possible recourse is 
creating newer, more affordable labels in which they sell cheaper, more mass-produced items 
that still retain key elements of their haute couture designs, thereby essentially knocking-off their 
own high-end creations. In this regard, designers may capitalize on one upside of rampant 
copying, which is that they are afforded increased name recognition when their works are swiftly 
delivered to the masses by copyists. Such name recognition could make their secondary or bridge 
lines desirable and popular, and could ensure their longevity in an increasingly fickle and 
changeable market. Nonetheless, while designers may be compensated for some losses by 
disseminating various versions of their own designs, they are not always able to recover from the 
loss of exclusivity that they enjoy at the top of the fashion pyramid, particularly as the window of 
exclusivity dwindles to the point of disappearance.36 Thus, the fashion industry remains well 
aware that it is vulnerable to the erosion of its value proposition, especially with respect to its 
highest-end goods that are meant to command the largest margins and to secure the viability of 
original designers and their enterprises, fashion houses, and brands. 
 
3. Devaluation of Middlemen and their Functions  
(Some Possible Long-Term Outcomes) 
 
Among the many stakeholders of content-rich industries, intermediaries or middlemen serve 
multiple purposes in producing the raw material of artistic creation into finished, credentialed 
                                                
35 On the economics of fashion, see generally C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and 
Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
36 See generally Chapter 1, Part I (discussing the “fashion pyramid”). 
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 229 
products that are brought to market.37 The term is used loosely here to designate the many 
entities and individuals active in the commercial process. Technology can make it possible for 
creators to take on themselves such intermediary functions; and it can further help creators to 
usher commercially finished products into the hands of users.38 This threatens the business model 
of intermediation to an unprecedented degree. Although intermediaries still exist in many 
creative industries, and in some cases may not be doomed to falter in the immediate future, many 
are still up in arms at the prospect of impending technologically induced obsolescence. 
 
Intermediaries abound in the mature music industry. Record labels, talent scouts, marketers, all 
play multiple roles: for instance, finding new talent; representing composers and performing 
artists; producing commercially packaged albums and songs; marketing and promoting the work 
of musicians; and enabling and assisting with the production live performance concerts.39 In 
exchange, these parties are paid through upfront signing fees, royalty streams, and contractual 
payments. In the case of record labels, they hold the copyright in the original compositions 
created by their artists; and they often retain rights in the catalog of artists’ prior works.40 But 
some composers and musicians are beginning to take control in their own output, and to retain 
the rights and royalty streams that such output generates.41 Artists may use digital technology on 
many counts: to create, edit, and finish their work; to promote their work online; to sell copies of 
albums, songs, tickets to their live performances, merchandise (such as T-shirts and other 
promotional materials) and other products online; to manage their royalty streams via performing 
rights organizations; to reach and interact with audiences, thereby building brand loyalty; and so 
forth. These practices dispel with the middleman altogether, and place control of both the 
creative process and creative control in the hands of the artist alone.42 
 
4. Devaluation of Credentialization 
 
                                                
37 See generally Antoine Hennion, An Intermediary Between Production and Consumption: The Producer 
of Popular Music, 14 SCI. TECH. HUMAN VALUES 400 (1989). 
38 Ku, supra note 5, at 306-311. 
39 See M. William Krasilovsky & Sidney Shemel, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC 340 (10th ed., 2007).  
40 Id. at 341. 
41 Id. at 14-20. 
42 See Ku, supra note 5, at 308-311. 
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In other fields, middlemen traditionally play important roles of credentialization, serving notice 
to audiences that a creative work is well-regarded by knowledgeable, reliable, and credible 
authorities and critics (that is, that the work has met their standards for quality, authenticity, 
veracity, and/or creativity). Middlemen such as newspapers, peer-reviewed journals, publishers, 
libraries, fashionable taste-makers, artistic critics, and the like signal to broad audiences what is 
most worthy of attention. But the proliferation of creative output available online means that 
users can find resources everywhere, and creators can make their work directly accessible to 
large audiences without such work being vetted, agented, or otherwise intermediated. Some of 
that work can still be high quality, possibly casting into doubt the ultimate utility of traditional 
entities credentializing the materials released. 
 
In many cases, technology is giving rise to a host of online critics, such as bloggers, desktop 
publishers, popular websites, and others who express their views on a vast array of creative 
works. When these self-directed, and sometimes self-appointed, voices assume a judgmental 
position, and eventually gain some measure of recognition among online readers, they begin to 
usurp the role of earlier-established credentializing middlemen. This may lead to the devaluation 
of credentializing content, as some audience members choose to read and follow online sources 
for free, rather than to pay for products such as newsprint and magazines. It also gives rise to 
fundamental questions regarding the functional value of credentialization itself. Some current 
commentators argue that its role has been overvalued, and that audiences can discern value for 
themselves.43 Others argue that if its role is undermined, society is more likely allow for the 
release of sub-par materials that audiences may take time, or may not be able, to vet, and that this 
may well lead to a disintegration of quality content in the marketplace.44 In the fashion world, for 
                                                
43 See generally id. 
44 See generally Anthony Horowitz, Do We Still Need Publishers?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2012/feb/27/anthony-horowitz-do-we-still-need-
publishers. The publishing industry offers a good example of the challenges to credentializing agents in a 
mature industry that has been unsettled by technology. Historically, publishing houses and literary agents 
agreed to sign authors that they felt would produce a body of work over the course of a career. Whether 
such work was commercially viable, popularly appealing, or critically acclaimed, the publishers and 
agents agreed the work would represent their brand, and it turn they would represent the author. They 
vetted manuscripts prior to publication, offered editorial support, marketing and promotional support, and 
commercial production, and then stood behind their writers in the publishing marketplace. See William 
Germano, What Do Publishers Do?, U. CHI. PRESS, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/ 
288447.html. Some publishing houses or imprints were so highly regarded that they cast a positive glow 
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instance, credentializing authorities such as fashion houses, high-end buyers, fashion magazines, 
and other arbiters of tastes and trends are being challenged by online critics, bloggers, self-styled 
“street fashion” artists and photographers, and other newly minted taste-makers. While 
beginning to acknowledge the power of some of these newcomers,45 many of fashion’s most 
established authority figures have conceded that they are still learning how to respond to, and 
perhaps learn from, the challenge that the army of online onlookers presents.46 
 
In a not-dissimilar fashion, universities traditionally play an important in the credentialization of 
education, including but not limited to degrees, grades, affiliation, and the overall preparedness 
of a student for the job market.47 But their authority is being challenged as well, particularly by 
the rising power of for-profit institutions able to produce relatively inexpensive online content 
and to provide alternate forms of credentialization, such as training, certificate-granting 
programs, or even degrees. At the same time, the advent of MOOCs and their providers, whether 
                                                                                                                                                       
on their creators, who gained prestige by association—indeed, just being “chosen” by a well-regarded 
publisher might attest to an author’s ability, status, regard and saleability. Id. By contrast, digital 
technology is now allowing self-publishing to occur on an increasing scale. This makes it possible for 
budding authors to bypass the middlemen, the publishing agents and houses, and to bring their work 
directly to their chosen audience. It further gives audiences increasing control over their ability to express 
their response to works, whatever the means of publication may be (i.e., self-published or via a publishing 
house). Audiences can, as always, express their acclaim by simply purchasing copies of the book and 
increasing its commercial success. And they can enter the credentializing process by leaving comments 
on their own websites, on the “reader reviews” sections of such vendors as amazon.com, 
barnesandnoble.com, or through a host of critical blogs, online reviews, and other critical outlets. Thus, 
for instance, in 2001 the hitherto-unknown British author E.L. James self-published her novel, “Fifty 
Shades of Gray,” by putting it online as an e-book and by selling it on an print-on-demand basis. See 
Natasha Bertrand, ‘Fifty Shades of Grey’ Started Out as a ‘Twilight’ Fan Fiction Before Becoming an 
International Phenomenon, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/fifty-shades-
of-grey-started-out-as-twilight-fan-fiction-2015-2. Due to aggressive viral marketing by the author, and 
by enthusiastic response particularly on the part of e-book purchasers, the book proved an enormous 
success that topped the best-seller lists and, with its sequels, sold in the hundreds of millions. Id. The 
book and its sequels were eventually assumed by Vintage Books. Id. 
45 See for example the gradual acceptance and incorporation of the young self-made blogger Tavi 
Gevinson into the fashion establishment. See generally Christopher Borrelli, Teen Fashion Maven Tavi 
Gevinson is 16 Going on 30, CHI. TRIBUNE (Sept. 18, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-09-
18/entertainment/ct-ent-0919-tavi-gevinson-20120918_1_tavi-gevinson-yearbook-one-required-summer-
reading. 
46 See, e.g., Sarah Jones, How Much Influence Do Fashion Bloggers Have?, LUXURY DAILY (Nov. 26, 
2014), http://www.luxurydaily.com/how-much-influence-do-fashion-bloggers-have (noting collaborations 
with bloggers by Marc Jacobs and Estee Lauder). 
47 See generally, WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 
(2006).  
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for-profit or non-profit, may undermine the credentializing role that academia has long 
dominated. Such a change could potentially occur with respect to single courses or entire 
programs. With respect to individual courses, MOOCs have the potential to reach thousands of 
students at once. This may prove particularly useful in covering basic materials, such as large 
introductory lecture courses have typically offered. But if MOOCs come to serve as a substitute, 
rather than a supplement, for those courses, universities may find that the original courses 
diminish in value. At some institutions, especially elite schools that pride themselves on 
personalized education, students may still opt for the in-class experience rather than the remote 
one. But at some institutions, particularly those that emphasize value-based pricing of the 
educational experience, students may prefer to take MOOCs offered by prestigious purveyors 
(for example, a Computer Science introductory or 101 course offered by an MIT professor 
through the auspices of Coursera) instead of the course offered by their home institution. Such 
institutions may find that their role as a credentializing entity is forfeited and, at the same time, 
their value proposition is undermined. Still further, with respect to educational degree-bearing 
programs, in certain areas—particularly, for instance, in skills-based training, such as computer 
programming, management training, and so on—a MOOC-based certificate program may come 
to replace an equivalent college-based program. If potential employers come to view them 
equally, students may flock to the MOOC as the cheaper alternative.48 
 
5. Loss of Traditional Sources of Revenue 
 
Content industries have typically relied on bread-and-butter sales of hard-copy products that are 
bundled, marketed and sold as production units with baked-in markups (for example, the costs of 
an album are typically higher than the cost of its individual song sales49) and generally good 
margins. These products include albums or CDs, as well as other recorded works in the areas of 
entertainment and culture. Digital technology enables the disaggregation of some of these 
                                                
48 There is some limited historical precedence for this: for example, the General Motors Institute, now 
Kettering University, has long been highly regarded for its technical, manufacturing, and management 
training, and the degrees it confers are widely held in as strong a regard as their equivalent in traditional 
university-based programs. See Kettering University, WIKIPEDIA,  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kettering_University. 
49 See generally supra Chapter 3, Section V.B. 
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products, such as the sale of individual music tracks rather than of entire albums, which tends to 
reduce revenues by erasing the added value of bundling. But the greater impact on hard-copy 
sales is the ability of digital users to gain access to online reproductions of such materials, such 
as, digital tracks of songs recorded in CDs.50 The online version of such works lends itself to 
easy copying and dissemination: as has been repeatedly evinced in the case of music, 
downloading digital music tracks has become commonplace practice and, notably when coupled 
with uploading music for other listeners to share, such practices have had a marked impact on the 
profit margins across the entire sector.51 Thus, the Internet clearly has an impact on both the 
uniqueness and the value of the original work, as well as helping ensure that readily accessible 
future copies have much less value than might otherwise be able to retain. 52 
 
Many of these industries also see the advertising revenues associated with their content 
undermined by digital technology.53 There are several grounds for advertising-related losses: (i) 
in general, there may be fewer readers that can be gauged and counted on for advertisers to 
reach; (ii) much traditional advertising has moved online (real estate, re-sales a la eBay, 
classifieds, etc.), and has not yet found reliable ways of monetizing online audiences (thus 
advertisers tend to pay less for online space than for print); (iii) even traditional industries are 
looking to leverage social media and online-oriented advertising and/or marketing: for example, 
fashion companies paying independent movie directors to make short feature films that mention 
their brand (and, it is hoped, lend it credibility by association); however, these efforts have not 
yet been seen to have any measurable payoff in terms of purchasing consumers.54 
 
                                                
50 See Ku, supra note 5, at 272-273. 
51 Id. 
52 This also works in the case of journal articles drawn from the website of a print magazine: for instance, 
a user can cut-and-paste an entire article, or can merely place a link to the article on her website, enabling 
the reader to consume the original article for free and depriving the original writer or copyright holder the 
right to collect any returns from consumption of the original work. 
53 Rebecca Greenfield, The Decline of Google (and the Internet’s) Ad Business, WIRE  (July 20, 2012), 
http://www.thewire.com/technology/2012/07/decline-google-and-internets-ad-business/54835. 
54 Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2000), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/09/mann.htm. 
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6. Competing with Free 
 
As mentioned, consumers who avail themselves of digital technology are proving increasingly 
reluctant to pay for content.55 Some commentators have argued that this trend began with the 
initial willingness of some content providers to make their content available for free online.56 
The precedent for this is arguably Napster, in which it was not a content provider but rather an 
innovative and enterprising individual who devised a means for digital music tracks to be 
reproduced, uploaded, and shared among listeners for free.57 While Napster was eventually 
dismantled, its progeny, such as BitTorrent, continue to make music freely available to audiences 
on the Internet.58 This new model of content sharing has spread to various other entertainment 
and cultural sectors, but it is the digital music sharing that has established the virtual model for 
free dissemination of both commercial and amateur content.59 
 
In education, it remains to be seen whether free MOOCs for basic or continuing education, 
particularly when aggregated to provide basic certification, credentialization, or degrees (for 
instance, a series of MOOCs leading to a certificate of competency, an associate’s or bachelor’s 
degree, or other equivalent), will be pitted against the tuition-based degree programs of 
traditional educational institutions. The potential challenge is compounded by the fact that these 
universities and colleges are essentially subsidizing the emergence of MOOC providers by 
creating courses in-house, as it were, and by supporting the creation, development, and in some 
cases ongoing support of MOOC providers through their own financial means, such as secured 
grants, foundational underwriting, individual gifts, and budgetary allocations. While these initial 
                                                
55 See generally supra Chapter 3, Part V.A. 
56 See CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: HOW TODAY’S SMARTEST BUSINESSES PROFIT BY GIVING SOMETHING 
FOR NOTHING 101-119 (2010). 
57 Id. 
58 See Russ Juskalian, 10 Years after Napster, Online Pirates Alive and Well, ABC NEWS (June 23, 2009), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=7913205. 
59 Other industries have also begun with free digital content, often finding to their consternation that later 
moving to a paid model becomes a formidable challenge. For instance, major newspapers began their 
early forays onto the Internet by making all of their content freely available. Finding that their newsprint 
sales and subscriptions were plummeting due to increasing online readerships, these newspapers then 
tried to impose for-pay mechanisms on consumers who had enjoyed untrammeled access to content. To 
date, most consumers still seem unwilling to pay for online news, and the decline in sales of print media 
continues apace. See infra Chapter 6, subsection I.B.4. 
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expenditures may be amortized over time, and may result eventually in economies of scale in 
teaching within the institutions, they remain considerable and ongoing. Institutions then face the 
possibility of losing tuition dollars when online students take the courses and/or get credit, 
certificates, or degrees. This is potentially a costly gamble: the cost of building up a program, 
and the challenge of monetizing the program, may be compounded with the additional pressure 
of competing with online courses, degree programs, and educational offerings provided by rival 
enterprises. Only adding to the problem may be the nature of these rival ventures, some of which 
may have vastly different cost structures, such as a for-profit business model, others of which 
may free ride on the work of earlier innovators (for instance, by copying course and degree 
formats, sharing in open source materials, platforms, and output, and so on), and others of which 
may be subsidized to an extent that is not possible in the traditional educational paradigm.60 
 
7. Or Competing with Almost-Free (So Can’t Clear Margins Of Production Costs) 
 
In many cases, the scenario of competing with free can become competing with almost-free.61 
Thus, for instance, knock-offs by lower-end fashion houses that come out almost at same time as 
originals are not free, but are at greatly reduced prices when compared with the originals. 
Similarly, very inexpensive digital versions of content, such as the single music tracks sold on 
iTunes, may be offered at such low prices that the original content producers cannot clear the 
margins of their production costs.62 Even in the case of education, proposed schemes to offer 
certain online courses, credentials, and/or degrees at highly reduced rates from those charged by 
traditional schools may yet offer education at a price that does not cover the production costs 
entailed in creating and supporting MOOCs and their providers. This means that even if 
consumers are willing to accept very low online rates for creative content, original content 
                                                
60 Another example of the provision of free content is classical sheet music, which has been cataloged 
online and offered for free, and is now competing with sheet music stores to such an extent that the latter 
are being driven out of competition. The few remaining stores are typically subsidized by a larger 
institution, such as the music store at The Juilliard School. See, e.g., Laura Gambino, New York City’s 
Last Classical Sheet Music Shop Closes its Doors after Eight Decades, GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/06/new-york-last-classical-sheet-music-shop-closes-
frank-music.  
61 See ANDERSON, supra note 56, at 135-162. 
62 This is increasingly proving to be the case with other forms of digital content in fields such as media 
and entertainment, journalism, publishing, and so on.  
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 236 
providers will still not be incentivized to produce such content if the low rates drive down the 
returns on their production, and therefore do not cover the original costs incurred in production 
to an extent that can keep them commercially sustainable. 
 
8. Ability or Inability to Price Discriminate 
 
Where content is easily accessible, virtually limitless, and available for free or at steep discounts 
(even if supported by advertising, so “free” to consumers in that they do not have to pay fees but 
rather provide viewership of such advertising), it becomes increasingly challenging to persuade 
consumers to pay even reasonable rates to support content providers and thereby to keep their 
businesses commercially viable. In other words, digital technology affords many different outlets 
for content, making it hard for content originators to charge full rates. The music industry 
demonstrated one of the earliest instantiations of this phenomenon, which has been increasingly 
evinced in other creative content industries.63 Moving away from a free model has proven 
difficult, and only compounds the problem that widespread availability of material already 
presents. Further, this increases the difficulty of maintaining tiered pricing, or rational price 
discrimination, a strategy that might otherwise help content producers reap the returns that their 
generation of original content should earn in the absence of undue competition with freely 
distributed goods. In music, for instance, the Apple iTunes pricing model, which has come to 
dominate the market due to lack of significant competition with alternative music distributors, 
pricing for digital tracks remains relatively flat, offering only two modest price points at which 
the consumer can obtain musical works.64 There is some variation in the price of entire CDs 
available on iTunes, but this is a dwindling market that is not likely to afford producers any 
                                                
63 In journalism, to take one such example, the problem has evolved to such an extent as to be deemed a 
crisis by many commentators. Thus, for instance, if many sources link to a New York Times article, users 
or readers can simply click on a link to obtain access to it without having to pay to purchase the article, 
whether in print or online form. While the New York Times may try to steer readers through its website, 
by making articles technologically protected, or limiting access via secondary sites to their site, and so on, 
the newspaper has found it almost impossible to thwart significant amounts of reproduction of its content. 
Moreover, the Times initially made all its content available for free on its own website, thereby possibly 
inculcating in its readership the idea that its online content not only was free but also should be free, and 
even should forever remain free.  
64 See supra Chapter 3, subsection II.B.1 and III.A.2. 
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financial relief in the long run.65 The market segmentation of consumers, in other words, is very 
hard to maintain in a flat online environment, that is, where consumers can all obtain access to 
content on the same terms, for free. In this scenario, it becomes increasingly hard to target 
specific niches of consumers and market to them specifically and at varied tiers of pricing. 
 
9. Struggling for First-Mover Advantage and Marketplace Position 
 
Gaining first-mover advantage can be an invaluable business tactic, as it is often the lynchpin to 
securing a strong and possibly invincible market position vis-a-vis competitors.66 From the 
outset, obtaining first-mover advantage allows a company to gain a competitive advantage 
through control of resources, which can lead to significant profit margins and potentially to 
secure a near-monopoly status.67 Further advantages are also conferred to the industry participant 
that secures first-mover status: (i) it may be able early on to purchase assets at favorable market 
prices well below those that will prevail when the market matures; (ii) in markets that only 
accommodate a limited number of profitable firms, it may be able to select the most profitable 
niches, and may be able to take strategic actions that limit the amount of space available for 
subsequent entrants; (iii) it may be able to establish a dominant positions in geographic or 
product space, effectively making it unprofitable for follow-on entrants to explore or occupy the 
interstices; (iv) it may be able to repel entry by competitors through the threat of price warfare, 
which tends to be more intense when firms are positioned more closely; (v) it may make initial 
investments that express its commitment to the market and establish its position as an incumbent, 
which then expands its capacity allowing greater output to be made following entry into the 
market. The combined forces of early investment (that is, sunk costs), increased capacity for 
production, and the threat of price cuts to make follow-on entry unprofitable, can secure the first-
mover’s advantage to a virtually unassailable position; (vi) when the first-mover advantage is 
secured, it may be able to achieve large economies of scale, further enhancing, if not anchoring, 
its dominant market position; and lastly, (vii) it can place powerful disincentives to consumers 
                                                
65 This is even more vividly illustrated by the example of newsprint in journalism, which has generally 
struggled to charge certain rates to subscribers (premium, discount, weekly, weekend only, etc.), other 
rates to newsstand purchasers, and varied online rates (print plus online access, iPad edition, etc.)  
66 See generally supra Chapter 1, subsection III.G.6. 
67 See id. Amazon is a good example of first-mover advantage. See Scott Anthony, First Mover or Fast 
Follower?, HARVARD BUS. REV. (June 14, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/06/first-mover-or-fast-follower. 
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that may wish or choose to switch to competitors’ products or services, primarily by imposing 
additional resource costs associated with switching that many consumers are unwilling to 
assume.68 
 
In the case of creative content industries, technological changes can either empower or disrupt 
companies, or entire industries, from their places in the hierarchy. At times, this may lead to 
irretrievable losses, or to near-monopolistic gains, that can transform one or more entire sectors. 
Prior to the digital age, it is arguable that the music industry was characterized by the dominance 
of the major record labels, music producers that captured the lion’s share of music sales and 
related profits.69 However, the emergence of digital music left the major record labels that 
exerted a great measure of control over the industry at a loss for a concerted, strategic response.70  
It took a new entrant from the computer industry, Apple, to compel the record labels to join in a 
negotiated compromise: the licensing and sale of individual digital music tracks over the 
Internet, via the intermediate mechanism of the Apple iTunes Store, and a very low cost 
(initially, 99 cents per MP3 download).71 Although eventually followed by such competitors of 
online music sales as Amazon and Tower.com, the first-mover advantage that Apple realized 
was enormous and, to date, invincible.72 Apple also chose essentially to subsidize its online 
music sales by charging very low prices per download, and realizing a loss or barely breaking 
even for several years of revenue, and relying on the sale of its electronic devices—which 
enabled users to access and listen to such downloads—to compensate for any such revenue 
shortfalls. The strategy proved enormously successful, and secured Apple’s top market position 
in the computer electronics industry.73 At the same time, however, Apple’s success reduced the 
clout of record labels correspondingly: (i) they were no longer able to retain their strength at the 
bargaining table, for instance in setting the terms of licensing fees; (ii) they were unable to regain 
                                                
68 See Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
41 (1988). 
69 See Music’s Brighter Future, ECONOMIST (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.economist.com/node/3329169. 
70 See generally supra Chapter 3, subsections II.B.1 & III.A.2. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. 
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their pre-eminence within the music industry; and (iii) they were effectively unable to realize the 
large share of returns that they had once seen in pre-digital times.74 
 
What may be most noteworthy about the emergence and transformation of the digital music 
landscape is the ability of Apple, primarily a technology company and not a creative content 
company, to secure first-mover advantage and effectively to dispossess the major record labels of 
their hegemony in the music industry as a whole. This example cannot go unremarked among the 
creative content industries, and as commentators on first-mover advantage have noted, illustrates 
the common phenomenon that “new entrants can exploit technological discontinuities to displace 
existing incumbents”75 and thereby establish a new dominant firm with first-mover advantage. 
 
10. Limitations of Technologically-Driven Strategies (DRM) to Thwart 
Copying/Piracy/User Behaviors 
 
Content industries may try to fight fire with fire: that is, to ameliorate technologically-induced 
problems with technology-driven measures. Yet even where content industries try to impose 
technological anti-theft measures, including digital rights management (“DRM”) and other 
protection systems, they may be limited in their ability to do damage control.76 DRM, for 
instance, as one such measure, raises several concerns: (i) it has not proven that effective, even 
                                                
74 In publishing, the example of Google Books similarly raises the possibility of a large, powerful entity, 
coming from outside the publishing industry, negotiating a similar arrangement that not only garners for 
itself an all-powerful first-mover advantage and market position, disempowers existing industry 
participants, and reduces revenues for the industry across the board. Google has undertaken efforts to 
create “the world’s largest digital library” via a massive book digitization project. See Miguel Helft, 
Judge Rejects Google’s Deal to Digitize Books, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/technology/23google.html?_r=0. It claims to have negotiated 
copyright with respect to the books it digitizes, with the exception of some “orphan works” that are still, 
in some cases, under dispute. Id. Google claims to show on its website only snippets drawn from books in 
its database, so that books may not be fully accessed and read by its users. Id. However, representatives 
from the publishing industry, such as the Authors Guild, claim that Google is “stealing” from copyright 
owners, book retailers, and other industry stakeholders. Id. They further argue that a neutral party, such as 
the Library of Congress, would be better suited to such a massive digitization project, as it would not be 
incentivized to maximize revenue by gaining a virtually monopolistic market share in a single database of 
digitized books. See Anandashankar Mazumdar, Copyright Office Report Outlines Issues Surrounding 
Mass Digitization of Books, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.bna.com/copyright-office-
report-n12884904134. 
75 Lieberman & Montgomery, supra note 68, at 48. 
76 See, e.g., supra Chapter 3, Section I.E. 
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when imposed in conjunction with anti-circumvention legislation, such as the controversial 
DMCA; (ii) it has proven largely unpopular with consumers, resulting in a lack of user buy-in 
that is crucial to retaining customers in an increasingly competitive marketplace (this has been 
evinced by the controversy over Apple’s digital protection, FairPlay, which Apple eventually 
removed from its products due in no small part to customer protests); (iii) it makes 
interoperability among devices even more complicated, which antagonizes users and increases 
the likelihood that some entrepreneurs will be locked out of markets if they are not compatible 
with the most popular devices; (iv) it can give rise to international differences that add to 
consumer frustration (for instance, CDs or DVDs that are DRM-encoded and therefore cannot be 
played on foreign devices); (v) it may create problems with Internet content streaming, thereby 
potentially having a negative effect on innovation in a fast-growing area of content delivery; and 
(vi) broadly speaking, it changes the balance between protection and freedom without the prior 
agreement of industry stakeholders, including creative artists, content producers, copyright 
holders, and end users. 
 
11. Parallel or Analogous Limitations of Anti-Copying  
Strategies in Other Industries 
 
In fashion, high-end production and sales are predicated on an appeal to exclusivity (and 
quality): elite designers circulate an ever-changing array of clothes collections that implicitly 
promise their clientele that the goods they purchase are novel, unique and special. The risk that 
these original designs will not in fact be unique is a constant threat to designers. To date, 
appropriation of these exclusive new designs has been curtailed by certain real-world constraints, 
such as the challenge of rapidly photographing originals, manufacturing knock-offs, getting them 
to sale, making calculated guesses as to which items will be trendsetters, and so on.77 But that 
begs the question of what happens if and when the technology of copying does improve: that is, 
if copies of the original become as perfectly executed as—and indistinguishable from—the 
originals, and so quickly issued that time delays become miniscule, to the point of being 
meaningless to the consumer.78 A world of frictionless copying is readily imaginable, and seems 
                                                
77 See generally supra Chapter 1. 
78 Id. 
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 241 
to be encroaching: witness the rapidity with which fashion runway collections appear in 
excellent quality knock-offs via huge retailers like Zara or H&M.79  
 
Trademark offers fashion one means of curtailing copying via anti-counterfeiting measures.80 
This, however, can lead to a sub-optimal outcome, such as fashion’s current arm's race: that is, 
top fashion firms have very invested heavily in various technological anti-counterfeiting devices, 
such as brand and/or logo encryption, as well as security measures, heavy patrolling of known or 
potential counterfeiting venues, aggressive litigation tactics seeking sanctions against copyists, 
and other enforcement mechanisms. The technologies underlying some of these anti-
counterfeiting measures is to a certain extent analogous to the imposition of DRM on CDs that 
the record industry has tried to use to thwart music piracy. But in both cases, the pirates always 
seem one step ahead of the creators. And in fashion, as in music, user response is also an 
important concern: the measures tend to be unpopular with the public, despite some recognition 
that they may be helpful. Thus, in fashion even more than in music, many consumers at all levels 
buy products at venues that are well-known to be counterfeiting havens, such as certain vendors 
in Hong Kong, and in well-known venues such as Canal Street in New York (and at times in 
private residences of willing, well-connected customers). Many of these consumers are unable or 
unwilling to appreciate the utility or necessity of anti-theft devices, watermarks, and other anti-
counterfeiting measures. Indeed, consumer preferences and practices have shifted to such an 
extent that among many fashion customers possessing and displaying a high-end knock-off can 
even be a point of pride. Despite the campaigns of the elite designers, who plead consumers to 
consider the investment costs and returns of original products, the trend, if any, is toward an 
increased tolerance, if not embrace, of knock-offs. This is somewhat analogous to the pride that 
certain music listeners evince in amassing music collections that have been gathered from free 
music distributors online, despite the pleas of artists, record company representatives, and others 
who decry the effect of music appropriation and its repercussions throughout the industry. And  
                                                
79 See id., subsection II.B.1.b. It is also noteworthy that these stores are highly effective tacticians in 
tracking consumer response to the merchandise, keeping it fresh by cycling through very short shelf-lives 
of the merchandise, keeping maximum flexibility in their ability to churn out varying sized shipments of 
goods based on popularity and sales, and other marketing strategies aimed at maximizing returns from 
popular but short-lived fashion merchandise. 
80 Id. 
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in both the case of music and fashion, it is both analogous and striking that the industry has not 
been able to muster a persuasive, behavior-changing and/or norm-changing response. 
 
II. WHAT SHOULD THE CONTENT INDUSTRIES BE AFRAID OF,  
BUT MAYBE AREN'T AWARE OF? 
 
A. Breakdown of Norms of Behavior by Creators, Users,  
Stakeholders and/or Communities 
 
1. Breakdown of Norms Vis-A-Vis Stealing vs. Sharing 
 
As mentioned earlier, users are not only changing their practices with respect to content but also 
expressing their preferences through such practical changes. Often the terminology used by 
various groups to describe these changes can be revealing as to how they are viewed, positively 
or pejoratively.81 The differences in terminology are not merely semantic, but speak to profound 
shifts across creative industries. In music, for instance, many artists and copyright owners (such 
as record labels) consider peer-to-peer file sharing to be “stealing” or “piracy,” while some users 
believe they are sharing, extending personal use among friends and/or peers, or making music 
available to others in ways that resemble earlier efforts, such as making mix tapes or bootlegged 
recordings of performances that are circulated among friends and/or peers. In fashion, those who 
imitate original designs may call their work “homage”;82 and those who appropriate designs may 
call their work “knock-offs” (which term can have a positive connotation in some circles); while 
those who feel their works are being detrimentally appropriated call it a “rip-off” economy.83 
The changing lexicon reveals a newfound acceptance of digital practices that are becoming so 
                                                
81 See, e.g., What Is Online Piracy, RIAA, 
https://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector=What-is-Online-Piracy. 
82 See supra Chapter 1, Section III.A. 
83 Analogously, In journalism, blog collectives, RSS readers, and other news and information aggregators 
argue that they are collecting and disseminating material in various formats that meet the needs and 
convenience of vast and varied audiences, whereas many of the content creators and providers of their 
source materials object to such a characterization, arguing that they “cannibalize” the content that they 
create, invest in and need to monetize in order to sustain their ongoing content production. See infra 
Chapter 6, subsection III.D.2. 
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deep-seated as to express normative shifts that are bound to be pervasive, wide-spreading, and 
difficult to alter or remove. Moreover, they are almost certain to drive changes in business 
practices, if not legal policies, as creative content industries are compelled to rethink their 
approach to content sharing among online users, creators, contributors and consumers. While this 
set of issues is hard for creative industries to unpack, it is even harder for them to accept and to 
adjust to, and the verdict remains unknown as to how they will come to terms with the newly 
emerging norms of the digital age. 
 
2. Breakdown of Norms Involving Reputational Capital,  
Attribution, and Cultural Recognition 
 
In many creative fields, norms surrounding reputational capital, attribution, and cultural 
recognition play significant roles. This may be due in no small part to historic factors, such as the 
development of many creative practices over time, and their rootedness in traditions that were 
structured around communities relying on small, tightly knit and organized groups, such as 
artisanal and merchant guilds, in which interactive norms often stood in for more formalized 
dictates and means of governance.84 As discussed earlier, some guild-like systems persist to this 
day, among tightly-knit creative, scientific and innovative communities, which retain guild-like 
attributes, such as informal exchanges of knowledge, norms-based rules that bind community 
members, and so on.85 The educational sector, particularly in areas of scientific research, is 
typically held to highlight the persistence of guild-like spaces today.86 What is certain is that the 
normative precepts that were long established in many creative areas persist to this day. Thus, for 
example, the tacit yet widely accepted standard of attribution can be found in such disparate 
fields as fashion, education, and music: a creator of original work is always deemed to merit 
attribution, and failing to do so may incur communal disapprobation, if not outright sanction. In 
certain instances, as in the case of education, these norms may be instantiated in actual policies, 
such as punitive measures taken against plagiarism, which is just one failure of attribution. In 
                                                
84 See supra Chapter 1, Section II.A; infra Chapter 6, Section IV.B. 
85 See infra Chapter 6, Section IV.B. Creative fields share this exchange of knowledge, as well as norms-
based self-regulation, such as theater, fine arts, and dance. Other creative fields also retain aspects of 
guilds, such as the tradition of apprenticeship in high cuisine. And interestingly, some fields outside the 
creative realms are also constructed along guild-like lines, such as plumbing, dentistry, and construction. 
86 Id. 
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others, social disapproval, mockery, and other communal practices serve to sanction 
appropriation without attribution, often with very real effect.87 
 
While intangible, and often not readily monetizable, these communal norms serve an important 
bridge-building communal role, and at the same time help to bolster the reputation, esteem, and 
self-esteem of creative individuals. In many fields, building reputational capital also contributes 
to the portfolio of accomplishments an individual can bring to the bargaining table. In fashion, 
for instance, having a portfolio of one’s works is considered an essential signifier of one’s 
professional worth, thereby functioning much as a catalog of work in music, a curriculum vitae 
in education, or a resume in other professional contexts. Reputational norms serve critical 
signaling roles, highlighting valued contributions and contributors in a given creative field, 
bringing to employers’ notice the most promising employment prospects, and informing 
emerging artists of developments at the highest level in their area of enterprise. As in the related 
case of attribution, well-established reputational norms can give rise to sanctioning mechanisms: 
that is, they are often accompanied by informal community-based sanctions, allowing creativity 
to flourish without undue threat of copying and appropriation. These systemic features obviate 
the need to impose formal copyright mechanisms that may entail industry-wide transaction costs.  
 
Particularly in low-IP systems, norms play a vital role in promoting creative production, whether 
individually or collectively, by rewarding creators with intangible yet meaningful merits and 
penalizing imitators with similarly intangible yet costly sanctions. Moreover, reputational norms 
can confer positive feedback, such as prestige, prizes, and rewards that are both intangible—such 
as improved standing among peers—and tangible—such as outright awards of medals, prize 
monies, and even rights in future royalties. Where such rewards are not linked to IP, they may 
                                                
87 One example is the loss of popularity that music groups widely agreed to have engaged in blatant 
copying can experience. See, e.g., Brian Koerber, 10 Copycats Who Stirred Up Treble in Music History,   
www.mashable.com/2014/06/05/music-copycats   
There is, however, admittedly a fine line in many creative practices between appropriation and 
creative borrowing. Classical music, jazz, and American roots music are all traditions that attest to deep-
seated practices of borrowing and sharing, as well as communal and often unattributed music production. 
But that has often come at a price, particularly to artists who have neither been recognized nor 
compensated for their creativity. This, after all, is one of the main purposes of copyright: to forestall such 
injustice. At the same time, in a well-functioning community involving long-standing members, shared 
norms and normative practices are likewise aimed at staving off injustice and allowing creative artists to 
receive their just dues both with respect to reputation and reward. 
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represent an efficient way of rewarding creative work without incurring the transaction costs that 
collecting IP-related returns can often necessitate. 
 
Any potential disruption of a creative ecosystem can challenge these vital reputational benefits, 
which may be as hard to uphold and protect as they are to recognize and quantify in the first 
place. Technological change may enhance reputational interactions or it may reconfigure the 
landscape in which they occur, thereby casting these norms in an entirely new and unheralded 
light. Overall, these non-legal norms create a strong ecosystem that promotes innovative creators 
and sanctions copiers. One may query whether these norms developed by necessity to 
compensate for a lack of IP protection or whether they simply pre-date the lack of protection and 
can explain why greater protection has rarely been sought. But at any rate, the ecosystem may 
not stand when propertization creates a wholly different culture, based on ownership rights, legal 
defense and protection of ownership rights, licensing, and other transaction-based relations. On 
the one hand, it is arguable that the emergence of stronger rights-based practices are actually to 
be preferred to norms-based systems: they may be more transparent, less guild-like (that is, less 
liable to restrict privileges and responsibilities community members), and more readily 
quantified, and thus more fairly compared among stakeholders (that is, apples-to-apples 
comparisons may be easier to make in quantifiable rights, versus non-commodifiable, and thus 
non-quantifiable, reputational capital). On the other hand, however, norms often step in to offer 
significant compensation where rights may not be obtained, or where rewards based in rights are 
likely to be limited, inaccessible, or otherwise unsatisfactory. In the creative context, norms of 
reputation and attribution may also express certain cultural values that are shared by artists, such 
as the importance of peer approval, promotion of creative collaboration, and open access to 
artistic repositories allowing creators to draw upon each others’ works and “stand on the 
shoulders of giants.” 
 
Education offers one of the strongest examples of a community inscribed at its core with deeply 
rooted norms of reputation and prestige. Some norms are clear-cut, such as reputational capital 
built by faculty through publication and scholarship, on the one hand, and teaching in the 
classroom, on the other. In the traditional educational rewards system, the publication of articles, 
books, and other evidence of scholarship confer reputational benefits that are of incalculable 
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value both to nascent and established scholars. These benefits are not directly measurable 
perhaps, but are still significant in counting toward the attainment of tenure track positions and 
tenure, grants and fellowships, and other academic emoluments. At the same time, well-regarded 
teaching confers other reputational benefits, such as peer recognition, curricular import, and the 
ability to attract the most talented students to one’s courses. 
 
But even in the tradition-bound world of education, technology can disrupt the entire system by 
which reputation is conferred, secured, and retained. In both scholarship and teaching, 
reputational standing may translate into the online educational world, bringing into prominence 
well-regarded teachers who will be invited to offer their courses as MOOCs by online providers. 
At the same time, however, it remains to be seen whether that reputational standing transfers 
readily to the online world—that is, whether it is equally recognized, rewarded and pursued. 
Moreover, it is unclear whether professors teaching massive courses online can maintain high 
levels of teaching that create or sustain their reputation, let alone pursue scholarship at the same 
time that further bolsters their academic repute. Secondarily, if popularity among these massive 
student bodies becomes a short-hand or a substitute for truly deserved teaching accolades, the 
very meaning and import of a teaching reputation is liable to be altered, whether for better or 
worse. With respect to scholarship, the reputational benefits are less readily translated into the 
online space. Scholars may be sought-after MOOC professors by virtue of their publishing 
record, or to the contrary scholarship may be viewed as unrelated to the teaching emphasis of 
online education.88 Equally importantly, MOOCs may come to displace a good deal of 
fundamental teaching, and thereby may undermine the job security, such as it is, of the lower 
tiers of academics (i.e., those that are not on tenure track). In this respect, MOOCs may add fuel 
to the fire of adjunctification, or the increasing reliance on teachers that are hired under contract 
for short-term, if possibly renewable, periods. But if MOOC providers do not see the immediate 
value of scholarship to their courses, its actual value, as well as its reputational benefits, are 
liable to be significantly eroded. And the opposite result may emerge as well: that is,  in a world 
where faculty are increasingly adjuncts, the value of published works may diminish in 
importance as their currency vis-a-vis reputation diminishes or disappears. Copyright in courses 
                                                
88  Unlike research universities, for instance, most for-profit schools do not place a particular value on the 
scholarship of their professoriate. 
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 247 
only compounds this problem. For if faculty are not ceded copyright in their courses, their lack 
of ownership of their own courses and course materials may impose real limitations on their 
ability to bring such works to one or more future teaching venues. Thus, both scholarship and 
teaching, as evinced by courses and course materials which may be subject to copyright, may 
come to have an attenuated value to faculty in the entire area of MOOC-driven education. 
 
In other creative fields, norms of reputation and attribution are equally freighted, particularly in 
cases where (i) individuals may not be able to attain ownership in their own creative output; (ii) 
salaries in the field are not necessarily reflective of individual mastery of a craft (possibly due to 
low profit margins, under-rated areas of work, understood tradeoffs between salaries and 
intangibles such as work-life balance, autonomy over one’s work, and so on); and (iii) 
reputational capital is taken into account in employment prospects, hiring practices, and other 
aspects of the job market. In fashion, for instance, major artists create original works that secure 
their reputation, while emerging artists likewise strive to create break-out works that will gain 
attention and begin to establish their reputation.89 While not necessarily highly compensated, 
particularly at the beginning of the arc of their career, many artists consider the regard of peers, 
as well as audiences, to be a vital part of the rewards they earn from the act of creation.90 
Emerging artists are well aware of reputations, and will often seek to apprentice themselves with 
master artists, hoping to learn, but also perhaps to improve their own reputations by affiliation. In 
fashion circles, working at an haute couture design house carries its own imprimatur, and is a 
well-respected resume booster among young talent.91 This culture of reputational gains achieved 
                                                
89 This may be held to be equally true in such fields as comedy, cuisine, literature, and other creative arts. 
90 The lack of compensation may occur even in the case of mature, highly respected and renowned 
fashion designers. For instance, Isaac Mizrahi, a famous designer of haute couture, has been compelled to 
declare bankruptcy well into the trajectory of his career. See Constance White, Mizrahi, Designer Most 
Likely to Succeed, Doesn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 1998), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/02/nyregion/mizrahi-designer-most-likely-to-succeed-doesn-t.html. 
91 Similarly, in cuisine, apprenticeship in the kitchen of a master chef has long been seen as an essential 
stage of culinary training, a rite of passage, as well as a means of beginning to secure a reputation as an 
emerging chef who has been vetted and approved by the master chef. Thus, in cuisine, chefs describe a 
“culture of hospitality” that they share among chefs and apprentices in the kitchen. They also share a 
culture of attribution and acknowledgement of priority: credit is given to innovators who create new 
recipes, culinary styles, and even methods of cooking (for instance, molecular gastronomy). Secondary 
chefs may imitate, appropriate, or riff on the works of master chefs, but attribution where at all possible is 
de rigueur: even in the case of historic dishes, for instance, a chef will often add “in the style of” to 
acknowledge the precedent source. Due to chefs’ desire for peer approval within culinary community, 
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by proximity and apprenticeship to established masters is hardly singular to fashion, nor does it 
necessarily require a low-IP environment in which to flourish. The question, however, is where 
reputational benefits will fall in a more IP-rich landscape, in which copyright in works may come 
to stand in as a proxy for training, know-how, and originality of design. Further, as in other 
creative endeavors, it may be more challenging for high-end designers to offer apprenticeships to 
young talent if they are concerned with protecting the unique aspects of their work and the 
sanctity of their copyrights. It is an open question whether the vigilance of defending IP rights 
will have an impact on the relatively open sharing, knowledge exchange, and even collaboration 
that can occur between master and apprentice.92 These are just a few concerns that highlight the 
potential upheaval that dramatic changes to a creative ecosystem can incur. 
 
3. Breakdown of Norms with Respect to Knowledge Exchange and Collaboration 
 
While many industries value collaborative work, creative fields may be said to have among the 
most deep-seated affinities for collaboration, sharing, knowledge exchange, and open-sourced 
generation of new ideas, output and experience. Often creative entities or individuals will agree 
to share rights in the fruits of their collaboration. Just as often, however, parties will agree in 
advance not to propertize certain parts of the work, or to reserve rights to to propertize at some 
future point in time in the creative process. This may entail agreeing to publish research at 
critical junctures, maintaining open source or open access repositories of data, information, and 
findings, and other collaborative engagements. These kinds of arrangements can go far in 
allowing collaboration to proceed untrammeled with concerns that complicated rights allocations 
or burdensome licensing negotiations will hold up the creative endeavor and thwart productivity 
from the start. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
blame is quickly meted out to known plagiarists within the community, and social sanctions are highly 
effective. Interestingly, Internet stories and blogs about food are quick to single out and discredit culinary 
pirates or copyists, which offers one instance of technology actually inhibiting outright copying without 
attribution.  
92 In the case of cuisine, some chefs have indeed expressed concern over appropriation of their recipes, 
cooking methods, and signature dishes. See generally Michael Goldman, Cooking and Copyright: When 
Chefs and Restaurateurs Should Receive Copyright Protection for Recipes and Aspects of Their 
Professional Repertoires, 23 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENTER. L. 153 (2013). 
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The norms surrounding collaborative work vary, but they can stand in for more formal 
arrangements such as IP rights allocations or rights licensing. While it might seem evident that 
propertization would establish clear-cut relationships between unequal entities, it may in fact not 
be necessary to create elaborate property rights, or to add layers of rights, in advance of 
collaborative creative production. For instance, in fashion, increasing collaboration between 
retailers (e.g., Zara or Target) and designers (e.g., Kate Moss or Martha Stewart) has proved 
resoundingly successful, on fairly simple terms: retailer sponsors work, while designers get 
credit and a cut of proceeds.93 No copyright is involved, although usually licensing and 
trademark terms are contractually agreed upon and explicated. Even when propertization is 
involved, as often occurs in academic research, property rights may be delineated in advance 
between corporate funders or foundation sponsors and academic scientists, but the right of 
scientists to engage freely in some measure of collaboration, even with outside scientists, may be 
agreed upon in advance. 
 
In the case of copyright in courses, professors have long engaged in collaboration and sharing 
amongst themselves, for instance, circulating syllabi, mentoring young faculty, co-teaching 
courses, guest teaching and lecturing, and creating interdisciplinary jointly-led courses. When 
courses become subject to copyright, however, these practices may be placed at risk by the need 
to clear rights among faculty, institutions, and stakeholders. The informal norms that facilitate 
collaborative practices may be replaced by more structured, explicated agreements. The risk in 
this case is that when propertization becomes the new norm, collaboration can entail new, and 
possibly onerous, licensing, transaction, and/or clearing costs. This may undermine spontaneity, 
particularly in fields where collaborating often occurs loosely and freely, such as academic work, 
but also in other creative fields such as literary writing (theater), entertainment (film), or music. 
Or propertization may require collaborating parties and related stakeholders to engage in more 
formalized cost/benefit analyses prior to collaborating. Not only might this have a chilling effect, 
particularly with respect to small-scale collaborations (where the costs of rights management are 
likely to be higher than the rewards), but it might change the open and collaborative nature of 
creative practices altogether, thereby reconfiguring the landscape of entire creative industries. 
                                                
93 See generally supra Chapter 1, subsection III.G.5. 
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B. Breakdown of Economies of Prestige 
 
In many creative content industries, the commercial exploitation of finished output has not 
historically been the sole incentive or reward for creative generation or innovative development. 
Indeed, leading commentators describe “economies of prestige” as areas in which public sector 
incentives and rewards can not only displace private sector benefits, but also serve as better and 
more efficient stimuli. In the words of two prominent scholars, Stephen Maurer and Suzanne 
Scotchmer, “different models of knowledge creation call for different incentive schemes.”94 
These schemes work particularly well in the case of creative environments “where the social 
value of an innovation is not appropriable by private firms or intellectual property rights are 
insufficient to cover costs.”95 Generally, the mechanisms that prevail in economies of prestige 
can be found in various public sector settings. As Maurer and Scotchmer note, “mechanisms 
[other than IPRs] have remained important [particularly in the public sector]. . . . Funding 
mechanisms used by the public sector routinely include in-house development, procurement 
through competitive bidding, and research grants to universities and promising scientists. The 
public sector also uses hybrids that mix sponsorship with intellectual property.”96 In the context 
of creative content industries, such as the education sector, the receipt of such research grants 
and sponsorship options have historically been an important source of support that bolster 
institutional resources earmarked for creation and innovation. Likewise, prestige-based 
incentives and rewards in the education sector have comprised prizes,97 research contests,98 
government grants,99 public sponsors and the direction of research,100 and mixed public/private 
incentives.101 
 
                                                
94 Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Procuring Knowledge 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9903, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9903.pdf. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1. 
97 Id. at 7-10. 
98 Id. at 10-16. 
99 Id. at 17-20. 
100 Id. at 20-23. 
101 Id. at 23-26. 
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In education, prizes, grants, public sponsorships and funding, and so on have been vital sources 
of support that stand side-by-side with institutional resources, private funding, and revenues 
flowing from the commercial exploitation of IP rights in academic output, such as patented 
innovations, or trademarked properties. Recently, however, these pillars of the economies of 
prestige have been threatened by widespread public opposition to public funding and support of 
higher education. Disruptive innovation on the copyright side of the academic funding equation 
may serve only to heighten opposition to prestige-based awards to academe, particularly if 
MOOCs offered by educational institutions become a commercially viable and potentially 
profitable venture. In such a case, public resistance to support of higher education may reflect a 
widely-held sense that academia can be wholly self-sustaining by profiting from its work 
product, not only on the patent and trademark side, but also on the copyright side. While there 
may be some justification for such a perspective, it is also a short-term view that does not fully 
take into consideration many important factors that are central to the academic world. For one, 
the long gestation time required for creating viable work may require immediate support in order 
to lead to long-term gains. Second, it is not at all clear that enough academic work, whether in 
patentable research and development (“R&D”) or in copyrightable courses, will yield sufficient 
revenues to clear investment costs, let alone to support the costly ecosystem of academia. Third, 
requiring institutions to look to their profitable work as a mainstay of support is likely to 
incentivize academics to pursue work that has the highest commercial potential, rather than work 
that is important but less viable in the marketplace, thereby undermining the central tenet of 
academia that is broadly described as the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. And fourth, 
institutions that are hard-pressed to earn revenues from the exploitation of academic IP may find 
themselves compelled to lean on their faculty to pursue commercially viable work. This can put 
at risk academic freedom, which is a central cultural tenet of higher education. 
 
C. Breakdown of Guild-Like Spaces Governed by Norms and  
Commonly Agreed-Upon Practices 
 
Norm-rich environments tend to be predicated on highly structured practices and agreements—
sometimes but not always informal or unspoken but understood—that bind together tightly-knit 
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communities.102 Guilds, or guild-like spaces, represent such controlled environments, that: (a) 
are restricted by membership, and extend responsibilities and privileges only to members; (b) 
may offer apprenticeship and training to nascent members, and confer the guild’s imprimatur 
upon successfully trained members; (c) protect the rights of members in their work, ensuring that 
rewards are reaped by members; (d) share a system of group norms, as opposed to formal legal 
enactments, that serve as an enforcement mechanism; (e) promote sanctions that give notice to 
potential copyists that they will be pursued, and at the same time actually thwart and/or punish 
actual copyists; and (e) promote both traditional creative work and new original work that meet 
with members’ approval and regard.103 
 
Guilds and guild-like spaces tend to be conformist in nature, and due in part to their longstanding 
practices and internalized agreements, do not generally rely upon an IP-rich regime to achieve 
effective outcomes that spur both creation and reward. As the foremost commentator on guilds, 
Robert Merges, notes, guilds create an “appropriability structure” that “makes it profitable for 
individual entities to both develop new technologies and share them.”104 Moreover, Merges 
notes, guilds can sustain “a balance of competition and cooperation under which group-generic 
information is shared, but individual-proprietary information is not.”105 Thus, by engaging in 
often (but not always) formalized self-governance practices, guilds represent a form of private 
ordering arrangement that can serve to reduce transaction costs, such as the costs of negotiating, 
allocating and managing IP rights and rewards.106 
                                                
102 See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2002); Robert P. Merges, From  Medieval 
Guilds to Open Source Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Univ. of 
Wis. Law Sch., Conference on the Legal History of Intellectual Property, Working Paper, 2004), 
available at http:// ssrn.com/abstract=661543.  
103 Robert Merges enumerates three leading characteristics of guilds: “(1) an ‘appropriability structure’ 
that makes it profitable for individual entities to both develop new technologies and share them; (2) 
reliance on group norms, as opposed to formal legal enactments, as an enforcement mechanism; and (3) a 
balance of competition and cooperation under which group-generic information is shared, but individual-
proprietary information is not.” Merges, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 2. I have 
expanded upon these characteristics to highlight their relevance to various creative content industries.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 In this respect, guilds can manifest some of the practical arrangements that are entered into by various 
private actors that are obliged to come to a mutually agreed-upon set of practices in order to prosper and 
share resources beneficially. See ELINOR OSTRON, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: 
HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994).  




Guilds were originally created to sustain production and creativity within a trade, by (i) offering 
a training grounds for young apprentices seeking mastery of the trade; (ii) delineating the 
traditions, responsibilities, roles, techniques, norms and practices of members of the trade; (iii) 
metering the rights and rewards flowing to guild members from productive output; (iv) policing 
outsiders seeking to compete with guild members and ensuring that they would not appropriate 
guild-specific practices, techniques or products; and (v) sanctioning any appropriation that might 
arise accordingly. Most guild-like systems today, such as low-IP or IP-free regimes that involve 
tightly knit communities of creators, may still adhere to some of these practices. Most 
importantly, these guild-like structures share the ability to exchange information and know-how, 
to keep vital information flowing among their members yet protected within their parameters, 
and to allow the appropriation of knowledge to lead to profitability among the group’s members. 
These present-day “appropriability institutions,”107 as Merges calls them, include patent pools,108 
industry-wide standard-setting organizations,109 informal knowledge exchange among academic 
scientists,110 and (in a more limited way) open source software development.111 
 
When technology challenges guilds or guild-like spaces, driving copying at such levels that the 
viability of the underlying creative industry is challenged, guild members may look at IP rights 
with increased interest, seeking to bolster guild-like practices with a more formalized rights-
based approach. But IP rights are not necessarily easy, or indeed ultimately desirable, to 
superimpose upon a guild-like system. First, IP can be skewed in its effects on guild members, 
benefiting certain more-established members at the expense of less- powerful ones. IP rights, 
after all, can require significant resources to defend via litigation or other formal mechanisms, 
such as mediation. Unless the guild or guild-like coalition has actual funds set aside for the 
protection of its minor members, IP lawsuits will not necessarily be open to all parties, nor likely 
to result in equitable outcomes across the board. Second, adding layers of IP to an existing 
                                                
107 Merges, supra note 103, at 13. 
108 Id. at 18-19. 
109 Id. at 19. 
110 Id. at 18. 
111 Id. at 19-22. 
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regime can interfere with longstanding practices that signal certain critical information to 
outsiders, including competitors, consumers, and market-watchers. And third, enhanced IP may 
not serve to stimulate creativity in a guild or guild-like system. In such systems, internal 
mechanisms may already suffice to promote and reward creativity. As mentioned, building 
strong reputational norms among peers is often already a major motivating force among creators 
in a given field. The desire to collaborate, and to be deemed worthy of collaboration, may also 
offer strong positive incentives to maintain high creative activity. The guild’s ability to ensure 
that rewards are appropriately garnered, and threats to such rewards (such as incursions by 
potential copyists) are policed, also allows creators to work with knowledge that they will reap 
profits and will not be undermined by unfair appropriation. In such circumstances, IP rights need 
not serve as a substitute for guild-based mechanisms. Nor do they clearly protect the creative 
output. Lastly, by superimposing, or substituting, a formalized set of rules for an internally 
agreed-upon set of practices and norms, IP rights may interfere with or undo the very 
foundations of a guild or guild-like system. To some critics of such a system, propertization may 
seem a positive development. But to the system’s members, awareness that it may be radically 
altered, and agreement to such changes, are preferably secured up-front, rather than after changes 
have been made and the guild-like practices and protections are displaced. 
 
The fashion industry features several guild-like practices, comprising a loosely-defined yet 
distinct membership of designers (both emerging and established) who engage in norms-based 
practices such as conferring reputation, policing appropriation, establishing the allocation of 
rewards and privileges, and so on. Indeed, in the early twentieth century fashion actually had a 
fairly well-established guild system, the Fashion Originators Guild (“FOGA”), which among 
other operations created a highly effective system of registering apparel, monitoring potential 
appropriation of registered apparel designs by outsiders, and by attempting to maintain apparel 
prices that had been threatened by competitors’ copying and cut-rate sales (although these 
practices primarily affected apparel at the higher price end of the spectrum).112 According to at 
least one prominent commentator, these practices that stood in the stead of actual IP rights might 
                                                
112 Id. at 19. 
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“suggest that a higher-IP regime was desired by high-end designers.”113 But another equally 
plausible approach to understanding the Guild’s efforts is to consider that they demonstrate the 
fashion industry’s interest in establishing its own set of mechanisms to regulate the behavior and 
norms of the industry, without recourse to the formalized property rights of IP rights systems and 
the institutionalized remedies of litigation. The Guild’s behavior arguably spurred outside 
competitors to innovate in the design of less-expensive apparel, rather than to copy high-end 
designs, when faced with the threat of Guild policing and sanctions. But it is hard to determine to 
what extent this impetus was caused by the propertization of rights in apparel, via a formal 
registration system of original apparel designs, versus through the active monitoring and public 
condemnation that the Guild undertook against its competition. 
 
The Guild itself was eventually challenged and dismantled by the courts on antitrust grounds.114 
This raises valid questions as to whether or not guilds or guild-like practices can exist at all 
without running afoul of anti-competition laws. But the more pertinent question in IP terms is 
what the Guild could accomplish with or without propertization of fashion’s original designs. If 
copyright of apparel were to be legislated into being, and if a registry of original designs were to 
be made functional, certain critical issues would almost certainly surface. For instance, it is clear 
in the historic case that copyright in dress design would best serve high-end designers. But these 
designers already enjoy a significant lead-time advantage in the field, as their works are the first 
to be issued and then followed. This might increase the market position for high-end designers, 
thereby concentrating yet more power at the top of the fashion design pyramid. Further, it is 
unclear whether copyright in design would benefit independent and/or emerging designers, who 
might be able to register their original works, but might not have the resources to defend any 
incursions on their properties. In the case of a guild, defense funds might be pooled and set aside 
to cover members’ litigation costs. But in a competitive marketplace, the smaller stakeholders 
might not realize the benefits of IP rights that they could not defend. One solution might be to 
create a clearing house, somewhat analogous to the performing rights organizations that manage 
music rights, which have the resources and authority to monitor copyrighted works in their 
                                                
113 Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comment on The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design 3 (Uni. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 328, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959727. 
114 Id. at 2-3. 
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purview and to sanction illicit copying or misuse of their members’ registered works. But this 
kind of registry seems more suited to fashion trademark, which centers on clear-cut logos, 
recognizable brands, and signifying markers that convey important information to consumers 
regarding quality, origin, and authenticity. A registry of trademarks to prevent fashion 
counterfeiting is highly appropriate to preserve these important industry-wide practices. In the 
case of copyright, however, the registration of apparel design is a much less well-defined 
proposition, as originality is hard to define (due in part to the norm of homage qua deliberate 
appropriation), and as appropriation is not universally condemned. Indeed, one part of the 
fashion copyright conundrum is the interest that some designers have in allowing copying to 
occur, and even in engaging in a certain degree of copying, in order to secure trends, bolster 
reputations, and reach ever-wider audiences. This positive regard for copying likewise permeates 
large segments of fashion consumers. Many consumers, at all points of the price spectrum, will 
increasingly concede that they are willing, if not eager, to purchase knock-offs that faithfully 
replicate the latest high-end trends at a fraction of the original cost. While elite designers have 
long deprecated these patterns of consumption, they are not immune to its appeal: several such 
designers have begun to create secondary lines, at reduced price and quality than their luxury 
lines, that knock-off their own latest trend-setting items as well as items drawn from the trends 
that they identify in the current season. The market in knock-offs is rapidly expanding, and the 
buy-in of designers across the spectrum may speak to its likely longevity. But it may also speak 
to a tacit understanding among designers at all levels that the absence of IP allows creativity and 
some degree of appropriation to co-exist in a thriving market, and to benefit the market overall. 
 
D. Possible Undermining of “Negative Space” in Fields Where IP Has Not Traditionally Been 
Called Upon to Keep Productivity Robust 
 
As seen in the case of guild-like systems, well-established practices and norms can effectively 
manage creative output among members, with recourse to propertization only where it may be 
required to stave off overly predatory copying that cannot be adequately penalized and halted. 
These private ordering arrangements may to a certain extent obviate the need to impose the 
transaction costs or administrative costs that are usually prevalent in IP-based regimes, and for 
this reason are arguably preferable first-order solutions to the copying conundrum. Similarly, in 
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mature industries that are already non-IP or low-IP based, also known as IP’s “negative spaces,” 
introducing propertization may require an initial cost-benefit analysis that takes into account 
likely transaction costs, as well as more intangible costs to the industrial ecosystem. 
 
The fashion industry example outlined in the guild context is a premier example of the 
functionality of negative spaces. Although structured as a guild at an earlier point in its history, 
the fashion industry is now so enormous and multidimensional, spanning international 
production centers and markets, that it can no longer rightfully be deemed guild-like, as its 
membership cannot now be meaningfully restricted. Nonetheless, efforts have been made to 
move to a property-based fashion regime, in which some copyright in original design might 
serve to keep productivity robust. However, as outlined above, there are considerable costs to 
such proposals. These include the following concerns: (i) copyright in fashion design may need 
to be protected against infringement (litigation costs); (ii) smaller designers may be hampered by 
inability to assume such costs, even if it is their work that is disproportionately subject to 
copying; (iii) administrative costs of “registering” designs, proving originality sufficient to merit 
copyright protection, and keeping up copyright may be unduly high, especially for new 
designers; and (iv) there may not be payoffs to copyright, as there is in music, if knock-off 
designers aren’t subject to “royalty”-like payments (as in the case of music where an artist will 
pay to cover a song). Thus, even a licensing system in fashion design is established, its costs may 
not outweigh its benefits. Even in the current environment, in which technological innovations in 
copying techniques have brought appropriation to new all-time highs, these concerns remain 
constant, and do not seem clearly to be resolved by the introduction of copyright in original 
fashion design.115 
                                                
115 Similarly, the culinary world represents a regime in which productivity currently flourishes without 
recourse to propertization of creative output. Although cuisine, like fashion, is a sprawling and 
international industry, it bears closer to resemblance to a guild-like system, insofar as its prominent chefs 
are still more limited in number, and their reputations are better secured among industry insiders. Other 
guild-like attributes include a free-wheeling culture of sharing, attributing, paying homage by imitating or 
making riffs on famous recipes, and a very strong system of apprenticeship that legitimizes and 
credentializes emerging talent. Yet again some calls have been made for shaping a limited copyright in 
recipes, as well as unique and/or original cooking styles. But as in the case of the fashion industry, 
copyright in cuisine may undermine some of the foundational practices, norms, and rewards that 
contribute to its thriving ecosystem. One aspect of cuisine that illustrates many of these features is its 
apprenticeship-based system of training and instruction. See generally Debra First, Chefs Take the Stage, 
BOSTON (June 27, 2012), 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 258 
 
E. Loss of Flexibility that Non-IP or Low-IP Spaces May Afford 
 
In some industries, the low-IP equilibrium may allow various kinds of useful flexibility, whether 
by design or by practice. Demands for greater propertization may emerge in these industries, or 
may be contested (past or present), but increasing propertization may come at the cost of 
flexibility, growth, and/or innovation.116 In creative fields such as music, for instance, the ability 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/food/articles/2012/06/27/when_the_chef_becomes_the_apprentice. 
Emerging chefs still follow longstanding practices of joining an established kitchen, mastering the 
repertoire of the head chef, developing their own style, and then breaking away to preside over their own 
kitchen. Id. Under the apprentice system, reputation is conferred first by association, and then by 
achievement: hence, many young chefs claim their expertise based in whose kitchen they worked in, such 
as Ferran Adria’s famed kitchen at El Bulli in Spain, or Lydia Shire’s stable of restaurants in the Boston 
area, or Alice Waters’ groundbreaking restaurant and garden in California. By proxy, these emerging 
chefs accrue reputational capital that would be much more difficult to establish without affiliation, not to 
mention without the rigorous training that apprenticeships entail. Generally, even the most talented young 
chefs will first learn to master the cooking vocabulary, or the range of dishes, for which the master chefs 
are duly renowned. When called upon to reproduce these dishes, young chefs are able to give expression 
to their prowess, and also to show that they have command over the fundamentals of haute cuisine. These 
practices, however, are predicated upon the ability of chefs to share, convey, re-create, and eventually re-
master an entire lexicon of recipes that are neither copyrighted nor otherwise propertized. A proprietary 
system would necessarily change the access that chefs have to this shared repository of culinary learning, 
and would require some form of rights clearing, such as some sort of licensing or contractual agreement, 
prior to recipes being learned, exchanged, and reworked. New recipes that involve intriguing variations 
on older versions might run the risk of appearing not merely derivative but also appropriative, thereby 
potentially violating the rights of the recipes’ copyright holders. As in the case of education, chefs seeking 
to bring their creative recipes with them to new employment positions might be curtailed from so doing, 
most notably if culinary establishments and restaurants chose to assert copyright in their chefs’ original 
works. Thus, not only might reputational benefits be forfeited, but portability of work might be restricted 
among itinerant chefs. Clearly the culinary establishment has considered proprietary rights to be 
important in some limited degree: cookbooks, for instance, are typically copyrighted in the industry, and 
the commentary surrounding recipes, including the authorial chef’s annotations, instructions, and 
information relating to the recipes are an integral part of the copyrighted material. It is only the recipes 
themselves that chefs do not subject to copyright; and it is this balance that seems to serve the industry 
well.  
116 Several examples of well-functioning low-IP regimes can be identified. In the case of computer 
databases, for instance, a split between U.S. and European Union practices is revealing. In the United 
States, such databases are unprotected; whereas in the E.U. they are protected. Tellingly, it is in the E.U. 
that the number of computer databases has actually declined steadily since protection was extended, 
whereas such databases continue to thrive in the U.S. A further example from the computer sector is that 
of Open Source (“OS”) software. In this instance, the underlying source code is indeed copyrightable. 
However, participants in OS programming construct, and engage in, a cooperative low-IP regime. 
According to some prominent commentators, OS projects use the default rules of IP law as a lever to 
require the code's openness--an end that OS projects pursue for what is described as “a mix of ideological 
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to work collaboratively on large musical works (such as musicals, operas, performance art, and 
other large-scale works), high levels of proprietary rights may complicate the negotiation and 
clearing of rights to the detriment of performance, reproduction, recording and distribution goals. 
Increasingly, music permeates a variety of entertainment products, such as movies, theatrical 
releases, television shows, and so on. The cross-licensing of musical rights has been known to 
spiral to such levels of complexity that some promising works have been thwarted or delayed 
due to hold-out problems and other rights-related obstacles. The problem is only heightened by 
the increasing globalization of music and entertainment, in that international rights become even 
more costly to assess and administrate.117 In contrast, in less IP-protected fields such as fashion, 
the general absence of copyright (with the exception of a minor carve-out for some fashion print 
design) simplifies the negotiations that cross-licensing entities must undertake to clear 
collaborative designs, shows, and collections. It is of course possible that if copyright were to be 
imposed on fashion, rights-clearing mechanisms could be established to minimize transaction 
costs and maximize the potential for collaborative work, cross-licensed output, and other such 
arrangements. But the flexibility of the current regime should nonetheless be appreciated as one 
of the features that has allowed fashion to flourish in its exchanges and cross-licensed output. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
and economic motivations”. A third example, analogous to the copyright industries, is drawn from 
technology and technology patents, and involves the microprocessor industry. This industry maintains 
another "contractual" low-IP equilibrium. The microprocessor industry harbors a "charmed circle" in the 
industry of a small number of dominant firms. These firms engage in portfolio cross-licensing, thus 
freeing them to pursue architectural and manufacturing innovations without concern for the large number 
of overlapping and conflicting patent claims that may otherwise arise. Added benefits from the large 
microprocessor firms' perspective are increased entry barriers that the portfolio cross-licenses impose 
upon would-be upstarts that lack similarly comprehensive patent portfolios. See infra Chapter 6, 
subsection I.F.3.  
117 See generally Alaister Moughan, Music with Boundaries: Cross-Territory Licensing Issue & How to 
Solve Them, NEW MUSIC SEMINAR (Apr. 23, 2014), http://newmusicseminar.com/music-with-boundaries-
cross-territory-licensing-issues-how-to-solve-them/. 
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F. Expansion of Copyright via Propertization of Things We Don’t Normally Consider 
Copyrightable, Such as Certain Performative Acts 
 
Under current copyright law, performative acts118, whether artistic, educational, commercial, or 
other purposes, are generally not copyrightable. One of the constraints hindering copyright in 
performative acts is the statutory requirement that a copyrightable work be “fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression.”119 There are workarounds for certain performative acts, however. For 
instance, an original choreographed dance may be deemed “fixed” when the choreographer 
records the steps of the dance on paper.120 This expands the contours of copyrightable works, 
however, and is a debatable proposition when applied to areas that either already have copyright 
protections or do not appear to be shortchanged by an absence of copyright protections. 
Expansion of the subject matter and scope of copyright demands a solid rationale that may not be 
readily discerned. Further, as earlier discussed, copyright protection tends to entail rights-
clearing transaction costs that may prove to outweigh the benefits it might yield to putative 
copyright holders. 
 
In the context of education, while courses are likely historically protected (courses arguably 
having some copyrightable status when they are “fixed” via course and lecture notes, and related 
teaching materials), the act of teaching a specific course has not been protected. Some faculty or 
institutions may seek to have teaching itself protected, in a manner as analogous to the protection 
extended to some dance choreography of a dance being protected. It is conceivable that such 
protection could function like a performance right in music, whereby performance of another’s 
work requires a licensing right to be obtained and royalties to be paid for the performance. This 
might be effectuated through a rights-clearing organization structured similarly to music’s 
performing rights organizations. Given the complex nature of education, and the enormous 
educational industry today, the transaction costs would likely be considerable. Moreover, the 
emergence of MOOCs only complicates the matter: to whom would copyright in the enactment 
                                                
118 By this I do not mean performance itself; rather, I mean the steps and instructions that set out how to 
do a performance, as in the case of dance, as described. 
119 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
120 Although even this characterization may be debatable. See, e.g., Julia Haye, So You Think You Can 
Steal My Dance? Copyright Protections for Choreography, LAW LAW LAND (Sept. 13, 2010), 
http://www.lawlawlandblog.com/2010/09/so_you_think_you_can_steal_my.html.  
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 261 
of courses be ceded, and whether or not it might be parsed among interested parties, such as the 
instructor’s home institution, the MOOC provider, and the instructor herself, might prove 
extremely difficult to negotiate, delineate, and manage.121 
 
G. Expansion of Copyrightable Subject Matter via Novel Construction of the Useful Articles 
Doctrine and Predicated upon the Possible Elision and/or Breakdown of the Distinction 
Between Functionality and Originality 
 
In certain industries, whether or not output is copyrightable may turn on the distinction between 
functionality and originality that is elucidated by the useful articles doctrine. In fashion, for 
instance, apparel design has historically been uncopyrightable, and grounds for that have been 
offered on functionality grounds, or the utilitarian function of clothes. If apparel becomes 
                                                
121 In the context of the negative space of cuisine, the nature of the performative act revolves around the 
preparation of a dish. Currently, recipes for dishes are not copyrightable, but the descriptions around them 
(as often arise in a cookbook, cooking magazine, or televised cooking lesson) may be copyrightable. It is 
conceivable chefs seeking rights in their original work could plausibly argue that the act of preparing a 
particular recipe according to instruction may constitute the "performance" of the underlying work. In an 
increasingly competitive world, asserting copyright over recipes may seem to make good sense: chefs 
could stake their claim to culinary success on their portfolio of original recipes, instructions, cooking 
styles, and methods of preparation. Yet establishing rights in performative works in cuisine represents yet 
another expansion of propertization in hitherto unclaimed space. Allocating these rights might again 
prove problematic. If copyright were expanded to include recipes, permission to reproduce recipes by 
cooking in an individual kitchen would have to be granted, either through a carve-out for personal use or 
through practice (that is, not pursuing licensing rights in each individual use). More challenging would be 
public preparations of copyrighted recipes, such as meals cooked in a restaurant. A three-course menu 
might require multiple rights in recipes to be cleared, entailing at least some transaction costs. Itinerant 
chefs and volatile restaurants (both of which are rife in the industry) would be compelled to delineate 
their copyrights and to determine where rights would be retained in the case of departure, dissolving, 
runaway success, or other major events. Collaboration might prove more cumbersome than customary, as 
the negotiation of rights would likely be required to precede the exchange of recipes, information, secrets, 
and know-how. And elaborate fine dining events might become still more costly than at present, as 
licensing thickets would need to be cleared and transaction costs absorbed into the price of the 
experience. Lastly, it seems unlikely that the status of individual chefs would be much improved were 
they to receive copyright in their culinary creations. Most chefs would not prosecute their rights if they 
had them (due to time and money constraints, as well as the distraction that litigation tends to entail). 
Copyright infringement suits would likely be brought by large publishing houses that own the rights to 
recipes contained in the cookbooks. And chefs who created the recipes might find it complicated and 
confusing to navigate their rights to use the recipes in their cookbooks, particularly if rights in the recipe 
were held by the publishing house and not by the chefs themselves. as they no longer have copyright in 
them. While licensing schemes could be developed to bypass some of these issues, they would still take 
considerable effort to delineate, clarify, and refine through practice. Thus, it would seem that cookbook 
publishers would stand to benefit most from copyright in recipes, although they are not constitutionally 
protected parties (as of course are authors and the public).  
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expressive, as in the case of certain fashion design, determinations of originality at this point 
may be fraught, not to mention highly complicated at this juncture in fashion’s rich and multi-
layered history.122 Nonetheless, it may well be argued that certain aspects of a fashionable work 
may not be merely, or even primarily, functional. Yet whether or not those elements may be 
deemed distinguishable, and therefore separable (legally, that is), from the work in which they 
are embedded remains an open question that would most likely require adjudication to 
determine. 
 
Authorship is another point of contention, particularly where it may be difficult to differentiate 
the work of authorship from the instructions about how to perform it. But instructions about how 
to perform a work are not the same as the work of authorship: for instance, a schematic rendering 
of choreographed dance steps is not a procedure, and the required instruments and sequence of 
notes for a symphony do not constitute a process. Along these lines, following the well-settled 
precedent of Baker v. Selden,123 processes and procedures (techniques) are uncopyrightable, but 
their expression may be copyrightable: for instance, a treatise on perspective drawing is 
copyrightable, but the author does not get an exclusive right to practice perspective drawing.124 
 
Again, the fashion sector can offer some insight into the debate. As noted, dance choreography 
may be copyrightable.125 Arguably, then, the expressive and aesthetic side of original fashion 
design may offer works of authorship that are copyrightable. For instance patterns and drawings 
of dresses and/or collections (particularly if annotated), “look books”, and so on could be 
                                                
122 See supra Chapter 1. Similarly, in cuisine, recipes have been deemed uncopyrightable on functionality 
grounds. To the contrary, however, there are commentators who argue that some new dishes are 
innovative and original enough to rise to the copyrightability standard (and some may not even be 
particularly functional in a traditional sense, for instance, the “molecular cuisine” pioneered by Ferran 
Adria and refined by his followers at Noma and elsewhere is arguably more designed to experiment with 
scientific principles behind cooking, as well as to play artistically with one’s ideas of what cooking is). 
See generally Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: Should Thomas Keller’s 
Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 1121 (2007).  
123 101 U.S. 99 (1880).  
124 See id. 
125 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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deemed copyrightable, while instructions or techniques describing how to sew or make an item 
might be deemed strictly functional and therefore not copyrightable.126 
 
The rhetoric of authenticity also plays into determinations of copyrightability. As one prominent 
commentator on fashion and copyright notes, "the rhetoric of authenticity performs much the 
same social function as property ownership, placing the claimant group in a position superior to 
all others with respect to the item in question.”127 A question as to whether authorship and/or 
originality norms tend to develop in creative endeavors that privilege individual creative 
composition, such as music, over what is, or was, often collaborative creation in fields such as 
fashion.128 It may be possible that making certain works in fashion, and potentially other low-IP 
fields, copyrightable confers varying degrees of status vis-a-vis authenticity, originality and 
expressiveness that may hitherto have been recognized by aficionados, but not formalized by 
being granted the legal status and protections that copyright confers. 
 
H. Potential Repercussions of Propertization on the Public Domain 
 
It may seem evident that content-rich companies would welcome propertization. Indeed, many 
vociferous proponents of property rights have emerged in low-IP regimes such as fashion and 
cuisine, giving rise to a general sense that propertization is desirable to protect creative content. 
But over-propertization may be problematic, even for content providers. Some of these problems 
are administrative, such as increased transaction and/or administrative costs, licensing 
headaches, increased levels of litigiousness, and so on. Other concerns are more difficult to 
                                                
126 Again, cuisine provides a parallel illustration. In culinary circles, there is already much movement in 
this direction: for instance original cookbooks, which may be expressive, authored, authentic, and 
“conceptually separable” from function are copyrightable; whereas recipes, which are instructions and 
techniques, or means of fixation, but are purely functional, are not. 
127 SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY IN AMERICAN LAW 54 
(2005). 
128 MARTHA WOODMANSEE & PETER JASZI, THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL 
APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE (POST-CONTEMPORARY INTERVENTIONS) (1994). This is not a 
perfect distinction to draw, admittedly, as many fashion designers act independently and are famous in 
their own right, while many musicians play together in bands, compose music together, and engage in 
collaborative efforts. But the status of authenticity in fashion is often put into question, in part due to 
fashion’s long history and the general perception that fashion rarely presents truly original works but 
rather continually offers re-workings of past trends, works and ideas.  
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quantify, but potentially equally weighty in their consequences, such as a possible erosion of 
collaborative norms. Another consideration is the effect on the public domain. While some 
content companies may not seem overly concerned with the public domain, others may be well 
aware that their creators draw from its wellspring for inspiration, ideas, and source materials. It is 
impossible to tell how much the growth of the public domain would be affected by granting IP 
rights in currently non-protected creations. But many creative works that are not extended 
copyright protection, such as fashion styles, musical practices and methods, and an array of 
educational and pedagogical content are available for use by anyone who pleases.129 In the case 
of increased propertization, the public domain would only be meaningfully enlarged if some 
creators who would otherwise keep their works secret would consent to publishing them in return 
for copyright protection. The default, however, would alter from a regime that begins with open 
access to one in which access is granted by a few generous parties. This seems likely to lead to 
more restrictions being placed on content, which may hinder creators who seek both to 
contribute to and to draw from the creative marketplace. 
 
I. Possible Negative Effects of Propertization on the  
Actual Creative Content Itself 
 
It has been suggested by two prominent commentators, Oliar and Sprigman, that making creative 
work copyrightable may in certain cases have an effect on the nature of the content itself.130 
While conventional IP wisdom sees protection as mainly affecting how much creative work is 
produced, they suggest that it also affects the nature and kind of content produced.131 These 
commentators point to the example of stand-up comedy to illustrate some of the effects that 
changes in the environment might have on creative material.132 Oliar and Sprigman trace an 
evolution in the culture and economics of stand-up comedy which track a corresponding 
evolution in the norms of stand-up comics away from a regime that treated jokes as a commons 
                                                
129 This also includes culinary recipes and dishes, comedy routines, and yoga poses. 
130 See generally Dotan Oliar & Christopher Jon Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 U. VA. L. 
REV. 1787 (2008).  
131 Id. at 1793.  
132 See generally id. 
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and toward informal property rules that limit appropriation.133 In the comedy world as it has 
evolved to the present day, a comedian is lauded by his peers as well as audiences for the unique 
nature of his creative material, such as jokes and stand-up routines.134 His reputation is critical to 
his being hired for various engagements or gigs, and it is therefore his coin of the comedy realm. 
A comedian’s jokes must be fresh, unique, and topical to retain the interest of audiences and gain 
the approval of peers. This means that comedians today are incentivized to invest in new, 
original and personal content.135 At the same time, while paying to one another’s creative 
material, comedians are strongly discouraged from borrowing jokes or routines without due 
attribution. Appropriation is prohibited not by externally-imposed rules, but rather by internally-
inculcated norms that render copying an unforgivable transgression against fellow comedians.136 
Those who flout the norms and appropriate creative work are likely to be sanctioned by overt 
criticism, shunning, and other social penalties that may have a markedly negative impact on a 
comedian’s employment prospects and standing in the community. Under the current 
community-based regulation, therefore, comedic creativity, as well as unwarranted appropriation 
of creativity, are regulated by an informal norms-based system. In this context, the text of the 
creative work—that is, the jokes, routines, and other elements of a comedian’s stock-in-trade that 
are uniquely expressive—are protected against encroachment and/or theft. Such protection may 
not be perfect, but the norms of the community do raise the cost of appropriation of such texts, 
which may not be deemed rational to assume by a prospective copyist. 
 
By raising the cost of appropriating creative comedic work, the norms-based culture of stand-up 
comedy incentivizes comedians to invest more in innovation directed at the substance, or text, of 
their creative output. Thus, comedians today will invest in new, original, and personal content, 
which tends to be observational in nature and point-of-view driven, rather than generalized. Oliar 
and Sprigman trace the rise of the personalization of comedy in recent years, and argue that 
comedians today invest less in developing the performative aspects of their work (such as sight 
gags, slapstick, and so on), as once occurred in such classic comedic settings as vaudeville, and 
more in simple stand-up routines in which fresh and original material are delivered (as, for 
                                                
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1854-55. 
135 Id. at 1831.  
136 See id. at 1812-23.  
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instance, in the simple stand-up delivery of such contemporary comedians as Jerry Seinfeld, C.K. 
Louis, and Dave Chappelle).137 Thus, they argue, following the rise of the norms system, 
comedians did not simply invest in creating more of the same kinds of material as before; rather, 
they changed the content of their material and diversified the types of comedy on offer.138 
 
The example of stand-up comedy, as limned by Oliar and Sprigman, suggests that the the 
benefits from establishing and enforcing an informal, norm-based property system in jokes and 
routines are greater in terms of ensuring real returns on investment, as notably argued 
Demsetz.139 But Oliar and Sprigman also argue that, contra Demsetz, causality is not strictly 
unidirectional.140 Demsetz’s theory would suggest that economic change may have have 
contributed to the emergence of norms-based property rights.141 Further, the norms-based 
system, accompanied by increasing adherence to the system, emerged contemporaneously with 
the transformation of comedic product from the generic to the increasingly original and 
personal.142 Causality, however, may also run in the other direction: that is, the more original the 
humor, the easier it may be to patrol originality against appropriation.143 This may lower the the 
costs associated with detecting appropriation of original jokes and routines, and with enforcing 
rights in such materials.  
 
Contemporary stand-up comedy therefore stands at a distinct remove from its predecessor. In the 
earlier post-vaudeville era, many jokes were generic, and were often hard to associate with a 
specific person.144 Today, when comedic material is more distinct, it is easier for listeners 
(whether peers or audiences) to detect appropriation.145 The costs, social and private, of 
enforcing rights in jokes are thus lower when humor is original. As the norms-based system of 
stand-up comedy has become more entrenched, it has come to make more sense for comedians to 
                                                
137 Id. at 1850.  
138 Id. at 1854. 
139 Id. at 1860 (discussing Harold Demsetz’s article Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347 (1967).  
140 Id.  
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 See id. at 1857.  
144 Id. at 1857. 
145 Id. 
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produce unique, observational, and point-of-view-driven content; and the more unique the 
comedians' material is, the easier it is to enforce and maintain a norms-based property system. In 
other words, with respect to the effect that norms and/or IP rules have on the nature of content, 
the causal relationship runs in both directions. 
 
The example of stand-up comedy exists in a negative space, in which IP does not formally grant 
property rights in original comedic output such as jokes and routines. Its norms-based system 
does, however, ensure that creative comedians will have the right to generate and benefit from 
their own original work without the threat of free-riding copyists who might otherwise 
undermine the source of their livelihood and the basis of their reputation among audiences and 
peers. The advent of technology in this instance may actually help comedians to maintain 
informal governance over this system by making it easier to detect appropriation of creative 
material: an Internet search for jokes and routines may unearth potential copyists more swiftly 
than ever. But the emergence of a particular kind of humor in the stand-up arena—one that relies 
more on the delivery of personal observations, sharply-honed witticisms, and point-of-view 
driven patter—may reveal that the nature of an ecosystem can have a profound effect on the 
creativity it supports, selects, and stimulates. Therefore, the choices that are made regarding 
which IP rules will govern a particular creative industry are most likely to implicate delicate 
normative judgments. Indeed, the choice of IP regime governing stand-up comedy may be seen 
as a factor that helps to shape both the type of material produced and the role of the art form in 
our society. For this reason, a reconsideration of IP rules may need to be updated, so as better to 
recognize and take into account various possibilities, such as: (i) they may change the nature of 
the creative practices they are regulating; (ii) different people are likely to create and consume at 
different levels of protection (good performers versus original writers); and (iii) different content 
is likely to be presented under different production processes. 
 
J. Breakdown of Commons 
 
Many of the features of guilds, discussed earlier in Section II.C, are also found today in 
commons, semi-commons, or constructed commons, which are analogous to guilds in their 
restricted membership, defined borders, practices and norms, and internal management of rights 
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and rewards. To a greater extent than guilds, however, commons are generally inscribed in the 
context of proprietary IP-based regimes. The traditional commons that exists in creative fields 
can be analogous to those that arise in real property contexts, as in the well-known cases of cattle 
ranchers and fish hatcheries.146  
 
Driving technological change can put pressure on the commons by various means, including 
accelerating resource exhaustion, changing the balance of powers between stakeholders, 
overturning long-established norms, and various other seismic shifts that may undermine the 
agreements, constructs, and understandings that allow a commons to be sustained and to thrive. 
In the university setting, the constructed commons147 is grounded in a proprietary model with 
respect to scientific research and scholarship, but is less formalized with respect to teaching of 
courses. Strong norms of sharing, collaboration, openness, and individual autonomy or 
“academic freedom” also undergird academia, which contribute to a commons that is, 
paradoxically, at once exceptionally robust and surprisingly delicate. In the case of academic 
research, for instance, some entities have greater rights in commons-based IP properties due to 
being parties in, or privy to, public-private partnerships among academic institutions and 
corporate allies. But when important fundamental research is concerned, commons may arise to 
protect basic materials that must be drawn upon to advance the scientific process—as in the case 
of basic genetic materials that are essential to a broad range of scientific work. Technology has 
facilitated the operational aspects of sharing of genetic materials in academia by offering 
massive databases that are readily accessible, user-friendly, sustainable, and broadly available. 
But technology also accelerates the rate to patenting, which puts pressure upon research 
scientists to make the most crucial genetic information less widely available, to confer upon the 
owner a competitive advantage in the race to patentability. This can undermine the norms of 
academia, and can put pressure on parties who operate within the IP-based system to emphasize 
property rights at the expense of academic principles, interests, or goals. 
 
                                                
146 See supra note 106. 
147 See generally GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS (Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & 
Katherine J. Strandburg, eds., 2014). 
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Similar tussles are being fought in the academic world over rights in scholarly publications, as in 
the case of academic journals.148 The Internet has revolutionized the production of, and access to, 
academic journals, in part by making available the contents of these journals available online, via 
services to which academic libraries may subscribe.149 Databases such as Google Scholar allow 
individual articles to be indexed by subject, thus greatly facilitating access to the articles. Certain 
smaller, most specialized journals may be prepared in-house, by specific academic departments, 
and may published only online; such form of publication has sometimes been in the blog format. 
Currently, there is a movement in higher education encouraging open access, either via a process 
of “self-archiving,” whereby the author deposits a paper in a disciplinary or institutional 
repository where it can be searched for and read, or via publishing it in a free open access 
journal, which does not charge for subscriptions, and may be either subsidized or financed by a 
publication fee.150 To date, open access has affected science journals more than humanities 
journals. Commercial publishers are now experimenting with open access models, but are trying 
to protect their subscription revenues; these goals may not be achievable simultaneously, but the 
possibility of a limited access system that provides some revenue and yet leaves some material 
open to general use may, with some innovative measures, be within reach. 
 
The open access movement may be seen to accord well with the norms of academia that 
emphasize upholding a rich, readily accessible public domain. But scholarship has tended to 
follow a more restrictive model of a commons, in which journals and other scholarly 
publications are broadly available within the universe of academia (although not necessarily 
completely unavailable to the outside world). The scholarship commons has remained semi-
closed due in part to expense, which after all is underwritten by institutions themselves. The 
privatization of the commons that is visible in these technological times in fact predates the 
advent of the Internet, and its exclusivity has been a matter more of pricing than access. But 
technology does serve to make the commons more readily available, which raises an interest in 
making it more readily accessible to all interested parties. In this regard, the move is not toward, 
                                                
148 See, e.g., JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND 
SCHOLARSHIP (2006); Bo-Christer Bjork & David Solomon, Open Access Versus Subscription Journals: 
A comparison of Scientific Impact, 10 BMC MED 73 (2012). 
149 See generally infra Chapter 6, subsection IV.E.3. 
150 An example of academic open access is the Social Science Research Network. SOC. SCI. RES. 
NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com.    
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but rather away from, propertization, and toward a fully open model. But the expense that 
academic journals entail, whether subsidized by an institution or defrayed by levying 
subscription fees, runs counter to the open access model—or at least begs the question of who 
will assume the costs of academic journals in the future. 
 
One possibility is that an entity such as Google may express an interest in assuming the costs of 
effectively subsidizing academic journals in order to corner the market on scholarship online. 
But while it may solve the expense problem, this option may raise concerns regarding copyright 
ownership of the articles, as well as access issues overall. If Google takes an ownership position 
in the journals, it may be assumed that it will have rights over access to the journals with respect 
to all other parties. Even if it chooses to allow access, the extent to which this is truly open may 
be in doubt. Metering, limiting access, imposing certain conditions on access, and so on might all 
be within the company’s prerogative vis-a-vis important scholarly works. Moreover, as a private 
company, Google may well intend at a future date to seek to monetize access to academic 
journals, and singlehandedly to do away with the commons-based model. If Google were to have 
a majority stake in the journals, it might well be able to have control over their future.151 This 
                                                
151 This debate is remarkably parallel to the question currently being raised by the Google Books venture, 
in which Google is planning to scan and digitize approximately 130 million volumes of books, and to 
make them available online through its Google Books service within the next decade (to date, 
approximately 30 million books have been scanned). See Joab Jackson,  Google: 129 Million Different 
Books Have Been Published, PCWORLD (Aug. 6, 2010),  
http://www.pcworld.com/article/202803/google_129_million_different_books_have_been_published.htm
l. The Google Books project was undertaken in 2004 in partnership with several prominent libraries and 
universities. See Kevin Bergquist, Google Project Promotes Public Good, UNIV. RECORD ONLINE (Feb. 
13, 2006), http://www.ur.umich.edu/0506/Feb13_06/02.shtml. Google Books makes available a 
“preview” or a “snippet” of the work, and allows a full view of the book if it is in the public domain. See 
Google Books Library Project—An Enhanced Card Catalog of the World’s Books, GOOGLE . In some 
important respects, the Google Books project is similar to a commons. It involves a limited number of 
parties (primarily universities, libraries, and Google); it provides the terms of access to and use of works; 
and it creates a restricted source for sharing, with the mechanisms that allow sharing to occur. In making 
the scanned and digitized works available to—and searchable by—the public, the Google Books project 
perhaps more closely resembles an effort at creating a public domain. However, only the books that are in 
fact in the public domain are available to the public. Those that are under copyright may be made 
available for sale to the public via electronic book retailers, such as Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Apple, and 
a new digital bookstore to be launched by Google that is tentatively to be called Google Editions. See 
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raises concerns within the academic community in particular as to whether such a venture would 
indeed be constructed and sustained as a “commons.” It is not clear whether the proprietary and 
indeed for-profit nature of a venture necessarily implies that a closing of the commons space. But 
the exertion of control by a parent entity would be certain to raise flags in the commons space, 
particularly among academic circles that insist upon access to resources as a universally agreed-
upon tenet and commitment. 
 
III. SOLUTIONS: CHANGING THE BUSINESS MODEL 
 
“Technology can change people’s relationship to content in ways that can make a profit.”152 
 
A. What Can Changing the Business Model Do? 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
There are significant copyright concerns that arise with respect to the mass digitization of books by 
Google and its partners. See Jonathan Band, Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 1 PLAGIARY 
6 (2006), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/google-library-project-both-sides-of-
the-story.pdf?c=plag;idno=5240451.0001.002. The question of whether consent is required to digitize 
books and make them available, whether in excerpt or whole, remains controversial and unsettled to date. 
But questions also arise regarding the commons-like nature of the Google Books venture. On the one 
hand, the union of universities, libraries, and the private entity Google seem to make near-universal 
access to a vast repository of published works a new and wholly unprecedented possibility. The potential 
democratization of knowledge is more in the nature of a public domain project, but it may be effectuated 
by a specific group of actors working together toward a common good. At the same time, however, the 
inclusion of a single entity, and the concentration of power in its control due to its mastery of the 
technology as well as the repository itself, is a force that may challenge the viability of the coalition in the 
long-term, and may even threaten to compromise the nature of the project due to the fact that Google is a 
private enterprise, and therefore is profit-driven by nature and design. Profit-driven companies can, of 
course, be part of a commons without necessarily compromising its essence and existence. However, 
conflicting interests within a commons can undermine its cohesion, and can throw into question the 
guiding principles of commons members that are motivated by other interests or goals. In the case of 
Google Books, technological innovation is making digitization of entire libraries possible, which is 
readily aligned with the goals of democratizing education and knowledge that many institutions, such as 
libraries and universities, share. But inequities among the parties, challenges to underlying copyright of 
authors, and essential questions of consent and buy-in, still remain at hand to challenge the commons-like 
nature of the project and the fairness of its outcome.  
152 Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 
133 (2011). 
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1. It Promotes Certain Key Behaviors Generally Agreed on as Being Optimal for the 
Growth and Development of Private Enterprise 
 
As noted, private ordering strategies and solutions—such as contracts, private arrangements, 
licensing and cross-licensing agreements, commons, and so on—are almost universally viewed 
as optimal first-choice options for responding to new business challenges in ways that will 
contribute to industry-wide growth and development.153 These choices afford the greatest 
freedom to private enterprises to pick and choose exactly what suits them, without requiring 
cumbersome governance mechanisms, burdensome administrative and other transaction costs, or 
onerous government oversight. They allow industries to emerge, to mature, and to adapt to 
technological and other kinds of disruptive innovation by rewarding positive innovative choices 
and behavior and weeding out regressive choices and behavior. The marketplace is generally 
preferred as the corrective mechanism for companies, and industries as a whole, that need to stay 
flexible and responsive to changing business environments. 
 
Changing business models and strategies redounds to the benefit of industries in myriad ways: (i) 
it rewards dynamism; (ii) it corrects static, broken, or intractable industries; (iii) it allows 
industries that don’t need IP to flourish without intervention; (iv) it allows companies to 
capitalize on first-mover advantage; (v) it can provide convenience to users; (vi) it promotes 
cross-subsidization, or using one product to subsidize another; (vii) it can foster crowd-sourcing 
for ideas, funding, or other resources, which may drive innovation faster, as a greater number of 
participants can generate an overall increase in creativity; (viii) it can capture spillover effects 
and positive externalities; (ix) it can offer business-driven solutions for certain problems; and (x) 
it can helpfully draw from the successful business models of no-IP or low-IP regimes. Changing 
the business model is the first approach that effective industries and firms consider when tackling 
significant changes in the industry in which they operate. In many creative content industries, 
technological innovation—such as the advent of the Internet, but also major improvements to 
devices that enable copying, user appropriation, dissemination and delivery of works to vast 
                                                
153 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright (John M. Olin L. & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 154, 2002), available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/ip/2003sp/downloads/landes-posner_indefinite.pdf. 
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audiences (not just the Internet, but also logistics systems), and so on—are compelling 
companies to develop new strategies and models that are better suited to the current landscape. 
 
2. Business-Driven Solutions 
 
One of the clearest examples of changing business models that has emerged in recent years is the 
music industry, which has been forced to reconfigure its entire approach to harnessing creative 
output in order to generate revenue across the sector. Following are some of the specific 
business-driven solutions that the music industry has contrived in response to the transformation 
of the sector by the disruptive innovation of the Internet. 
 
a. Selling Production Units; Responding to Declining Sales of Production Units 
The standard unit of sale in music prior to the emergence of online music consumption was the 
record album, or later the recorded CD. Digital technology first enabled users to disaggregate 
albums and not only listen to but also, critically, to download (for listening or purchase) single 
song tracks in an easy-to-use MP3 format.154 The music industry first resisted disaggregation of 
song sales, considering, perhaps rightly, that such single-track purchases would likely result in a 
decline in overall music purchases.155 Moreover, bundled albums were often sold at a price 
greater than the sum of each part, and a loss of album sales would also represent a loss of the 
mark-up the industry had enjoyed. Both of these predictions came true: music sales have 
declined over time, and albums are bought in far fewer quantities than they once had been.156 At 
the same time, however, disaggregation became hugely popular, and consumption of a single 
digital track is now a well-established practice among music listeners and purchasers.157  
 
The most powerful industry representatives in music, the recording labels, did not initially drive 
the change from album sales to single track sales. While digitization was the technological force 
that enabled the change, the driver that set the new model in place was a technology company, 
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Apple.158 Recognizing the new market in disaggregated songs, Apple brought the record labels 
into negotiations and essentially forced their hand, compelling an agreement among the parties to 
sell music online, via the Apple iTunes Store, thereby locking in the major music purveyors to a 
single system of music delivery.159 As discussed earlier, this early lock-up has afforded Apple an 
enormous first-mover advantage—which the record labels in essence forfeited at the outset by 
not coming to an agreement amongst themselves—and this advantage generally persists to the 
present day.160 Apple has been further able to capitalize on its first-mover advantage in two 
respects. First, by recognizing its leading market position, it has been able to grow sales of 
digital music very rapidly, offering individual song sales at very inexpensive prices (at the start, 
99 cents per song) and building its market through the immensely popular iTunes Store, which 
features exceptional availability and pricing. This has allowed Apple initially to realize losses, or 
merely to break even, for several years running, and only eventually to begin to turn a modest 
profit. Second, by recognizing that its core competency is in technology, rather than music, 
Apple has benefited from locking in the record labels to its ecosystem, a universe comprised of 
devices that are not interoperable with any devices not made or authorized by Apple. Due to this 
closed ecosystem, Apple can allow the sale of Apple devices that hold and play music, such as 
the iPod and its progeny, to effectively subsidize the sales of individual digital tracks: that is, 
users will purchase the devices in order to have access to the Apple iTunes Store, and at prices 
high enough to subsidize the artificially-low prices of the music tracks. This cross-subsidization 
runs greatly to the benefit of Apple, but to the detriment of the record labels, which are forced to 
license their songs at very low, flat per-song rates. This, however, may be seen as the price of 
losing the essential first-mover advantage, and relinquishing the ability to establish a leading 
market position in the online music space.161 
 
The music industry has also changed its fundamental business model in other respects that 
likewise respond to the changing environment that has been brought about by technological 
innovation. It has shifted its focus from recorded music as a primary source of revenue to a more 
                                                
158 See generally supra Chapter 3, subsections II.B.1 & III.A.2. 
159 Id. 
160 See id.  
161 See Mitchell Einhorn, Gorillas in Our Midst: Searching for King Kong in the Music Jungle, 55 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 145, 146-48 (2008). 
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diversified portfolio of revenue-generating properties that supplement and bolster music sales. 
For example, the relatively recent “360 deal” that is now becoming common practice in the 
industry involves a contractual agreement between a record label and an artist that grants the 
label rights and royalties not only in recordings but also in performances, including a percentage 
of the proceeds from live concert ticket sales and any other income.162 The record label is also 
granted rights in ancillary sales of merchandise (such as concert T-shirts). Moreover, industry 
members are beginning to view technology as a boon, not merely a challenge: for instance, many 
artists are building strong online support via websites that enable them to reach audiences 
directly and to create relationships between artists and their listeners. These websites nurture the 
experiential relationship that audiences have with creators and content, and thereby reinforce fan 
loyalty by creating a network of “insiders,” or loyal listeners who are privy to special 
information, early releases, extra music tracks, and so on.163 This helps foster loyalty, but may 
also serve to reduce the incentive to resort to music piracy by promoting unique tracks, inside 
information, and a sense of investment in the artist herself. More recently, some innovative 
artists are beginning to follow their audiences online, and to track supportive audience clusters in 
order to determine the most receptive locales for future performances.164 
 
One further source of profitability that content companies are wrestling with in the wake of 
technological change is advertising-related revenues. Many creative industries, including music, 
have long relied on revenues to support their content delivery models. In the music sector, radio 
broadcasting has historically been an important part of the industry business model, garnering 
                                                
162 See generally supra Chapter 3, Section III.B. 
163 See id. 
164 Other industries have followed these innovative business strategies and adapted them to their own 
purposes. The videogame industry, for instance, now actively builds websites that center upon the 
experiential interaction between users and content: for instance, the World of Warcraft (“WoW”) offers 
its users the ability to interact with “real” members of the WoW community. See Mark Lemley, Is the Sky 
Falling on the Content Industries, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 134 (2011). Again, by creating an 
insider network of privileged users, the videogame industry hopes to thwart would-be pirates from 
resorting to ersatz production and thereby siphoning off revenues from the original creative work. Id. The 
publishing industry is also trying to attach online audiences with community-oriented websites that 
connect creators to audiences. For instance, entrepreneur Chris Anderson created booktour.com, a website 
designed to connect authors conducting live book tours with their receptive audiences (however, 
booktour.com closed for business in 2011). See Carolyn Kellogg, BookTour.com Closing Up Shop, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/jacketcopy/2011/08/booktourcom-closing-up-
shop.html. 
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audiences for new releases, royalties for sound recordings, occasional live performance 
rebroadcast rights (as in the case of the long-running Metropolitan Opera radio broadcasts), and 
other advertising-related revenues.165 By contrast, online music streaming has proven less 
effectively monetized, due in part to limited but increasing audiences, relatively lower 
advertising rates commanded online, and historically-imposed restrictions in online music 
royalty payments.166 In sum, online advertising has proven extremely limited in appeal and 
effectiveness, and has not displaced print advertising, although the latter has also been in steady 
decline. Companies dependent on advertising to sustain their viability are hard-pressed to devise 
adequate responses to this challenge. Some creative solutions, such as maximizing Google search 
placements, optimizing product placement in unexpected venues (such as the use of product 
placement in films by fashion and merchandise enterprises), and more recently data mining and 
data sales (such as the sale of users’ search preferences, shopping habits, and so on), offer some 
promising solutions. But the advertising-supported media paradigm has not shifted, and its 
business model may require retooling to be fully effective in the new technologically-oriented 
environment. 
 
b. User-Generated Content (UGC) 
Digital technology places newfound power in users over already-created content, but it also 
enables users to create their own content, or UGC, at significantly lowered production costs. 
Some of this content may be new, such as original compositions recorded online by emerging 
artists. In these cases, the material will not conflict with already-copyrighted material. But some 
of this content may draw upon source material that is already in circulation, and may be under 
copyright. In music, some of the most widely regarded UGC involves young performers 
reinterpreting, remixing, riffing on, or otherwise recreating artistic compositions from a wide 
range of sources.167 In order to gain exposure to audiences, many of these performers display 
their work on popular sites, such as YouTube or MySpace.168 While creative, some of these 
works may also be appropriative, and may be in violation of one or more copyrights. However, 
                                                
165 Other such industries include newspapers, journals, television, cable and other media. 
166 See Paul Resnikoff, Streaming Services Will Never Be Profitable, Study Finds, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS 
(Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2014/02/18/profitless.  
167 See supra Chapter 3, Section I.G. 
168 See id. 
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these performers may be unable, or unwilling to make the effort, to clear licensing rights, and 
may be initially seeking to gain attention, exposure, and/or acclaim, rather than immediate 
commercial benefit. Many participants in the music industry are beginning to recognize that 
these works may offer some value to the industry, rather than merely undermining value by 
transgressing an established copyright. For instance, music agents now scour sites such as 
YouTube to identify creative talent, such as new young composers.169 In the case of UGC that 
uses popular music, the response of the industry is more mixed. On the one hand, some music 
representatives will search for works that violate copyright and issue notice that the UGC must 
be removed at a risk of prosecution. On the other hand, some music representatives argue that the 
UGC serves to reinforce the popularity of the underlying work, and can bring it to the attention 
of newer or larger audiences. Particularly in cases where no obvious commercial benefit to the 
creator of UGC is evinced, the argument that UGC helps to buttress the value of copyrighted 
material can be persuasive. Many in the music industry are also becoming aware that UGC can 
be commercialized by the very parties who hold the copyright, namely (in most cases) the record 
labels.170 Thus, agents from these labels are now beginning to sign artists who have been 
discovered via their online releases of UGC. This nascent new business strategy affords the 
labels access both to new talent pools as well as to new audiences on whom they can capitalize. 
 
c. Clearing Rights 
Changing the business model can be an effective method for companies tackling technological 
innovation and its effects, but it can also involve a reconfiguration of property rights, licensing 
practices, and other IP-related strategies. Creative content companies and content distributors—
or entities that carry and distribute content such as cable and satellite television, radio, and 
Internet service providers—must manage these rights effectively while minimizing transaction 
costs. One solution is to create collective rights management organizations that are generally 
legislatively mandated and externally administered by neutral third-party entities, such as 
performing rights organizations in the music sector. Where large carriers are involved, as in the 
case of cable and satellite television, these measures may entail compulsory licenses; or, as in the 
                                                
169 See id.; supra note 8-9 and accompanying notes. 
170 Anja Konjicanin, Justin Bieber Makes Them Proud. But Why?, VANCOUVER OBSERVER (Dec. 24, 
2010), http://www.vancouverobserver.com/politics/news/2010/12/24/justin-bieber-makes-them-proud-
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case of radio, they may entail a government-supervised but privately-organized collective 
licensing regime, accompanied by an exemption from having to pay sound recording royalties to 
copyright owners.171 
 
Collective solutions can facilitate industry strength over the long term, but they cannot and will 
not displace private ordering solutions among companies that contrive negotiated arrangements 
for rights clearing, IP management, and rewards allocations. In cases where multiple rights are 
involved, companies that broker and enter into agreements may find that bargaining for cross-
licensing agreements and similar arrangements reduce transaction costs ex ante, thereby ensuring 
that revenues are distributed among copyright owners cost effectively. These agreements can 
internalize transaction and administrative costs, and can break down such costs among members, 
defraying the burden on any one party. 
 
d. Facilitating Interoperability 
Negotiated agreements can also enable companies to secure their market position in an industry, 
giving content-rich companies the ability to compete in newly contested marketplaces. When 
technological innovation brings foundational changes to an industry, companies may have to vie 
for a foothold. For instance, a new technology may give rise to new venues for content 
dissemination, and content providers will then be compelled to seek out and secure channels for 
distribution of their content. In music, for instance, the development of portable music players—
beginning with boom-boxes, tape players, the Sony Walkman, and evolving to the iPod and other 
handheld devices—required music producers to ensure that their product would be carried by 
each successive new device. In the era of the Internet and new technology companies, however, a 
new element of exclusivity has been added to the portable music market. That is, contemporary 
electronics manufacturers are currently able to restrict their software in order to prevent creative 
content from being carried on competing devices. By curtailing compatibility among devices, 
these electronics companies can lock consumers into their universe, and can compel content 
providers to release their product via exclusive, narrowly drawn pipelines. While the digital 
music may be released in a standard format, such as the MP3, it may not necessarily be able to 
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be released via multiple devices without prior negotiation among the content provider and each 
specific electronic delivery system. The lack of compatibility, or interoperability, demands a 
level of negotiation, therefore, that is far more complicated than occurred when simpler, more 
generic electronics were commonplace. Today, content companies must look to business 
strategies that optimize the release and delivery of creative products on multiple devices under 
multiple negotiated agreements. Thus, for instance, in the case of music, the record labels must 
enter into contracts with a number of handheld electronics manufacturers, such as Apple, 
Samsung, and Nokia, in order to ensure that their digital music tracks will be released on the 
widest range of devices to reach the greatest number of listeners. 
 
It is evident that IP-based solutions are required to clear the rights that the dissemination of 
music on various devices that are incompatible and not interoperable. But by negotiating 
agreements that set the contractual terms and conditions for such dissemination in advance of 
rights-clearing, content providers and electronics companies may streamline these processes in 
more cost effective ways. An early illustration of the efficacy of such business-oriented solutions 
is the agreement between Apple and the major record labels that made possible the large-scale 
sale of digital tracks on the Apple iTunes Music Store. By agreeing in advance to the terms of 
music sales, the parties broke a logjam vis-a-vis online music distribution that had not been 
overcome through earlier attempts at online music release on the part of individual labels. When 
the record labels realized that online music was inevitable, they came to the bargaining table and 
entered into an agreement with Apple that is still operating to the present day.172 The Apple 
model provides for a simple, streamlined licensing of music rights, but it is essentially a business 
plan that enables music to be disseminated online. Had the record labels contrived a solution 
amongst themselves, the terms of the agreement might have been more in their favor. 
Nonetheless, all the parties came to realize that a business-driven solution was optimal for online 
music delivery. This is the model that is likely to offer a basic template for content production 
and delivery in other industries, particularly as they respond to similar challenges in the online 
landscape.173 These agreements are still nascent, and have not attained the breadth of the iTunes 
                                                
172 See Tim Arango, Despite iTunes Accord, Music Labels Still Fret, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/business/media/02apple.html. 
173 Entertainment firms in film, video, television and other media are already beginning to wrestle with 
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delivery system, with respect to either the number of contracting parties or the size of the 
receiving audience. But the solutions are, and will likely continue to be, driven by the business 
model of creative content companies. As the online environment changes, these firms  will be 
compelled to anticipate changes in the environment and their consequences, and to work 
proactively to forge new allegiances that build market share, facilitate creative content exchange, 
and attain a degree interoperability that best suits their needs and objectives in the marketplace. 
 
While commonly used in a technological context, interoperability concerns can also rise in the 
broader sense of compatibility between systems or components of a system. In the higher 
education sector, this has interesting ramifications. Traditionally, higher education has been 
relatively atomized: students matriculate from a given school (or system, such as the University 
of California system), receive the vast majority of their credits from that school, and pay tuition 
to that school in exchange for a diploma upon successful completion of the school’s 
requirements for graduation. Institutionally, therefore, the student is bound to one main entity; 
and that entity is rewarded by a full degree’s worth of tuition.174 There are typically some 
opportunities for students to pay for and earn credits elsewhere—study abroad, exchange among 
a handful of schools, and so forth—but the home institution ensures, via its academic policy, that 
the student is primarily educated, and makes his or her payments, within its purview. This is a 
closed ecosystem that has remained relatively unmarked and unquestioned prior to the disruptive 
innovation of online education, extended not only by traditional institutions but also by 
newcomers such as third-party providers, for-profit entities, educational consortiums, and so on. 
These entities are beginning to offer an array of courses bound to compete with the course 
offerings of traditional schools, and to challenge their proprietary model that is predicated on a 
lack of interoperability. At the moment, universities and colleges have not constructed a plan to 
negotiate with these entities and to contrive a way of expanding their course offerings to students 
without entirely forfeiting revenues from the enhancements to their curricula. Instead, these 
traditional institutions have pursued several key tactics: (i) to create online courses that their own 
students can take, only some of which may be taken for credit; (ii) to limit course credits to their 
                                                                                                                                                       
the limited release of their product through venues such as Hulu, YouTube, and individual channels such 
as the online arm of the popular comedy the Daily Show. See infra Chapter 6, subsection I.C.4. 
174 This is, of course, vastly simplified, but the basic point—allegiance to one school, and a single draw of 
revenue at that school—holds. 
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own courses, effectively excluding credit from other institutions; (iii) to support accreditation 
that thus far has prioritized real-space learning, established institutions, and traditional pedagogy; 
and (iv) in some limited cases, to explore slowly institution-wide interest in developing online 
education, often as a cost-cutting measure or means of attracting a larger, more diverse student 
body. 
 
In other words, the business model of higher education has not yet moved away from limiting 
interoperability, either by changing policies, renegotiating relationships among educational 
institutions and providers, pursuing revenue-sharing plans for online education, or rethinking 
accreditation. At the same time, a lack of clarity in determining allocations of copyrights and 
related rewards in coursework increases the likelihood that educational institutions will find such 
tactics cumbersome and complicated. But the disruptive innovation of MOOCs has begun to 
quicken change within the academy, and the spiraling costs of college tuition are spurring wide 
coalitions of students and parents, not to mention interested educators, to call for change. By 
promoting interoperability among education providers, traditional schools may be able to reduce 
the strain of high costs and tuition, thereby contributing to the satisfaction and well-being of their 
students; and by exerting quality measures via the processes of accreditation, they can ensure 
that their product retains its standards and standing. By bringing new business models and 
practices to the table, educational institutions may also confer benefits upon their faculty and 
staff, extending the scope of their teaching, the strength of their teaching contracts, and the basis 
of their livelihood. But whether these steps will be taken willingly by educational industry 
participants or, as in the case of the music industry, be compelled upon them, remains to be seen. 
 
e. Drawing from the Business Model of Low-IP and/or No-IP Regimes 
A useful blueprint for companies that want to build business plans flexible and resilient enough 
to adapt to innovation may be offered by industries that are built on low-IP or no-IP frameworks. 
In many mature creative industries that are structured to promote product and innovation flows 
without substantial property rights and protections, several features stand out: (i) the ability to 
protect core competencies; (ii) the use of loss leaders to attract users to the value-bearing 
product; (iii) the flexibility to capitalize on trends, tastes, and built-in obsolescence; (iv) the 
ability to capitalize on creative performance, rather than merely on creative product; and (v) the 
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vision to allow copying to drive creativity, indirectly leading to increased profitability for the 
original creative individual or entity. 
 
The ability to protect core competencies is exemplified by creative content industries in which 
innovation remains in the hands of highly skilled, imaginative, and capable designers who create 
the output that fuel their respective industries.175 In fashion, for instance, original designers must 
constantly create new apparel designs that feed consumers’ insatiable appetite for new and 
trendy clothing, giving rise to an industry churn that is vital and ongoing. But their work is not 
copyright protected, and indeed need not be to keep profits flowing. Although some profits will 
be lost due to knock-offs, the originality of haute couture designs are most prized by discerning 
audiences, and the quality of the highest-level products ensure their exclusivity as well.176 In 
education, teaching skills are at a premium and cannot be replicated without a high degree of 
mastery, training and pedagogical skill. Most educators have not had to assert property rights in 
their teaching because it remains the exclusive provenance of those who have been trained to 
teach. Moreover, the “capture” of educators within the echelons of higher education ensure that 
work cannot be easily poached by competitors until the teachers’ contractual obligations have 
run their course.177 
 
The use of loss leaders to drive product sales allows companies to attract consumers with free or 
inexpensive content while at the same time protecting more valuable, high margin products. In 
education, for instance, universities and colleges are experimenting with offering free online 
MOOCs that attract a wide-ranging audience, and that bring new learners into close contact with 
high quality instruction. The online interactions may serve as a kind of recruiting material that 
can attract students to degree-bearing programs, thereby ensuring a steady stream of 
                                                
175 This includes industries such as architecture and technological and industrial design—although unlike 
fashion, but like education, these do have some significant IP protection.  
176 In architecture as well, design protection is limited, but the originality of star architects is prized, and 
their distinctive design is not readily replicated by lesser lights. See supra Chapter 1, subsection III.D.2. 
177 Computer software is slightly different: the product may ultimately be IP-protected. But many 
software designers and programmers value contributions to open source software, which is not subject to 
IP protection. In part, this is due to the value attributed to creative prowess in the computer design world. 
Working on open source software enables professionals in the computer field to demonstrate their 
mastery of software design, while still protecting their own skills, work, and the value of their creative 
production. See infra Chapter 6, subsection IV.E.3. 
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matriculating students who will pay tuition to pursue a full-time higher education degree. But 
universities may eventually create MOOC sequences that themselves lead to a certificate or 
degree that is either inexpensive or free. These MOOC programs may then serve as loss leaders 
that are accompanied by ancillary products related to (i) education, such as one-on-one tutorials, 
intensive research studies, (ii) employment, such as networking opportunities, job fairs, and 
internships, or (iii) further training, such as programming, hands-on training outside the 
classroom, and so on. Another possibility is that these ancillary products become the loss leaders, 
and the universities ultimately come to charge tuition for the MOOCs. In either direction, one 
product or set of products enhances the value of the core product. In the latter case, however, 
copyright protection may be considered to capture the full value of the MOOCs if they are 
offered at a price. 
 
In the case of music, as the value of content remains flat or declines relative to previous years 
(adjusted for inflation), digital tracks may come to be seen as a loss leader of sorts. Particularly if 
newer audiences rely primarily on music streaming--that is, listening but not purchasing their 
preferred musical choices--musical content may be limited in its profitability for some time. 
Recognizing the potential for such an eventuality, the music industry has increasingly turned to 
live performance, rather than recorded music, as a source of revenue and growth, particularly 
with respect to the top of the spectrum of commercial artists.178 
 
                                                
178 But it is not music alone that can move toward the commodified performance and away from the 
commodified creative product. In comedy, for instance, the stand-up comedy routine as performed by a 
talented comedian is far more valued than the jokes, routines, and/or actions (such as sight gags) that 
make up the act. Analogously, in cuisine, the recipes of famous chefs may only occasionally generate 
revenues when compiled in cookbooks. More significant are the performances of chefs, such as cooking 
shows, lessons, demonstrations, and of course the meals that they produce in restaurants (which are not 
typically copyrighted). Even when famous chefs are not involved, recipes are not generally deemed 
valuable in the culinary realm. Many recipes are freely shared and circulated, for instance via such 
websites as epicurious.com, marthastewart.com, and so on. These recipes are viewed as loss leaders, 
which are intended to drive cooking audiences to purchase products such as the sale of magazine 
subscriptions (such as Bon Appetit, Gourmet, and Cooks Illustrated), or to follow the many ventures of 
famous chefs, (such as Martha Stewart, Alton Brown, and Mark Bittman). While culinary enterprises 
blend performance and product in the wide range of offerings, they like music are seeking to supplement 
relatively restricted revenues mined from the exploitation of creative content with new revenue streams 
that may flow from performance, collaboration, user-generated content, and other new forms of creativity.  
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f. Contracting into Optimal Arrangements 
Another approach companies may take in adapting to new environments is to use contracts to set 
the terms of their relationships, whether within the industry or with respect to end users (or both).   
Where it is optimal to contract around IP entitlements, or in some cases even to contract them 
away, companies can find that contractual arrangements are a superior means of striking an 
optimal balance of ownership and access.179 This tends to be particularly effective when IP rights 
have been inefficiently allocated in a given sector, or when judges, legislators, or administrators 
create systemic inequities that cannot be easily rectified, appealed, or reversed. It also allows 
both multi-party arrangements and complex licensing schemes to be secured in the case of large, 
complicated creative endeavors, many of which will span multiple genres, locales, venues for 
release (domestically and abroad), and long-term payouts. In the case of fashion, for example, it 
is becoming increasingly commonplace for designers to design several collections per year, 
releasing them internationally at fashion shows that target exclusive, restricted audiences. At the 
same time, designers may engage in collections designed for sale at larger retailers and at lower 
price points. But added to these releases are new ventures that are attracting fashion designers, 
such as participating in modern dance performances, pop music videos, or performance art. 
These productions often involve multiple media, and therefore multiple rights, that must be 
negotiated among a host of interested parties. Contractual arrangements are almost certainly the 
best course of ascertaining and managing rights when such complexities abound. 
 
B. What Does Changing the Business Model NOT Do? 
 
Creative companies can adapt their business model to meet the demands of a new industrial 
landscape shaped by disruptive technological innovation. These strategies may include creating 
new contractual arrangements, rolling out new products, changing the balance between existing 
products and new revenue sources (such as performance, ancillary activities, or supplemental 
products), monetizing user activity (such as placing advertisements on websites), or promoting 
new product placement (such as featuring products in outside content). Business plans can also 
                                                
179 See generally Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Mark Lemley, Contracting Around 
Liability Rules, 100 CAL. L. REV. 463 (2012). 
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involve quasi-property arrangements, such as joining or reinforcing a commons, creating a 
network of licensing agreements within an industry, creating guild-like organizations that allow 
the sharing of information, training, and resources among members, or participating in certain 
open source endeavors to buttress proprietary products.180 Creative content industries that are 
able to ascertain the right mix of business strategies and solutions may realize crucial cost 
savings by reducing transaction costs that can proliferate when the management of IP 
entitlements is involved. In general, these efficiencies can be enhanced with economies of scale, 
giving changed business models a distinct edge over changed IP-based allocations as first-order 
solutions to industry-wide challenges. 
 
Yet while changing the business model can be an effective tactic for the creative industries, it 
can also be flawed on various counts. These shortcomings are especially problematic when they 
(i) undermine certain core principles of the given industries; (ii) interfere with interactions 
among companies, or between companies and end users; (iii) restrict spillovers or positive 
externalities;  (iv) lead to suboptimal outcomes due to imbalances of bargaining power among 
stakeholders; and/or (iv) more contestably, have a negative effect on non-commodified values, 
social interests, and democratic goals. 
 
1. Promote Uniformity 
 
When creative companies change their business model, they do so in response to challenges that 
are posed by innovation within the industry, such as emerging technologies, as well as challenges 
that are raised by competitors who themselves are reacting to change. In this competition-driven 
landscape, creative companies will vie with one another to gain a first-mover advantage, to 
secure as dominant a position in the market as possible, and to wield and leverage their exclusive 
portfolio of IP rights with the dual aims of maximizing revenues and minimizing competition. 
These goals, while fully rational from the perspective of corporate self-interest, run counter to 
the greater goal of promoting uniformity. Lack of uniformity within an industry may be a natural 
outcome of a competitive environment but, as in the case of individuals, many policymakers that 
                                                
180 For example, IBM’s use of some open source software, or Adobe’s open source software that protects 
some of its work on a proprietary basis. 
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a level playing field at the outset is more likely to lead to a meritocratic outcome, in which the 
best industries (or, analogously, individuals) rise to the top of the field. When technological 
innovation disrupts a field, the equilibrium point may need to be reset. Even in cases where many 
companies within an industry are incentivized to change their business model, more equitable 
grounds for starting may be preferred for the industry as a whole, so that rights and 
responsibilities are distributed more equitably at the outset, and rewards and revenues are gained 
more fairly in the long run. In the case of the fashion industry, for instance, arguments over the 
proposed (and currently tabled) legislation that would grant copyright in fashion design have 
pointed out the disparity in interests and power among industry stakeholders.181 These advocates 
of reform argue that enacting copyright protection would level the playing field and enhance 
parity among designers across the fashion spectrum. 
 
2. Promote Interoperability 
 
Changing the business model, as mentioned above, may be made in service of seeking a supra-
competitive advantage, such as one company establishing a dominant position that imposes a 
closed ecosystem on its users and thereby locks up the entire industry. Typically this closed 
system by definition precludes interoperability with outside devices, products or systems, as its 
raison d’etre is to keep users dependent on one company’s spectrum of products and services. 
While this can work greatly to the advantage of a single entity, it tends to be suboptimal for the 
industry and its community of end users. First, a closed system can lead to monopolistic pricing, 
as users who are compelled to purchase goods and services within a closed system can neither 
seek out compatible but less costly products nor engage in comparison price shopping within the 
product lines that the closed system offers (for instance, searching out competitive prices from 
various retailers). Second, a tightly controlled ecosystem can force third-party vendors (such as 
add-on applications, or “apps”) to conform to the dictates of the controlling company. Such 
dictates may include assurances that the third-party entities will not create products compatible 
with competitors’ products, thereby reinforcing the monopolistic position of the initial company. 
Third, closed ecosystems that preclude interoperability within a field can also impede or divert 
innovation of a range of new devices, systems, or products. That is, if a predominant company 
                                                
181 Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69 (2008).  
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establishes a powerful position in an industry—one that is at least quasi-monopolistic in its 
authority—both competitor companies or third-party vendors are constrained to avenues of 
innovation that either conform to the parameters of the ecosystem or operate on the margins of 
the ecosystem with limited returns. Competitors that devise entirely new systems, even if such 
systems are superior in various aspects to the dominant ecosystem, run the risk of being shut out 
of the market, due to their inability to secure a position at the margins of industry production. 
Thus, innovation across the industry may be constricted by the inability of an industry to sustain 
parallel or multiple tracks of development among competitors, particularly in cases where a 
single company or cluster of companies can establish a prevailing ecosystem that becomes the 
standard among companies and users alike. 
 
The example that typifies the kind of ecosystem that deters interoperability is the Apple model, 
which has had a profound impact on the music industry. By creating an interlocking system of 
devices, including personal computers, handheld devices, online music and media platforms, and 
operating systems, Apple has created an electronic universe that is, figuratively speaking, 
hermetically sealed. The Apple universe is closed to outsiders, due to (i) exclusive licensing and 
sales contracts with third parties, (ii) restrictions it places on content sharing with other 
competitors’ devices and systems, (iii) limitations placed on users’ ability to use and reuse 
content (for instance, content may be downloaded and copied onto a limited number of a user’s 
devices), and (iv) a general lack of interoperability with devices and systems not in the Apple 
universe. Apple has long established a dominant position in the music sector, initially secured by 
creating a partnership agreement among the record labels and Apple for the licensing and sale of 
digital music tracks online. But its singularly powerful position comes at a cost: third-party 
vendors and competitors alike have struggled to create products that are compatible with Apple 
devices and that conform to the terms and conditions (relating to copyright and to other rights 
and revenues) that Apple dictates. Those companies that choose to operate outside the Apple 
ecosystem still struggle for market share, and are hampered by the unwillingness of many music 
consumers to range outside the user-friendly ecosystem that Apple has established and for which 
it is known. On the one hand, it may be argued that this is only a natural outcome for a truly 
innovative and successful technology company that has come to master the music industry 
universe as well. However, this dominance comes at a cost. For instance, emerging companies 
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that were beginning to offer music sharing systems comparable to Napster, yet able to 
distinguish between licit and illicit sharing and further able to obstruct the latter, were effectively 
quashed by Apple’s online music store, its exclusive agreements with recording labels, and its 
subsequent dominance of the market. More recently, the exclusive Apple ecosystem has 
essentially cornered the online music sales market, and has impeded competitors such as Zune 
(Microsoft’s now-defunct digital media player) from gaining a foothold in the digital media 
market. This works to the detriment of consumers, who are generally benefited by greater choice 
among digital media systems, as in virtually any market.182 
 
In contrast, in the case of higher education, as discussed earlier, changing the business model 
may promote interoperability. Negotiated arrangements among education providers may expand 
the curricular choices that students have when they pursue a degree, or they may even expand the 
very degrees that students choose to pursue. But an opposite course of action could emerge as 
well: that is, the business model of higher education could be changed to accommodate MOOCs 
and online courses only within the boundaries of a given institution. For instance, a university 
may determine that its optimal model allows a student to choose from an array of courses that is 
has developed, both in real space and online, and that the student can take up to a certain number 
of courses at other institutions for credit, but only on a limited basis. The only difference from 
the present system, therefore, would be to expand online courses offered for credit, but such 
courses would by and large be created, owned and administered by the home institution. The 
conclusion to be drawn is fairly evident: if a school prioritizes interoperability as a net good, it 
can pursue business models that prioritize opening education to an array of institutions. If, 
however, it is more protective of its properties, conservative as to retaining control over the 
quality of its curriculum, and concerned with retaining students and tuition dollars, a traditional 
school may choose to limit interoperability and access to online courses that it does not create, 
control or own. 
 
3. Promote Collective Solutions, and Other Communally-Worthwhile Outcomes 
 
                                                
182 Tom Warren, Zune Hardware Was a Mistake, Admits Microstoft Exec Robbie Bach, VERGE (May 14, 
2012), http://www.theverge.com/2012/5/14/3019100/zune-hardware-mistake-robbie-bach. 
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Individual companies that change business models are typically acting competitively, which may 
or may not promote collective solutions. If it is in their rational self-interest to enter collaborative 
arrangements, companies will leave room for collaborating in their business plans. Thus, for 
instance, scientific research institutions will make ample provision for retaining access to patent 
pools that will allow them to draw on fundamental research resources, such as genetic databases 
that make basic gene sequences available to researchers within the scope of the patent pool. In 
these cases of rationally-driven collaboration, institutions that may be competitors can agree to 
share access to data within a closed scientific community in order to promote individual 
advances in research and discovery. 
 
Collective pooling of resources can also occur in creative fields that involve uncopyrighted 
materials, such as group runway collections in fashion, in which original designers work together 
to create a unified style that each will individually express and sell to his or her own market 
segment. Alternative to collaboration among peers, or horizontal collaboration, is collaboration 
among designers and retailers, or vertical collaboration. In fashion, this can entail an original 
designer joining forces with a retailer to create a collection that is exclusively sold by the retailer 
and leverages the designer’s status within the retailer’s market niche. Thus, for instance, 
exclusive designers trying to reach more mass-market consumers are increasingly agreeing to 
make limited edition collections that are sold by a popular retailer at relatively inexpensive prices 
(for example, the 2013 “Isabelle Marant ‘for’ H&M” collection183). Importantly, this new 
hybridized sale of high-end designer products marketed for middle-end or low-end retail 
consumption represents an innovative business model response to the threat of appropriation that 
would-be fashion copyists are increasingly posing to the industry. 
 
These examples of successful collaboration, however, tend to proliferate in specific 
circumstances: in low-IP or no-IP based regimes, collaboration is facilitated by the lack of 
property rights in original design that removes the task of clearing rights from the steps that must 
                                                
183 See Ella Alexander, Isabel Marrant for H&M: See All the Pictures, VOGUE (Sept. 25, 2013), 
http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/2013/09/25/isabel-marant-h-and-m---full-collection-photos-2013. 
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be taken prior to entering into a collaborative arrangement.184 In highly propertized regimes, 
collaboration is indicated when competitors require access to a common pool of data or resources 
and seek to avoid costly rights-clearing processes in advance of their efforts. In the latter 
situation, however, the commons that is created offers a collective solution to an potential early-
stage road block, but it does not perforce promote collaboration in the research and discovery 
work itself.185 
 
4. Promote Cumulative Innovation 
 
Changing business models may promote cumulative innovation in creative industries, but it must 
be a goal that is pursued deliberately, as opposed to competitive strategies that may not prioritize 
collaborative work. Thus, for instance, in the context of industries that rely primarily on patent 
rights to thrive and grow, cumulation is promoted not only by business models but also by a 
strategic use of patenting versus publication rights. In the context of cumulative innovation in 
patent-rich fields, publication may be wielded as a strategy for redividing the bargaining surplus 
between the original inventor and cumulative improvers.186 This strategy, however, relies more 
on the use of IP entitlements, and the restraint of such rights in order to advance publication as a 
strategic ploy, as opposed to changing business models. Similarly, employee mobility and 
knowledge portability are strategies that may serve to advance cumulative innovation within 
innovative industries.187 These strategies may be shaped by changing business models, such as, 
for instance, crafting employee non-competition agreements, or promoting the exchange of ideas 
in some open source endeavors, or they may be advanced by changing IP policies, such as 
extending publication rights to employees. In the case of education, scholarship and research in 
scientific fields have often sought to promote cumulative innovation through a combination of 
                                                
184 Trademark rights are easier to clear, as in the case of collections made by a designer “for” a retailer: 
each brand is retained, both the designer and the retailer are able to use their respective brands in the 
collection, and both gain strength by association with the partner. 
185 Valuing collaboration is a normative judgment that is subject to discussion. For the purposes of this 
paper, it is assumed that collaborative, interdisciplinary, or team-driven work helps innovators to reach 
goals together that may not have been attainable individually. Hence, it is treated as an intrinsically 
desirable social good. 
186 See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 U. VA. 
L. REV. 1857 (2003). 
187 See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Intellectual Property Law and the Boundaries 
of the Firm (Penn Law, Legal Scholarship Repository, Paper No. 65, 2004). 
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 291 
business-related and IP-related strategies. Increasingly, instruction and coursework in education 
are becoming potential grounds for cumulative innovation, collaborative efforts, and useful idea 
exchange. But changing business models in education may not advance such causes, particularly 
as the increasing adjunctification of education does not particularly incentivize or reward 
collaborative work. Thus, if valued, cumulative innovation in education is likely to require both 
changing business models and adaptive IP entitlements to continue to flourish. 
 
5. Protect End-User Rights, the Public Domain, or Less-Powerful Stakeholders 
 
When creative companies or industries are spurred to change their business models, they are 
acting primarily to protect their revenue-generating properties and processes, as is their mandate. 
But there are several respects in which these industrial priorities, however valid and rationally 
self-interested, may run counter to the interests, rights, activities, and values of other parties in 
the creative fields. First, changing business models may have a varied effect on the end users 
and/or consumers of products generated by creative industries. On the one hand, they may serve 
end users well, by creating economies of scale, cost efficiencies, or other positive effects that can 
get passed down to the consumer, such as through lowered prices. On the other hand, however, 
they may prove adverse to end users’ interests, either by (i) changing the terms that were 
previously granted, such as reducing the scope of permissible activity (for instance, imposing 
new restrictions on “personal use”, or curtailing rights to “fair use”); (ii) charging end users 
greater fees for their consumption or engagement with products; or (iii) redrawing the lines of 
access to creative properties that may have served as building blocks for user-generated content 
or other creative activity on the part of end-users. Second, changing business models may entail 
efforts to fence in properties and/or activities that were previously considered part of a creative 
and cultural public domain. Not only end users but also the general public may be implicated in 
such fencing off, which may be to the detriment of overall creative activity. Third, changing 
business models may have an adverse effect on the rights and rewards of stakeholders that are 
involved in creative industries but that do not have a strong bargaining position with respect to 
their competitors. The broad range of stakeholders that are implicated in creative industries tend 
to have very different levels of bargaining power, or leverage, and may be effectively forced into 
suboptimal results when a changing business environment causes companies to pursue new 
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profit-maximizing strategies that may favor well-positioned entities over emerging, independent, 
or newer entrants that are not backed by powerful supporters or lobbyists that can ensure they get 
their due market share. 
 
In music, for example, the cost to end users that changing business models levy may be 
extensive.188 They may include new restrictions on the use of content, as in the case of music that 
is purchased online and that can only be downloaded onto a limited number of devices.189 In 
terms of personal use, the right to reproduce creative works—even those that have been duly 
purchased by the end user—may be limited or cut off by technological means (that is, anti-
copying protections). This can lead to an odd imbalance, such as a user’s ability to enjoy a wide 
range of personal uses of hard copies of creative works (for instance, the ability to photocopy 
books) but her inability to extend these same personal uses to digitized versions of creative 
works (for instance, her inability to re-record films, even those she has purchased and wishes to 
record for purely personal use). Equally importantly, the access that end users have to creative 
work, as well as their ability to use it in innovative, creative, or transformational ways, may be 
impeded or thwarted by changing business models. In music, established practices have 
historically allowed artists to borrow from one another and thereby to create new and 
transformative works, and even entirely new genres (for instance, the growth of much modern 
folk, rock, blues and R&B music is predicated on such creative borrowing). Increasing emphasis 
on the propertization of music may be one approach that the music industry has taken to disallow 
creative borrowing without rights clearing and/or royalty payments being assessed.190 This may 
be primarily an outcome of IP-based solutions that seek compensation for musical borrowing, 
even in cases where the new artist is not appropriating the original work but rather using it in an 
innovative and transformative manner. At the same time, however, the music industry seems to 
have made a concerted business decision to repress creative borrowing that may entail even the 
slightest of inroads on propertized material. Thus, for instance, in the 1980s the industry brought 
its force to bear on the practice of music sampling, in which the creative practice called for 
                                                
188 This is equally true in media and entertainment sectors.  
189 Similarly, in the case of film, video and recorded television series, works that were previously 
available for multiple personal uses are similarly curtailed, such that an end user may only view the works 
on certain devices. See infra Chapter 6, subsection I.D.2. 
190 See generally Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907 (2005). 
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mixing short portions or samples of recorded music to create a new, fresh, and original work.191 
As sampling grew in popularity, the music industry demanded that artists and/or DJs obtain 
clearance of copyrights of all the short samples used to comprise their works.192 Clearing the 
copyright thickets proved challenging for all but the most successful musicians and DJs, which 
led to a number of musicians encountering legal difficulties with respect to their use of 
uncredited samples.193 As a result, the innovative practice of music sampling was largely 
thwarted, and many of its creative practitioners were forced to abandon their efforts in order to 
steer clear of the sampling morass. 
 
6. Curtail Monopoly-Seeking Behavior 
 
Companies change their business models in order to establish as large a market share as possible 
and thereby to maximize their profitability. When innovation throws an industry into disarray, 
the primary incentive is to adapt business models in ways that are advantageous to a company 
and garner it a superior position vis-a-vis its competitors. In certain situations, transformative 
change can leave an opening that can be exploited to garner dominant market share. Companies 
that are thusly situated are naturally motivated to seek a monopolistic market position, which can 
lead to supra-competitive monopolistic returns. It is challenging to try to change business models 
within an industry to curtail or solve for monopoly-seeking behavior. In the case of an industry 
that becomes dominated by a monopolistic entity, one possible approach might entail a coalition 
of competitors uniting their forces to garner enough collective market power to challenge and 
counter-balance the monopolist’s stronghold. (Note that on the one hand, the single dominant 
firm risks running afoul of antitrust laws aimed at monopolists; but on the other hand, the 
coalition risks running afoul of antitrust laws aimed at cartels.)  
 
                                                
191 See Chris Richards, The Court Case That Changed Hip-Hop—From Public Enemy to Kanye—Forever, 
WASH. POST (July 6, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-court-case-that-changed-hip-
hop--from-public-enemy-to-kanye--forever/2012/07/06/gJQAVWr0RW_story.html. 
192 Id.  
193 Id. 
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Alternative possibilities are presented by the open source movement.194 Under the open source 
philosophy, creative and innovative work is undertaken collaboratively, with rights of attribution 
and non-commercial rights of reproduction. Part of the point of open source production is to steer 
creative and innovative industries toward collaborative, shared production that runs counter to 
the kind of monopolistic tendencies that competitive markets can allow, if not encourage.195 
Equally fostering such creative openness is the Creative Commons, which has generated the 
Creative Commons License to allow creators to work without exerting complete control over 
their output and yet without fearing appropriation of their work for commercial exploitation or 
without proper attribution.196 These strategies share features that are drawn as much from 
changing the IP environment to changing business practices, and effectuate successful 
development of industries, firms and creative talent without necessitating competitive 
positioning or attempts to corner a market. Moreover, they can enable creative industry 
participants to launch challenges to dominant firms without requiring cartel-like behavior, 
litigation, or other sub-optimal practices and tactics. 
 
7. Maximize Spillover and Network Effects 
 
Spillover and network effects are positive externalities that tend to occur in richly creative areas 
that are rife with innovative industries (for example, Silicon Valley, or New York City). In these 
areas, innovation by a firm may leak out to others in its orbit, naturally subsidizing the 
productivity of other firms without direct governmental intervention. It is well-established that in 
these conditions the social returns to innovation exceed the private returns to any given entity. In 
part, this is because the benefits of innovation may spill over to other firms in ways that cannot 
be fully internalized. The level of these spillovers naturally varies by industry. Further, sector-
                                                
194 The open source movement was spearheaded by the computer software industry, but now spans an 
array of other fields, as well as a comprehensive philosophy of collaborative and open source production. 
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF 
CREATIVITY (2005); see also Andrew Orlowski, Lessig, Stallman on ‘Open Source’ DRM, REGISTER 
(Apr. 15, 2006), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/15/lessig_stallman_drm. 
195 This has arguably been an effective strategy in the computer industry, as demonstrated by an 
increasing number of companies that have turned to open source, non-proprietary software development 
to challenge the hegemony that had been long enjoyed by Microsoft. 
196 See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about. 
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specific productivity is directly and positively related to the level of spillover. In other words, 
inherent "leakiness," both of practices and propertization within a sector, may have a positive 
effect on innovation in some but not all industries. 
 
Changing business models when undertaken by a single venture is a strategy intended to 
maximize market position and its payoff in terms of revenue, and therefore is a competitive 
strategy that is not intended to enhance spillover and network effects. When undertaken by an 
entire industry, however, it may have a significant effect on the greater environment, leading to 
better or worse long-term outcomes. 
 
One illustration of the differing effects that a changed business paradigm can have on the 
environment with respect to spillover effects arises when the industry-wide change is predicated 
on protecting core valuable properties and leaving open practices, resources, and know-how that 
are deemed non-essential.197 But a changed business paradigm that protects some properties and 
releases others may not ultimately enhance spillover effects. In the case of education, for 
instance, protecting core valuable properties appears to necessitate restricting access to degree-
bearing programs to matriculating, tuition-paying students, while greater openness is granted to 
online MOOCs that are available for free to all interested learners. This dichotomy is premised, 
however, upon the increased propertization of the courses themselves, so that copyright in 
courses and course materials may protect the value of the teaching and the materials taught. In 
other words, by copyrighting courses, universities are trying to prevent free-riding by competitor 
institutions on the labor and output of their faculty. The changed business paradigm therefore 
necessitates a heightened IP strategy that newly cordons off course instruction and materials by 
placing them under enforced copyright protection. It can be imagined that such a development 
                                                
197 In the computer software industry, for instance, companies jealously guard the source code that 
undergirds their valuable products and services (such as operating systems). At the same time, open 
source ventures are becoming increasingly common in the computer world, as industry participants come 
to value the resources, expertise, creativity, and collaborative problem solving that open and 
unpropertized work can accord the entire industry. In this case, spillovers and network effects arise 
because entire areas of innovation are left relatively free of property allocations (that is, they may be 
subject to a Creative Commons license, and therefore are subject to a property regime, but one that is not 
predicated on an ownership model), while other areas of innovation (such as specific source code, 
algorithms, business practices built around a proprietary system, and so on) remain appropriately 
protected. See infra Chapter 6, subsection II.D.2. 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 296 
might have chilling effects on spillover and network effects, as faculty come to realize that their 
coursework may not as freely be shared within the community without some sort of rights-
clearing occurring ex ante. In this case, then, the relative openness of academia becomes 
restricted by changing business practices (and their heightened IP corollary), which may have an 
adverse affect on the greater community as a whole. 
 
C. What Are the Relative Advantages/Disadvantages to  
Changing Business Model vs. IP Level? 
 
1. Business Model Advantages 
 
The advantages that are inherent to the adaptation of business models, as opposed to other 
strategies for change (such as seeking enhanced IP protection, as shall be discussed below), are 
at once numerous and powerful. First, as noted, it is generally agreed that private ordering 
solutions are market-driven, and are preferable to solutions driven by external mechanisms, such 
as governmental intervention, legislative fiat, and so on. Second, it typically offers more flexible 
and industry-specific solutions that are highly granular, in that they can be structured to fit the 
needs of a company, a class of companies, or a given industry. In other words, the needs of the 
music industry may not be the same as those of the educational sector, and business model 
solutions can take those differences into account and be shaped accordingly. Third, business 
models do not usually involve the "one size fits all" model of IP entitlements, which are usually 
so broadly written and construed as to span many industries under one paradigm—such as the 
monolithic grant of copyright—rather than being shaped to fit the contours of any particular 
industry. Fourth, business model changes tend to be more flexible than alternatives, because such 
changes can be adjusted and readjusted in accordance with changing factors in the environment. 
As they do not tend to require external approvals, for instance from legislatures, governing 
bodies, administrators, and industry stakeholders, but are rather made on a case-by-case basis via 
the internal governance mechanisms of individual companies, business model decisions can be 
as adaptable or fluid as the companies involved are willing to allow. Finally, business model 
changes may be made through private arrangements within or across industries, rather than under 
the directive of externally imposed policy measures. The basis for industrial private ordering is 
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generally rational self-interest on the part of industry actors. Therefore, private ordering is a 
negotiated decision that must obtain the best possible results for each of the interested parties to 
be agreed upon and established. While policymakers may strive for such a utilitarian outcome, 
they may be hampered by information asymmetries, a lack of deep understanding of the industry, 
or the need to strike a compromise with outside stakeholders who may bring their own interests 
to the table. While these are not always negative considerations, they may impede the most 
effective response to change from the perspective of business concerns within the industry. 
 
2. IP Advantages 
 
Changing IP entitlements in a creative industry involves across-the-board measures that by 
definition are not privately ordered, open to negotiation ex post (that is, after IP measures have 
been put in place), or granular at a company-specific level. When disruptive innovation occurs 
within an industry, companies often hasten to devise counter-attacks that will secure their profit-
making ventures. These efforts, as observed above, have the advantages of speed, customization, 
and responsiveness to the particular challenge at hand. In contrast, changing IP entitlements can 
entail a slow, laborious, and painstaking process of negotiating rights among stakeholders, 
persuading legislators and policymakers, establishing new practices and norms under the newly 
enacted system, and hammering out the details in the course of daily business. 
 
Yet when disruptive innovation strikes or threatens, and market failure is imminent or indeed 
present, industries tend to clamor for changing IP entitlement allocations as a sure-fire solution. 
The equation is fairly straightforward: simplified, it posits that changing IP will increase the 
returns flowing from the exploitation of content owned by copyright holders. Most industry 
stakeholders call for more IP protection; some argue that more protection plus technological 
lock-ups (such as DRM) are required to stave off incursions from Internet-enabled activities that 
negatively affect revenues, such as widespread copying, dissemination, re-sales, and so forth. 
Despite the lack of granularity, then, changing IP entitlements as an industrial strategy remains 
an important tenet in the views of many creative industry participants. 
 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 298 
Creative content industries that call for changes in IP policy and practice do have some good 
reasons for seeking recourse in legal solutions. That is, changing IP entitlements offers several 
advantages that may be preferable to the creative industries than changing business models. First, 
while the call to change IP may be wholly based in rational self-interest on the part of certain 
industry members, it may also appeal to a broader group of stakeholders than changing the 
business model might, as it is more likely to distribute its benefits and costs more equitably 
across the industry spectrum. As a policy decision that affects broad swathes of constituents, 
changing IP is likely to require ex ante negotiations that involve multiple parties, including 
groups that may otherwise be under-represented, such as creators and/or inventors, start-up or 
emerging ventures, and end users. Second, broadly implemented IP systems may comprise entire 
licensing systems, such as rights-clearing organizations, which protect the rights of creators but 
also allow access to their works on an equitable, and perhaps open, basis. In some cases, this 
may prove more widely beneficial than a changed business model that puts all creative work 
behind an impenetrable curtain of copyright. Third, IP systems may be promulgated or 
reinforced (for instance, by adding new layers of copyright protection to a product that has 
previously come solely under the purview of patent or trademark) as an alternative to imposing 
technological protections on creative output. In this case, for instance, stricter rules or 
enforcement with respect to copyright infringement might displace or reduce the need for 
enhanced DRM protection on some works. The caveat in this case, however, is that an industry 
may instead choose to pair heightened IP with strengthened technological safeguards, thereby 
doubly fencing in products behind two barriers to access. Fourth, changing IP systems is likely to 
require some allowance for openness of access and use, such as maintaining “fair use” 
exceptions to protections, or re-affirming the right to “personal use” of copyrighted works. These 
allowances may be more likely to arise when stakeholders other than copyright holders, such as 
follow-on creators, consumers, and social and/or political activists are able to represent the rights 
of end users and other parties that may not always be represented at the bargaining table when 
legislation is lobbied for, agreed upon, and eventually crafted. 
 
There are four vital areas in which changing IP systems can prove more broadly beneficial than 
the alternative, changing business models, to a creative industry faced with innovation-driven 
change. First, the effects on the user and/or consumer are particularly important when the user is 
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herself actively engaged in creation, such that the lines between a creator and a user/consumer 
may blur. For instance, musicians have had a long and storied history of borrowing, reworking, 
remixing, and re-imagining the creations of their predecessors.198 Music copyright allows for this 
rich lineage of transformative borrowing by offering musicians the right to cover prior works, 
subject to a reasonable royalty fee. New technologies have expanded such borrowing, but in 
music, some of those creative endeavors have been curtailed, such as music “sampling” in rap 
and hip-hop genres.199 In fashion, however, creative borrowing by user/consumers remains 
unprotected, as does the original work itself.200 Enacting copyright protection of fashion designs 
could protect both the original work and the “cover,” thereby encouraging creative talent to bring 
to the fore new works that are inspired by, or that draw from, original works, without fear of 
appropriating without remunerating the original designer. 
 
Second, changing IP may have major effects on consumers in cases where “secondary” 
production, such as knock-offs, generics and discounted products, give consumers access to 
products that they might not otherwise be able to afford. This may vary enormously from field to 
field, and naturally will be affected by the kind of changes to IP that are effectuated. In the 
fashion industry, for instance, one possible change might entail strengthening existing trademark 
protections to fortify anti-counterfeiting activities, while continuing to withhold copyright 
protection from apparel. These measures would allow original designers protection in their 
exclusive creative works, while allowing knock-offs to flourish and reach lower tiers of 
consumers for whom trendy clothes would otherwise be inaccessible. But changing IP levels in 
fashion and allowing copyright in apparel might yet allow knock-offs to survive, particularly if 
fashion copyright were formulated to carve out certain kinds of designs from protection—for 
instance, certain “looks” that have become part of the common currency, and that therefore are 
not likely to be deemed especially original—and further, if high-end designers were to continue 
                                                
198 See supra notes 191-193 and accompanying notes.  
199 But technology has also expedited users’ creative borrowing in other fields as well. In online activities, 
for instance, many users find that access to creative written works gives them a platform from which to 
launch creative writing of their own: fan fiction, political commentary, blogging, commenting and other 
activities all attest to the inspiration that online writing can extend to the greater community. Similarly, 
Open Source activity allows users to share innovative projects, to have access to the works of others, to 
contribute original work, and to be engaged at once as user and as creator. See infra Chapter 6, Section 
IV.D. 
200 See generally supra Chapter 1. 
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to knock off their own works with a view to penetrating lower-tier retail markets. There are 
analogies to be drawn from the realm of patents as well.201 In the case of education, “secondary” 
production might entail the creation of MOOCs, which offer full courses to interested learners at 
little or no cost. Changing IP might entail protecting the courses taught by university faculty, 
whether online or in the real space classroom, under copyright, in order to prevent wholesale 
appropriation of the creative work by third parties, such as third-party providers and other 
competitors in the MOOC space. 
 
Third, changing IP can help to maximize spillover and network effects. As suggested by various 
studies on spillovers, positive externalities can be created in some industries when innovation by 
one firm leaks out to other firms, naturally subsidizing their productivity without external 
intervention.202 While there is marked variability among industries in the patent context, 
spillovers in the creative context is arguably more likely to be positive, due to the nature of 
creativity that almost invariably involves borrowing, sharing, exchanging, and inspiring among 
generations of creators. In creative industries, as in the patent context, there is also the potential 
for cumulative innovation, which can contribute to and advance industry-wide productivity as 
well. Changing IP can have a significant impact on such cumulative innovation, particularly 
when it addresses employee mobility and knowledge portability.203 In these regards, changing IP 
must take into consideration the greater context of the creative industry, as well as the landscape 
in which they are embedded, to maximize industry-wide returns. 
 
Fourth, changing IP can be effected in ways that contribute to vital societal interests, needs and 
goals. For instance, encouraging robust online participation, production, and user-based input 
serves to enrich democracy and advance the free speech of public citizens through open and 
equal exchange in the “marketplace of ideas.” Further, increasing the availability of cultural and 
                                                
201 In the case of generic drugs, changing IP might entail reducing the span of protection on patented 
drugs, so that consumers might have greater access to expensive medication. Another possibility might be 
to carve out certain markets that cannot afford to pay for expensive medication that is on patent, either by 
reducing costs, allowing some companies to reverse-engineer the drug and manufacture it in limited 
quantities, or create cross-licensing opportunities with countries in markets that cannot afford to purchase 
the drug at its full price.  
202 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law (U. Minn. L. Sch., Legal Theory 
Res. Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-11, 2003). 
203 See generally Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 186; Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 187. 
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intellectual resources, such as news and information, arts, books, and so on serves to enrich the 
public and to fortify the public domain. And finally, improving access to education and 
knowledge by offering MOOCs, Open Source courses (such as MIT’s OpenCourseWare), as 
well as enhancing open access scholarship and publication, serves to educate and inform the 
citizenry. These goals may seem too lofty to be achieved simply through changing IP 
entitlements. But by shaping IP in the creative industries with measures that protect critical 
business interests yet at the same time keep in mind the need to advance greater social aims, IP 
allocations may have a profound affect on the well-being of creative industries, consumers and 
the public. 
 
IV. SOLUTIONS: CHANGING IP 
 
Several questions arise in the course of reconsidering IPR allocations, which must be addressed 
in order to determine how creative industries responding to disruptive innovation can optimize 
the balance between changing IP entitlements, on the one hand, and changing business models, 
on the other hand. These questions, which will be addressed below, are as follows: (i) What can 
IP do?; (ii) What can more/enhanced IP do?; (iii) What’s wrong with more IP?; (iv) What about 
eliminating IP?; (v) Does IP commodify things? (and should we be worried if it does?); and (vi) 
Are there other, more effective ways to calibrate IP? 
 
A. What Can IP Do?; What Can More/Enhanced IP Do? 
 
1. Create a Market 
 
Changing IP entitlements, such as implementing a copyright protection scheme in a low-IP 
creative industry, offers a classic solution to market failure brought about by transformative or 
disruptive technological innovation. In cases where new technologies threaten to diminish the 
value of industrial output, extending or expanding copyright protection in creative works may 
create, reinvigorate, or reinforce the market in those works. Basic copyright theory posits that 
this occurs because creators know they will be compensated for their creations, and thereby have 
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ongoing incentives to create.204 In the case of fashion, for instance, it is argued that imposing 
copyright protection on original design will protect such works against rampant copying, which 
generates sales of knock-off items that undermine the value of the initial exclusive works.205 
 
2. Manage Rights Metering via Licensing Organizations such as Pros 
 
In a changing environment, the enforcement of IP entitlements can ensure that revenue streams, 
including royalties, licensing fees, and other payments for the use of copyrighted works, continue 
to support the viability of creative businesses. Rights-clearing organizations such as performing 
rights organizations (“PROs”) allow the management of licenses, whether individual or 
collective, to be centrally administered, streamlined, transparent (that is, everyone who uses them 
can understand and see how they work), and to contribute to parity among disparate participants 
and users of the system (for instance, individual creative artists versus larger entities, copyright 
holders versus users, and so on). Compulsory licensing via clearing houses or PROs can regulate 
the flow of copyright-protected work. On the one hand, it can ensure that royalties get paid to 
copyright holders whenever a work is accessed or used. On the other hand, it can ensure that 
work is available to follow-on creators or artists for access or use. In the case of music "covers", 
for instance, an original artist may have copyright in her work, which gives her the rights to 
record and perform her work. (Often the representative record label with which she has signed 
may actually retain the copyright, but the principle and the outcome remain the same.) However, 
a secondary artist may record or perform her copyrighted work, contingent upon paying royalties 
to the primary artist for such access and use. 
 
In a digitized economy, the very real possibility of “slippage”—that is, access and/or use of 
creative works that are not accounted for, metered, or compensated—can challenge an artist’s 
livelihood or an industry’s vitality. Metering may offer a pragmatic solution enabling copyright 
holders to register each occurrence of access and use of a work and to levy fees accordingly. 
Such metering works best when mechanisms, often technological in nature, can be positioned at 
the point of interaction between user and device, and thereby to count and charge for each 
                                                
204 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecesors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).   
205 See supra Chapter 1.  
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discrete transaction. Metering may be combined with technological protection, such as DRM, to 
further ensure that access and use of copyrighted works only occur licitly, with due 
compensation, and in accordance with the directives of the copyright holder. However, the 
combination of metering and DRM may stifle uses that had historically been permitted, such as 
personal use on individually-owned devices (as discussed, for example, in the Betamax case206), 
and may prove so burdensome to users that the lock-up becomes increasingly unpopular with 
users and ultimately rejected by the greater user base. Further, one distinct advantage that 
metering enjoys in comparison with protections such as DRM is that metering allows device 
interoperability, while still ensuring that copyright holders are appropriately remunerated. In a 
changing business environment, the ability to remain flexible, and the option to adapt one’s 
products and services to mesh with state-of-the-art advances in the field, may prove invaluable to 
a copyright holder seeking to disseminate her work to the largest possible paying audience. 
 
Metering may benefit the creative industries, but even to copyright holders and their 
representatives it may become more convoluted. The case of music in the digital age—when 
music is increasingly being created, distributed, accessed and consumed online—is illustrative of 
the complexity that the metering of IP entitlements may occasion. Digital music is disseminated 
via three main sources: (i) peer-to-peer file sharing networks, such as BitTorrent; (ii) online 
music stores, such as the Apple iTunes Store and Amazon.com; and (iii) online music streaming 
services, such as Pandora, Spotify, and Rdio. All three avenues for music sharing follow a basic 
model of disaggregating digital music tracks (that is, discrete songs rather than compiled albums) 
and disseminating them singly. There, however, the resemblance ends. In the first case, music is 
shared directly among users, and disaggregation of the online music files renders metering 
functionally impossible. Even if certain occurrences of file sharing are licit via this method (as, 
in a parallel drawn from earlier practices, sharing a mixed tape for personal use among friends 
might once have constituted licit sharing), they cannot be metered, and therefore this entire 
system of music file sharing bypasses compensation to the copyright holder altogether. In the 
third case, music is streamed directly to the listener via an online service that is closely 
analogous to broadcast radio. Here, metering follows the model of traditional radio, and 
performance royalties are paid by the broadcaster to compensate the copyright holder. In the 
                                                
206 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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second case, as previously discussed, digital tracks are sold on the music sites, following the 
model of earlier bricks-and-mortar record stores, and the price of each work comprises the 
standard per-song royalties to the copyright owner. 
 
In the digital music universe, however, it is not merely the choices for music delivery systems 
that are changing, but the choices for music distribution to those delivery systems that are 
changing as well. In other words, creative artists are beginning to use digitization to bring their 
works directly to these venues, and in some instances to bypass the traditional middlemen, such 
as record labels and agents. The role of PROs in this regard takes on a newfound significance, 
but one that is decidedly complex. On the one hand, musicians and composers can take 
advantage of PROs to ensure that they are duly compensated for their work. The clearing houses 
do not require the input of record labels or agents to function, and therefore are likely to prove a 
valuable and cost-effective mechanism to artists seeking remuneration for their creative work. 
Moreover, the largest music PROs, BMI and ASCAP, are expanding the range of benefits they 
offer artists, such as informational workshops on copyright, rights management services, and so 
on, which can contribute to securing artists' rights and royalties. On the other hand, PROs may 
become less critical with respect to sound recording rights and more important with respect to 
live performance rights if digitization effectively reduces revenue streams in online music and 
compels artists to look to live performance for a greater share of royalties. As these kinds of 
shifts occur, middlemen such as record labels and agents may become newly deputized to 
manage performance rights, related royalties and licensing fees, and to oversee the metering that 
PROs offer the individual artist who is increasingly making her living from live concert 
performances. Thus, rather than rendering the middleman obsolete, the PROs may come to 
reinforce their centrality to copyright clearing processes and returns. At any rate, digital music is 
likely to require mechanisms that uphold artists’ rights and returns in the face of swift, 
widespread, and potentially detrimental copying. To defend artists’ rights and rewards, PROs 
will be required to continue to offer a consistent, transparent, efficient and relatively 
straightforward mechanism for the continued clearing of rights. This may prove useful when new 
sources of revenue open up via newer technologies, such as online music streaming, ringtones, 
video streaming (with music as a part of the video) and other as-yet unforeseeable uses of music 
on the Internet and related technologies and devices. 
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3. Support New Business Solutions, Including Disaggregation, Price Discrimination, and 
Distinctions Between Valuable Assets 
 
Digital technologies provide both producers and users with the tools to disaggregate creative 
content, that is, to break it into components that can be accessed uniquely or sequentially. The 
music industry demonstrates the indelible impact of content disaggregation on an entire 
industry.207 IP entitlements serve a critical purpose in the wake of the digitization, and 
concomitant disaggregation, of creative content, as they ensure that content usages will be 
metered and compensated. First, this is of course paramount to creators who must be 
remunerated for the work they have created, and to copyright holders who are owed royalties for 
their rights. Second, it is essential to reassure creative content companies that they can safely 
partner with online streaming services208, secure in the knowledge that the work they release will 
be monetized and that royalties will be duly assessed and collected. And third, it helps to assure 
advertisers that services offering such content are legitimate, attractive to consumers, and viable 
                                                
207 Music is only one of the earlier manifestations that can be found among the creative fields. In 
television, for instance, cable television stations typically offer bundled programming to consumers, and 
by grouping together a cluster of networks are effectively able to subsidize the costs of less popular 
networks with the revenues from more popular networks. Similar clustering occurs on a more granular 
level when multiple television programs are bundled together on a given network, enabling the greater 
viewership to support the lesser ones. Since its inception, the cable television industry has relied on 
bundling as a means of marketing packaged networks (and the varied programs they offer) to consumers 
at a spectrum of price points, ranging from “basic” to “premium” services that vary according to the 
popularity of shows carried, the quality of broadcasting (historically, at least, high-definition resolution 
was offered at a premium), and other features. See generally Haley Sweetland Edwards, Cable Industry 
Frets Over Future of Your Television Bundle, TIME (Apr. 30, 2014), http://time.com/82416/cable-
industry-frets-over-future-of-your-television-bundle. The cable industry rationalizes its price 
discrimination on grounds that consumers can choose between services and pay only for the programming 
they prefer; and although consumers may be obliged to pay for certain products that they might not 
choose, they can indirectly support less mainstream or niche markets, thereby helping to ensure that cable 
television programming remains well diversified. Id. Digitization, however, has proven a disruptive 
innovation in the cable television context, as the rise of online video and television streaming services, 
such as Hulu, Netflix, and Amazon, permits end users to disaggregate the offerings that cable television 
networks, as well as their counterparts in mainstream broadcasting, and to consume them on an 
individuated basis. Id. Thus, for instance, rather than being compelled to purchase a bundle of network 
programming, a consumer is able to purchase, access, or view the specific television program, series, or 
even episode that she selects. And while this content may be re-aggregated, as in the case of subscription 
services offered by Netflix and others, the ability to choose how much content to access and use is newly 
placed in the control of the end user.  
208 Again, this is equally relevant to cable and television. 
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business entities. In the absence of IP, these online services would more closely resemble file 
sharing sites such as Napster, which would potentially signal that at least some amount of the 
content disseminated might be illicitly disseminated. Advertisers might well be unwilling to 
place their advertisements and to expend their resources on potentially illicit websites, and thus 
might shun online streaming services altogether. Advertising, however, is critical to the ongoing 
viability of such services, particularly those which receive only a limited share of revenues from 
subscription services, as is the case with the majority of online music streaming services such as 
Pandora, Rdio, and others.209 The understanding that IP protects online creative content serves as 
a guarantee of value allowing advertisements to appear on online streaming websites and thereby 
to effectively underwrite the online endeavor. 
 
The digitization of education is giving rise to a disaggregation of content that might conceivably 
revolutionize the sector. As discussed earlier, institutions that break down instruction into 
discrete online courses, which can be consumed singly or multiply, are engaging in a radical 
disaggregation of educational content. By establishing copyright in courses, educators can 
emphasize the importance of propertizing these instructional units and assigning IP entitlements 
to their copyright holders. Asserting copyright in the courses serves several purposes: (i) it 
creates a market in individuated courses, rather than in the more traditional unit of educational 
value, the cumulative degree; (ii) it empowers institutions to be remunerated by collecting 
royalties flowing from copyrighted courses; (iii) it sets the terms for employee mobility and 
knowledge portability; and (iv) it differentiates between academic products, the modular online 
course versus the sequential classroom courses leading to a degree. 
 
Digitization is not only segmenting educational content, but it is also affecting the value 
accorded by educators (and, consequently, student-consumers) to distinct components of 
disaggregated content.  Pursuant to copyright law, copyright holders in courses are free to 
exercise their right to charge for performance of the courses, or conversely to offer the courses 
                                                
209 In parallel fashion, online streaming services for film, cable and television content also rely on 
advertising, as in the case of Netflix. See Michael Lindquist, Ads on Netflix?, TALENT ZOO, 
http://www.talentzoo.com/beyond-madison-ave/blog_news.php?articleID=13689. Netflix has the rare 
model in which robust subscription services can somewhat alleviate the pressure to maximize advertising 
returns. See id. 
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free of charge. In the case of online education, the MOOC course unit has been assigned a zero 
value by institutions entering the online space. Educators may be pursuing various strategies by 
offering MOOCs for free. First, they may regard MOOCs as loss leaders that attract a host of 
learners to the educational space. This could serve two purposes: (i) to draw some learners into 
the pursuit of a degree at the traditional institutions that are acting as MOOC providers; and/or 
(ii) to draw learners into the MOOC space, and eventually to secure their consumption with a 
view to monetizing MOOCs and related programs, services or products in the long run. Second, 
educators may view MOOCs as experimental forays into the online learning environment, and 
may wish to conduct an array of pedagogical ventures without risking loss of their core products 
(that is, courses, instruction, and materials) to competitors. Propertization in this case would 
serve as a kind of insurance policy, ensuring that appropriation of online educational work 
product could not be made without some right of recourse (although economic harm and 
damages might be an open question, given the currently cost-free pricing of MOOCs). 
 
The third strategy that educators may be venturing is speculative, but may be aimed at much 
longer-term payoffs. That is, by copyrighting courses, educators can signal that propertized 
instructional units, as well as related materials, function as a commodity in the educational 
marketplace. It is arguable that traditionally courses serving as part of a degree program in a 
university also served as a kind of commodity, or a component of the commodity of an academic 
degree (for which a price, tuition, must be paid). But educators can underscore the commodity 
value of MOOCs by several means: (i) by extracting courses from the traditional university 
setting and offering them online; (ii) by asserting copyright in online courses, offering them 
online on a stand-alone basis; (iii) by pricing them as separable units (whether the price is free or 
not is immaterial); and (iv) by establishing a market in MOOCs that vie with competitors in the 
online educational arena. Importantly, the commodity value of the MOOC is distinguishable 
from the value proposition of traditional education. In the case of MOOCs, the value of the 
course lies in online instruction, training, and the intermediated online learning experience. In the 
case of traditional education, the commodified package is more broadly limned, and includes an 
entire curricular course of study leading to a degree, as well as many intangible goods, including 
face-to-face classroom instruction, live student interaction in the classroom and on campus, and 
the entirety of the student college experience. The distinction between the online learning 
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experience and the live learning experience is, roughly speaking, analogous to the difference in 
music between a recorded performance and a live concert experience.210 As in the case of music, 
educators may choose to differentiate between online and real space instruction, to value them 
differently, and to consider them completely separate revenue streams (whether actual or 
potential). Also as in the case of music, educators may view the MOOC as offering limited 
returns, relying instead on the live university experience as the more significant source of 
revenue. In both cases, then, it is paradoxically the intangible elements of the experience—live 
interactions, lived experience—in which the value of the creative content inheres.211 
 
B. What Can More IP Do? 
 
1. Increase Revenues that You Can Extract from Your Copyrighted Material 
 
Copyright holders usually agree that they lose out on some rents—that is, returns that would 
otherwise be reaped from exploitation of their copyrights—when certain unremunerated uses are 
permitted by copyright. Often the case is made that copying material for personal use—for 
example, when an individual copies a music CD to use on multiple devices—has long been 
                                                
210 Although MOOC interactions are live, and not merely recorded, they are technologically 
intermediated, may be asynchronous, and may not involve direct interaction between instructors and 
learners. 
211 It is not in music and education alone that commodification of creative content can paradoxically 
depress the value of work product (if indeed the product has marketable value), particularly when 
disruptive technologies facilitate the process of producing and disseminating the work, but can promote 
the value of the live experience in which the product is embedded. Copyright can contribute to the 
monetization of content and experience, but it is not always a requisite feature. In the case of 
photography, technology has greatly lowered the costs associated with taking, perfecting, copying, and 
disseminating photographs (among other activities), and in most cases has minimized the value of the 
photograph as a commodity per se. At the same time, technology has enhanced many experiences that 
may be associated with photographs, particularly online experiences such as posting, sharing, exchanging, 
and commenting on personal photographs. Many companies are beginning to find ways to monetize the 
experiences associated with photography, including websites such as Pinterest, Instagram, and Shutterfly, 
which allow photographers to display their works, to interact with one another, and to participate in a 
virtual community of photography enthusiasts. While some users of these websites may assert copyright 
in their original photographs in order to protect the creative value of their endeavors, it is more likely that 
copyright functions, if at all, to prevent outright appropriation of images (and perhaps of the users’ 
privacy rights) than to allow monetization of the creative content. Rather, it is the experience in which 
value inheres, and which may prove profitable to the enterprises that are able to facilitate, exploit, and 
support the live experiences enjoyed by the creative community.  
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deemed permissible by copyright law. In the digital era, however, such copying may be seen by 
copyright holders as problematic. The argument of copyright holders is twofold. First, they argue 
that recorded content may be used for potentially illicit purposes, such as widespread 
dissemination that undermines actual licit sales of the creative content. But second, they argue, 
even if the copying is licit, the user may make copies for multiple uses to an extent that deprives 
the copyright holder of significant returns.212 Increased copyright, therefore, might entail 
requiring payment for each and every occasion on which an individual gains access to, uses, or 
copies a copyrighted creative work.  
 
2. Increase Revenues by Allowing Creative Works in Low-IP or No-IP Regimes to Be 
Copyrighted, and Protect Emerging Creators in Those Fields 
 
In creative industries that historically have been extended little or no IP protection, the argument 
for imposing IP entitlements is threefold: (i) in a world of extensive, inexpensive, and increasing 
copying, the value of original works can be protected, exploited, and sustained; (ii) emerging 
creators will particularly benefit from copyright protection, as their work is the most likely to be 
copied, they are the least likely to be able to thwart copying without the legal mainstays that 
formal IP protection extends copyright holders; and (iii) the administration of a formalized 
licensing system will allow licit use and re-use, transformative work, and other acts of creative 
borrowing and interpretation to occur widely but with due remuneration to original creators. 
These are among the arguments put forth by proponents of copyright in the fashion industry, who 
argue that rampant copying is undermining the business models of original designers of haute 
couture as well as newly emerging independent designers. While trademark protection may 
inhibit some amount of copying of elite fashion design (not only brands and logos, but also the 
recognizable “look and feel” of haute couture), the brands and logos of emerging independent 
designers are not likely to deter potential copyists from knocking off their work. One problem 
that has been raised, however, is the creation and administration of copyright in a field that has 
existed for many, many generations, and that has been richly creative in so many aspects that it is 
daunting to imagine how newly creative works could be identified, registered, administrated, and 
                                                
212 This argument may contravene the first sale doctrine, but attempts have been made to reconcile it with 
the doctrine among creative content producers and copyright holders. See Jessica Litman, Lawful 
Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
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otherwise protected. Fashion copyright advocates, however, may point to the successful 
operation of licensing agencies, such as collective rights organizations in music and other 
creative sectors, and may argue that such agencies have been well-developed to address and 
master just such challenges, and are therefore well-able to administer rights efficiently and with 
minimum transaction costs. 
 
C. What’s Wrong with Just More IP? 
 
1. Changes Balance of IP/Public Domain; Or Changes Balance of Rights Between 
Copyright Holder and Consumer 
 
Some commentators argue that historically a balance has been struck between IP and non-IP 
spaces, such as fair use, public domain, and gray areas that were left alone such as “personal 
use.”213 They further argue that by increasing IP protections—whether length of time, scope, or 
other measures—the balance is reneged upon without due consideration and buy-in by all 
stakeholders, including users, emerging creators, the general public, and others who are usually 
under-represented by lobbyists and legislators.214 But such personal use is only one aspect of the 
important bundle of rights that many legal scholars consider to lie at the heart of copyright and 
creativity: that is, “users’ rights” as a whole.215 Advocates of users’ rights argue that expansions 
in IP in the creative content industries are significantly disruptive of balances of rights between 
copyright holders and consumers, and further fail to recognize or make allowances for the 
blurring of lines between these parties.216 
                                                
213 See generally Litman, supra note 212, at 1909. 
214 Jessica Litman argues that personal use has been left out of the discourse of copyright law deliberately 
and perniciously:  “We are in danger of obliterating lawful personal use because we’ve been pretending 
that it isn’t there.” See id. at 1903 
215 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 
977 (“With the development and dissemination of digital technology, the importance of private copying 
and its legal status, whether fair or unfair under copyright law, has only increased.”). 
216 It should be noted that not all legal scholars, naturally, are advocates of users’ rights. One prominent 
opponent is Jane Ginsburg, who argues that “people who read, watch movies, and otherwise use 
copyrighted materials are merely ‘consumptive users’ and not active or creative participants and thus 
don’t merit special attention by copyright law or policy.” See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in 
Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 15 (1997). Ginsburg also argues that users encroach upon 
authors with their claims to rights, and thereby challenge creative production, observing that “the 




First, according to a major advocate of users’ rights, Jessica Litman, users are perforce a broad 
category of the freedoms that users have in creative works, including “creative and imaginative 
behaviors such as reading, listening, listening, watching, and playing [which] further copyright’s 
goals.”217 These rights inhere in the array of copyrightable works, including those that are more 
recently emerging, such as digital creativity and production.218 Moreover, such rights are 
culturally embedded, necessitating the freedom for users to engage with culture or, as one 
leading commentator, Julie Cohen, puts it, to be involved in processes of “working through 
culture” that are “irreducibly contingent,” or ever-changing in response to the relations that the 
user and the creative material eventuate.219 Expansions of copyright can occur at the expense of 
these important user freedoms, and may precipitate even greater incursions on copyright’s 
balancing act by neglecting to recognize the user altogether.220 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
perspective of user rights, albeit important, should remain secondary. Without authors, there are no works 
to use.” See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”: Authors, Exploiters, 
and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM L. REV. 1466, 1468 (1995). This is not, however, the position 
taken by this paper. 
217 Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 325, 331 & n.22 (2011). 
218 As Litman puts it, “[t]he tendency to see music listeners, art viewers, television watchers, or video-
game players as less deserving of copyright’s solicitude than book readers, though, strikes me as 
misguided. We’ve made the choice to give authors of music, art, television and video parity with writers 
of books in the rights conferred by the copyright system. If we believe that these works merit copyright 
protection, it should follow that we value opportunities to experience and enjoy those works enough to 
assure the reasonable freedom to take advantage of them.” Id. 
219 Julie Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1179 (2007). 
Julie Cohen describes the relational interplay between users and creative works in the cultural landscape:  
[T]he cultural activities of situated users take place within a web of semantic and material 
entailments. One cannot simply step out of or around the resources, values, and absences 
within her own culture, but must negotiate one's way through them, following the 
pathways or “links” that connect one resource to the next. This process, which I will call 
“working through culture,” is irreducibly contingent. It moves in patterns that are both 
(and sometimes simultaneously) recursive and opportunistic, and supports an 
understanding of creativity as relational at its core. 
Id. 
220 As Cohen describes the condition: “Copyright doctrine, however, is characterized by the absence of 
the user. . . . [This] absence produces a domino effect that ripples through the structure of copyright law, 
shaping both its unquestioned rules and its thorniest dilemmas.” Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in 
Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 347-48 (2005). 
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Second, Litman and other legal scholars, such as Rebecca Tushnet, Julie Cohen, or Larry Lessig, 
feel that the expansion of IP in creative content industries can drastically affect the relational 
interplay between users and creative works, particularly when the user is actively engaged with 
such works in ways that can themselves contribute to the creativity that lies at the heart of 
copyright law and policy.221 In this respect, the “situated user,” as Cohen puts it, “should be left 
untrammeled by unduly expansive copyright restrictions, which perhaps (or seemingly) 
paradoxically will serve to further copyright’s goal of encouraging creative production.”222 
“These user activities include creative remixing,” which is merely one point on a spectrum of 
uses of creative work that are encroached upon and threatened by expansions in copyright.223 
Other forms of creative interplay between the user and creative materials are also able to thrive 
when copyright is kept suitably at bay, as Lessig points out, and are able to flourish in a “hybrid 
economy” that leaves ample room for spontaneous user generation of creative materials that may 
be inspired by, or draw from, earlier cultural output.224 
 
Third, some commentators argue that by the increasing metering of creative works due to 
expansions of copyright is liable to encroach upon historically established freedoms of users to 
enjoy such works with broad liberties and without undue payment requirements. For instance, 
Lawrence Lessig, a powerful advocate of users’ rights, argues that the interplay of creativity and 
users has always been liberally granted and largely accepted as free and unfettered.225 On this 
line of argument, as articulated by legal scholar Joseph Liu, the fundamental nature of copyright 
law is distorted by overly expansive IP: that is, “[a]fter all, the overall purpose of the Copyright 
                                                
221 See, e.g., id. 
222 Id. “Users play two important roles within the copyright system: receive copyrighted works, and some 
users become authors….This essay introduces a new character, the situated user, who engages cultural 
goods found within the context of her culture through a variety of activities ranging from consumption to 
creative play, and whose activities are the vehicle through which copyright’s collective project is 
advanced.” Id. at 348-49. 
223 Litman expresses it eloquently: “As digital tools enable audience members to interact with works of 
authorship in different and interesting ways, any sharp distinction between passive consumption and  
creative remixing dissolves into a spectrum of different ways of enjoying works.” Litman, supra note 
217, at 350. 
224 Lessig points out that this is undeniably a trend toward “remix” culture: “it is no surprise that other 
forms of ‘creating’ [such as remixing] are becoming an increasingly dominant form of ‘writing’.” LESSIG, 
supra note 24, at 69. 
225 As Lessig contends, “[c]reators here and everywhere are always and at all times building upon the 
creativity that went before and that surrounds them now. . . .  No society, free or controlled, has ever 
demanded that every use be paid for.” LESSIG, supra note 194, at 29. 
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Act is not to reward authors for authors’ sake, but to reward authors to benefit consumers and 
society more generally.”226 The strongest claim on this view, as expressed by commentator 
Glynn Lunney, is that a broad array of uses should be permissible to users so that their rights and 
liberties can be preserved without intrusive or burdensome expansions of rights in creative 
works. Lunney goes so far as to argue that only when users undermine creative production that 
copyright may step in and curtail or meter their activities. Or as Lunney contends, “unauthorized 
copying, again unlike theft, becomes socially undesirable only when it goes so far as to threaten 
the public’s interest in an adequate supply of creative works.”227 
 
Fourth, some commentators argue that re-calibrating the balance between creators and users by 
expanding or tweaking copyright may have an unwarranted and indeed unwanted effect on the 
very nature of works that are generated in various creative content industries. One leading 
commentator on users’ rights, Neil Netanel, argues that “an expansive copyright law will tend to 
diminish the creation and dissemination of additional works and lead to a clustering in already 
popular genres.”228  
 
Fifth, and lastly, it is arguable that creative content industries have moved from a predominantly 
sales-based model to a licensing based-model, and that consumers have been moved from 
ownership to licensing status with respect to the creative goods they consume. This, it may be 
argued, is itself a critical change that has been made unilaterally and without the informed 
consent of the customer. Moreover, it has real implications with respect to the consumer’s 
interaction with, and control over, the creative content she has selected and paid for. The right 
and ability to copy, share, sell, or repurpose licensed material is significantly different than those 
attaching to purchased material. And when licensed material is further restricted by technological 
lock-up, such as DRM protection, the rights of the user may be materially changed. This again 
changes the balance of rights between the copyright holder and the end user, yet only the rights 
holder can be seen to have the unilateral power to make such a reconfiguration to occur. 
 
                                                
226 Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 BOS. COLL. L. REV. 397, 398 (2003). 
227 Lunney, supra note 215, at 983. 
228 NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 135–36 (2010). 
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In the case of music, for example, electronic device manufacturers singlehandedly issued limits 
on the number of times a downloaded work might be copied onto a user’s personal devices, 
curtailing such personal use without notice or user buy-in. Further, record labels imposed DRM 
protections on music CDs and digital tracks, preventing even licit copying by users who had 
legitimately purchased musical works. And the industry began to bring copyright infringement 
actions under the stringent Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),229 thereby challenging 
users to explore even the boundaries of fair use, personal use, and non-infringing use of musical 
works. Together, these measures could be seen to change the balance between IP rights and 
users’ freedoms without securing even a modicum of user consent and approval.230 These are 
arguably incursions on “lawful personal use,” as Litman calls it, and thereby illustrate one set of 
challenges that expansive copyright law can pose to users and consumers. 
 
But the example of music also reveals incursions on users’ rights to creative freedoms in the 
works that they lawfully obtain. For instance, the rights of users to creatively use musical works 
has been challenged by restrictions on “sampling” music in remixs, mash-ups, and other new 
forms of musical composition that have been facilitated by digital technology.231 Further, users’ 
rights to gain access to short snippets of music, and to weave them into their creative works, has 
been hampered by onerous licensing requirements that whittle away at their ability to use even 
the shortest of melodies, chord sequences, or musical fragments without being subject to 
metering mechanisms and royalty requirements. This may prove particularly onerous to smaller, 
independent creators with limited budgets, thereby creating a market that favors large-scale 
productions and, as Netanel suggests, may thereby have an impact on the caliber, scope and 
nature of the original musical work being composed today and in the future.232 Finally, the 
                                                
229 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.).  
230 In the case of literature, electronic books or “e-books” point to another copyright-related concern. As 
in the case of digital music, e-books are copyrighted and actually licensed to users, rather than sold 
(although the term “sold” is often used as short-hand to describe the transaction), pursuant to the terms of 
a licensing agreement. This represents a dramatic but often overlooked shift in the treatment of such 
creative works altogether, as the original sale of books and CDs, respectively, were indeed actual sales 
that conferred ownership rights in the property on the purchasing consumer. The licensing involved in the 
case of e-books raises important questions with respect to the first sale doctrine (which will not be 
addressed in this paper).  
231 See supra Chapter 3, Section II.A. 
232 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
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expansion of music copyright is increasingly challenging new kinds of creativity, such as 
performance arts and multi-media works, which often rely upon access to a broad swath of 
creative works in order to build layered, collage-like pieces that offer a kind of cultural tapestry 
built upon many contributions, inspirations, and artifacts. Again, this can affect the kind of work 
being produced, as well as the access that creative multi-media artists are afforded to their 
baseline materials. It is possible that an expansive reading of fair use may protect some of these 
works. But fair use has historically proven to be a tricky point of repose for creative endeavors, 
and may not prove adequate in the face of expansive copyright and aggressive defense of IP 
rights and royalties on the part of empowered copyright holders in creative works. 
 
2. Locks Up Too Much so that Follow-On Innovation May Be Choked Off 
 
Adding or reinforcing IP in creative industries can run the risk of incentivizing companies to 
create locked, segregated ecosystems that thwart follow-on innovation or interoperability with 
other products, devices, or entire systems. In a competitive market, this risk can also arise when 
companies change their business models to respond to a changing environment, with the aim of 
gaining a competitive advantage that can effectively corner market share and thwart potential 
encroachments by competition. But changing business models are continually subject to 
competitive pressure arising from industry innovations; and even in cases where a company 
seems to enjoy a quasi-monopolistic position, the eventuality remains high that such a position 
will not remain fixed in the long run.233 In contrast, adding or reinforcing IP can institute a 
systemic change that (i) is externally imposed (by legislative fiat, for example); (ii) operates 
across a broad swathe of the sector (for instance, affecting an entire class of creative producers 
and/or copyright holders within an industry); (iii) may be additionally fortified by technological 
lock-ups, such as DRM protections; and (iv) is fixed and therefore may be less susceptible to 
external competitive pressures.234  
                                                
233 The computer industry is rife with examples, such as the case of Microsoft, whose operating system 
dominated the market for several decades (its hegemony has arguably diminished considerably in recent 
years, but many argue this is due in part to antitrust lawsuits and other exogenous factors). 
234 In an innovation-driven industry such as computer software, the effects of propertization on software 
products are discernible and ongoing. In the United States, software copyrights are used by proprietary 
software companies, such as Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and so on, to prevent the unauthorized 
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3. Can Undermine a Constructed Commons 
 
Increasing IP entitlements can create a propertized system that regulates the flow of creative 
work as well as the revenues and rights that attach in such work. At the same time, however, it 
can displace more tacitly agreed-upon arrangements that have been made within the context of a 
                                                                                                                                                       
copying of their products. The proprietary nature of software is reinforced by statute, as software is 
expressly included under the protection of the DMCA (which criminalizes the illicit evasion of copy 
protection in those properties in its purview). Many software products are also protected by various anti-
copying technologies. As in the case of other copyrightable products, copyright for computer programs 
prohibits not only literal copying, but also copying of "non-literal elements," such as a program's 
structure, sequence, and organization. See generally Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ61.pdf. Taken together, this array of protections 
allows commercial developers of proprietary software to safeguard their products against competitive 
inroads, as well as against unfair competitive practices such as reverse engineering software in order to 
reproduce and appropriate its essential source code. At the same time, however, these measures allow 
software companies to create closed software systems that compete against one another and that may not 
be interoperable without the operation of expressly designed cross-licensing arrangements. The 
complexity involved in negotiating such arrangements may not be cost-effective, particularly in markets 
that are fast-changing, with little certainty as to which operating system or software products will rise to 
the top. Further, there is little incentive to promote interoperability, as creating a proprietary software 
system that dominates the market may lead to supra-competitive rewards (that is, rewards flowing from a 
monopolistic market position), thereby incentivizing competition rather than collaboration. For these 
reasons, follow-on innovation can be impeded by extending IP protection to computer software, leading 
to the dominance of a handful of companies at the expense of newer, more emerging companies that may 
not be able to establish a handhold in the closed ecosystem that is maintained and controlled by the 
industry giants. 
 
The negative ramifications of proprietary software were recognized early on by innovative software 
developers, and gave rise to the “free software movement” arising as early as 1983, under whose auspices 
the GNU General Public License (GNU GPL) was developed. See The History of the GPL, FREE-SOFT, 
http://www.free-soft.org/gpl_history. In 1998, the open source movement broke off from the free 
software movement, but at the heart of both movements lies the basic principle that software developed 
openly, and free of proprietary constraints, promotes innovation, sharing and cooperation, and increases 
digital and social freedoms. See Richard Stallman, Why Open Source Misses the Point of Free Software, 
GNU OPERATING SYS., https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/open-source-misses-the-point.html. The myriad 
goals, directions, and innovations that free and open source software movements embrace are beyond the 
scope of this paper. But they represent a compelling push back against certain restrictions and conditions 
that proprietary software has imposed on its products, consumers, and follow-on innovators, including (i) 
preventing innovators from reverse engineering source code, even with the aim of adding improvements 
or modifications; (ii) requiring end users to comply with system-wide controls, such as mandatory 
upgrades; (iii) requiring users to divulge personal data, at a cost to their privacy and/or security; (iv) 
preventing users from copying software onto multiple devices (even those they may own), from sharing 
software, or from making copies for any reason (even potentially licit reasons); and (iv) thwarting follow-
on innovators from creating additions, applications, and other useful inventions without first entering into 
licensing agreements with the software copyright holder. 
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constructed and established commons. In the classic case of commons delineated by Ellickson 
and Ostrom, for example, negotiated rights are struck among parties who share a common 
resource, such as a grazing land or a pool of water, and the behaviors and norms of the parties 
are mutually agreed upon and adhered to without resort to externally-imposed and administered 
mechanisms.235 Imposing an IP regime upon a constructed commons may seem at first glance 
merely an act of reinforcement, a kind of “belt and suspenders” protection that operates as an 
ancillary support in changing and turbulent times. However, it can be more pernicious, 
undermining the agreements that have been struck and that sustain the operations of a group of 
actors or an entire industry.  
 
This challenge may prove especially dramatic in fields that have strong normative parameters, 
and that rely on an array of non-material incentives, rewards, and indirect emoluments to buttress 
the compensation accorded to creative individuals or entities.236 In both education and fashion, 
for instance, rewards such as reputational benefits, grants and prizes, peer recognition, and so on 
may serve as either substitutes or supplements to monetary compensation for creative work.237 If 
that work becomes propertized, however, reliance on the mechanisms of non-monetary rewards 
may become attenuated or incidental. In education, this may mean that a scientific researcher 
chooses to pursue patenting rights in her work, rather than to publish the results in academic 
journals. Alternatively, she may choose to pursue individual work rather than to seek 
collaborative work, preferring to keep patentable work proprietary in order to further her own 
interests and keep potential patent-related revenues to herself. In other words, property rights 
may dissuade creators from generously sharing the fruits of their labor, rather incentivizing them 
to seek to maximize monetary rewards in exchange for such work.238 It is not, therefore, that 
                                                
235 See ELINOR OSTRON, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); see also ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS 
SETTLE DISPUTES (1994). 
236 Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is it the Best Incentive System?, in 2 
INNOVATION POLICY & THE ECONOMY 51 (Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2002); Peter S. 
Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1474 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).  
237 This also pertains to disparate creative fields such as comedy or cuisine.  
238 In cuisine, for instance, rather than teaching apprentices how to master an individual cooking style and 
set of recipes, a chef may choose to assert copyright in his instruction and recipes (rather than merely in a 
cookbook that annotates such recipes), despite the possibility that such a substitution may undermine the 
system of apprenticeship and homage on which the commons of haute cuisine has been constructed.  
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reputational benefits, sharing and collaboration, and a rewards-based system cannot exist side-
by-side with a propertization-based regime. It is rather that in certain important cases property 
rights may demand exclusivity, rent-seeking behaviors, and may close off the rights of follow-on 
creators (such as former apprentices) to share in the creative efforts of those that came before 
them and instructed them in the creative art in question. 
 
4. Can Change the Balance Between Propertization and Disclosure 
 
As discussed earlier, changing the business model that prevails in a creative content industry 
may put up roadblocks to collaborative activity.239 But the ecosystem of a given industry may be 
so meticulously structured that expanding or reinforcing IP rights can also disturb the balance 
between propertization and disclosure to an extent that undermines the latter. This is particularly 
problematic in creative industries that value disclosure as a vital facet of free knowledge flow 
and enrichment of the public good, such as the education sector. The case of academic patenting 
versus publication is a useful illustration in this regard. In academic work, publication is 
considered a critical feature of scientific research, both as a means of sharing scientific research 
and discovery, enhancing scholarly reputations, and furthering diverse institutional aims such as 
attracting top students, attracting external funding, and so on. But publishing and scholarship can 
at times conflict with interests in propertizing scientific R&D, particularly when the outcome can 
be profitable to institutions and their allies.240 Some commentators argue that while there is an 
inherent tension between the goals of patenting and publication, it is still the case that academia 
has been able to strike a compromise between patenting activity and publishing activity, and that 
these patenting and fundamental research can even be sustained as complementary activities.241 
                                                
239 See supra Section III.B. 
240 An important caveat to note is that when propertization takes the form of patenting, the process of 
filing a patent does indeed entail disclosure. However, this is late-stage disclosure, and occurs long after 
the run-up to patentability. In that period of run-up, the knowledge gained and the advances made may 
not be available to others. Perhaps the better distinction to draw is between the end-game disclosure of 
patenting, then, versus the lifetime of disclosure of publication. However, this seems to erase the 
importance of early-stage and fundamental research disclosure, which is what gives rise to the distinction 
used here between patenting and publication. 
241 Ajay Agrawal and Rebecca Henderson, two leading scholars in the field, have studied patenting and 
publication activity at the Departments of Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Engineering at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. There findings are generally positive: “(i) Patenting as a minority 
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In contrast, other commentators have argued that an increasing reliance on propertization has 
become increasingly prevalent in academia, placing essential values at risk.242 However, in both 
cases, it is recognized that IP can place basic scholarly aims and publication rights at risk, and 
that increasing propertization only serves to heighten that risk and threaten the balance that 
academia now seeks to maintain. 
 
D. What About Eliminating IP? 
 
1. Why It Is Not Always Feasible to Eliminate IP 
 
Some proponents of non-proprietary creative work argue that drastically reducing (for instance, 
only offering one form of IP protection, such as trademark in the fashion industry) or eliminating 
IP (such as moving to wholly open source production) can contribute to a richer, more innovative 
creative environment and a more robust public domain, as exemplified by (i) certain low-IP 
regimes, such as fashion; (ii) no-IP based regimes, such as comedy and cuisine; (iii) various 
kinds of open source production, such as Wikipedia, some blogs, and some free software; and 
(iv) open copyright-based systems, such as the Creative Commons (“CC”) and the Creative 
Commons copyright-license243 (including some open source software). Effectively eliminating IP 
is usually argued to work best in conjunction with changing business models to draw substantial 
revenue from non-propertized sources, such as (i) live performance (music and teaching or 
lecturing in front of live audiences, and so on) (ii) advertisements (carried in hard copy sources 
such as newspapers and magazines, as well as online sources such as websites, portals, search 
                                                                                                                                                       
activity: a majority of faculty in the sample never patent, and publication rates far outstrip patenting rates; 
and (ii) Patenting is not representative of the patterns of knowledge generation and transfer from MIT:  
patent volume does not predict publication volume, and those firms that cite MIT papers are in general 
not the same firms as those that cite MIT patents. However, patent volume is positively correlated with 
paper citations, suggesting that patent counts could be reasonable measures of research impact.” Ajay 
Agrawal & Rebecca Henderson, Putting Patents in Context: Exploring Knowledge Transfer from MIT, 48 
MGMT. SCI. 44, 44-46. They conclude that the implications of their findings are likewise positive: “Our 
results offer some evidence that, at least at these two departments at MIT, patenting is not substituting for 
more fundamental research, and that it might even be a complementary activity.” Id. at 59. 
242 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 
97 YALE L.J. 177 (19887); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of 
Biomedicine, 66 L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 289 (2003). 
243 See CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 196. 
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engines, and blogs, and so on); and (iii) the sale of ancillary devices and services (electronic 
devices, platforms, and support systems, and so on). One might argue it is possible to enact such 
changes to business models while at the same time continuing to protect revenue from core 
propertized sources that are carefully distilled to their valuable elements or features (exclusive 
fashion, music releases, recordings and catalogs, and educational degree-oriented programs). 
 
The objections to reducing or eliminating IP are as diverse as the creative fields to which 
changes might be made. The greatest objection is based in the underlying rationale for IP, or a 
concern for the guarantee of earning a livelihood and the incentive structure that necessitate IP 
entitlements at the outset of creative activity. It is difficult to imagine how creators will be able 
to make a living from their creative labor without the right to receive revenue flowing from the 
fruits of such labor; and the recent losses faced by creators in industries whose IP has come 
under attack due to technological disruptions seems only to confirm the centrality of IP to the 
profitability calculus that is integral to the professional creator’s life. 
 
Other objections are illustrated by the creative industries themselves. First, as the music industry 
has shown, disruptive technologies can affect the value of original content, both by making 
wholesale copying and appropriation possible and by pitting free content against proprietary 
content, thereby dramatically reducing the value of the latter (for instance, the proliferation of 
free music on YouTube, SoundCloud, and other sites that carry musical performances can 
compete with recordings that must be purchased or licensed and paid for by consumers).244 
Another concern is that while the overall quantity of music content has likely increased, the 
quality of content is highly differentiated and in some cases may be compromised.245 Further, 
reducing or eliminating IP may also serve to reduce or eliminate the role of middlemen, such as 
agents and talent scouts, record labels, critics, and others, who traditionally served an important 
role in vetting, reviewing, and authenticating musical acts and their output. Doing away with 
                                                
244 See generally supra Chapter 3. Similarly, in journalism and news media, disruptive technologies are 
reducing the value of news content, in part by allowing rampant copying of original content, such as 
articles and opinion pieces, and in part by allowing competitors who generate free content to compete 
with traditional proprietary news media. See infra Chapter 6, subsection IV.E.3. 
245 Again, this is relevant to journalism and media, in which online news sources whose provenance and 
reliability may not be proven are nonetheless able to compete with, and at times draw audiences away 
from, mainstream news sources. 
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these intermediaries may compromise the high standards of musical production that were once 
ensured by the administration of record labels and other industry professionals.246 In other words, 
a proprietary media system may serve to vet and verify content, in ways that non-proprietary 
systems are as yet unable to consistently reproduce. 
 
Second, some proprietary systems are essentially underwritten by advertising. Broadcast radio, 
for instance, has historically been free to listeners, but audiences pay for consumption by being 
compelled to listen to periodically broadcast advertisements. Advertising is equally available to 
online music streaming companies, as well as to other entities that disseminate creative content 
online. However, music broadcasters pay licensing fees to music copyright holders, thereby 
enabling the content to be duly compensated for online performances. Advertisers recognize this 
licensing scheme, and support the music broadcasting system in order to reach audiences that are 
listening and consuming its content. The absence of a proprietary scheme may not completely 
drive advertisers away from sites or services that disseminate creative content, for if non-
propertized content reaches a critical mass of viewers or listeners, reaching such an audience 
may still prove attractive enough to warrant advertisers’ investments. But proprietary systems are 
the sole means of ensuring that creators are remunerated for their production of content. Thus, 
while advertisers may be somewhat indifferent to the context of delivery, they may largely prefer 
to support sites that promote proprietary content in order to attract the best creative talent and 
thereby to attract and capture the most attentive and loyal audiences. 
 
Third, many mature proprietary IP systems, such as the music industry, are predicated upon a 
longstanding licensing scheme that manages rights, administers compensation and enables the 
circulation of creative content. Simply removing IP entitlements would strike at the heart of the 
terms of production and compensation that are integral to the industry and its creators. The 
efficacy of an entrenched licensing scheme would be replaced with a non-proprietary system that 
would be required to generate a new set of practices, norms, rights, and means of compensation. 
While this might prove possible in the long run, it would create a great deal of instability in the 
                                                
246 Yet again, this pertains to the case journalism: by undermining traditional news-gathering institutions, 
the plethora of online sources that now disseminate journalism, which can vary in quality and veracity, 
also undermines traditional news-gathering institutions, which were once the well-established means of 
according credibility and authority to news and its coverage. 
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short run, which might well prove particularly devastating to an industry already undercut by 
technological disruption. The licensing system administered by music PROs has served as a 
model for other creative industries, and to end it without a viable replacement would seem 
hazardous and unpredictable. 
 
Fourth, some ventures that are maintained on a non-proprietary basis, particularly open source 
ventures in various fields, may be effectively subsidized by free and/or volunteer labor, or by 
institutional support that indirectly compensates creative or innovative work. In the context of 
open source software, for instance, a collaborative community of software program producers 
and developers contribute their efforts and ideas to improve computing source code and then to 
share and circulate it within the community.247 The input of the open source community is made 
on a wholly voluntary basis, and is generally unremunerated. Open source also does not involve 
ownership rights at any stage of the process: the source code is made available via a free license 
to the product’s design or blueprint, and ownership rights in the improved source code may not 
be made subsequent to modification of its original design. (Although individuals may avail 
themselves of Creative Commons alternative licenses, or levels of restriction, for their works.) 
Many volunteers who participate in open source projects are motivated by different ambitions: 
some are interested in problem-solving for its own sake; some pursue the reputational benefits of 
prestige and renown that accompany innovative work within a knowledgeable community that 
highly values innovation; and some are interested in learning as much as in imparting knowledge 
and know-how. Entrepreneurial businesses or individual software developers may also 
participate in open source projects in order to solve a particular problem. They may choose to 
bear the full cost of initial creation, and may bring that initial work under some measure of IP 
protection. But then they may seek to bring their work to an open source community, seeking to 
benefit from the insights, improvements, and innovations that the collaborative community 
efforts may bring to bear on refining the original work. 
 
Thus, by communalizing the process of development and amelioration, the initial creator(s) can 
distribute costs across more users, and can even make allowance, within reason, for free riders to 
                                                
247  See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004).  
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benefit without undermining the creative process or the value of the project to the innovative 
entrepreneur. However, even in these cases, the work of contributors to the open source part of 
the effort is effectively subsidized: first, the contributors are most likely to hold remunerated 
positions of employment, and to be engaged in the open source work as a side project undertaken 
primarily for interest; and second, the entrepreneur(s) will share the original work, with the 
understanding that it may contribute to the productivity of members of the open source 
community, either directly as the basis for some licensed follow-on innovation or indirectly as 
the source of inspiration for follow-on entrepreneurs. In either event, the open source work does 
not need to be remunerated in order to compensate the collaborative community members. Their 
labor is functionally donated, and the content producers may eventually choose to adopt a 
proprietary license subsequent to participating in the open source exchange.248 
 
But it is in other contexts that labor without propertization may be more problematic. In the case 
of education, for instance, classroom instruction has historically been considered protected by 
practice and by institutional support, and therefore has not been subject to many disputes over 
property rights. Traditionally, education has functioned as a constructed commons249 in which 
faculty teaching is supported by an infrastructure built around shared norms such as academic 
freedom and autonomy, valued scholarship and associated reputational benefits, portability of 
academic work, and collaborative freedom. In exchange for providing instruction in the 
classroom, as well as broader tutelage and guidance of students (and often administrative duties), 
academics not only are paid a salary but also are granted the right to conduct research and 
scholarship. Academics have also generally been allowed to take their work from one place of 
employment to the next, including the courses they teach, the materials they prepare, and the 
research and scholarship they generate. Only the latter, historically, has been deemed worthy of 
copyright, in part because courses and related materials have not been considered to have much 
monetary value extrinsic to the institutional setting in which they are offered. 
 
                                                
248 It should also be noted that some open source developers eventually stake proprietary claims in some 
portion of their work, creating companies that are based in open source code but that monetize its 
application in a concrete and profitable way. 
249 See generally GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, supra note 147. 
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The disruptive technology of the Internet, as has been argued earlier, now locates a potential 
monetary value inhering in the courses offered at institutions and online. Increasingly, copyright 
is being asserted in courses and related materials, although there is some dispute as to who will 
be the rightful copyright holder in the academic context. Resolving that dispute will no doubt 
affect academic IP entitlements and consequently influence the direction of revenues that flow 
from instruction. But copyright in courses remains important irrespective of the copyright holder 
that is granted the entitlement. On the one hand, institutions that claim course copyright argue 
that they must able to protect, and possibly recover, the investment they make in online 
instruction. Copyright in courses also enables institutions to prevent appropriation, by giving the 
institutional copyright holder the right to pursue copiers or infringers that are attempting to free 
ride on the courses that have been underwritten by institutional budgets. Copyright in courses 
can further proscribe the dissemination of courses by instructors to multiple online educational 
providers, another form of infringement on institutional course copyright that again undermines 
the initial investment made in building and supporting online courses. 
 
On the other hand, however, faculty that claim copyright in courses argue that they are 
increasingly be called upon to teach courses without the institutional backing traditionally 
afforded by long-term tenure and tenure-track positions.250 Faculty point to the increasing 
adjunctification of the academy, and argue that they are likely to be hired primarily to fill short-
term positions that are teaching-intensive, without the additional emoluments that an established 
institutional connection can confer.251 Thus, the non-monetary and intangible rewards of 
academic work, such as the right to pursue independent and autonomous scholarship and 
research, academic freedom, reputational benefits, the freedom to collaborate, and so on, may not 
continue to be extended to most newly hired faculty members. If these non-monetary and 
normatively-based rewards are depreciated or extinguished, faculty argue that being paid for 
academic work, particularly instruction, will take on a proportionately greater value in the 
compensation package extended to faculty. Copyright in courses, if granted to faculty, can 
protect and reward new revenue streams that may derive from online instruction, preparation of 
courses and related materials, tutelage and guidance, and other teaching-related activities. 
                                                
250 Adjunctification (again) and How (Not) to Fix it (Again), NEW APPS BLOG (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.newappsblog.com/2014/05/adjunctification-again-and-how-not-to-fix-it-again.html. 
251 Id. 
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Moreover, copyright in courses can compensate faculty for the investment that they make in 
online instruction, just as it might for an institution. As an analogy, faculty point to copyright in 
scholarship, which is often retained by the faculty member who generates the work, arguing that 
copyright may similarly be granted to the productive instructor.  
 
Clearly, therefore, copyright in courses is likely to prove increasingly important in the online 
educational context, regardless of whether it is claimed by institutions or faculty. Eliminating IP 
entitlements in this regard becomes vexed due not only to the disruptive technology that online 
education heralds but also due to the changing structure of the traditional academic realm. 
Traditionally, overt propertization of academic work may not have seemed as pressing, as the 
academy functioned as a kind of guild, protecting and constructing its rights and rewards around 
the shared values of the guild, such as community, shared norms, exchange and collaboration 
within the community, a tacit tradeoff between instruction and scholarship, respect for 
institutional stability and rewards for faculty loyalty, and so on. Increasingly, however, the 
academic world is retreating from its guild-like, or commons-like, foundations, and is 
systematically embracing a more industrial, or corporatist, approach to self-perpetuation and 
growth. Online education, adjunctification, the commodification of courses, and consumer-based 
strategies are but a few aspects of this corporate approach. In this context, propertization 
becomes paramount, and IP entitlements become the primary mechanism for allocating 
responsibilities, priorities, and rewards relating to the monetization of online instruction. 
 
V. REFINING THE IP SOLUTION: TAILORING 
 
Disruptive innovation can dismantle the core business model of a creative industry, but at the 
same time it can give rise to innovative business strategies and solutions that eventually move 
the industry forward in a healthy and newly productive direction. As discussed, business 
solutions are often preferred because they allow private actors to bargain amongst themselves 
and to contrive arrangements that maximize returns and minimize transaction costs. However, 
when such solutions are undertaken unilaterally or without the support of changes in IP 
entitlements, they may fall short of responding successfully to the demands of a reconfigured 
business environment. Often, therefore, creative industry participants confronting disruptive 
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innovation will call for the enlargement, reinforcement or addition of IP measures on an 
industry-wide basis. Yet while simply adding layers of IP protection may be an expedient and 
highly sought-after prescription for curing the ills of a challenged industry, it too offers a 
solution rife with critical concerns that may impede the industry attaining an optimal solution 
that, in broadly utilitarian terms, yields benefits for many or all of its constituents. 
 
Additionally, simply expanding IP entitlements is not the sole means available of calibrating IP 
responses to changes in the innovative landscape. Other options include strengthening one form 
of IP protection while reducing reliance on other forms of IP protection. In the fashion industry, 
for example, some commentators have called for bolstering trademark protections of brands, 
logos, and defining trademarks, while simultaneously calling for restraint in allowing copyright 
protection to be sought in designs and patterns.252 Other options include withholding IP 
protection altogether from certain industries that have historically been outside of IP-based 
regimes, and concomitantly reinforcing practices, conventions, norms, and a system of rewards 
that allow creativity to thrive, even in the face of changing technologies, within a healthy and 
generally self-perpetuating ecosystem.253 
 
Striking an optimal balance between changing business models and altering IP entitlements is a 
key consideration for creative industries that must preserve their strongest elements while 
protecting and growing their revenue streams even as they are transformed by the forces of 
innovation. Another key concern, however, is a feature intrinsic to IP itself: namely, 
standardization, which must be taken into account when potential IP re-allocations are 
                                                
252 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property 
in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). In the computer industry, to take another example, some 
commentators have called for limited copyright protection in certain programming, to be coupled with 
reductions in patent protection for certain aspects of programming, such as pivotal algorithms and/or 
business methods. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV.  2308 (1994). 
253 In the case of comedy, for instance, the individuation of stand-up routines, the culture of attribution, 
the centrality of performance-based rewards (rather than rewards based upon the licensing of recorded 
routines or jokes), and other guild-like practices and norms buttress a robust ecosystem. In this case, some 
changing business practices, such as the expanding use of comedy on television, in films, and in other 
media (which, though recorded, is typically performed before a live audience, thereby prioritizing the live 
experience, rather than the recorded material) allows comedians to tap new revenue streams without 
having to copyright their material and draw revenues from licensing the personal, individualized, and 
unique routines that make up their stock in trade.  
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proposed.254 Standardization of IP as used herein signifies that the fixed terms of an IP 
entitlement, such as for example a fixed term of copyright protection, will be applied universally 
within an industry. Such changes that happen across-the-board are likely to affect a great many 
stakeholders, yet these various entities and individuals are unlikely to face similar circumstances, 
and therefore may not experience comparable outcomes or benefits from such sweeping 
alterations of policy and the resulting changes in common business practices. This is likely to be 
particularly relevant to time-sensitive creative fields, such as fashion, in which a one-size-fits-all 
copyright granted to original design would encompass the works of haute couture original 
designers, emerging independent designers, and knock-off artists alike. Only in some of these 
cases might the extended term of copyright be useful, protecting highly original, classic designs 
intended to endure over generations. In other cases, such a long term might stifle the creative 
turnover, agility, and rapid transformation that many designers require to respond to quickly 
changing tastes, trends, and markets. The term of copyright cannot be modified, however, to suit 
any given niche of the fashion design sector. In such circumstances, standardized copyright 
protection may not present an optimal solution to current change. 
 
The majority of IP parameters, provisions and terms are standardized, but there remain 
significant deviations from the norm. Copyright law, for instance, has approved certain specific 
carve-out areas that enjoy narrow protection, such as certain prints and boat hulls.255 An even 
greater example, arguably, is fair use, which permits the use of otherwise copyright-protected 
materials for certain limited purposes, such as education, parody and satire, and certain other 
non-commercial uses.256 Thus, while most proponents of IP changes tend to call for systemic, 
wholesale re-allocations of IP rights, standardization need not be embraced at all costs, and the 
law does allow some leeway for challenging and even diverging from highly standardized and 
inflexible laws as may be necessary to benefit diverse creative industries and their participants. 
 
                                                
254 “Standardization” means that one measure will be applied universally, such as a fixed term of 
copyright that is granted to all copyright holders, irrespective of the industry in which the copyright 
arises. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
989, 1066-67 (1997).  
255 See generally supra Chapter 1, Sections III.G.1-2. 
256 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 




IP standardization (that is, one-size-fits-all IP entitlements) makes IP operational, easy to use, 
consistent, and transparent in its allocation of entitlements, rewards, and rights. This helps keep 
standardization at the top of the roster when it comes to making policies that align and allocate 
innovation-based entitlements. In any well-established copyright industry, such as music,257 
standardized copyright has helped to shape the industry, but has also helped to lend it 
consistency, streamline its rights, and secure its rewards. 
 
1. Standardization Makes IP Clear and Easy to Use 
 
Standardization of IP facilitates orderly, transparent, and fair operations. Among its features are: 
(i) clear and fundamentally well-established definitions of parties, stakeholders, rights, and 
monies; (ii) clear definition of rights, terms of rights, and where rights are adjudicated; and (iii)  
administrative bodies that are well-established, with mechanisms for gaining, and if necessary 
defending IP protection, that are clearly delineated (in the case of copyright law, the relevant 
bodies are the Copyright Office; Federal Courts; and Congress). 
 
2. Standardization of Licensing Rights is Streamlined, Easy to Use, and Fair 
 
Standardization of IP administrative mechanisms are central to facilitating the access and use of 
copyright (and other IP instruments, such as trademark and in some cases patenting) in the 
creative industries. One of the most important and well-developed such mechanisms is 
compulsory licensing, which permits an individual or company seeking to use another's IP to do 
so without seeking the rights holder's consent, and simply to pay the rights holder a set fee for 
the license.258 Compulsory licensing is typically administered in the creative industries under the 
aegis of a collective rights organization, which streamlines the process, sets licensing terms, 
                                                
257 Also benefiting from strong and standardized rights are entertainment, media, and publishing. 
258  See George Howard, Should There Be a Compulsory License for Derivative Works?, TUNECORE 
BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.tunecore.com/blog/2013/04/should-there-be-a-compulsory-license-for-
derivative-works.html. 
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arranges the remuneration of rights holders, and in some cases manages and arbitrates disputes 
among license holders and licensees.259 
 
In the case of music, for instance, the Copyright Act provides for a compulsory license in 
musical compositions,260 which allows a person to distribute a new sound recording of a musical 
work, if the original work has been previously distributed to the public, by or under the authority 
of the copyright owner.261 The new recording is not required to be identical to the previous work, 
as the compulsory license allows the recording artist to rearrange the original work to conform to 
the recording artist's interpretation. However, the compulsory license does not permit the artist to 
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work.262 The compulsory license 
requires the recording artist to provide notice and pay a royalty. Although the compulsory license 
allows a recording artist to make and distribute physical copies of an original musical 
composition for a set royalty, the owner of the copyright in the original composition is still able 
to control public performance of the work or transmission over the radio.263 The original 
copyright owner may license the work for public performance through PROs such as BMI, 
ASCAP, or SESAC. 
 
These music licensing provisions, among others, clearly serve a vital purpose: they establish a 
streamlined and efficient procedure that does not impose an undue burden on the recording artist, 
while at the same time ensuring due compensation to the original artist. Naturally, there may be 
valid criticisms of their operations—for instance, music PROs have been criticized for seeking to 
expand coverage of public performance licensing rights to encompass non-commercial use by 
non-profits, private entities or individuals, and other minor players264—but they nonetheless 
serve the essential function of centralizing, operationalizing, and administering music rights with 
                                                
259 Id. 
260 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2012). 
261 Id. § 115(a)(1). 
262 Id. § 115(a)(2). 
263 Id. § 106(4). 
264 For example, the largest music PRO, ASCAP, was criticized for seeking royalties from the Girl Scouts 
of America for the singing or “performance” of protected songs around the campfire. ASCAP retracted its 
position, but suffered a reputational blow from the debacle. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Ascap Asks Royalties 
From Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/17/nyregion/ascap-asks-royalties-from-girl-scouts-and-regrets-it.html. 
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relatively low transaction costs and minimal inefficiencies (particularly as compared with other 
alternatives, such as purely individualized and de-centralized negotiated licensing among the 
myriad participants in the music industry). 
 
3. Standardization Offers Leeway for Important Policy Objectives 
 
Standardized IP entitlements are fundamentally a byproduct of policy decisions that are shaped 
at high levels, predominantly in courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies, and are therefore 
meant to operate efficiently in many different contexts and industries. Thus, for instance, where 
the creative industries are concerned, the copyrightability of expressive works “fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression”265 may apply equally to a musical composition, dramatic or 
literary work, industrial design, or computer software. Historically there has been some 
recognition that the one-size-fits-all paradigm is not well-suited to optimizing the balance of 
incentives and rewards to creators, on the one hand, and rights of access, use and re-use by 
partakers, on the other hand. Equally importantly, the need to maintain a rich and accessible 
public domain is generally acknowledged, as recent battles over the scope and length of 
copyright law attest. 
 
The understanding that IP rights are and need to remain curtailed is also pervasive among those 
who set IP policy. Thus, for instance, careful consideration is given to the expansion of copyright 
duration, in part because the Constitution stipulates that IP protection will be granted only for a 
finite period of time,266 and in part because seemingly chronic expansions seem to extend 
standardized IP across all the copyright industries, without appreciable regard to whether or not 
such measures are appropriate or helpful to all the affected fields.267 Similarly, IP policymakers 
remain vigilant over the scope of IP entitlements, as for instance in the case of patent law, which 
seeks to place limitations on terms such as patentable subject matter. The debates over the 
patentability of broadly-drawn business method patents, genetic sequences, algorithms, and so 
on, attest to the fine line that patent law must draw in rewarding innovation without risking 
access, follow-on innovation, and progress and growth within a given field. For these reasons, 
                                                
265 Id. § 102. 
266 See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 8, cl. 8. 
267 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
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standardization of IP continues to be contested territory, and those who advocate for the need to 
carefully delineate and in some cases restrict or cabin across-the-board entitlements have 
prevailed in certain aspects of copyright law. 
 
a. Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
One such restriction is inscribed in the essential parameters set by copyright law: that is, 
copyright does not encompass ideas and information, but only extends to the form or manner in 
which they are expressed.268 This idea-expression dichotomy can offer leeway to creators who 
generate multiple ideas that might otherwise infringe upon the rights of other creators who have 
arrived at similar points in their creative work. In many creative industries, the idea-expression 
divide creates an unpropertized space that is crucial to fostering high levels of productive activity 
among a broad range of creators, without potentially restricting creative output until the works 
are fixed and thence copyrightable. 
 
b. Fair Use 
A second carveout to standardized copyright is the fair use doctrine, which seeks to balance the 
public’s interest in open access with the property interests of copyright holders by creating a 
limited roster of exceptions to the copyright holder’s exclusive rights in her work.269 This 
doctrine protects uses that are considered meaningful or enriching to society, such as criticism, 
parody, instruction, and some scholarship, by allowing these limited uses to be made without 
prior permission from the copyright holder or royalties paid to the rights holder.270 In the context 
of education, for instance, teachers may use excerpts from copyrighted texts or other materials 
for instruction without clearing rights or securing permission to do so.271 Fair use may be 
critiqued as a complicated affirmative defense to copyright infringement, whose parameters may 
seem murky, subject to a court’s discretion, and difficult to ascertain prior to use. At the same 
time, however, it may be the first line of defense for disruptive technologies that may risk 
                                                
268 This principle was first clarified in the 1879 case of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99; it has since been 
codified by the Copyright Act at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
269 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
270 See id. 
271 See generally Deborah Gerhardt & Madelyn Wessel, Fair Use and Fairness on Campus, 11 N.C. J. L. 
& TECH. 461 (2010). 
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infringing on existing copyrights with their unprecedented and untested practices or devices. In 
many creative industries, fair use is the front line of battles over new ideas, devices and methods. 
 
In the creative industries, therefore, the fair use doctrine can be paramount for various key 
purposes. For instance, it may allow uses to occur that cannot be proven to have an effect on not 
only the copyright owner’s market, but also on the potential market of the original product.272 In 
the case of disruptive technologies in the creative industries, this may prove critical to an entire 
industry. Illustrative is the early dispositive case of Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, in which the 
copyright owner, Universal, failed in the court’s estimation to provide adequate empirical 
evidence that the use of Betamax technology had reduced Universal’s viewership and negatively 
impacted their business model.273 Notably, this leaves open significant room for future 
innovations in the creative industries to disrupt the field—as indeed the Betamax videotaping 
technology had previously disrupted entire media sectors (that is, television and film)—and yet 
to be sheltered from copyright infringement actions pursuant to the fair use doctrine as elucidated 
in Sony.274 
 
But the fair use doctrine is certainly not a panacea for new technologies, and may in fact have an 
adverse effect on new technologies in the creative industries. In the case of music, for instance, 
the practice of “sampling” in certain genres of music was accepted practice until the early 1990s, 
typically occurring without regard for copyright in the snippets of underlying compositions that 
were used. However, the legal ruling against rap musician Biz Markie, who appropriated parts of 
a Gilbert O’Sullivan song, changed practices and opinions virtually overnight. The court in 
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc.275 held that samples must be licensed, 
as long as they rise "to a level of legally cognizable appropriation." In other words, sampling of 
                                                
272 Notably, the burden of proof here rests on the copyright owner, who must demonstrate the impact of 
the infringement on commercial use of the work. Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 
(1984). 
273 Id. 
274 Thus, for instance, such disruptive technologies as TiVo (digital video recorders that allow users to 
view recorded and time-shifted television programs, and to skip certain advertisements) or Aereo (digital 
devices that allow subscribers to view live and time-shifted streams of television on Internet-connected 
devices) may rely upon arguments based in fair use, or in related analyses (such as impact on commercial 
markets) to successfully prevail against copyright holders who contend that they are substantially and 
primarily engaged in copyright-infringing practices. 
275 Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y 1991). 
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 333 
significant portions of underlying works would not be permitted; while de minimis sampling 
would still be considered fair and free in line with tradition, as "the law does not care about 
trifles."276 The recent Sixth Circuit Court decision in the appeal to Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 
Dimension Films has reversed this standing, eliminating the de minimis defense for samples of 
recorded music, but stating that the decision did not apply to fair use.277 These cases, however, 
have had a marked effect on contemporary rap and hip-hop genres, however, in which sampling 
has far less prevalence than it once did. This chilling effect may reveal that while fair use can 
hold promise for creative industries seeking to diverge from the standardization of copyright 
principles and practices, fair use may also hold pitfalls that do not clarify an area of creativity’s 
direction, but rather render it ambiguous, risky, or liable to challenge in the courts.278 
                                                
276 Id. 
277 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647 (2005). 
278 As one of the most important disruptive technologies, the Internet stands at the heart of change in 
many creative industries, and is likewise at the heart of several fair use disputes in creative contexts. As 
early as 2003, for instance, Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, the Fourth Circuit found on appeal that 
thumbnails, inline linking, and other online copying practices undertaken by the defendant in its image 
search engine did constitute fair use and would not therefore be found to have violated copyright. 336 
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). The ability to link materials online is pivotal to certain entities in creative 
sectors, such as online journalists, bloggers, and others that choose to aggregate links to news sites, to 
comment on links, or to offer ready access to third-party materials or resources. These practices, however, 
can be highly disruptive to traditional industries which, as in the case of journalism, may find that their 
most valuable material, such as time-sensitive news, original articles and commentary, and so on, may be 
appropriated via linking by online entities or individuals who have not contributed to the expenses of 
generating such original work. Clearly, then, a viable fair use defense for these activities is likely to prove 
powerful in the hands of those who use thumbnails, links, and other such practices to disrupt the business 
models of traditional companies yet at the same time to open access to creative materials to a great many 
users. 
 
Yet another contested ground of the fair use doctrine and copyright holders is the Google Books search 
engine, a service from Google, Inc. that searches the full text of books, magazines, and other materials, 
which are then scanned, converted to text using optical character recognition, and then stored in Google’s 
digital database. While books in the public domain remain fully and freely available via the Google 
Books service, in-print books may show “snippets” (two or three lines of text) or alternatively, where 
permission has been granted, a “preview” of viewable pages. See supra note 74 & 151, The Google 
Books project is presently in dispute, stemming from claims brought separately by the Authors Guild and 
Association of American Publishers accusing Google of engaging in massive copyright infringement. Id. 
Google has countered that the project represents a fair use of the materials and resources involved, 
comparing Google Books to the digital age version of an indexed card catalogue. Id. While the actions are 
still pending, Google has prevailed to date, with a New York district court holding that Google Books 
constitutes fair use, and “provides significant benefits . . . advances the progress of the arts and sciences, 
while maintaining respectful consideration for the rights of authors and other creative individuals, and 
without adversely impacting the rights of copyright holders.” Author’s Guild v. Google, 954 F. Supp. 2d 
282, 293 (2013). The Google Books digitized search engine offers yet another exemplar of the potential 
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B. Uniformity Costs 
 
The power and utility of standardization of IP are so compelling that divergence from the norm 
requires rationalization. Uniformity costs comprise an important rubric of reasons for moving 
away from standardization and toward a more flexible, industry-specific treatment of IP 
entitlements and their allocation among stakeholders. In some cases, uniformity costs may grow 
to be so extensive that they require re-appraisal—that is, weighing such costs against the benefits 
of standardization to ensure that IP entitlement allocations still remain the optimal way to 
achieve innovation-oriented goals. 
 
1. Initial IP Entitlement Allocations are Not Readily Aligned 
 
The key concern of creative industries are how to incentivize creative production, invest in invest 
in valuable goods that are both intangible and inexhaustible, and profit from the commercial 
exploitation of their output. This is the standard innovation lottery problem that copyright law is 
meant to address and resolve.279 The standard economic solution to this public goods or 
                                                                                                                                                       
reach that the fair use doctrine may afford new technologies in creative fields. Digitized libraries may be 
analogized to traditional libraries, which make materials open and accessible to widespread audiences. 
But in the case of Google Books, the works that are digitized, catalogued, indexed, and archived are held 
and made available by private actors (Google is working in conjunction with several major libraries and 
other partners). The digitized repository on an unprecedented scale, coordinated but also controlled by 
private hands, may well represent a disruptive technology if, as private for-profit entities are wont to do, 
Google chooses to exercise its authority over the search engine in ways that maximize its profits. For 
instance, Google may choose to place links to booksellers on its search results, granting rights to 
“snippets” and previews only to certain pre-selected private partners. Or Google may seek to influence the 
price of e-books to which it links, thereby exercising quasi-monopoly power over a vast number of 
written works. Although these commercial uses may not be permitted under the scope of the fair use 
doctrine, copyright holders may still be compelled to resort to litigation to ascertain the limits of Google’s 
authority over its digitized library. In the meanwhile, publishers, writers, libraries, and a host of other 
entities involved in creative written work will likely find the landscape disrupted by Google’s digitization 
project.  
279 In a competitive economy, we should expect underinvestment in creative and inventive endeavors 
without some form of government assistance. Once an author, inventor, or their respective financial 
backers has paid for the creation of a valuable creative or innovative work, competitors can reproduce and 
distribute that work at prices too low for those who invested in the creation to recoup their investments. 
Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1367-70 (2009); see also Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual 
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appropriability problem is government action.280 This grants creators of original works a bundle 
of intellectual property rights, which are designed to stimulate investments in the activities that 
drive progress by excluding direct competition with the rightsholder in the marketplace. 281 The 
owner of such rights enjoys the reward of monopoly pricing if there is sufficient demand in the 
market for the underlying innovation.282 These rights must, however, be limited, due to the 
significant costs that intellectual property rights incur in the market: while rightsholders are 
protected and incentivized to produce and profit from their output, they are equipped by law to 
wield their rights against end users, direct competitors and follow-on innovators who may seek 
to bring socially beneficial innovations to market.283 In order to promote progress, therefore, 
intellectual property law must strike a balance, providing sufficient incentives for innovation 
without unduly stifling the efforts of follow-on innovators or the liberties of end-users.284 
 
The balancing act of intellectual property law is exacerbated by innate uncertainties that underlie 
the distribution of returns to investments in creation, innovation, research and development.285 
While it is possible that government actors could step in to correct market imbalances, creators 
                                                                                                                                                       
Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1474, 1476 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007). 
280 The United States Constitution grants Congress a range of powers from which it may fashion 
solutions. First and foremost, Congress has power “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writings 
and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
281 Some commentators argue that the public goods model is not perfectly suited to works of authorship. 
See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. 
L. REV. 635, 693–703 (2008); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright, Private Copying, and Discrete Public 
Goods, 12 TUL. L. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1 (2009). 
282 Carroll, supra note 279, at 1367-70; Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 279, at 1476–77. 
283 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–
59 (2005) (discussing the social costs of intellectual property rights). 
284 While some advocates of intellectual property law take this as a given, it is not necessarily as self-
evident as it might seem. See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 279, at 1477 (“Whereas the earlier 
economics literature proceeded as if intellectual property protection was the self-evident solution to  
the incentive problem, a more recent literature . . . has tried to understand when that is true, and when 
other incentive mechanisms might dominate.”). 
285 See F. M. Scherer, Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 7530, 7535 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes 
eds., 2001) (“So skew is the distribution of rewards that it is difficult to make profits converge toward 
fairly stable averages by supporting feasibly large project portfolios.”). On uncertainty of creativity and 
innovation, see generally FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) (explicating the 
difference between conditions of “risk”—randomness with known probabilities—and “uncertainty”—
randomness with unknowable probabilities). 
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and inventors are more likely, on average, to have marginally better information about their 
potential for success in their given markets. Thus, it is generally agreed that increasing a 
creator’s ability to exclude or deter competitors through exclusive rights is a superior approach, 
due primarily to the superior private information that they enjoy.286 It is also the consensus that 
intellectual property rights are justified as a means of risk-spreading. That is, creators or 
innovators are required to stake capital and labor in pursuit of success, despite uncertainty that 
poses risks, which may not readily be quantified, in advance of their venture. Intellectual 
property rights spread the risk of failure among these potential rightsholders, who may either fail 
to produce output that merits protection or produce output that the market deems to be worth less 
than the cost of acquisition.287 While the risks to potential investors are therefore substantial, 
spreading these risks among investors with private information is generally agreed to be 
marginally more efficient than other possible options (such as allocating the risk to government 
actors, relying on government grants or rewards, and so on).288 
 
The magnitude of risk-taking in the innovation lottery is also mitigated in part by the ability of 
intellectual property rights to lend markets the capacity to correct, to some degree, for the 
misallocation of rights. Further, these markets may potentially spread decisions about which 
risks should be undertaken and who should bear them. Further still, these markets may discipline 
creators or innovators who waste assets in pursuit of unworthy creative or innovative goals.289 
Intellectual property as it presently stands harnesses the superior private information that creators 
and innovators have about the value of their cultural or technological contributions and spreads 
the risk that they and their investors or underwriters may be mistaken about the practical 
feasibility of a creative or innovative idea and about its market valuation if realized. It also 
spreads the risk that may be incurred if the timing or amount of reward necessary to induce 
                                                
286 See Carroll, supra 279, at 1373-79; Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the 
Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1728 (2000); Lunney, supra note 
281, at 3, 5, n.9 (“[T]he principal advantage of a regime of exclusive rights is that such a regime . . . tends 
to decentralize the decision-making process, assigning decision- making responsibility to those likely to 
possess the relevant, but otherwise private, information.”); Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, 
Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525, 528 (2001). 
287 See Carroll, supra 279, at 1373-79. 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
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desired innovations and creative works is not accurately assessed.290 These features have 
contributed to a longstanding understanding that intellectual property is an optimal approach to 
promoting creativity and innovation.291 
2. Economic Costs 
 
Uniformity costs almost always manifest as economic costs that are intrinsic to, and may be 
inextricable from, an IP system. Several features of economic costs are implicated: (i) IP rights 
can distort markets away form the competitive norm, therefore creating static inefficiencies in 
the form of deadweight losses; (ii) IP rights can interfere with the ability of other creators to 
work, therefore creating dynamic inefficiencies; (iii) the prospect of IP rights can encourage rent-
seeking behavior that is socially wasteful; (iv) the enforcement of IP rights can impose systemic 
administrative costs; and (v) overinvestment in research and development can in itself be 
distortionary. 
 
The uniformity costs that arise as a result of standardized IP can be divided into two broad 
categories.292 Type I uniformity costs emerge “when creators of the same class of subject matter 
face different magnitudes or types of the appropriability problem.”293 In music, for instance, 
                                                
290 In recent years, however, the efficacy of risk spreading through copyright law has become the subject 
of much debate. Since the advent of digital networks such as the Internet, the copyright balancing act has 
been skewed, as interested parties may subvert the copyright bargain, while rightsholders may pursue a 
host of strategies to fortify their rights and enforcement capacities that may have serious consequences on 
creative production, dissemination and public welfare. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively 
Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006) (describing actual and potential consequences 
of digital enforcement initiatives); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (proposing cheaper 
enforcement procedure to limit potential collateral damage from other enforcement initiatives). 
291 There are of course likely to be costs associated with the intellectual property system. For instance, one 
significant social cost is that resources are channeled to innovations that are more likely to serve those 
with an ability to pay, and these innovations are likely to be underutilized by those who are priced out of 
the market by monopoly prices or by those who are denied licenses because the transaction costs are too 
high or the rightsholder refuses to license. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 278–79 (2007). The market also is likely to skew toward production of 
consumption information goods rather than productive information goods because of the problem of 
valuing positive spillovers. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 257, 278–79 (2007). 
292 See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006). 
293 Id. at 856.  
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some original composers would likely create whether or not their work was protected by 
copyright, while others would not. In the former case, the lack of incentives needed for creation 
might render copyright nonessential to spurring creative production.294 However, music 
copyright does not distinguish among composers and their motivations, and thus can be 
somewhat inefficient.295 Type II uniformity costs when there is variance among industries and 
technological fields.296 In the case of patents, for instance, it is striking that patent law grants the 
same entitlements to such disparate innovative products as pharmaceutical drugs and novelty 
toys.297 Similarly, copyright law grants the same entitlements to authors of musical works, novels 
and computer programs.298 In both cases, however, the terms of entitlements granted may not be 
particularly suited the area or subject matter of creativity or innovation. Yet under a one-size-
fits-all model, standardized IP allotments must be accorded and some inefficiencies must be 
borne. 
 
Several scenarios can reveal the emergence of uniformity costs that are caused by the imposition 
of standardized IP on a creative industry. One such example involves the term length of IP 
protection, which is determined by statute in both patent and copyright.299 In both cases, 
however, the inability to differentiate term lengths of IP protection accorded to various 
endeavors can lead to protection being extended long past when it is needed to spur production 
and protect returns. In the case of patent protection, for example, a novelty toy may only be 
valuable to consumers for a short season of popular appeal. Nonetheless, the toy is accorded a 
full measure of protection (20 years), stifling the ability of future innovators to create derivative 
works, generic toys that reproduce its characteristics, or other non-protected works. In the case of 
copyright, a musical work may generate returns for its author/composer and copyright holder 
(assuming here, arguendo, that the  “author” or composer is in fact the copyright holder of such 
work) during her entire life, yet will also generate returns for the composer’s estate due to the 
                                                
294 Id. 
295 Another example is found in the case of computer software, in which open source software and 
proprietary software are accorded the same level of protection, irrespective of programmers’ motivations, 
need for IP protection, or monetary objectives. 
296 Id. at 857. 
297 Id. 
298 Id. 
299 See generally id. at 852. 
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generous terms of copyright protection (life plus 70 years).300 But while the returns that accrue 
after the composer’s demise cannot be said to be helpful to spur creativity, it is arguable that at 
the same time the protection, or over-protection, that generous copyright terms grant may stifle 
follow-on creative works, as well as limiting access to the original work that would otherwise be 
fully available if it were in the public domain. 
 
Another example of uniformity costs occurs when IP protection is so expansive that the rights 
holder is able to garner excessive rents from exploitation of an original work. As in the copyright 
example given above, a composer of a musical work who owns copyright in her work will earn 
royalties well after her lifespan has run (such royalties going to her estate). In this case, it is hard 
to argue that the full term of copyright is required to incentivize the composer and to ensure that 
she receives sufficient remuneration for her creative efforts. Further, again assuming that the 
copyright holder is the original composer, it is hard to argue that the extensive span of copyright 
protection incentivizes her to create more or to innovate further than she already has, because she 
can rely upon the initial copyright for protection and compensation. Indeed, it might be argued 
that the income stream she has secured from almost-perpetual rights in her original work may 
even disincentivize her from composing further works, particularly if the original work becomes 
a successful and profitable source of revenue. In such a case, whether with respect to creative or 
innovative efforts, the rights holder is rationally equally likely to seek to eke out more revenues 
from existing IP rather than to innovate in pursuit of new revenue streams. For these reasons, IP 
protection that is too expansive for a given industry (because it is applied equally to all 
industries, irrespective of individual differences) may prove anti-innovative and anti-competitive 
in application and outcome. 
 
Yet another concern with respect to uniformity costs arises when licensing becomes too 
cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise not possible; in this situation, logjams can occur because 
propertization gives rise to disparities in protection that are insoluble. In the case of patents, for 
instance, patent “thickets” can form where variance of IP protections among industries and/or 
technological fields create high barriers to partnership, licensing, interoperability agreements, or 
other industrial arrangements. Uniformity costs can be formidable where such thickets are 
                                                
300 This is of course applicable to other fields such as literary writing, theatrical works, and so on. 
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formed, and where research and development, innovation and product development are unable to 
progress due to cross-licensing costs that outweigh the potential benefits of multi-party ventures. 
In the case of copyright, similar logjams can form where IP protections give rise to licensing 
requirements that are not managed via clearing houses  or other facilitating administrators. In the 
case of new technologies in the creative industries, this may lead to barriers to entry for new 
delivery systems, such as music and content streaming online, and may prevent innovative 
technologies from disseminating content through new avenues to audiences seeking creative 
content outside the traditional venues of consumption. 
 
3. Social Costs 
 
There are a variety of costs that follow from the initial challenge of aligning entitlement 
allocations. The best-recognized ones are economic, and are based in a relatively narrow 
construction of the Constitution. These economic costs center upon the constitutional mandate 
that is widely agreed upon: to incentivize innovation and, thereby, to maximize production. But 
there is a broader range of costs that many scholars discussed, if not as universally embraced. 
Many of these look past the creator and consider the spectrum of parties affected by the grant of 
IP rights and rewards. Broader social benefits look to enriching the public domain and promoting 
the rights of creative consumers and users. Where IP rights are granted, some commentators 
maintain, even the most powerful of society’s principles are affected, such as personhood 
(Radin), free speech (Baker), widespread participation in democracy (Benkler and Lessig), as are 
many of society’s main activities, such as education, health/welfare, news, and so on (Benkler). 
An important argument driving the debate over tailoring centers on the idea that the optimal 
alignment of IP rights and rewards will be able to spur innovation while advancing these critical 
social aims. Of course, when written this broadly, it seems daunting, if not impossible, to shape 
policy that advances these goals all at once. But calibrating the impact of IPR allocations might, 
and arguably should, at least take into consideration the potential effects on these concerns not 
merely on the creative innovator, but on the creative consumer as well. 
 
From a narrower viewpoint, it is at least clear that uniformity costs give rise to social costs. 
Where IP protections are extended, greater allocative inefficiency is liable to arise, because the 
Chapter 4: Analysis Viswanathan 
 341 
choice is not between granting rights to party A over party B, but between granting a right to A 
or to the public at large, which is made of an unknown and unknowable proportion of higher and 
lower-valued users. Thus, where IP rights are granted, the overall social cost is likely to be 
greater than normal. In the copyright industries, this is generally evinced as rights being granted 
to a single class of participants that are identifiable, vocal, and likely to be powerful within a 
given sector. This may come at the expense of the more ineffable public interest, which is 
comprised of a disparate, unorganized, and possibly unrepresented coalition of interested parties. 
While some organizations may choose to advocate and lobby for certain causes on behalf of the 
public interest, the uniformity of IP protection is not constructed to accommodate easily these 
“outsider” positions. In several cases, as for instance the current debate over net neutrality, the 
public interest may be shortchanged in the face of strong and uniform IP protections. 
 
4. Costs to Users 
 
Standardized IP is not only monolithic in its treatment of IP entitlements but also monopolistic in 
its grant of exclusive IP rights. Starting from the initial conferral of rights, therefore, rights 
holders are placed in an advantageous position vis-a-vis users. When disruptive innovation 
threatens to erode the favorable position of rights holders, they may advocate the extension and 
expansion of their IP rights, as well as additional legal and technological enforcement, which if 
achieved may compound the imbalance between rights holders and end users. 
 
The costs to users standardized IP generates may arise at inception, such as the loss to the public 
domain that such IP rights necessarily entail (due to their formal fencing-off of property). 
Technological innovation, however, particularly where coupled with modern expansion of IP 
rights, can incur greater costs to users. For instance, many of the creative industries have seen a 
decrease in users’ rights, access, and control over works that they obtain. In the case of some 
creative content, such as music, digitized content (for example, a digitized music track) is 
licensed by a user, as opposed to previously recorded content (for example, a vinyl album or CD) 
that could be purchased and owned by the user. The difference in rights and access is striking: 
with licensed digitized content, a user is bound by the terms of the licensing agreement, which 
tends to be more restrictive than the terms of an outright sale. In the case of music, many 
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digitized tracks may only be copied a certain number of times, may not be widely shared, and 
may not exist in the user’s cache permanently. In contrast, a music album may be copied an 
infinite number of times, may be shared, and exists in the user’s permanent collection.301 When 
technological protections are added, the problems riddling the rights of users may be 
compounded. For instance, creative content may be protected by DRM and therefore cannot be 
recorded, copied, disseminated, or permanently cached. Further, due to competition among 
carriers, media companies, and providers, users may find interoperability to be limited (for 
instance, Apple iTunes music cannot be played on non-Apple devices unless the music is ripped 
onto a CD or converted to a compatible MP3 format).302 Further still, due to international 
discrepancies and competitive policies, users may not be able to access, use or otherwise enjoy 
many commercial films that are recorded, streamed, or disseminated in different countries (for 
instance, Apple iTunes offers different music in America and Europe, and music purchased in 
one locale is not typically compatible with devices purchased in other locales).303 And lastly, 
users may find that licensed digital content is less clearly governed by the first sale doctrine than 
owned pre-digital content. Taken together, these restrictions represent real costs to end users that 
were arguably either minimal or non-existent in the more traditional and pre-digital world in 




The structure of IP entitlements enables creators to produce original work and ensures that they 
are rewarded for their output, thereby incentivizing future production. Collaterally, however, IP 
can give rise to uniformity costs that can lead to a variety of negative consequences, which may 
come at a high price not only to users but also to other industry stakeholders. The results of 
inappropriate IP allocations are broad and varied, and may include diminishing users’ rights and 
access, narrowing the public domain, detracting from well-established norms and practices, and 
                                                
301 Similarly, in the case of music, e-books are licensed rather than owned; in the case of films, digitized 
films streamed via services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime, on demand services, and various online 
services are licensed rather than owned. 
302 Similarly, in the case of film, DVDs may not be watched on Blu-Ray and vice versa. 
303 Analogously, in the case of film, many DVDs made in the US are not interoperable with European 
devices, online streaming of films via US providers may not be accessible via European or Asian 
providers, and vice versa. 
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potentially exacerbating downward pressures on creative industries already challenged by 
technological innovation and other major changes. One approach to reducing uniformity costs is 
to decrease a reliance on IP rights altogether, and to use changing business models, adding 
revenue sources (such as advertising, data mining and data marketing, ancillary services, and so 
on), and other non-IP based strategies to create new markets and opportunities for profitability. 
In the same vein, private ordering solutions, such as strategic partnerships, joint ventures, 
constructed commons, guild-like structures, and other negotiated arrangements can likewise 
reduce transaction costs and minimize the uniformity costs that arise from IP-based solutions. 
 
Another approach to reducing uniformity costs is not to do away with IP entitlements, which 
after all may be requisite to protecting the interests of creators and rights holders in certain 
creative industries, but rather to change the structure of IP rights by “tailoring” such rights, or 
granting IP rights are well-calibrated to suit the specific contours of a given industry. There 
already exist several examples of calibrated IP entitlements that have been inscribed in copyright 
law and policy, including: (i) the “hot news” doctrine that narrowly protects rights in time-
sensitive news and may allow an infringement action to be brought on the basis of “willful 
misappropriation” of such “hot news;”304 (ii) carveouts that offer copyright protection in limited 
areas of production, such as fashion design prints, boat hulls, and so on; (iii) specific exceptions 
created by Congress, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the courts; and (iv) “gray areas” 
 created by the fair use doctrine that allow certain exceptions to the exclusive rights that 
copyright confers, such as parody, educational use, and certain other non-commercial uses. 
 
The mechanisms for tailoring IP will be discussed in detail below. They include, but are not 
limited to: (i) varying initial allocations of IP; (ii) calibrating rights in accordance with the 
optimum durability of copyrighted work; (iii) promoting IP-based regulatory systems or regimes; 
(iv) redefining terms and standards; and (v) creating and/or reinforcing alternatives to IP, such as 
rewards, norms, open source, and so on. 
 
                                                
304 See David L. Applegate & Ryan Schermerhorn, Hot News: The “Hot-News” Doctrine Is Hot Again, 
FED. SOC’Y (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/hot-news-the-hot-news-doctrine-
is-hot-again-or-is-it.  
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 344 
1. Varying Initial Allocations of IP 
 
One approach to tailoring IP entails varying initial entitlements across different industries. This 
has been proposed in several guises. Some advocates of limited copyright argue that copyright 
protection may and should be granted in accordance with the needs of a specific industry. In the 
case of fashion,305 for instance, copyright has not historically been granted to original designs or 
other original output.306 Some proponents of copyright have lobbied to bring copyright 
protection to fashion design, and a recent bill in this regard, the Design Piracy Prohibition Act,307 
has received widespread attention and some favor (although at present it has been tabled). One 
proposal that has been brought to the fore by the recent bill is to stagger the terms of protection 
of certain fashion designs to protect them from their inception through their first three years in 
the market, presumably their most commercially significant period in the life of the work. Other 
proposals have recommended extending copyright in elements of fashion design, particularly 
those that rise to a standard of originality and that risk being reproduced at a cost to their 
creator.308 These restricted extensions of protection have likewise been recommended by 
commentators with respect to other creative fields309, as well as other forms of protection, such 
as patent protection.310 
 
2. Varying Terms and Standards (Drawn From Arguments in Patent Law);  
Offering Options 
 
Assessing IP entitlements in various creative fields can require broad-brush measures, such as 
bringing copyright to an industry like fashion that has previously only received trademark 
protection.311 If copyright law is to extend to new fields, however, it may also consider 
                                                
305 As discussed, other negative spaces include comedy, cuisine, yoga, and some sports instruction. 
306 In other fields, this output includes routines and jokes; recipes and, until recently cooking methods; 
yoga poses, methods and techniques; football plays or strategies; and so on. 
307 H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 
2511, 112th Cong. (2011).  
308 MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE & INTERNET LAW (2011).  
309 For instance, it has been suggested that some practitioners might seek a limited protection in certain 
yoga practices and poses. 
310 See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 U. VA. L. REV.  1505 (2009). 
311 Burk & Lemley, supra note 202; R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property 
and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003). 
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somewhat more fine-grained approaches to granting IP upon certain outputs and activities. At 
first this may seems challenging, as copyright can appear monolithic by nature. But copyright 
law can look to patent law for guidance in shaping and tailoring its application to creative 
endeavors. By establishing rules, principles and practices that are at once nuanced and flexible, 
tailored copyright can help creative industries that are being transformed by innovation, and 
leave room for adjustment or reassessment when further innovation makes inroads on existing 
businesses. 
 
A useful taxonomy of tailoring in patent law proposes two types of tailoring: terms and 
standards.312 In a reasonable Type I approach to varying rights among creators, flexibility with 
respect to patenting is conferred by a close and careful analysis of the person having ordinary 
skill in the art (“PHOSITA”). Copyright does not have a precisely analogous term of art to 
describe a reasonable (hypothetical) person having knowledge of a particular field (and thus, 
loosely speaking, able to assess if the work is patent-worthy). However, in the case of newly-
minted copyright, as in fashion, a similar reasonable person with knowledge of the field might be 
invoked to help determine what works rise to the standard of originality that fashion deems 
original and the law deems copyrightable. Such an equivalent to the PHOSITA could also be 
useful with respect to determinations of “substantial similarity” and misappropriation in 
copyright infringement claims. 
 
With respect to standards in the patent context, a “technology-specific” approach has been 
proposed arising from the Federal Circuit’s application of the ordinary skill in the art analysis to 
biotechnological inventions.313 This approach arguably results in relatively stringent disclosure 
standards, especially under the written description requirement, and relatively less stringent 
obviousness requirements. This results in biotechnological patents that are arguably likely to be 
more "narrow and numerous" than would be the case absent the exceptionalist approach. 
Copyright similarly has some potential to focus specifically on variations among creative 
industries and to bring those differences to bear on considerations of copyrightability. In some 
instances, this can be said already to have occurred in copyright’s history. Entire creative 
                                                
312 Wagner, supra note 311.  
313 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002). 
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industries have been affected by determinations of originality that specify the extent of 
copyrightability. In the case of fashion, for instance, copyright has historically not been granted 
to fashion design and apparel, due to the determination by courts that such works do not separate 
functionality from design.314 Those determinations, however, may be open to challenge.315 
Moreover, in many other the creative industries, narrow copyrights may be imagined that are 
broadly similar to those found in patent, and at least similar with respect to the ability of courts 
to take into their deliberations the shape, nature, and effect on copyrightability of the creative 
industry in question. 
 
The ability of creative industries to seek copyright will by definition, and by necessity, vary over 
time. In the event of disruptive innovation, businesses may choose to seek IP entitlements 
immediately, or may prefer to bide their time and wait to determine what is best when a new and 
workable environment emerges. One proposed approach to affording creative businesses greater 
flexibility is to offer real options that regulate who acquires, keeps, and exercises IP 
entitlements.316 While possibly challenging to implement, such real options hold the promise of  
allowing businesses to feel secure that they will be able to avail themselves of IP rights should 
the need arise, but also reduces the incentive for businesses to seek such rights prematurely. In 
the landscape of many creative industries that are still ascertaining how best to respond to the 
changes that disruptive innovation has wrought on their business models and plans, real options 
may represent a measured and time-sensitive recourse for those considering rights-based 
strategies and solutions. 
 
3. Calibrating Rights in Accordance with Optimum Durability of Work 
 
The justification for granting IP entitlements, broadly, is to incentivize creation by ensuring 
rewards in productive output. But in many industries the value that inheres in a work, and the 
degree to which profits can be yielded by exploiting a work, can vary considerably over time. In 
                                                
314 In the case of cuisine, it may be argued that certain limitations have been placed on copyright grants as 
well: that is, copyright may be granted to cookbooks, or to annotations of recipes, but not to the recipes 
themselves. 
315 This would not be dissimilar to other “technology-specific” approaches to copyright, which have been 
mixed and ever-evolving, as in the case of computer programming.  
316 Carroll, supra note 292, at 849. 
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the case of fast-moving industries, for instance, such as fashion (copyright) or pharmaceutical 
drugs (patents), it is arguable that the greatest value of the creation or innovation will be 
consolidated in the early period of its release and exploitation. In fashion, this is because the 
“freshness” of a garment or accessory, or its peak popularity among consumers, tends to be 
short-lived, remaining desirable for only an initial season at an haute couture level and then a 
subsequent season at middle- and mass-market levels. This is comparable to sectors that 
experience rapid changes in the utility and value of patentable works to consumers, such as 
computer technologies (both software and hardware), in which innovation, turnover, and 
changing preferences, markets, and product rollouts are likely to curtail the longevity of even the 
most innovative products released. The time-sensitivity of creative work, therefore, may yield 
important clues that help policymakers determine the appropriate levels and measures of IP 
protection that will protect a work when it is valuable and at peak profitability. 
 
Another important factor in determining the optimum durability of a creative work arises when 
the makeup of the creators or innovators themselves are more closely scrutinized. In the case of 
fashion, for instance, the creators who stand to be protected by copyright (as has been proposed) 
are original designers who lie at the high end of the spectrum, such as haute couture houses of 
design, and those who are emerging, such as independent designers who are seeking a toehold in 
the established ranks (they may be at the high or low end of the spectrum, depending on the 
market(s) they choose to target). These designers are doing the creative work that reasonably 
merits protection, as it is their collections that establish trends, drive sales, and build the ongoing 
churn on which the industry depends. While their work may merit protection, however, it is 
valuable only for the short period of time in which it is desired among consumers, or “hot.” This 
is also the period, however, in which high-end designers have a significant lead-time advantage 
in the market. Even without copyright, therefore, they are likely to enjoy the favorable returns 
that accompany being first-to-market with exclusive, desirable goods. At the same time, 
however, high-end designers may assume risks that are associated with being first-to-market, and 
IP protection can help to reduce the costs that such risk-taking may incur, and thereby to promote 
risk-taking behavior on the part of future designers. Subsequent to the lead-time period, knock-
off designers can create similar garments that mimic the look and feel of these trend-setting 
pieces which further contribute to the industry churn and also extend product sales to lower 
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market consumers who could not otherwise afford to invest in fashion’s first exclusive offerings. 
As the initial risk-takers, the fashion designers under copyright would be appropriately 
protecting their right to returns in successful original works. But after these garments have 
proven profitable, which is again most likely to occur in their earliest appearances on the 
runways and shelves, the rationale for protecting long-term returns diminishes in tandem with the 
decreasing profitability of the creative work.317 
 
At the initial stages of commercial exploitation, creators in fields such as fashion and innovators 
need protection to reap maximum rewards and thereby to recoup their investment and/or start-up 
costs. But at a later juncture, when they need less protection because they have already taken full 
advantage of the initial monopoly rents, the innovators or creators can relinquish their hold on 
the product’s exclusivity at relatively low cost. Equally importantly, their cost is counterbalanced 
by a social gain, in that consumers are benefited by getting eventual access to lower cost knock-
offs or generics, and thus wider social gains may be realized that counterbalance the later, and 
possibly more minor, losses that may be incurred when exclusivity and its IP-based rewards have 
run their course. 
 
But an important caveat distinguishes fashion from some other creative content industries, and 
may undermine its case for protection as a consequence. The fashion industry as it is currently 
constructed does not require IP protection at the beginning of a fashion cycle to safeguard 
creators’ productivity and profitability: key industry features, such as the high pace of churn, and 
                                                
317 Parallel examples can be found in industries that rely on patent protection. In the case of 
pharmaceutical drugs, for instance, patents protect innovators and rights holders who are investing 
significant resources and funds in R&D, the costs of obtaining FDA approval (such as clinical trials, 
application fees, and so forth), marketing, and other expenses that are incurred in the course of bringing a 
new drug to market. Again, it is the protection of innovation at its most valuable stages that is paramount 
to incentivizing innovators and ensuring their due rewards. However, when the protection period runs, 
generic manufacturers are permitted to produce knock-off drugs (possibly by reverse engineering the 
original product), and thereby to contribute to the vitality of the overall pharmaceutical drug market. 
However, an important distinction must be made: in the case of patents, the period of time in which 
protection is extended is relatively short, although it remains uniform across industries. In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, the full span of patent protection may be needed to protect the original product at its 
peak profitability, since drugs may prove desirable, indeed at times necessary, for a matter of years. In 
this case, therefore, the span of patent protection may be suited to some drug releases, while other 
products will not require the full term to run before they begin to lose the market value that is based in the 
requisite exclusivity.  
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the short window of exclusivity, ensure that original designers are able to reap the earliest rents 
by being ahead of the curve and having exclusive rights to sale in their latest, most popular, and 
most profitable designs. It is only in the event that technology actually transforms the industry, 
rendering copying of designs virtually instantaneous, indistinguishable from the originals in all 
meaningful respects, and therefore substitutable for the originals, that the elite designers’ initial 
returns will be undermined. Although innovation is beginning to disrupt the fashion industry, the 
extent of such copying and its effects on high-end profitability are still subject to dispute. 
Moreover, elite designers have created highly effective strategies for competing with knock-offs, 
including increasing their efforts to design works for non-elite markets, in other words, creating 
original designs that compete at various levels. Thus, if the creators are scrutinized, as suggested 
above, their viability and competitiveness in the fashion market speaks not to their need for 
fashion copyright, but rather of their ability to flourish without it. 
 
There are cases in which calibrating the optimal durability of protection may lead to the 
conclusion that protection is in fact limited in overall value and, if granted, may require being 
allocated on a case-by-case basis. There are, of course, significant cost concerns associated with 
such fine-grained protection; and many questions arise as to the overall fairness, viability, and 
manageability of such a course. The reasoning behind considering fine-grained protection 
remains defensible, however, and can lead those considering whether or not to seek or extend 
protection to a more profound consideration of benefits and costs associated with their efforts. In 
the case of publication and employees in knowledge-based economies such as the education 
sector, for instance, patent protection may be sought rather than publication (although of course 
patent applications must make the claims that define the invention), in order to protect an 
innovation’s profitability. By contrast, publication discloses a work to the public, and hence its 
value does not lie in secrecy (which confers a competitive advantage in many industry sectors), 
but rather in disclosure. Disclosure and publication, however, may have strategic uses, such as 
serving as a strategy for re-dividing the bargaining surplus between the original inventor and 
cumulative improvers in the context of cumulative innovation.318 There are other useful purposes 
of disclosure and publication, such as enhancing employee mobility and knowledge 
                                                
318 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 
U. VA. L. REV. 1455 (2002).  
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portability,319 reputation, or the strength of an innovator’s portfolio. These features may lead the 
innovator to conclude that her invention, and the knowledge it comprises, may be actually more 
valuable with limited protection, particularly such that allows publication to have its rightful 
importance and worth, rather than with full IP protection. As a practical matter, it is highly likely 
that these kinds of considerations will have to occur on an individual basis, rather than as a larger 
policy decision with respect to tailoring IP entitlements. However, the case of publication rights 
reveals that inventors and creators must take into account the costs and benefits of disclosure 
versus protection in a nuanced assessment that recognizes the value of both sides of the equation, 
and that seeks protection only when it optimizes as many facets of productivity as possible. 
 
4. Promoting IP-Based Regulatory Systems or Regimes 
 
Creative industries that are challenged by disruptive innovation and seek not only new business 
models but also new or expanded IP protection must consider the administrative and transaction 
costs that actualizing IP measures is likely to necessitate. Particularly when systemic change is 
sought, the efficient management of IP rights will almost certainly involve strategic, collective, 
and administratively-streamlined procedures that strike the balance between creators’ rewards 
and users’ access. Implementing IP-based regimes can call for the creation of collective rights 
management organizations, which organize and manage the licensing of copyright on behalf of 
rights holders. These regulatory bodies are especially effective when disruptive innovation 
displaces the role of middlemen, who (among other important functions) have largely been 
responsible for managing rights and rewards in longstanding creative industries. 
 
There are also other measures that can effectively regulate and manage IP rights in creative 
work. In the case of mature industries, such as education, extending and expanding copyright in 
online courses and related materials may present challenges to administrators, who must work to 
ensure that rights are equitably allocated and rewards, either actual or future, are dispensed fairly 
and in rough proportion to expenses and risks undertaken by the various participants. There are 
various initial allocations that can be imagined: in the case of the University of Pennsylvania, for 
instance, a traditional university offering MOOCs via Coursera, the interested parties have 
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agreed to a specific contract governing online instruction.320 The UPenn-Coursera contract 
provides that the university retains copyright in the courses, while the faculty are entitled to per-
course remuneration and/or certain non-monetary benefits (administrative and technical support, 
lightened teaching load to assist with preparation time, and so on), and any royalties that accrue 
are paid to the university with a possible eventual payout to faculty.321 Coursera reserves the 
right to stake claims in other royalties as they may arise in the future.322 
 
These allocations may make good sense given an intra-university context, in which faculty 
members remain stable, attached to their home institution, and a single online educational 
provider is involved. Multiplied across the educational spectrum, in a scenario that brings many 
shifting parties and allegiances to an ever-expanding world of online courses, as well as ancillary 
activities (tutoring, networking, professional employment and career prospects, data mining, 
pedagogical research, and so on), the management of rights and rewards can easily become far 
more complex and daunting. Further, derivative rights, secondary rights (in teaching materials, 
notes, online bulletin board postings, and so on), and transmission rights (in video, radio, and 
possibly other media) may add more layers of rights management to the picture. And as in the 
case of other mature industries, such as music, academic stakeholders may wish to preserve an 
array of future rights, such as performance rights analogous to the right to perform a copyrighted 
musical work (that is, the right for one professor to teach another’s course). These various 
interests have been efficiently managed by collective rights organizations in the music sector, 
and a similar IP-based regulatory regime may map well onto education and other creative 
industries that are complex, changing, and moving toward a rights-based system of rewards. 
  
D. When Tailoring Does Not Work So Well 
 
IP tailoring seeks to help industries adapt to change with rights that benefit creation and facilitate 
market transactions without stifling the emergence of new entities, the rights of users, and vital 
public interests. This is of course the ideal balance that is sought, but its pursuit has real and 
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possibly insuperable limitations. For one, changing business strategies may limit the utility of IP 
and, even when combined with IP, may not fully rescue an industry from wider changes. It may 
be that new business models, technologies, or even industries are tasked with revitalizing 
industries that have already been challenged to the point where they cannot recover from their 
newly destabilized state. Alternately, the combination of new IP entitlements and business 
models may come at such a high cost to greater interests, such as the public good, privacy rights, 
openness, or other social goods, that stakeholders in a creative industry must reconsider the path 
they are traveling. Changing the course of an entire industry may seem quixotic or virtually 
impossible to effectuate, but it cannot be disregarded if social goods are to be prioritized and 
upheld. Even thinking about the costs of tailoring itself is worthwhile, as it can serve as a 
reminder to creative industries that the change they lobby for may not be laden with costs, 
unintended consequences, or other adverse effects, and that such change should be made 
knowingly, carefully, and with a view to minimizing these costs, if it to be taken at all. 
 
1. Pricing and Revenues 
 
Inevitably, disruptive innovation forces the hand of creative industries and causes them to 
reassess and adjust their business models in order to survive, regroup, and eventually, it is hoped, 
to thrive. But even in cases where business models change, and IP rights are well-suited to 
industry needs and demands, a transformed market may continue to experience sclerotic growth, 
decline, or actual failure. While the worst-case failure may be irreparable market failure, a 
slightly less-worse case of prolonged decline may be nearly as painful to endure. Then only 
another wave of disruptive innovation may be required to save the industry, or to transform it 
anew into a healthier, functioning environment. 
 
The music industry may illustrate the challenges and struggles that an industry racked with 
disruptive innovation can face, although it is far from clear what its ultimate fate might be. In the 
music sector, sales of individual of units of creative work (songs or digital tracks), which 
disaggregated earlier larger units (record albums), has led to a precipitous decline in net sales and 
net revues in the industry (even factoring out unpaid downloading and copying). The industry 
has stayed somewhat healthy through the "360 contracts" that make revenues from sales related 
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to musicians' work, such as concert tickets/tours, merchandise, promotional materials, and so on. 
However, extremely well-established and well-administered IP rights, even when wielded with 
some major enforcement efforts (RIAA and other suits) and coupled with technological 
protections such as DRM, have not enabled the industry to return to pre-digital levels of 
profitability.  In music, then, songs have become cheaper, but they are just as protected as ever, if 
not more so (a user may only make a restricted number copies of digital tracks on electronic 
devices; users can only access digital tracks in certain markets, and on certain devices that may 
not be interoperable; the use of “snippets” has been restricted by case law even when they are 
used for new genres such as sampling, and so forth). For users, this may be a net positive effect, 
in that more music can be consumed at more reasonable prices, and only music that a user 
desires need be purchased (as opposed to being compelled to buy an entire album). At the same 
time, however, it may not be an unmitigated boon: users who license online music may discover 
that their rights are restricted in comparison to the rights they held in music that they purchased 
in physical hard copy form. 
 
Equally importantly, the effect of this new business model on the music industry has been 
adverse if not, as some have argued, calamitous. While reports of declining sales can differ in 
demonstrating the impact (due in part to differences in baselines and factors considered), they are 
generally unanimous in showing a significant divide between pre-digital and post-digital sales 
and revenues. In the last fifteen years or so, individual digital tracks have sold at relatively flat 
rates, and it is only recently that the largest seller, Apple, has realized enough of a profit that it 
does not need to subsidize losses realized from music sales with gains realized from electronic 
device sales. It is difficult to imagine how to change the business model to correct for soft or 
declining sales of digital tracks: while the per-track cost to consumers has been raised across the 
board (in the case of Apple iTunes, many tracks have gone from 99 cents to $1.29 per 
downloaded song), it is not clear that prices are wholly inelastic. Further, it is equally difficult to 
imagine how to re-calibrate IP entitlements to improve the state of the industry. One suggested 
approach is to reduce reliance on copyright in recorded music, and essentially to treat some 
recordings as a loss leader—that is, giving them away for free, while charging users for live 
performances, compilations, access to artists, limited new releases, and so on—and thereby 
effectively tailoring IP while not actually changing entitlements, but rather by the strategic 
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decisions of rights’ holders. Another suggested approach is to rely on online music streaming 
services for a greater share of revenues, creating subscription-based packages, allowing music 
streaming to be underwritten by advertising, charging additional prices for live streaming, and so 
on. This option would require IP rights to address online streaming licenses and to craft 
regulations and fees that would put streaming services on a competitive foothold with traditional 
broadcast media (such as radio).323 In sum, while it is hard to surmise how tailoring will solve for 
the legions of challenges that face the music industry, such a solution must be pursued, and 
indeed one possible approach will be outlined later in this paper. 
 
2. Price Signals 
 
Assigning new IP entitlements to a creative industry is often argued to be a means of ensuring 
that price signaling on the part of producers directed at consumers, who seek to differentiate 
between tiers of products, can be effectuated in a clear and effective manner. The argument is 
premised on the value of IP as a kind of groundwork that gives creative producers an assurance 
that their work is protected, and therefore not vulnerable to copying without consequence, which 
producers can then pass on to consumers in the form of credible separation of products and 
differentiated pricing, or price discrimination. The argument for tailored IP is that it promotes an 
enhanced environment for price signals, in that it protects higher tier products at their point of 
greatest value, and protects high-end creative producers at their peak vulnerability. One 
shortcoming of this argument, however, is the underlying assumption that a market in which 
some copying exists is necessarily a market that cannot effectively operationalize price signals. 
This remains an open question, particularly in the case of well-functioning negative space 
creative industries that permit some copying but that still remain robust due to turnover, 
behavioral norms, customer preferences and customer segmentation, and other factors. 
 
In the context of the fashion industry, Randall Picker, a critic of the conceptualization of 
negative space, argues that “in a world without fashion copyright, high-end designers lose one 
                                                
323 From a broader perspective, these issues are similarly roiling other media, such as television and video, 
as well as publishing, journalism, and other content-rich fields. See generally supra Chapter 6. 
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means to commit to their customers that the masses won't catch up with them.”324 On his view, if 
apparel is centered on separation, the value of the good is completely dependent on the 
technology of copying.325 In such a situation, if instantaneous copying co-exists with low or 
nonexistent IP, high-end designers will not be able to sell products to their most exclusive 
customers.326 But, the more that they can promise to their customers, the higher the price that 
they should be able to charge for that promise. Picker argues that “[l]egislation creating a fashion 
copyright would give high-end designers the means to make credible commitments about 
separation and to raise their prices.”327 While this may not translate quickly into legislation, 
Picker argues that fashion copyright would create a preferable regime.328 Further, Picker suggests 
that most fashion copying is vertical and not horizontal.329 Horizontal copying connotes copying 
at the same level of the fashion pyramid: for instance, a couture house such as Fendi would likely 
copy its peer Louis Vuitton, while a mass market store such as Target would likely copy its peer 
Wal-Mart.330 Vertical copying connotes copying at different ends of the fashion pyramid: for 
instance, lower-end designers for Target copying higher end designers such as Vuitton.331 Picker 
argues that vertical copying virtually always flows in this upward direction: that is, Fendi never 
expects to copy fashion design from Target, but Target may decide to copy Fendi.332 
 
In brief, then, Picker’s argument runs as follows: (i) copyright is likely to be one-sided: that is, 
low-end firms copy from high-end firms; (ii) rapid imitation limits the value that high-end 
designers can promise to their customers; and therefore (iii) with a fashion copyright, high-end 
firms could commit to their customers that they would not face quick matching by low-end 
copyists.333 In further defense of fashion copyright, Picker adds: (iv) fashion copyright can 
compel would-be copyists into abandoning copyright (fearing that copyright holders would bring 
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infringement actions) and instead pursue creative design.334 If tailoring were to be added to 
Picker’s argument, a copyright crafted to protect original fashion garments at their inception, at 
which original designers enjoy a lead time advantage and can therefore attain peak profits, would 
contribute to the accuracy of price signaling, as elite designers would be able to make credible 
commitments about the exclusivity of their works in their first appearance in the fashion market. 
 
While internally consistent, however, Picker’s argument for fashion copyright, even when 
supplemented by IP tailoring, paradoxically reveals the shortcoming of tailored IP in a creative 
negative space. As Raustiala and Sprigman convincingly argue, fashion can best be described as 
a “stable regime of free appropriation,” plausibly flowing from the fact that as a designer, “one is 
more likely, over time, to be a copyist than to be copied.”335 Further, appropriation in its current 
state in the industry occurs both horizontally and vertically, but also vertically in both directions. 
For instance, elite designers such as Stella McCartney or Rei Kawakubo have shown that they 
are as likely to appropriate ideas and designs from Japanese street fashion (the trend to re-create 
the trend-setting attire of “Harajuku girls” is an example) as they are to appropriate one another’s 
work. Elite designers are equally likely to appropriate ideas and designs from one another, 
though, as collections that either openly imitate each other, or pay homage to another designer, 
are rife in fashion’s ever-changing seasons. Most recently, high end designers have adopted a 
strategy of appropriating from their own collections: for instance, creating works that are aimed 
at lower-tier retailers, but that still bear the look and feel of their exclusive apparel. For instance, 
Missoni, Phillip Lim, and others have created lines for Target that bear their distinctive signature 
look, while compromising certain elements (such as quality of fabric, and so on) to make these 
garments affordable for lower tier consumers.336 This last example of appropriation would not, of 
course, be affected by IP entitlements, as copyright holders can always imitate or copy their own 
work in any number of ways or occasions. It merely serves to underscore the pervasive and 
vibrant practice of appropriation that is an accepted industry standard, and that allows the 
industry to churn creative products at all levels of the fashion spectrum. Indeed, it is arguable 
that appropriation has been a foundation in the emergence of popular mass-market retailers, both 
in the U.S. and abroad (not only Target, but also H&M and Zara), which has helped to expand 
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the fashion market exponentially as it reaches mid- and lower-tier consumers. In this 
environment, therefore, fashion copyright, even if properly tailored, may be more of a hindrance 
to growth than an aid. 
 
3. Pre-Existing Norms 
 
In cases where strong norms and established practices prevail, tailoring and price discrimination 
need to be used very judiciously. For instance, traditionally reputational capital in academia has 
been an important overarching norm, effectively displacing the use of ownership rights in 
academic materials per se to confer value on academic scholarship and production or value on an 
institutional affiliation or degree. A good example of this is the balance of propertization vs. 
publication in scientific research. Generally, scientific research has created an internal balancing 
act that rests on two distinct and opposing goals: on the one hand, the propertization (usually via 
patent) of downstream scientific discovery and innovation, and on the other hand, the publication 
of upstream scientific research and disclosure of scientific findings (while patenting also 
involves disclosure and publication, its timing is different, and its disclosure of what is 
patentable may be narrower than scholarship would otherwise divulge). This arises in both 
academic and industry contexts, which should be considered separately. 
 
In the academic context, scientific research and scholarship are intended to lead to publication. 
The publication of scholarly works is crucial to advancing an academic’s reputation and career 
prospects. They are also part of an academic’s portfolio, contributing directly to her employee 
mobility and knowledge portability. At the same time, however, academic institutions are 
increasingly looking to public-private partnerships, or corporate sponsorships, to underwrite their 
often-costly scientific research. In search of returns on their investment, corporate partners look 
to the prospect of patentable discovery and the revenues that can flow from exploitation of 
patented output. The pursuit of patents may exert pressure, directly or implicitly, on academic 
scientists seeking to share, discuss, or publish their findings at earlier stages (i.e., prior to 
patentability or to a patent application actually being filed). 
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In academia, scientists have no prospect of owning patent rights in their work: almost all 
university technology transfer offices have long followed the model established by MIT, in 
which institutions immediately garner all patenting rights. But academic scientists do retain 
valuable publication rights. Indeed, academics have long argued that publication yields 
reputational capital that is an intangible but real asset in their portfolio, particularly with respect 
to their long-term employment prospects, for instance, securing a tenured position. However, the 
increasing “adjunctification” of academia raises questions as to the ongoing importance of 
publication, and gives rise to a key question: if an academic cannot get on tenure track, how 
useful is publication to her career? Some institutions argue that adjuncts do not need publication 
to further their careers (that is, publishing is not helpful to advancement in short-term and 
contractual adjunct positions). But in contrast some academics argue that adjuncts need 
publication even more than tenure-track professors to stand out from the field and win even 
lower level jobs in an increasingly competitive marketplace. Academics further argue that 
scholarship is a key part of their rights and responsibilities as academics. Just as the precepts of 
academic freedom confer upon them the right to choose research topics, engage in scholarly 
debates, and perform autonomous and self-directed scholarship, so does academic freedom grant 
them rights in and over the results of their work, including determinations regarding disclosure, 
publication and dissemination of the fruits of their labor.337 
 
In the corporate context, a similar debate arises, but one that tends to lack some of the normative 
drive of the academic one. Here, scientific research is driven primarily by a profit motive, 
although industry scientists are also often in pursuit of reputational rewards, quite possibly for 
career- enhancing purposes as well. Corporations, like universities, retain patent rights in their 
employees’ scientific research and discoveries, usually pursuant to standard “work for hire” 
principles. But some firms allow scientists to retain certain publication rights, subject to 
corporate approval. Equally importantly, the firms themselves retain publication rights, which 
they may deploy strategically. For instance, in a cumulative innovation context, an originating 
firm will use publication as a strategy for differentiating and dividing rewards between itself and 
other improving or innovating firms. Therefore, the strategic value of publication tends to be 
paramount in industry, but to the originating firm as much as to the original individual(s) who 
                                                
337 Similar debates are now arising with respect to copyright in courses, as discussed earlier. 
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innovate within the firm. Any change in IP treatment of innovation will likely affect the firm, 
and therefore may have stronger safeguards than has historically occurred in the academic 
context. An increase in publication rights to employees, therefore, might be countered by 
heightened industry protection, for example, an increase in restrictive non-compete covenants in 
employment contracts, for fear of idea theft to competitors when an employee leaves the 
company. In industries that have a particularly fast pace of innovation change, publication would 
likely have an even greater strategic value, due to the time sensitivity and early-stage value of 
disclosure. Therefore, any changes to IP protection would most likely be viewed through the 
magnifying lens of industry impact prior to change. 
 
4. Openness, UGC, Open Source, Users’ Rights, and the Public Domain 
 
Tailoring IP can work with unprotected spaces that are considered worth keeping open; indeed, 
tailoring can work to establish the divide between protected spaces and open ones. Limited 
copyright, for instance, can leave room for creative borrowing by follow-on creators, especially 
when these later works are non-commercial in nature and therefore unlikely to impinge on the 
business model of the copyright holder. One example of this is the Creative Commons 
License,338 a public copyright license that makes possible the distribution of otherwise 
copyrighted work. The Creative Commons License is governed by copyright law, and enables a 
creator to give others the right to use, share, and build upon a work that she has created. The 
License also affords the creator flexibility and the discretion to choose to permit only certain 
uses, such as non-commercial uses, of her work to be made; conversely, it protects users or 
follow-on creators who use, redistribute, or rework an original work, subject to their abiding by 
the terms and conditions that are specified in the original creator’s license for distribution. 
 
Similarly, in the case of user-generated content (UGC),339 or creative media content which may 
be produced through open collaboration, tailored IP can create space for rich creative production, 
including news, research, resource and information generation, problem processing, and artistic 
output, through a variety of media, such as digital video, blogging, podcasting, forums, social 
                                                
338 CREATIVE COMMONS, supra note 196. 
339 Olumfunmilayo Arewa, YouTube, UCG, and Digital Music: Competing Business and Cultural Models 
in the Internet Age, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 431 (2010). 
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networking, social media, mobile phone photography, and wikis. UGC may draw upon a 
combination of open source, free software, and content-based sharing sites to further shared 
goals of collaboration, skill-building, and discovery. Tailored IP, including the use of limited 
licenses (such as the Creative Commons License discussed above), can enable UGC to flourish. 
In non-commercial cases, tailored IP can create space for UGC to proliferate and disseminate 
under the fair use doctrine; however, when copyrighted material is used in the production of 
UGC, fair use may not suffice to exempt the work from copyright infringement claims. 
 
But it is when UGC has commercial implications that the benefits of tailored IP become more 
complicated and fraught. On the one hand, many commercial websites rely on UGC, and are able 
to monetize its production.340  
 
Likewise, sites such as YouTube, Facebook, MySpace, and FanFiction.net, encourage the 
production of UGC, which forms a significant portion of their online content and appeal to 
viewers, subscribers and, by extension, advertisers. The ability of these websites to monetize 
UGC (even if, at present, limited to the draw that advertisers consider site page views to hold) 
renders them eager to host UGC and reluctant to curtail UGC production based on possible 
copyright infringement in the underlying material that goes into making it. But in this case, UGC 
may be made by creating derivative works that borrow from, copy, or allude too directly to other 
original copyrighted work. The producers of this underlying content tend not to be so sanguine 
about the use of their material in UGC that is contributing to the commercial benefit of host 
websites at the producers’ purported expense. These original content producers argue that not 
only may infringement occur explicitly and intentionally, it occurs in a way that does harm to 
their commercial interests: for, had the UGC creators respected the copyright of underlying 
                                                
340 For instance, Amazon and Trip Advisor actively seek user feedback, and rely on user input to rate, 
respectively, products and hotels and restaurants. These reviews are instrumental to the websites’ content 
and appeal and, therefore, do not trigger IP concerns (unless the reviews themselves contain infringing 
matter, in which case the websites reserve the right to remove the offending material or reviews). A 
parallel development can be found in the video game industry, in which games such as World of 
Warcraft, The Sims, and Second Life allow players large latitude to participate not only in playing virtual 
games but also in building essential parts of the games. UGC thus contributes to the business models of 
both websites and video games, and allows these media companies at once to satisfy users’ urges for 
creativity, to reap new creative output at no cost, and to monetize the output without having to negotiate 
IP in the creative works.  
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work, they would have sought permission and, where appropriate, paid royalties for the licensing 
rights in such works. 
 
Each of these factors, however, is problematic. First, some use of original works in UGC may be 
unintentional, as in the case of the use of snippets of background music or video clips. While this 
may fall under the scope of the fair use doctrine, such a determination may not be evident at the 
work’s inception. Second, it is not clear that commercial interests are materially harmed, as there 
is some dispute as to how much work must be used to rise to a level that constitutes harm. Third, 
by hosting a broad range of UGC, the websites may be expressing a tacit approval of possibly-
infringing UGC that is deceptive to the ordinary user who is interested in creating and 
disseminating her own creative, if possibly derivative, work. Fourth, and finally, it is unclear 
how tailored copyright could contribute a clear and straightforward solution to the murky waters 
of UGC that draws upon some copyrighted underlying creative content. In this regard, the 
potential conflict of interests between UGC-hosting websites, on the one hand, and original 
creative content producers, on the other hand, is not readily resolved by a solomonic division of 
IP entitlements. And the costs to creation, innovation, and new business models is real. As in the 
case of music sampling, an overly strict insistence on requiring licensing of snippets may shut 
down an entire emerging genre, to the detriment of creative production. In the case of UGC-
hosting websites, however, the day may come when UGC-generating users demand rights in 
their creative work or a share of the proceeds that their creative work may yield. It is possible 
that eventually the majority of participants in the ever-growing UGC space will determine that 
maintaining the use of open source, open collaboration, and creative licensing will offer greater 
benefits in the long run than adhering to strict copyright protections, onerous licensing 
provisions, and restrictive usage rules that together inhibit user creativity. The alternative would 
be to turn to a high copyright regime, as has been historically the case in the music industry 
(among others), with the understanding that disruptive innovation may again reveal the 
shortcomings of such a copyright-intensive regime, as it has in the recent past. 
 
E. Other Concerns 
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1. Dividing Up The Fields; Assessing IP Entitlements; Gaming The System 
 
By definition, tailoring IP entails making judgments and adjustments that are industry-specific. 
But the first dilemma that may be integral to tailoring arises when dividing the creative fields is 
at issue. In some endeavors, such as music, the definition of each field seems relatively easy to 
delineate, based in the creative output, the history of the field, and so on. But new technologies, 
new forms of creativity, and new user practices can blur the lines and cause policymakers to 
deliberate over the categorization of works and the appropriate protection that should be 
extended. In the case of UGC, for instance, creative content can be musical or theatrical, a 
performance or a recorded work, infringing or fair use (or original), and so forth. The nature of 
the content may be disputable, but so often may the nature of industry practices by contestable. 
Online music streaming may be considered broadcasting, or it may be considered distinctly 
different, a content delivery system or network that is sui generis.341 In other words, creative 
production and dissemination may defy easy categorization, and that may therefore challenge 
determinations of how much to propertize, how best to protect, and how finely to parse and 
parcel out the rights that attach to creative work and how to untangle the complications that 
ensue by the dissemination of such work in new and burgeoning delivery systems and vehicles. 
 
Another concern that arises in this regard is that creative producers are bound to try to game the 
system for their own advantage. In other words, a foreseeable consequence of tailoring IP is 
the likelihood that creative producers will respond to any tailoring of IP rights and rewards on a 
per-industry basis by (i) seeking to be categorized under the type of production that they feel best 
suit their needs and give them the best competitive advantage in the market; (ii) lobbying to be 
given extra protection based on their own particular strategic interests and demands; or (iii) 
seeking to be exempt from regulations that they consider unfavorable, by arguing that they do 
not fit into a category that they perceive to be unduly burdensome to their own operations and 
competitive game plan. Such attempts at favorable self-positioning are understandable, but can 
be onerous to entire industries, not to mention courts, adjudicators, and administrators, as 
determinations of the nature of creative industries and the technologies in which they are 
                                                
341 Further, non-streamed materials, such as e-books, podcasts, pre-recorded programs, and so on that are 
disseminated through online content delivery systems, such as electronic devices or online radio services, 
may either be analogized to streaming media, treated as traditional media that is simply disseminated via 
newer technologies, or cordoned off and treated as a separate area of creative work. 
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embedded become increasingly complex in nature, and their outcomes become increasingly 
high-stakes and momentous in their repercussions across multiple industry sectors. 
 
2. Institutionalism and Uncertainty 
 
Tailoring IP, if formally effected and not simply adopted as a matter of practice within an 
industry (for instance, an agreement among fashion industry participants to emphasize trademark 
and not to pursue copyright), must occur through legislative and judicial change. Courts, 
however, are often not the venue to resolve these matters; and legislatures may require costly 
lobbying efforts, suitable timing, and may be subject to pressure from different stakeholders with 
different budgets, connections, and other potentially distortionary means. It is far more likely that 
administrative bodies such as the Register of Copyrights and the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) have a superior competency to evaluate rapidly changing technologies and their 
environments. Those entities, however, may be overwhelmed with their ordinary tasks and 
functions, and may not have the capacity to promulgate sweeping change. Moreover, the high 
transaction costs that such change will no doubt entail may not readily be borne by these 
administrative agencies. Tailoring, therefore, is a challenging proposition to ask of these entities, 
and demanding that they assume the role permanently may not be a tenable goal. 
 
The issue of uncertainty also plagues IP tailoring. Legislation is glacial; whereas technological 
change can occur at light-speed. Further, it is virtually impossible to predict ex ante which areas 
of innovation will take off, and which areas will be benefited by redrawing of the rules with 
respect to the balance of IP entitlements, business strategies and plans, and market forces.342 This 
may be one of the reasons that administrators such as the Register of Copyrights and the PTO are 
reluctant to embrace swift and sweeping changes to IP allocations and their systemic 
implementation in various industries.343 
                                                
342 One need only consider the rise and fall of technology companies, software developers, content giants 
such as television broadcasters, publishing houses, newspapers, record labels, fashion houses, and so on, 
to recognize that creative industries are a moving target, and calibrating their IP entitlements is an equally 
transient prospect. 
343 In some cases, this conservative approach may seem justified, particularly in retrospect: for instance, it 
has been argued that the antitrust lawsuits against Microsoft regarding their bundling of browsers with 
persona computers were rendered less effective, if not obsolete, by the rapid decline of Microsoft’s 
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3. Is There a Constitutional Construction Argument That Tailoring Is the Best Way to 
Protect the Public Domain? 
 
It is significant that the Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not enumerate the specific 
creative endeavors that are to be granted IP entitlements, but rather refers broadly to the goal of 
promoting “Science and useful Arts.”344 In this regard, of course, it resembles other areas of the 
Constitution, such as the First Amendment, which only delineates the contours of rights, 
privileges, and proscriptions of government actions. It has been argued in the context of the First 
Amendment that these broad provisions were deliberately not explicated in order to leave room 
for successive generations to interpret them in accordance with the exigencies of their time. 
Thus, for instance, the First Amendment has been interpreted over time to encompass myriad 
contemporary concerns that may not have been imaginable at the time of its writing (political 
donations as protected speech; personhood rights in corporations; rights in contraception; and so 
on). It is also arguable that, in either the case of the Copyright Clause or other such directives, 
explication can have a signaling effect: that which is enumerated is protected, but that which is 
not enumerated has been deliberately left out and is not to be protected. This can contribute to a 
system that is clear, transparent, accessible, and practical. There is, however, a counterargument 
to this vein of thought: by leaving rights, privileges, protections and proscriptions deliberately 
open-ended, one may leave space for future rights or adjustments to rights, especially as 
disruptive changes and shifting environments may require flexibility, fluidity and openness. 
 
In terms of tailoring IP, both the open-ended approach and the explicative approach have their 
virtues and appeal. Insofar as legislative change is mandated, a more carefully crafted set of 
entitlements is likely to come closest to representing the agreed-upon positions of the various 
stakeholders who have participated in the legislative process. But insofar as creative industries 
take it upon themselves to tailor their own IP to suit their most pressing needs, leaving room for 
reconsideration and re-calibration may be more conducive to sustaining healthy competition 
                                                                                                                                                       
market share and the rise of its technological competitors, which together eroded its previously quasi-
monopolistic position to a level at which it could no longer truly affect the personal computer market. 
344 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
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while retaining the ability to respond optimally to disruptive innovation and the changing 
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CHAPTER 5: INDUSTRY PRESCRIPTIONS 
I. FASHION 
A. Business 
1. The Nature of the Copying They Care About (By Market Segment) 
 
 
The fashion market can be segmented into tiers of designers, which is useful to identify and 
disambiguate the different kinds of copying that are liable to occur. These variations in the nature 
of copying should be addressed specifically, as their concerns are not interchangeable and their 
solutions offer distinct sets of tradeoffs. 
 
The tiers of designers are as follows1: (i) high-end designers (“high-end”) who are renowned for 
originality, quality, and exclusivity. Their works are first released in runway collections, then 
sold privately (by the designer’s house) at high cost at to a limited, elite set of customers. 
Eventually, their works may be released for sale to a limited number of prestigious retailers. 
These works establish or anchor fashion trends for one or many seasons; (ii) mid-tier (“mid-tier”) 
designers and labels, whose works are intended to adapt the trendiest works for mid-market 
customers. Their works are aimed at large retailers, and are not intended to outlast seasonality 
(sometimes called “fast fashion” in the trade, although this term can also encompass low-end 
design); (iii) low-end designers and retailers (“low-end”, who are aimed at selling works to mass 
markets and (iv) independent designers (“indies”) who are emerging talent, seeking to establish 
themselves as original yet commercially viable creators. Some of these indies seek funding to 
continue their work independently, while others seek an alliance with a more established partner 
to produce and market their designs. Also considered briefly are (v) “street” fashion creators 
(“street”), who are often enthusiastic, talented amateurs interested in adapting fashion to their 
own interests, tastes, and inspiration. The increasing respect accorded to street fashion is well-
documented, and shows that creativity is valued across the fashion spectrum 
 
                                                
1 This list, as well as the list that follows of “kinds of copying”, is not meant to be comprehensive; more, 
it is intended to be illustrative of the tiered nature of the industry. Also, it can help isolate the various 
kinds of copying faced by the industry across the board. 
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There are many kinds of copying that occur across fashion’s various tiers. Some of the most 
striking examples are as follows: (i) High-Indie: a high-end designer, in search of appealing 
original work, can copy an indie designer, who may not have the means, clout, or ability to 
contest such copying successfully. Ex.: Diane von Furstenburg’s settlement paid to a pair of 
lesser-known Toronto designs after “appropriating the design” of a floral print jacket.2. (ii) High-
high: a high-end designer can follow the successful model of a rival, and hew so closely to the 
original that infringement is alleged. Ex.: in a recently resolved case, Louboutin, a high-end 
designer whose red-soled shoes proved a runaway commercial success, brought suit against Yves 
Saint Laurent, a rival high-end designer who produced an all-red shoe with red soles.3 (iii) Mid-
High: possibly most common, mid-tier designers and retailers follow cutting-edge designs and 
emerging trends with a view to adapting them for mid-level consumer tastes and wallets. These 
adaptations are intended to invoke the original designs and concepts exhibited by their 
precedents on the runways; thus, it is not surprising that some mid-tier versions will be hard to 
distinguish from the originals. This may be especially likely in the case of original works that are 
so successful as to become standards that are considered part of the fashion “canon” (but that 
may be seen as losing some of their claim to enduring originality when becoming part of the 
canon, much as an overly familiar good runs the risk of losing its claim to trademark when it 
becomes so famous as to be deemed generic). Ex.: Certain mid-tier retailers have hired designers 
that recreate affordable versions of “classic” designs, such as Diane Von Furstenburg’s iconic 
“wrap” dress, or Mizzoni’s iconic striped wool-and-silk patterns.4 (iv) Mid-Indie: similarly, mid-
tier designers can adapt popular works by independent designers and thereby bring them to the 
mass market. This can be especially injurious when independent designers do not have the means 
to defend themselves against outright appropriation, or when it detracts from their originality in 
ways that prevent them from gaining recognition, funding, or alliance with essential partners. 
                                                
2  David Graham, Fashion icon pays up in copycat spat, THE STAR (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.thestar.com/life/fashion_style/2009/05/13/fashion_icon_pays_up_in_copycat_spat.html  
3 The YSL shoe was not found to infringe, but the case was long, disputatious and incited a great deal of 
contention within the trade. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 
206, 227 (2d Cir. 2012). 
4 See, e.g., Caroline Sessoms, Missoni's Not The Only One Into The Zig Zag Trend: It's Everywhere Now, 
SHE FINDS (2012), http://www.shefinds.com/2012/missonis-not-the-only-one-into-the-zig-zag-trend-its-
everywhere-now/.  
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Ex.: the Cody Foster & Co.’s alleged appropriation of woks by independent artists and designer 5  
(v) High-Street: increasingly, “street” fashion has gained credibility and widespread appeal 
among all tiers of the fashion marketplace, due in great part to its participants’ originality in 
creatively adapting, reshaping, mixing, and modeling apparel and accessories6; at the same time, 
high-end designers, well-aware of the originality that street fashion can offer, have taken to 
incorporating some of its designs in their own work. Ex.: Alexander McQueen, to take one such 
designer, was known to be inspired by street fashion, and to bring some of its features to bear in 
his own haute couture collections.7,8 
 
The nature of fashion copying, varying across the different segments of industry participants, 
mandates a range of responses crafted to address the costs incurred by designers whose work has 
been appropriated, to eliminate or reduce the unfair benefits reaped by designers who cross the 
permissible boundaries of creative borrowing, and to disincentivize or thwart copying -- more 
specifically, the kinds of copying that discourage creativity, pass the boundaries of reasonable 
creative borrowing, and in the long run diminish rather than enrich both the commercial 
marketplace and the public domain. 
 
2. Business Solutions 
 
                                                
5 John Brownlee, How A Company Gets Away With Stealing Independent Designers' Work, FAST 
COMPANY (Oct. 18, 2013, 12:50 PM), http://www.fastcodesign.com/3020194/how-a-company-gets-
away-with-stealing-independent-designers-work. 
6 Technology has also contributed to the spread of street fashion by allowing fashion followers, bloggers, 
and photographers to circulate photos and videos testifying to street fashion’s creativity as exhibited in 
the real-live streets of worldwide fashion capitals 
7 Rajini Vaidyanathan, Six ways Alexander McQueen changed fashion, BBC (Feb 12. 2010, 10:50 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8511404.stm.  
8 Two other kinds of copying across tiers can occur, but will not be discussed in this paper: (vi)Indie-High 
or Indie-Mid: this doesn’t occur as often, as indie designers are trying to make a name for themselves, and 
the best way to do that is to show originality and thereby stand out; and (vii)Street-High: this also doesn’t 
occur often, for while street fashion might mimic some of the details of high fashion, it usually wants to 
be seen as free of such elitist restraints. One exception to this might involve street fashion enthusiasts 
carrying a frank knock-off, like a fake Birkin bag, but that’ll likely involve fake/counterfeited goods and a 
bit of tongue-in-cheek attitude. 
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a. Business Pushback (What They Should Do Commercially) 
It is the high-end designers who generate original fashion that claim they are most susceptible to 
economically damaging copying.9 Many of their leading advocates recognize that independent 
designers are similarly situated -- that is, originate designs that are prone to being copied and 
mass marketed by copyists -- and therefore they argue that high-end designers and independent 
designers are most in need of anti-copying protective measures. Some commentators have 
argued that the nature of commercial enterprise in fashion reduces such potential losses by 
creating an ongoing churn or turnover in product demand, ensuring that designers’ original 
works will be continually in demand.10 Others, however, have countered that original designers 
are still hurt economically when they issue new works that are copied almost instantaneously, a 
trend that is only likely to be exacerbated by improvements in technology that enable ever more 
rapid, accurate and widespread reproduction of original works.11 These opposing arguments 
divide fashion industry experts on the need for anti-copying solutions. However, they share a 
focus on the parties whose works are most susceptible to appropriation -- that is, high-end 
designers and independent designers -- and on the time in which such copying is most potentially 
harmful -- that is, at the initial stage in which the original work is introduced to consumers who 
are avid for exposure and access to fashion’s latest, most trend-setting offerings. 
 
Commentators and designers alike differ on the nature and degree of potential harm that may 
result from design appropriation.12 They also differ as to whether or not copyright protection is 
                                                
9 See, e.g., Cathy Horyn, Fashionable Speed Bumps, N.Y. TIMES  (July 27, 2007, 3:31 PM), 
http://runway.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/fashionable-speed-bumps/?_r=1 (noting that the author 
“hear[s] more and more designers complaining about copying.”).  
10 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual 
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006); C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, 
Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2009). 
11 Randal C. Picker, Of Pirates and Puffy Shirts: A Comment on The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design 3 (Uni. of Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 328, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=959727; Felix 
Salmon, Susan Scafidi on Copyrighting Fashion, UPSTART BUS. J., (Sept. 19, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2007/09/19/susan-scafidi-on-copyrighting-
fashion.html?page=all.  
12 Compare Susan Scafidi & Narcisco Rodriguez, Fashion Designers Need Strong Legal Protection for 
Their Clothing, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/07/who-
owns-fashion/fashion-designers-need-strong-legal-protection-for-their-clothing with Kal Raustiala & 
Christopher Sprigman, Piracy Fuels the Fashion Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/09/07/who-owns-fashion/piracy-fuels-the-fashion-industry. 
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the optimal solution to stave off such appropriation. But many commentators do not carefully 
consider the business strategies that can actively counter copying, undermine its economic 
depredations, or creatively steal its thunder by incorporating its practices into intra-firm practices 
that bring the gains from copying into the profits of the fashion house that originated the work in 
the first place. Some of these practices have already begun to take root among industry 
participants. Often they have grown organically, as ways for firms to expand their reach across 
the spectrum of consumers in the marketplace. But as often these have not necessarily been 
recognized as measures that help firms successfully contend with rampant appropriation and its 
attendant economic losses. It is vital, however, to recognize their contribution to the bottom line 
of original and independent designers’ fashion houses, as business solutions are an integral part 
of solving the appropriation conundrum that is an integral part of creative commerce. 
 
While possibly facing some similar concerns, high-end designers should take measures that are 
in some respects different from those taken by their independent counterparts. The first two of 
these measures entails a high-end designer bringing appropriation under its own roof and 
capitalizing upon the interest in its original works across the consumer ranks. One strategy 
involves collaboration between a high-end designer and a mid-level marketer or mass marketer, 
the latter of which might otherwise be tempted to appropriate designs without benefiting the 
original creator. Instances of such collaboration have increasingly emerged in the fashion 
marketplace: for instance, “name” designers such as Isaac Mizrahi, Martin Margiela, Missoni, 
and Miuccia Prada have partnered strategically to sell collections in association with mid-level 
marketers such as Target, H&M, and Zara.13 In these instances, high-end designers can either 
recreate their earlier haute couture works, or re-imagine them in more accessible and affordable 
designs, thereby creating their own version of knock-offs that are sold after the original works 
have enjoyed their first currency at the top of the fashion curve. 
 
Another option is for high-end designers to diversify their own lines of work, offering not only a 
single, exclusive haute couture collection over a single season but rather multiple collections, 
possibly over multiple seasons, that parlay the original works into different lines appealing to 
                                                                                                                                                       
  
13 Greg Petro, Retailer/Designer Collaborations -- The Missing Link, FORBES (Feb 28, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregpetro/2013/02/28/retailerdesigner-collaborations-the-missing-link/. 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 371 
different market segments. Here, high-end designers can either borrow from their earlier 
exclusive works and create new versions adapted to the tastes of mid-level audiences, or they can 
create new works based on a similar “look and feel” that continue their appeal to mid-level 
audiences without drawing from the exclusivity of their top lines. High-end designers such as 
Ralph Lauren have capitalized highly successfully on these strategies, creating several product 
lines that range from the original Ralph Lauren Collection to the slightly less cutting edge luxury 
line Black Label, then to the mid-level Lauren, and to the mass market RL.14 Some of the 
features that appear in Ralph Lauren’s runway collection may appear throughout the fashion 
house’s diverse lines of apparel and accessories, but the original works are liable to retain their 
unique blend of design, quality and originality, such that they remain differentiated from their 
various instantiations. But in all cases, the original designer Ralph Lauren is able to garner the 
considerable profits that flow from the issuance of his designs through their dissemination in the 
fashion marketplace, thereby minimizing the risk of loss at the hands of knock-off artists and 
other appropriators. 
 
A third business strategy expands upon the theme of bringing appropriation within a designer’s 
own house. As noted, high-end designers can capitalize upon their ability to create a “look and 
feel” that is enormously appealing to customers across the fashion spectrum. These designers can 
create, and in many respects have begun to create, a broad range of lower- or mid-priced “entry 
level” items, such as accessories, perfumes, jewelry, and so on, that offer the designer’s instantly 
recognizable look to a spectrum of consumers and aficionados eager for access to his or her 
works. These works can be produced at low prices and offered at high margins. While they may 
be easily copied, the premium that comes with purchasing a real brand label item can be enough 
to keep consumers from purchasing the street version or the knock-off of the original good. This 
strategy has proved very successful for high-end designers such as Burberry (signature plaid 
scarf and belts), Chanel (branded buckles, bracelets, etc.), and Tiffany’s (branded charm 
bracelets, baby gifts, etc.).15 
                                                
14 The Ralph Lauren retail site, for example, offers dresses costing thousands under the “Collection” 
heading and others for under $100 under the Polo Ralph Lauren tab. See www.ralphlauren.com.  
15 See, e.g., Lisa Wang, Luxury Sales to Exceed $318 Billion, Driven by Emerging Markets and 
‘Affordable Luxury’, BUS. OF FASHION (Oct. 8, 2013, 5:00 AM), 
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These various business strategies are targeted at the devaluation of content that follow in the 
wake of disruptive innovation, to the consternation of content-rich industries.16 First, high-end 
designers can use sophisticated pricing strategies when creating their different product lines. 
Discriminating customers will learn to read these price signals, and to recognize that the haute 
couture collections -- which are priced at stratospheric levels that indicate originality, quality and 
exclusivity -- are meant to be separated from the lower tiers of apparel and accessories issued by 
a designer house or label. But these same consumers will also find that increases in sales of 
variegated goods will increase the name recognition of high-end designers across the market 
spectrum. The recognizability of designers, and their increasingly widespread cultural cachet, 
can then contribute to making their secondary or bridge lines still more desirable and 
commercially successful. Thus, differentiated designer lines, coupled with sophisticated and 
distinct price signals, can effectively counter the devaluation of content in the industry. 
Internalizing knock-offs thus becomes a plausible defense against rampant copying and its 
economic costs,17 and helps bolster traditional sources of revenue while introducing new sources 
that will strengthen the industry’s long-term prospects for commercial success. 
 
For independent designers, the business strategies may be harder, as they can have fewer 
resources to stave off or fight against copying, but there are still plausible solutions. Indie firms 
should partner with high-end firms to seek protection from copying by alliances with deep-
pocketed allies. High-end firms should encourage such alliances, rather than seeking to engage in 
such appropriation themselves, thereby enriching their own stock of original works while 
building up allegiances within the creative ranks of fashion originators. This is a more viable 
solution than merely expressing concern for independents, or trying to come up with solutions 
that may not fit their particular needs (for e.g., the independents are often unrepresented and 
powerless to litigate against copying, so calling for them to litigate will not serve their needs or 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/bof-exclusive/euromonitor-coach-michael-kors-louis-vuitton-
versace-fflur-roberts.  
16 See supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.2. 
17 See supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.2. 
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meet their abilities).18 Independents should also co-brand with high-end designers, especially 
with complementary products like accessories, perfumes, etc., and/or in cases where there is no 
risk of products competing against each other or cannibalizing each other’s markets. And where 
possible, independent designers should follow the lead of high-end designers in creating 
differentiated lines that reach across market segments and broaden their name recognition, 
appeal, and eventual loyalty across as wide a range of consumers as can be secured. 
 
Finally, high-end designers, who often claim that independent designers are the lifeblood of 
fashion, have a responsibility to the emerging talent pool that they should exercise by wielding 
their substantial industry clout. Therefore, they should boost the livelihoods and prospects of 
independents by offering more attribution, name recognition, conferring of approval (rewards, 
grants from Fashion Council), and sponsorship (helping young designers to incorporate with 
equivalent of small business admin. grants). For instance, Diane Von Furstenberg has proposed a 
joint fund, established and funded by high-end designers, to help defray costs of protecting 
independent works.19 This is a norms-based approach that requires an understanding and 
appreciation of the role that recognition can play in bringing independent designers the kind of 
success that will enable them to counter appropriation and its associated economic costs. The use 
of rewards, prizes, and reputational boosts result in tangible gains for young designers and in 
intangible but real advancements in standing among peers, visibility and desirability among 
consumers, and long-term commercial viability.20 
 
B. Technological 
1. Online Changes 
 
                                                
18 This could still be the case even if there were fashion copyright -- after all, they’d still be unable to 
afford litigation. See Legal Solutions, infra section I.C. 
19 Diane Von Furtenburg, Von Furstenberg: Fashion deserves copyright protection, LA TIMES (Aug. 24, 
2007), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/la-oew-furstenberg24aug24-story.html. Von Furstenberg wants 
this to be in tandem with copyright, but perhaps it doesn’t need to be (it may be hard to figure out how to 
administrate, but it could be done). 
20 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection II.A.2. See also, Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, 
Procuring Knowledge 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9903, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9903.pdf. 
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It is virtually impossible to prevent copying of designs wholesale, especially as technology 
advances: new mobile devices with photocopying capabilities (not just iPhones, but also smart 
watches, Google Glass, etc.) can be introduced sub rosa into almost any setting, and attempts at 
thwarting and/or banning them almost never proves successful in the long run. This is just part of 
the culture of appropriation that has increasingly become part of present day reality. (see 
Cultural, below) 
 
2. Possible Responses 
 
There are, however, a few possible responses to technological incursions in the fashion market. 
First, educating consumers as to the value and worth of highly original works is essential, in 
order to persuade consumers to support their creation by keeping their production economically 
viable for high-end designers and independent designers creating high-end goods. Exclusive 
works require skillful production, high quality values, and an irreproducible quality that 
comprise no small part of their price tag. Consumers should be taught that the highest-end 
merchandise is worth paying for, and cannot be copied in a way that reproduces its inherent 
value. In other words, education of consumers can reinforce the principle of exclusivity that is 
one of the pivot points of fashion’s cyclicality.21 Consumer understanding of the economic losses 
that original designers incur from counterfeiting may be limited, misconceived, or outright 
erroneous.22 As mentioned, this lack of perspective may, in some cases, lead consumers to 
consider owning a knock-off either harmless or, worse still, a point of pride. As in the case of 
music, the industry has made attempts to raise awareness among consumers, but for the most part 
these attempts have not been concerted, large-scale, and sufficiently well-funded to counteract 
both counterfeiting and its acceptance among buyers of fashion merchandise.23  
 
                                                
21 Note that this is as much cultural as technological. 
22 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection II.A.1.  
23 Some designers and trade representatives have been involved in efforts at such education, and there 
may be some evidence that they are succeeding. For examples or recent industry efforts, see the Council 
of Fashion Designers of America’s “Protecting Design” site, available at 
http://cfda.com/programs/protecting-intellectual-property. However, there is also evidence that 
purchasing of knock-offs has not abated, and that educational campaigns have not had the widespread 
effect needed to offset industry-wide economic losses due to counterfeiting. 
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Second, original designers should sell design patterns and how-to-make manuals online, akin to 
the old sewing patterns (for instance, Butterick’s and Sears’ patterns, and more recently Vogue 
dress patterns) and try to pre-empt the copyists’ market in such patterns. By doing so, designers 
can fix their designs in a tangible form, thereby possibly laying the groundwork for copyright 
claims in patterns that are arguably analogous to choreographed and recorded (that is, in a 
written recording) dance steps or architectural blueprints. Further, designers who sell patterns to 
their works can also implicitly suggest that they welcome copying of their clothing by the 
average purchaser of patterns, in part because they are well aware that the craftsmanship, quality, 
and expertise that goes into making the original works render those works irreproducible, if not 
unique. Finally, designers selling patterns can convey that they are interested in disseminating 
the patterns for consumers’ benefit, knowing that consumers will see how original and striking 
the patterns are and will have their understanding of the irreproducible nature of the works 
reinforced by seeing the patterns for themselves. 
 
Third, anti-technological measures should be pursued, even though fashion does not have 
recourse to the equivalent of DRM protection and therefore must rely primarily on watermarks, 
symbols and other devices that are intended to thwart, identify, or criminalize counterfeiting.24  
 
The fourth and final response entails making an essential choice as to whether to create a fashion 
copyright and registry,25 or to strengthen fashion’s negative space, including its existing practices 
and norms, and allow its operations to continue to safeguard fashion’s viability and values.26 
 
a. Trademark and Trademark-Related DRM 
It is incontestable that trademark violations have had a hugely negative effect on the fashion 
industry.27 This has only accelerated with technological improvements that make both copying 
and dissemination of copies easier, faster, more untraceable, and most costly than ever. For this 
reason, industry participants should push harder for the support and vigilant pursuit of a range of 
anti-counterfeiting measures (domestic and international), including brand and/or logo 
                                                
24 See discussion infra section B.2.a. 
25 Discussion in infra section I.C. 
26 Discussed in infra section I.D.  
27 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.11.  
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encryption, security measures, heavy patrolling of known or potential counterfeiting venues, 
aggressive litigation tactics seeking sanctions against copyists, and other enforcement 
mechanisms. Also, the industry should: increase trademark vigilance; seek out more legislation 
and enforcement of existing legislation; apply political tactics such as lobbying, political 
pressure on rampant trademark violators; and ensure that consumers are educated as to the true 
nature of the economic losses that trademark violations wreak across the industry, both 
domestically and abroad. 
 
C. Legal 
1. The Biggest Possible Change Is to Establish Fashion Copyright 
 
 
Some commentators, designers, and members of the fashion industry have called for the 
establishment of a copyright in fashion.28 Advocates of fashion copyright argue that the industry 
can increase revenues across the board, and protect the original works created by high-end and 
emerging designers.29 As noted earlier, legislation has been proposed and, while tabled at 
present, is still a topic of heated contention in fashion industry circles. Clearly, creating a fashion 
copyright would entail enormous changes across the board, and would involve several essential 
measures. If fashion copyright is indeed to be established, the following steps would most 
certainly be required. First, the industry should agree to establishing a compulsory licensing 
scheme, similar to the well-established system that regulates the music industry.30 The initial step 
in that process is to establish a centralized, neutral collective rights management organization 
(“CRO”) that has open membership at reasonable fees. Second, the industry should ensure that 
the CRO is well-funded, so that it can engage in a variety of helpful activities, including: (i) 
supporting new independent designers/artists (like the music PROs BMI/ASCAP); (ii) creating a 
slush fund to support independent designers that need to protect their rights, through litigation, 
mediation, or other means; (iii) managing existing and emerging fashion designers’ rights and 
royalties, offering them a host of resources, information, advice, and outreach (in other words, 
offering the fashion world’s analogs to all the activities that the music PROs do); and (iv) 
                                                
28 See, e.g., Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69 (2008). 
29 See supra Chapter 4, subsection IV.B.2.   
30 See supra Chapter subsection V.A.2.   
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 377 
possibly supporting technology start-ups whose products are designed to work in the fashion 
space (for e.g., fashion-oriented apps, blogs, websites). Third, the industry should empower the 
CRO to establish, administer, and regulate the creation of a registry of original fashion works 
(apparel, accessories, designs and patterns, other creative output). These works will be protected 
by fashion copyright, and the registry will ensure that their protections are managed properly by 
the governing entity, the CRO (analogous to the work undertaken by the music PROs).31 Fourth, 
the industry should determine that fashion copyright will be limited in protection by timespan, 
and should establish a short window of time for protection that, recognizes the limited time value 
of exclusive apparel.32,33 Fifth, the industry should establish liberal policies with respect to its 
“compulsory licensing”: for instance, anyone can make a “cover” of an original composition 
(that is, her own version/interpretation) if she pays appropriate royalties (again, this is analogous 
to the right in music to make a “cover” of an original work).34 Sixth, the industry should consider 
empowering the CRO to have administrative mechanisms for dispute resolution (this could be 
some sort of arbitration panel or oversight body),35, so that most contested copyrights can get 
settled out of court. This would likely prove cheaper, more efficient, and easier for most 
designers to afford, and would encourage a degree of self-policing among designers. 
 
One advantage to fashion copyright, touted by commentators who consider the industry to have 
lost critical economic rents due to copying, is that designers will be able to refine price signals 
that indicate the relative market value of their goods. Price discrimination allows separation of 
product lines and affords designers the ability to make credible commitments about differentiated 
product lines.36 Price signals then give designers the means to indicate how they value product 
lines and to direct consumers to the products that they prefer and can afford.37 Fashion copyright 
should create the foundation for clear price signals, as it protects works from copying and 
therefore preserves their value which is reflected in the price they are ascribed. Further advocacy 
                                                
31 Id. 
32 See supra Chapter subsection V.C.3. 
33  This limitation is analogous to the “hot news” exception in journalism.  
34 See supra Chapter 4, subsection IV.A.2. It is less clear whether or not there should be a right to make a 
transformative work, but on the whole, leaning in the direction of liberality is likely to keep the process 
more manageable, open, and positive for industry creativity. 
35 See supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.2. 
36 See supra Chapter 4 subsection V.D.2. See also Picker, supra note 11.  
37 Id. 
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of fashion copyright contends that the challenges it poses to would-be copiers (such as the threat 
of litigation) can also serve to compel these follow-on designers to pursue creative, original 
work, rather than to run the risk of being caught copying.38 But while these arguments are 
generally valid for creative content industries, they fail to take into account the functioning of the 
creative negative space industries, which have a broad array of norms and practices that stave off 
harmful copying and encourage creative borrowing that actually bolsters the returns of the 
industry and its designers. In an industry that experiences copying at all levels, in all directions, 
and in which the ranks of designers and consumers alike enjoy the benefits of creative borrowing 
and re-imagining, price signals work somewhat differently than the norm. Top tier prices 
indicate that a designer’s work is valuable at its origin, when it is first issued in an exclusive 
collection and available for ownership to a limited number of private customers and exclusive 
retailers. After that initial window, price may not function so rigorously in the industry; and 
indeed the byzantine tiers of fashion pricing, discounting, and so on indicate that pricing does not 
function so much as a single signal but rather as a set of signals that are subject to designer or 
retailer discretion and consumer interpretation. This is in part due to the fact that the industry 
does not know in advance which items will become coveted trend-setting pieces that anchor a 
season and affix its returns in a handful of sought-after goods. Flexibility in prices, therefore, is 
at least as important to the fashion industry as clarity in price signals. While fashion copyright 
may not interfere with price discrimination and price signaling practices, it may not further the 
industry’s marketing and sales strategies. Indeed, some commentators argue that, to the contrary, 
it will impede the stable but fluid nature of the fashion market, in which creative borrowing is a 
cornerstone of profitability and the movement of goods.39 For these reasons, the industry should 
consider fashion copyright to be a means to ensure protection of revenues, particularly when 
goods are initially issued, but not as compelling a means to determine and indicate precisely 
what those goods are worth in the market. 
 
2. How To Make Fashion Copyright Efficacious 
 
                                                
38 See Picker, supra note 11. 
39 See supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.2. See also Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10.  
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Clearly, the establishment of a fashion copyright has been under consideration by the fashion 
industry for some time now. Two proposed bills collectively referred to as the Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act, are currently inactive, but still offer some indication of the seriousness with 
which the industry and commentators regards the fashion copyright option.40 Curiously, the 
proposed legislation makes no mention of a collective rights mechanism that would administer 
and manage copyrighted materials, but rather only requires originators to seek copyright directly 
with the Copyright Office. This is a grave oversight, as the introduction of industry-wide 
copyright will necessarily entail considerable changes and new challenges that individual 
designers will likely be inadequately equipped to confront and overcome. Rights-clearing 
organizations such as CROs are one of the most useful tools for managing rights, maintaining 
users’ and follow-on creators’ rights, and metering product usage and its related revenue 
streams.41 For the creative processes of fashion to flourish, and at the same time for the 
commercial cycle to thrive, fashion copyright needs to be carefully crafted and just as carefully 
administered and regulated. As in the case of music, which offers a useful precedent of 
successful administration of copyright, any fashion copyright should therefore involve liberal 
compulsory licensing, made to function effectively and universally by a centralized CRO. The 
fashion CRO should be particularly attentive to the needs of independent and emerging 
designers, just as arguably the music PROs have been increasing their supportive efforts for 
emerging musical artists. 
 
Fashion copyright only makes sense if the industry decides it wants to establish such rights in a 
very tight, limited, time-and-budget constrained/restricted manner. The industry should 
recognize that a short, limited copyright will allow rights to be calibrated in order to optimize 
exploitation of the work at the height of its commercial value, and when it is most susceptible to 
                                                
40 H.R 2196, 111th Cong. (2009-2010). For a ready overview of the bills, see Design Piracy Prohibition 
Act, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Design_Piracy_Prohibition_Act (last visited March 28, 
2015).  See also Jack Hicks & Tiffani Otey, “Will Design Piracy Prohibition Act Send Designer Copycats 
Out of Style? An Analysis of the Current and Future State of Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion 
Design,” IP Links, NCBA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER (Nov. 2009); Silvia 
Beltrametti, Evaluation of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease? An 
Analogy with Counterfeiting and a Comparison with the Protection Available in the European 
Community, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 147 (2010); Aya Eguchi, Note, Curtailing Copycat 
Couture: The Merits of the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act and a Licensing 
Scheme for the Fashion Industry, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 131 (2011).    
41 See supra Chapter 4, subsection V.C.4. 
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copying that could otherwise undermine its returns. Peak desirability and profitability tend to be 
at the beginning of the fashion cycle, upon issuance of an original work or line of work, and 
therefore copyright protection should be concentrated upon supporting the creator at that initial 
stage.42 At the same time, the industry should mandate that designers seeking protection must 
present specific, clear parameters of the copyrightable subject matter at issue. Specific copyrights 
sought should include illustration, such as a blueprint, pattern, specs, and possibly a prototype. It 
would also be helpful to require the designer to explicitly state the reasons/basis establishing that 
the work is unique and merits protection. Keeping fashion copyright curtailed is most reasonable 
because the nature of commercial value in the vast majority of fashion designs lies in the early 
stages of its dissemination and sale. Moreover, the long, rich history of fashion ensures that 
many designs will already have been issued, and designers will likely be restricted to seeking 
protection in a limited number of original works, designs, stylistic flourishes, or creative details.  
 
Concomitantly, the industry must leave ample room for creative adaption, variation, and 
embellishment of some existing design. Even the most ardent supporters of fashion copyright 
agree that fashion’s historical trove has been built upon creative sharing and cross-pollination. 
Indeed, some of fashion copyright’s most vocal advocates, such as Diane von Furstenberg, have 
themselves been held accountable for appropriation from other designers43, genres, ethnicities or 
cultures44, or individual fashion mavens or celebrities.45 At the same time, while creative 
adaptation at the lower end of the fashion spectrum may not directly enrich fashion’s creative 
legacy, it does give access to fashion’s ever-changing works to a great range of consumers who 
would otherwise be locked out of the market. For these reasons, limiting copyright to the period 
of greatest commercial vitality is a reasonable compromise that the industry should explore 
thoroughly. 
                                                
42 See supra Chapter 4, subsection V.C.3. 
43 See, e.g. David Graham, Fashion icon pays up in copycat spat, THE STAR (May 13, 2009), 
http://www.thestar.com/life/fashion_style/2009/05/13/fashion_icon_pays_up_in_copycat_spat.html 
(describing a financial settlement from Von Furstenburg to a lesser-known pair of Toronto designers for 
“appropriating the design” of a floral print jacket).  
44 New York Fashion Week Designer steals from Northern Cheyenne/Crow artist Bethany Yellowtail, 
NATIVE APPROPRIATIONS (Feb. 18, 2015), http://nativeappropriations.com/2015/02/new-york-fashion-
week-designer-steals-from-crow-artist-bethany-yellowtail.html.  
45 1950s Fashion: Marilyn Monroe, James Dean And Teddy Boys, MY DAILY (Oct. 17, 2013, 6:53 AM), 
http://www.mydaily.co.uk/2012/05/10/1950s-fashion-marilyn-monroe-james-dean-teddy-boys/. 
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But there is another reason that the industry should strategically curtail fashion copyright. As in 
the case of scientific research, the pursuit of IP protection is frequently balanced against an 
interest in strategic disclosure that achieves goals other than ownership, such as heightening 
one’s reputation, securing a strong scholarly portfolio, increasing one’s mobility and 
employability, expanding one’s reach to a knowledgeable audience, and so on.46 Analogously, 
eschewing copyright in fashion can strategically serve an original designer in various respects. 
First, it can allow a designer to issue new work without having to seek and secure copyright, 
which may not be an instantaneous process. By competing with other original designers at the 
height of a new season, and by issuing a series of unique works that defy instant appropriation, a 
truly creative designer can show that she is at the top of her game, and impervious to the threat of 
copying. Second, the reputational benefits can be enhanced by her creating a portfolio that is 
unique but also marketable to various potential partners, rather than wholly proprietary (for 
instance, owned by the fashion house with which she is affiliated, rather than by the designer 
herself). This can contribute to a designer’s mobility and commercial flexibility. Third, a 
designer may actually wish to be copied, such that her work is at once recognizable (for instance, 
a “signature” work) and universally followed (for instance, through knock-offs that spread the 
work to lower tier markets). One example is particularly fitting yet somewhat ironic, as it is 
taken from one of the strongest advocates of fashion copyright, Diane von Furstenberg: her 
iconic “wrap dress”, which she issued in the late 1960s and has continued to issue with variations 
to the present day, is simultaneously famous, deeply associated with the designer, yet has been 
knocked off innumerable times, at virtually every level of the fashion spectrum. Ms. von 
Furstenberg has benefited from the many appropriations that have followed in her wake, 
primarily due to having secured a reputation for creating an “iconic” work, but also for having 
renewed interest in her work emerge as a result of follow-on copying that has occurred in several 
fashion cycles. It is hard to see how copyright in the wrap dress would have resulted in greater 
economic gains than the uncopyrighted status quo has allowed. This example, then, as well as 
countless others, should compel the industry to realize that fashion copyright is a tool to be 
wielded judiciously, strategically, and in carefully limited measure. In the case of fashion, as in 
other industries, a solution based in copyright must be paired with changes in business strategies 
                                                
46 See supra Chapter 4, subsection V.D.3. 
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and models, changes in norms of attribution, and a recognition of the varying interests that must 




An important objection to fashion copyright is that fashion may not necessarily need copyright 
protection even at the beginning of the cycle: the high pace of churn, and the short window of 
exclusivity, means that original designers can still reap the early rents by being ahead of the 
curve. Only if copying becomes almost instantaneous, and indistinguishable from the originals, 
is there a threat to the elite designers’ early returns. At that point, they have a stronger argument 
for some copyright-based protection (other than trademark). Even then, however, original 
designers need to demonstrate that knock-offs significantly undercut their market. But, on the 
one hand, high-end designers are quick to assert that their articles are by nature original, unique, 
and therefore non-fungible. Their sales are to exclusive audiences, and while elite consumers 
may purchase some lower-tier items, they are not necessarily likely to substitute knock-offs for 
the haute couture that they pursue and consume. At lower tiers, copying may negatively affect 
high-end designer sales of slightly more affordable items; or it may dilute the cachet of the 
original work, such as an original garment or accessory. But market segmentation may still work 
against claims that knock-offs cast a pall on original sales and the diffusion of works into the 
market. These claims need to be substantiated, and the losses need to be demonstrably greater 
than the gains made, even by high-end designers, by capitalizing on industry churn and the 
appetites for consumption that such churn whets and replenishes regularly. 
 
 But even if it is granted that there are some losses realized by copying, the imposition of a new 
copyright-based scheme seems a radical measure to adopt in order to prevent losses incurred 
primarily by a limited set of designers who realize gains at one end of the fashion spectrum. 
There are, naturally, concerns that a new fashion copyright will involve very significant 
transaction costs: establishing a CRO, setting up a registry, determining administrative, 
adjudicative, and other responsibilities, and other procedural steps seem almost overwhelming in 
their enormity, complexity, and expense. But there are other important concerns. Will the cycles 
that are inherent to fashion, the churn of product turnover, the anchoring of trends, and the ever-
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changing interest in new designs and goods be sharply curtailed by fashion copyright? If works 
are copyright protected, it will likely be daunting to follow-on designers to attempt to adapt, 
creatively borrow, or find inspiration in their features. Will this lead follow-on designers to be 
ever more creative in their knock-offs, or will it increase their motivation to create wholly new 
works, as at least one commentator has argued?47 Another question addresses the impact on end 
users: will this prove disadvantageous to consumers who strive to have the latest trends and 
designs delivered to them via secondary designers that create knock-off versions at reasonable, 
affordable costs? The potential disadvantage to a large market of consumers is not unlikely, and 
must be considered even at some expense to the originators of the creative works. Other concerns 
involve practices and norms that have long tradition in the fashion sector, such as “homage”, or 
works explicitly inspired by prior creations and meant to reflect the respect and admiration -- 
often with due attribution -- that the designer feels for the precedent creator. Will the practice of 
homage be chilled by copyright? Will norms of attribution be displaced if copyright clearly 
designates the originating designer and thereby eliminates the need for attribution? Will 
designers simply wait until a work is totally off-copyright even to approach it as a source of 
inspiration, for fear that copyright infringement claims lurk around the corner? While open-
ended, these concerns most importantly raise some of the challenges that fashion will face if it 
asserts the right to a new copyright protection. They also call into question assertions that fashion 
copyright is an obvious and necessary measure. And they point to the delicate balance that the 
industry has established to date, which should not be disrupted without weighing the costs and 




It is incontestable that trademark violations have had a hugely negative effect on the fashion 
industry.48 This has only accelerated with technological improvements that make both copying 
and dissemination of copies easier, faster, more untraceable, and most costly than ever. For this 
reason, industry participants should push harder for the support and vigilant pursuit of a range of 
anti-counterfeiting measures (domestic and international). Also the industry should increase 
                                                
47 See Picker, supra note 11. 
48 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.7.  
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trademark vigilance, seek out more legislation and enforcement of existing legislation, should 
apply political tactics such as lobbying, political pressure on rampant trademark violators, and 
should ensure that consumers are educated as to the true nature of the economic losses that 




Cost to fashion if it tailors by establishing copyright: loss of fashion’s “negative space”: 
Fashion is a well-established “negative space” industry.49 Here, price functions as a signal in 
various ways that are well-understood by customers and retailers alike.50 A certain amount of 
creative borrowing has always been permitted, indeed encouraged, by fashion’s norms. But this 
does come at a potential cost: unprotected designers, particularly independent original designers, 
run the risk of being copied or knocked off. Establishing fashion copyright might lessen this risk 
by putting into place corrective measures and sanctions against copying. However, it will require 
formalized processes that will doubtless cause designers to incur costs, such as costs of real or 
potential litigation, registering copyrights, and so on. Further, having formalized procedures is 
likely to have a chilling effect on freer practices such as informal collaboration, sharing of ideas, 
cross-pollination, and so on. It may also make established designers think twice about 
collaborating with younger designers, as they will be compelled to weigh transaction costs in 
formalizing such arrangements. There are almost always real costs to formality, and those costs 
may be disproportionately heavy for younger designers who are not necessarily well-equipped to 
bear them, including (a) having a war chest for litigation; (b) having to forego informal 
collaborations; (c) not being able to copy or be copied (some young designers may want to be 
copied so that their work gets exposure and is seen/admired/recognized in the field (loss leader); 
and (d) having to worry in advance about creative borrowing from works that appear to be in the 
public domain but that may be contested or claimed by copyright owners. 
 
Another cost of fashion copyright that will take a toll across the industry is the displacement of 
deeply established norms and practices by formalized procedures. Fashion shares many norms 
                                                
49 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, Section II.D. 
50 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, Sections I-IV. 
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with other “negative space” creative industries that are also limited in their formalized rights and 
protections.51 Fashion, like cuisine, comedy, and other fields, has been historically configured to 
encourage sharing and appropriation, which often takes the form of homage. Sharing and 
borrowing, however, are strongly linked to norms that mandate attribution and recognition of the 
original creator; without proper attribution, the appropriator runs the risk of being called out and 
shamed by colleagues, critics, observers and even consumers. The norms of fashion ensure 
originators that their reputation is enhanced by creative borrowing, and reinforce traditions of 
apprenticeship that are long-established in the trade and continuing to the present day. As in 
other low-IP fields, such as education, these reputational norms can boost an originator’s 
employment prospects and mobility by strengthening her recognizability and credibility among 
peers. While a similar outcome could be achieved by amassing a copyrighted design portfolio, an 
original designer may find that having her work readily visible, openly imitated, copied or 
borrowed from, and accessible without fear of crossing copyright boundaries is in fact preferable 
to having a formalized portfolio to which she may not have rights, access, or ownership status 
when she chooses to change jobs. Reputational benefits can also afford designers greater leeway 
when they themselves choose to borrow creatively, as the work of a creative designer is likely to 
be scrutinized and praised for its original variations on a theme rather than derided for its 
reliance on pre-existing work. 
 
The operation of reputational and attributive norms, as well as a culture that encourages 
responsible sharing, borrowing and imitation, are part of a normative set of practices that have 
traditionally existed in guild-like settings, such as the guilds that once dominated creative fields 
such as fashion, music and education.52 The formalized, structured, and typically restricted guild 
no longer prevails, and indeed in some cases has been exchanged for a formalized and layered 
system of IP rights. But private ordering arrangements are still found in many settings, as 
evinced by the agreements among Western ranchers famously delineated by Ostrom, as well as 
formal and informal agreements among artists in many creative endeavors.53 Ordinarily, these 
                                                
51 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, Section II.D and subsection V.D.2.   
52 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, Section II.A.2. 
53 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1990); Robert P. Merges, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
793, 794 (2010).  
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arrangements will emerge among a group of actors who share certain pressing concerns and 
needs, and who find that operating collectively, but without recourse to the strictures of IP, offer 
the most cost-effective and manageable way of producing mutually desired outcomes. On a 
broader scale, however, entire communities often tacitly agree to adhere to certain shared norms, 
similarly seeking to achieve mutually beneficial results. This behavior can be described as guild-
like, as it comprises a set of agreed-upon directives for practice, rewards for approved behavior, 
and sanctions for offenders. In the case of fashion, blatant copying without attribution is 
generally frowned upon, and may be called out by peers and critics.54 High-end designers tend to 
attribute scrupulously, as they are well aware that they cannot afford to risk their reputations for 
originality and fairness. Knock-off designers and retailers may not attribute as carefully, but they 
may indicate in various subtle ways that their work follows a trend and recreates it for the 
average customer.55 There are many more norms that pervade the fashion community, and that 
together create a rich network that supports both originators and follow-on designers in their 
marketability and longevity. The negative space fields are built on these norms, and the vitality 
of their industries speaks to their success. 
 
Fashion, like comedy and cuisine, have had norms that stand in for formalized practices (see 
norms-based approaches, below). These norms can co-exist with fashion copyright (at least to a 
certain extent). But if a no-copyright system functions robustly with these foundational norms, 
and if a copyright-based system imposes the transaction costs that are attendant to formalization 
on some of the most vulnerable original creators -- i.e., emerging designers -- then the case for 
fashion copyright is less than crystal clear. For this reason, bypassing the IP universe, or at least 
limiting it to trademark protection, minimizes the real costs that come with imposing copyright 
on a long-established and relatively well-balanced field, while maximizing practices that are 
                                                
54 See, e.g., Nika Mavrody, Designer Knockoffs: Is Zara Copying Celine or Is Everyone Copying 
Everyone?, THE FASHION SPOT (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.thefashionspot.com/runway-news/320417-
zara-celine-designer-knockoff/; Connie Wang, Runway To Racks: How Fashion Gets Knocked Off, 
REFINERY29 (May 24, 2012, 7:30 AM), http://www.refinery29.com/fashion-knock-offs#slide;  Mike 
Masnick, Designer Leading The Charge For Fashion Copyright... Caught Copying Someone Else's 
Design, TECHDIRT (Jul7 22, 2010, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100722/03120410318.shtml. 
55 For instance, placement of an outfit in “Lucky” magazine may juxtapose a high-end designer outfit with 
a suggestion to the customer that she can “recreate the look” with a knock-off copy. While not a direct 
attribution, this does recognize the original work, and associates it with desirability in the consumer’s 
mind, thereby bolstering the reputation and increasing the reach of the original creator. 
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giving rise to a multi-billion dollar industry. In this case, even disruptive innovation need not, 
and at present does not, mandate turning to an entirely new set of solutions that are not likely to 
solve problems at the top of the spectrum while also likely to impose new problems at all other  
points on the fashion industry curve. 
 
1. Other Norms-Based Approaches 
 
As mentioned earlier, designers should educate each other on certain accepted cultural norms, 
and should encourage adoption of those norms on a greater scale, and with a greater degree of 
agreement and opt-in, than has been the case thus far. High-end designers are well-equipped to 
lead the charge on this front, and have the resources to invest in outreach and other efforts. At the 
same time, they stand to benefit from strong industry norms, both because they can gain access 
to new original works by allying with independent and emerging designers, and because they can 
bring industry pressure to bear on rampant copyists if their message is heard, appreciated and 
embraced. Designers should reinforce the longstanding idea that homage is an accepted tradition 
in fashion, and that inspiration among peers is valued. But they should draw the line at outright 
stealing and appropriation, particularly when done concomitantly with the issuance of the 
original work. There is a marked difference between copying an established work and copying a 
new original work, and the difference lies not only in the nature of imitation but also, and more 
significantly, in the economic loss incurred by the original creator. High-end designers are best 
situated to illustrate the difference, and to deliver the message throughout their community. They 
are also ideally placed to defend independent designers, and to call out copying of independent 
designers as one of the worst offenses possible, due to their vulnerable nature and lack of 
resources to stave off appropriation. High-end designers should reinforce the understanding that 
original talent is essential to the industry’s vitality, and that copying at the level of independent 
and emerging talent therefore comes at an especially high cost. By educating and inculcating 
these norms in the industry, designers can create a baseline for a range of norms-based 
approaches to thwarting copying, such as shaming, calling out, and censuring. These norms-
based approaches occur in many other creative industries, particularly in “negative spaces” such 
as comedy and cuisine that rely less on IP and more on community practices to keep 
appropriation at bay. 
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2. The Fashion Industry Should Offer More Hybrid or Non-IP Based Rewards56 
 
Stronger rewards that give due accord to design originality are culturally-based approaches that 
will serve to motivate emerging designers, highlight talent that may be potentially interesting to 
established designers for potential strategic alliances, and reinforce the anti-copying message.57 
Prizes, rewards, and recognition are all valuable incentives, and help confer credit that can be 
monetized by emerging designers in various ways. For instance, independent designers that have 
made a concrete impression will be visible to high-end designers and mid-market labels or 
retailers, and will be possible targets for collaboration with these established entities. This can be 
mutually beneficial, as independent designers can infuse new energy into more staid, traditional 
brands and stores. In this regard, disruptive innovation can actually be useful, as technology 
brings the independent designers increased recognition among customers as well -- for instance, 
fashion bloggers are now quick to identify and eager to follow emerging talent -- and this can 
serve to expand existing entities’ customer base when they partner with the independents. 
Original independent designers should also be sponsored for shows that highlight and recognize 
their work: their visibility, coupled with a strong recognition factor, may make knock-offs more 
identifiable and apparent, and may make it easier for the independents to stake successful claims 
in their work when copying is alleged. Even in the absence of fashion copyright, this can prove 
useful to independents who are trying to establish a portfolio of work that demonstrates their 
originality and viability in the fashion marketplace. 
 
3. The Fashion Industry Should Incorporate Outsiders Into Its Ranks 
 
Credentializing authorities are being challenged in the fashion world by outside figures such as 
online critics and bloggers, self-designated street artists who appropriate and knock-off 
fashionable items and trends, and others.58 These outsiders are able to harness the 
                                                
56 See Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 20.  
57 See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004); Nancy Gallini & Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Intellectual Property:What is the Best Incentive Mechanism? in 
2 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51-78 (2002). 
58 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.3.  
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communicative reach of the Internet to gain authority over fashion followers and consumers to 
an unprecedented degree. The fashion industry has been slow to react to these changes, and for 
the most part has viewed outsider forays into credentialization as threatening, irrelevant, or 
inconsequential. This is precisely the wrong approach, based in a lack of understanding of the 
potentially positive effects that outsider authority can have on the industry’s prospects. The 
industry should recognize that in today’s world credentialization is equally effective when 
conferred by experts as when conferred by enthusiasts, whether amateur, professional, or 
somewhere in-between (for example, a blogger with fashion training or expertise who discusses 
fashion without remuneration or commercial ties). By incorporating outsiders into its ranks, the 
industry can expand the reach of its designers, particularly those who are trying to diversify their 
appeal and attain a wider measure of visibility and appeal than the tightly-knit circles of haute 
couture generally allows. In terms of expanding commercial viability, both high-end designers 
and independent designers can capitalize on the reach of online fashion critics to build their 
audiences. Further, many online critics are as astute as vetted and credentialized experts, and 
may have even greater exposure to designs across the fashion spectrum. They are, therefore, 
ideally poised to detect copying and appropriation in a wide range of settings, not just locally but 
also globally. They can be equipped to detect knock-off that infringe on trademark, as in the case 
of outright counterfeits. But they can also be equipped to detect appropriation that would infringe 
on fashion copyright, if it were to be established in the industry. By detecting illicit 
appropriations and bringing them to the notice of fashion’s ever-expanding audience, online 
observers could play an invaluable role in thwarting rampant copying. 
 
While slow to recognize the possible upside of outsiders, the fashion industry has recently shown 
some signs of acceptance, sometimes even conferring the equivalent of credentialization on 
gifted online critics who have captured an audience interest and positioned themselves as market 
leaders with whom to be reckoned. For instance, the industry has come to accept outsiders such 
as Tavi Gevinson, an online blogger whose has become a recognized pace-setter in fashion 
trends and whose critiques have proven consistently appealing to the commercially desirable 
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international youth market.59 Certain fashion houses have also agreed to provide some influential 
fashion bloggers with a range of products that they wear, discuss, or exhibit on their websites, 
thereby effectively advertising the products to young, fashion-savvy followers and consumers.60 
These outreach efforts demonstrate the growing industry recognition that outreach to consumers, 
particularly those most likely to consume both in stores and via e-commerce, can and should 
match acceptance by standard, credentialized authorities with placement in newer venues and 
appeals to more entrepreneurial outsiders, critics, and enthusiasts. This positioning will only be 
more important in the future, whether or not fashion copyright is established, as it is a cultural 




1. Problems with Current State of Industry 
 
The costs associated with education are spiraling; it seems a constant refrain in the news, and a 
constant anxiety-producing preoccupation of educators.61 Some commentators see online 
courses, MOOCs, content providers (whether for-profit or not-for-profit), and other related 
services as holding the potential for a corrective effect or offering new solutions that can 
revitalize the economy of the entire sector.62 This is far from universally acknowledged, 
however, as other commentators consider MOOCs unlikely to deliver substantial value even over 
                                                
59 See, e.g., Michael Schulman, The Oracle of Girl World, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/fashion/tavi-gevinson-the-oracle-of-girl-world.html (detailing the 
rapid rise of Gevinson from a preteen blogger to a fashion industry mainstay).  
60 See, e.g., Rachel Strugatz and Karen Robinovitz, To Pay or Not to Pay: A Closer Look at the Business 
of Blogging, WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY (June 6, 2012) (exploring the increasingly close relationship 
between fashion houses and bloggers, which has evolved from simply sending products to paying for 
coverage of the brand).  
61 See, e.g. Michelle Jamrisko & Ilan Kolet, College Tuition Costs Soar: Chart of the Day, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-18/college-tuition-costs-soar-chart-
of-the-day (breaking down the dramatic escalation in the cost of higher education in the last three 
decades).  
62 See, e.g., Steve Kolowich, How Will MOOC’s Make Money?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 11, 2012), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/06/11/experts-speculate-possible-business-models-mooc-
providers. 
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time.63 At present, the issue is still speculative, as MOOCs have only recently emerged, and only 
for-profit institutions have insisted that they can be readily monetized. Moreover, traditional 
education has never been able to monetize stand-alone courses64 effectively or on a large scale. 
Therefore, not much precedent exists in terms determining how to prepare effective stand-alone 
courses, how to allocate copyright in such courses, and how to monetize them. Disruptive 
innovation has begun to help answer the first part of the equation by enabling institutions, faculty 
and independent providers to create effective stand-alone courses online, which appeal to 
enormous audiences with the potential, theoretically at least, to be turned into paying customers. 
But as discussed earlier65, the future of MOOCs and their place in the educational landscape 
remains far from clear, and solving the copyright part of the puzzle is one important part of 
situating MOOCs in an optimal position for bringing education online and out to the masses in a 
cost effective, affordable, and institutionally responsible way. 
 
2. Disaggregation of Education into Courses 
 
In education, disruptive innovation, or the introduction of online courses on a sweeping scale, 
has enabled disaggregation to occur as it does in music: the course rather than the degree 
becomes the primary unit of production66 (the analogy in music is that the individual unbundled 
song, recorded as a digital track, represents the primary unit, as opposed to the previously unified 
and pre-packaged album/CD). Increasingly, institutions are coming to accept the demarcation of 
the course-unit, and are working to build educational plans based on the accumulation of course-
units by students.67 
 
                                                
63 See, e.g., Ry Rivard, Who Owns a MOOC?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 19, 2013), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/03/19/u-california-faculty-union-says-moocs-undermine-
professors-intellectual-property.  
64 There may be a few exceptions, but generally stand-alone courses have not been found to be valuable. 
Even in the online space, early endeavors such as Fathom have not cashed out as expected. See Scott 
Carlson, After Losing Millions, Columbia U. Will Close Online-Learning Venture, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC., Jan. 17, 2003, at A30. 
65 See discussion supra Chapter 2, section II.D.   
66 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.d.   
67 Note that this is not a completely new phenomenon -- some degree of flexibility in offering courses as 
stand-alone offerings has existed -- but it is an accelerating practice that is becoming commonplace, and 
beginning to be considered as valuable, at least potentially, as offering a full degree. 
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In education, however, unlike in music, the disaggregation of creative production units can and 
should co-exist with the traditional aggregated product, the degree, which is impossible to 
substitute and has a value that is greater than the sum of its parts.68 The university degree holds 
such value that it should be protected against devaluation, lying as it does at the center of the 
educational mission69. But IP protection is not needed to protect the degree as a whole: it is so 
intrinsically valuable that it is already protected by the business model of the traditional 
university. The degree is protected by its desirability to student consumers, both as a path to 
being educated and a credentialization as having been educated. It is also valuable to many 
students for its experiential components, such as the on-campus living experience, direct 
interaction with teachers and encounters with fellow students, and so forth. As a centerpiece of 
the process of obtaining an education and proving oneself academically and pre-professionally, 
the university degree is still estimated by many to be an optimal path to success. This obviates 
the need to extend formalized protection, such as copyright, to the degree as a whole. 
 
While copyright is not needed to protect university degrees, trademark may on occasion have a 
role in advancing their worth. For some institutions, the strength of their degree and the weight 
of their conferring degrees may mean that protecting their name, or in trademark terms their 
brand, is one way in which IP can fortify the value of their property, the degrees that they offer. 
This is one reason for which many elite universities are vigilant protectors of their trademark, 
and seek sanctions for misuse of their name and affiliations.70 As in the case of fashion, 
trademark serves to protect a valuable property that is neither fungible nor readily quantifiable, 
but that is a demarcation of quality that is intrinsically valuable to the founding entity. Other than 
brand protection, however, copyright or other formalities are not needed to protect the 
institution’s other valuable properties: the degrees it confers. 
 
At present, therefore, two tiers of educational production, stand-alone courses and degree-
granting programs, stand side-by-side. They may be intertwined, as for instance when schools 
                                                
68 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.d.   
69 The educational mission is generally agreed to be educating students and formally certifying that their 
education has been duly completed to an acceptable standard. 
70 See, for example, the Harvard Trademark Program, which prevent unauthorized use of the mark, 
handles the licensing of the university trademark, and openly solicits information on unauthorized uses. 
HARVARD TRADEMARK PROGRAM, http://trademark.harvard.edu/ (last visited March 28, 2015).  
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that primarily offer degrees choose to offer stand-alone courses, but they should still be 
considered as distinct but equally worth preserving entities, and should be treated as such. One 
contrast is clear: while entire degree programs do not need copyright protection, stand-alone 
courses should be protected by copyright, as they are a specific, singular works that may have 
currency on multiple markets and to multiple audiences, particularly if disseminated online. 
Copyright protection in courses, however, must be coupled with business strategies that plan 
carefully for the commercial exploitation of academic work on a much broader scale than 
traditional education has known.  
3. MOOCs as a Key Business Strategy Prior to Monetization 
 
Universities should recognize that the development of MOOCs not only aims to further 
educational goals but also serves to advance key business purposes. First, MOOCs should be 
used to attract new consumers, at least some of which are likely to avail themselves of the 
resources of the underlying traditional institution offering the MOOC.71 Second, MOOCs should 
be offered for free, particularly at the outset of their introduction, as a means of exposing the 
university’s educational capabilities to new audiences.72 In this respect, MOOCs serve as loss 
leaders that may or may not be immediately monetized, but that eventually pay off by growing 
consumer interest, desire for products, and readiness to invest in new educational services and 
goods,.73 Third, MOOCs should be used to protect core competencies.74 In other words, 
universities should protect their highly valuable degree programs, while offering MOOCs that 
expand their offerings at little or no risk to their underlying mission, products and goals. 
Concomitantly, universities should establishing property rights in the online space, and reserve 
their full rights to their online properties, including MOOCs, educational platforms, and other 
related products and services.75 In the event that MOOCs are monetizable, propertization should 
assure institutions the ability to reap the rewards of their programs either directly or when used 
or licensed by third-parties. 
 
                                                
71 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.d.  
72 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.e. 
73 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.d. 
74 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.e. See also supra subsection II.A.2. 
75 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2.e. 
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4. Financing MOOCs 
 
At present, some traditional non-profit universities are developing and offering MOOCs in a 
manner that is broadly analogous to open source production in the computer software field.76 
That is, they are developing online courses primarily in-house, using internal financing (i.e., 
funds from the university budget and/or endowment), building out already-existing platforms and 
support services, and drawing on faculty labor and input (universities may seek out voluntary 
efforts from interested faculty, or they make offer some form of compensation (for instance, 
offering reductions in teaching load in exchange for faculty involvement in online projects). One 
reason that this strategy has emerged is that universities are finding an increasing demand for 
inexpensive educational offerings, particularly as the cost of traditional education shows little 
sign of decreasing in cost. At the same time, however, it is unclear whether or not MOOCs can 
be sufficiently monetized to offset the considerable costs required for  development, roll-out, and 
adaptation. This is the basic dilemma that competing with free, or almost-free, alternatives to 
traditional products,77 presents in the academic context; and it is compounded by the threat to 
traditional sources of revenue, particularly tuition dollars, that are also discussed therein. 
 
There are a host of issues that arise with respect to the financing of MOOCs, which universities 
must bring to light and with which they must come to terms. Financing issues are deeply linked 
to labor issues, which are addressed in Labor, below. One fiscal concern lies in the difference in 
financial capability that divides institutions and the disparities that relative monetary positions 
are sure to create and exacerbate. This divide will likely have significant long-term ramifications, 
and therefore cannot be overlooked or kept out of institutional calculations regarding the future 
of MOOCs.  At present, it is apparent that two kinds of traditional universities are funding online 
course development. Several well-endowed and prestigious schools, such as Stanford and MIT, 
are major players that can underwrite the development of both MOOCs and their supportive 
service platforms (such as the creation of the MIT OpenCourseWare system, which offers all of 
the universities courses online for free to any interested learners).78 Wealthy schools can afford 
                                                
76 See discussion supra Chapter 4, section III.B. See also supra Chapter 4, subsection III.B.4. 
77 See discussion supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.6 and I.A.7. 
78 See MIT OPENCOURSEWARE, http://ocw.mit.edu/index.html (last visited Mar., 29, 2015). See also 
Florence Olsen, MIT's Open Window: Putting Course Materials Online, The University Faces High 
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to take their time building out online courses, exploring the various avenues for deploying such 
courses, and ascertaining how to maximize the utility of online course development. They can 
effectively subsidize production, and may even be called upon to write off some of the costs 
associated with course development, experimentation, delivery and eventually monetization. 
There may be repercussions that flow from the development of MOOCs at the top of the 
educational pyramid, but the fact that it is occurring there, and that it can be best explored at that 
level, should at least be explicitly recognized. 
 
In contrast, less wealthy schools, such as Arizona State University, presumably have to contend 
with developing online programs on a tighter budget (particularly if they are state institutions 
that receive government funding and are answerable to political parties and the public), which 
can place them at a considerable disadvantage with their better-endowed peers when contending 
with investment in cutting-edge technology, course build-out, and innovative change that may or 
may not lead to new and/or sustainable revenue sources. Moreover, due to cost concerns, they 
are more likely to be hard-pressed to monetize their online offerings, in order to amortize the 
costs associated with online build-out and to show tangible returns for their expenditures. This 
may affect both their ventures and the courses they offer, and may curtail their flexibility in ways 
that hamper them further in their development and growth, particularly as compared to their 
wealthier competitors. 
 
Another issue compounds the problem: disparities between traditional schools offering MOOCs 
are further challenged, and possibly exacerbated, by for-profit initiatives that are proliferating in 
the online space. While outside the scope of this paper, considering the successful financing of 
MOOCs by traditional institutions should take into account the fierce competition posed by the 
for-profits, as well as the skewing of pricing models that occurs when for-profits and non-profits 
compete in the same general space (even if that space may be differentiated by various factors 
such as quality, consumer base, scholastic mission, and so on). 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Expectations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 6, 2002, at A31; Charles M. Vest, Why MIT Decided to Give 
Away All Its Course Materials via the Internet, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 30, 2004, at B2. 
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The financial structure of MOOC ventures may not be cleanly divided between non-profit and 
for-profit institutions: there are gray areas that proliferate in the educational landscape. For 
instance, some traditional institutions have chosen to create, finance, or support independent 
spin-offs that may be privately funded in part or whole by outside sources such as venture 
capital, angel investors, and so on. Some of these entities are structured on a for-profit basis, 
such as Coursera, while others are non-profit, such as edX. As wholly separate entities, whose 
educational role is distinct from that of traditional institutions, these entities are outside the scope 
of this paper. Nonetheless, they add a critical dimension to the financing structure of MOOCs. 
 
Finally, some institutions, such as the University of Pennsylvania, are opting to segregate their 
online ventures, including MOOC offerings, into wholly separate programs that are created, 
administered, and treated as wholly apart from the traditional university, not only academically 
and pedagogically but also fiscally. In these stand-alone divisions, MOOCs can be produced 
without oversight of the traditional university overseers (such as the Board of Trustees), but 
equally importantly can be administered, financed and monetized in ways that do not necessarily 
require adherence to standard university practices, procedures, and norms (for instance, the 
directives set forth in Faculty Manuals or University Handbooks need not apply to online work). 
Along similar lines, monies may be earmarked by these institutions to fund online efforts in ways 
that may not require immediate accountability or short-term returns. While wealthier schools 
may be well able to afford such measures, they may again enjoy a competitive advantage that 
may be rational but not wholly equitable, a fact that should at least be acknowledged and 
circulated within the academic community. 
 
5. Faculty Labor and Compensation; Adjunctification;  
Portability and Employee Mobility 
 
Another major issue related to the financing and support of online education that should be 
recognized is that MOOCs are being created, taught, and administered by faculty: theirs is the 
labor that fuels the courses, and they are the pioneers who are building the courses on the 
ground. However MOOCs are ultimately financed -- whether they continue to be effectively 
subsidized by traditional institutions and/or private capital, or whether they eventually becoming 
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money-generating and self-sustaining enterprises -- faculty labor should be understood to be 
foundational to the production of online education, to an equal extent as they are essential in the 
real world space of universities. 
 
Faculty labor and input should be considered part of the calculus of financing and monetizing 
MOOCs, as well as compensating those who labor to produce MOOCs and their related ventures. 
Such labor can be volunteered by faculty, as it is by some computer programmers in the open 
source movement.79 As in the case of open source software, faculty efforts in developing online 
education can stem from mixed motivations, such as ideological commitment to openness and 
collaboration, intellectual curiosity, entrepreneurial flair, interest in pursuing reputational gains 
among colleagues, pursuit of potential long-term rewards, and so on. When faculty choose to 
invest their own resources in online development by volunteering to give time to such work 
(possibly in exchange for reduced regular teaching loads), or by participating in online 
educational ventures, institutions should accept and appreciate such contributions. As in the case 
of open source, however, some rights to staking later proprietary claims should be reserved for 
successful faculty, particularly if their work eventually yields profitable results. Faculty must 
also make clear that while their efforts may be undertaken with some of the same driving force 
as open source, such as intellectual interest and collaborative openness, they are not bound to 
donate their work indefinitely and without benefit or cost. Even more so than in the open source 
movement, faculty operate within a closed system of employment that ties their compensation 
strictly to the institutions in which they work. While computer programmers can create start-ups, 
change jobs, sell programs, codes, or apps, and engage in other entrepreneurial activities rather 
easily, academics must function within institutional boundaries, whether those institutions are 
found online or in real space. Thus, the calculus of faculty labor differs from that of labor in the 
open source software movement. Faculty and institutions should recognize this difference, and 
should accommodate it by allowing faculty the freedom to move from the free contribution of 
labor to a more proprietary model when online education matures and becomes formalized, if not 
monetized, by its institutional founders. In the changing environment of the educational sector, 
this should at least help prevent some exploitation of faculty labor in the production of online 
educational content. 
                                                
79 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.B, II.C, III.B.4, III.B.6, III.C.2, and IV.D.1.  
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The nature of faculty labor, compensation, and the overall terms of employment are drastically 
changing, however, and the ripple effects this has in the virtual landscape should be seriously 
considered when crafting online programs and directives. Faculty labor has always been central 
to education, whether online or in real space. Historically, however, the majority of faculty 
tended to remain rooted at a single institution, and the lifetime tenure position was conferred to 
ensure a stable teaching force, to promote academic autonomy, and to underlie an institution’s 
claim to quality education.80 Much of this has altered, although recognition of the transfigured 
labor market has been slow to follow the mutations. Faculty move much more frequently; tenure 
is being replaced by adjunctification, or a pattern of short-term positions that turn over and do 
not offer stability either to institution or to faculty members; and faculty labor, more than ever, 
has taken on many of the attributes of a commodity. Arguably, what faculty teach, both 
information and learning, has become commodified as well.81 Among the traits of a commodity 
is that it is considered fungible, payable in clear-cut units, and often dislocated from intangible 
value-based claims such as those that have been vaunted in education, for instance being 
attached to a “higher mission” or “educating the whole person”. Today, faculty labor is 
increasingly detached from institutional longevity, loyalty, and academic goals such as research 
and scholarship. Compensation of faculty labor is a case in point: faculty, particularly but not 
limited to adjuncts, are paid in individual units of pay -- where the unit of production is a course 
-- rather than as a salary with benefits, performance-based raises, and other features of secure 
long-term employment. Faculty are expected to seek out jobs in an increasingly competitive and 
fragmented market, and expectations of tenure are decried as being increasingly unrealistic,82 if 
not outright undesirable.83 Many have argued that this is deplorable and runs counter to the 
                                                
80 See generally BILL READINGS, UNIVERSITY IN RUINS (2007) 
81 See ELI NOAM, TWO CHEERS FOR THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (2001), available at 
http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/articles/Commodification.htm. 
82 See, e.g., Resources on Contingent Appointments, AAUP, http://www.aaup.org/issues/contingent-
faculty/resources-contingent-appointments (last visited April 1, 2015);  Michael Berube, Among the 
Majority, MLA (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.mla.org/fromthepres&topic=146; Colleen Flaherty, ‘It’s My 
Business’, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 13, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/13/aaup-
session-centers-intellectual-property-and-academic-freedom-online-education-age. 
83 See Christopher Beam, Finishing School: The Case for Getting Rid of Tenure, SLATE (Aug.11, 2010, 
6:46 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2010/08/finishing_school.html.  
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educational mission writ large; but it is indisputably becoming part of today’s reality, and there is 
little to indicate that the trend will change. 
 
The implications of faculty adjunctification and the disaggregation of educational value into the 
production unit of the course (whether stand-alone or as part of a degree) has both business and 
legal implications. The business implications follow upon the understanding that the nature and 
structure of faculty work have irrevocably changed. In a world of adjunctification, professors 
will, and have to, move when and where they must to follow the paying jobs. They no longer 
have job security, so they are forced to be itinerant. Therefore, job portability and employee 
mobility have now come to matter to a far greater extent than they once did. At the same time, 
however, the competitive, mutable and short-term employment market has the result of making 
course instruction a much more contested territory than historically had been the case: when 
tenure, full salaries and long-term benefits are practically eliminated, competition to secure 
teaching appointments for each course is intensified, and the need to secure compensation for 
each course taught becomes paramount to permanently unattached and adjunctified faculty. 
 
It must be recognized that faculty are no longer compensated by tenure and its related rewards 
(job security, full employment benefits, academic freedom to do research and scholarship, and so 
on). It follows that they must be paid for the courses they teach, and such payment must be 
maximized in order to make teaching a viable means of earning a real livelihood (if not, 
education runs the risk of driving able teachers away from the profession altogether). 
Commodified courses should be adequately compensated, commensurate with the standard 
payment plans of education. Thus, for instance, teaching hours should be remunerated on a per-
hour scale, but without regard to the number of students taught, unless those numbers require 
some additional amount of input (extra grading time, supervision of online discussion sites, etc.). 
But as courses become increasingly portable, faculty become increasingly mobile, and 
employment becomes increasingly disaggregate, compensation becomes only one prong of the 
business solution. An equally important prong is the treatment of faculty mobility and course 
portability, particularly in the fluid online education space. Institutions should craft policies that 
ensure that courses are portable, and should afford faculty the freedom to bring courses they have 
developed to other institutional settings when they move. 
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At the same time that they appropriately and adequately compensate instructors, however, 
institutions should also safeguard their own investment in courses and course support systems.  
These protections should be designed as business solutions that use copyright protections to 
support and advance the institutional goals of stability and viability.84 Overall, a balance must be 
reached that enables faculty to do their vitally important work and that enables institutions to 
support that work by providing context, resources, and a stable foundation for the educational 




In terms of business model strategies and solutions, the monetization of MOOCs on a really large 
scale is the end goal of many universities that are determined to adapt their business model to an 
increasingly technology-driven world. But universities will need to figure out how to make 
MOOCs pay. There are several possibilities, but each has its inherent challenges. One option is 
monetization by charging high amounts, to a large number of online students (MOOCs are, of 
course, “massive” by design), for courses available on demand, as well as  ancillary services 
(such as one-on-one tutoring, skills assessment, career planning, and so on). This business model 
is at the center of the aspirations of universities and MOOC providers alike.85 Recent history, 
however, has shown -- through the failure of the Fathom consortium and other early online 
educational ventures -- that it is far from obvious whether, and how, this will transpire. On the 
one hand, the student audience is there: many students are actively participating in MOOCs, with 
varying success, and the demand is only escalating. On the other hand, it is not clear that students 
are willing to pay for MOOC instruction. It is arguable that there will be a sharp decline in 
student participation if MOOCs have a price tag, particularly if they are not directly related to 
course-credit or degree-granting options. 
 
                                                
84 Discussed infra section II.B. 
85 See, e.g., The Hype is Dead, but MOOCs Are Marching On, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Jan. 5, 2015) 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/moocs-making-progress-hype-died/ (transcribing an 
interview with Daphne Koller, co-founder of Coursera, on the growth of MOOCs and the underlying 
business model).  
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Recent historical precedent aside, speculation is rife in educational circles that an innovative 
pricing model can work to make MOOC education profitable.86 For instance, if courses can be 
sold for credit and/or toward degrees, or can compete with for-profit courses, they may prove 
highly appealing to motivated students, especially those seeking to avoid the high cost of 
education today and uninspired by the traditional on-campus experience. Further, if ancillary 
services, like networking opportunities, career counseling, and so on start to emerge, the 
monetization of MOOCs may have more potential value, in real world terms, as a means to 
securing employment as much as (or perhaps more than) a means to gaining an education. 
Another option is monetization via advertising plays, such as targeted ad campaigns, pop-up ads, 
and so on. But this strategy is problematic because while this is the baseline model of making 
money on the Internet, it has historically had very low returns, as advertisers have shown they 
will not pay a great deal for online ads, and indeed will pay at rates that are far lower than 
standard rates in print and other real space venues (billboards, etc.).87 
 
A third option is monetization by moving to an all-online (or almost-all-online) institutional 
model. This is the most radical strategy, and has been undertaken only by a few non-profit 
institutions, such as Franklin Pierce Law School and Liberty University. Other institutions have 
made entire degree-granting programs online, such as bachelor’s degree programs at Arizona 
State University, Pace University, and so on.88 This seems to have succeeded best so far in 
targeted professional degree-granting programs, such as nursing, computer technology, 
accounting, and so on. While there are a few online bachelor’s degree programs that are ranked 
by U.S. News and World Report, and therefore presumably well-regarded, it is not clear how 
profitable they are. Theoretically, though, institutions that regard bricks-and-mortar space as 
inessential to their educational purpose will consider entirely online programs, consisting of 
individual courses that are mixed and matched by students in an a la carte manner, to be an 
attractive prospect. 
                                                
86 Id.  
87 See, e.g., Ethan Zuckerman, The Internet’s Original Sin: It’s not too late to ditch the ad-based business 
model and build a better web, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2014, 6:04 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/08/advertising-is-the-internets-original-sin/376041/. 
See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.5, III.A.2.a, and IV.D.1. 
88 See Best Online Bachelor’s Programs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
http://www.usnews.com/education/online-education/bachelors/rankings?int=999208 (last visited Mar. 29, 
2015).  
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a. Obstacles to Monetization 
When online courses start to show a potential for monetization, a number of issues will almost 
certainly emerge. Illustrative of the complications that might arise is the following scenario: if a 
student enrolls in at University A, takes a for-credit MOOC at University B that is taught by 
Professor C (who perhaps developed the course at the behest and supported with the resources of 
University A) and hosted by online service provider D, who gets rights in the revenue stream? 
This must be established at the outset, and is most readily addressed by private contracting. The 
question will no doubt become still more complicated when for-profit and non-profit competitors 
begin vying for rights and revenues in the online space. Further complicating the matter, the 
sponsorship of MOOCs by corporate partners, federal funding and/or outside grants (public or 
private), strategic alliances among MOOC providers and universities, accreditation concerns, and 
as mentioned earlier employee mobility (for instance, faculty teaching multiple MOOCs and/or 
courses in different spaces; faculty replicating their courses in different venues; faculty shifting 
their time and resources among online and real world teaching priorities, and so on) will add yet 
more layers of complexity. Again, this will probably first be solved by contract, but eventually 
larger policy decisions may have to be made when some consensus in the educational 
marketplace starts to emerge. 
 
7. Network Effects (Positive Network Externalities) 
 
MOOCs have the potential to be great data mining resources, as will be discussed in Technology, 
below. This information can be shared among schools to create improvements in pedagogy. 
Another positive benefit is network effects:89 educational institutions can learn from each other; 
strengthen each others’ innovations; be pushed forward by good competitive 
pressures/developments; collaborate; share students; achieve economies of scale; and obtain the 
positive network effects90 that can arise when a great number of people are involved in creative, 
fertile activities that are pushed to new heights by technological advances and innovation. 
                                                
89 See discussion in supra Chapter 4 subsection III.B.7.  
90 For an overview of network effects, see generally S.J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, NETWORK 
EXTERNALITIES (EFFECTS), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/palgrave/network.html.  
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It is well established that “employment conditions as well as geographic concentration of an 
industry can have a strong effect on the pace of innovation”91. There are many implications for 
universities, only a few of which are relevant for the purposes of this paper. First, in locales such 
as Boston, universities are concentrated (Harvard and MIT) and MOOCs and MOOC providers 
can flourish (edX, MIT OpenCourseWare).92 In locales such as California’s Silicon Valley, 
universities and MOOC providers also flourish (Stanford and San Francisco State University; 
Coursera), and their presence is supported by the availability of venture capital and other outside 
investors, complementary tech start-ups, a highly skilled labor force in the tech sector, and a 
consumer base comprised of early adaptors (Boston is also developing these forces, but is 
arguably still playing catch-up). Second, the exchange of information and mobility of labor 
across companies contributes greatly to rapid progress and growth, while legal limitations on 
non-competition clauses helps germinate and disseminate ideas and innovative build-outs of such 
ideas throughout these sectors.93 Third, network effects stimulate collaborative and cumulative 
innovation,94 which occurs both within institutions (such as interdisciplinary scholarship) and 
across institutions (such as collaborative research and development). 
 
a. Promote Positive Network Effects 
Positive network effects should be supported throughout the educational space, but are even 
more compelling when technology advances their cause and achieves large scale results. To 
promote both of the facets of network effects outlined above, copyright in online courses should 
first be established and agreed upon, to ensure both that the institution will get paid back if those 
courses become profitable, and that faculty will continue to create, improve and teach the courses 
if they are duly rewarded for their efforts. Copyright and business strategies should be harnessed 
together to further promote positive network effects. First, as noted earlier, faculty should be 
                                                
91 Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 1527 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, ed., 2007). See also, RICHARD FLORIDA, 
CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS (2004); Building the creative economy: An interview with Richard 
Florida, MCKINSEY&CO. (Dec. 2013), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/building_the_creative_economy_an_interview_with_rich
ard_florida; ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012). 
92 See discussion in supra Chapter 4 subsection III.B.7. 
93 See discussion in supra Chapter 4 subsection III.B.4. 
94 See discussion in supra Chapter 4 subsection III.B.7. 
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treated as skilled, mobile, and independent innovators, and therefore should be granted liberal 
rights in course mobility and portability to allow them to move across institutions and to take 
their copyrighted courses with them. This is comparable to the limited non-competition 
provisions typically seen in tech sector contracts,95 such as those that prevail in Silicon Valley.96 
Further, while MOOCs are and will be shaped by institutions to fit the contours of their own 
needs, resources, and interests, they can benefit immensely from collaborative efforts and joint 
construction. Spin-offs that are meant to pool resources and foster swift or unconventional 
innovation should be a key part of educational institutions’ strategies. Concomitantly, institutions 
should have key incentives for collaboration involving research and development with respect to 
MOOCs. These incentives should include measures that both stimulate informal institutional 
exchange and support formal cross-licensing plans,97 and should ensure that the underlying 
processes are well facilitated, easy to deploy, and readily available. 
 
In many respects, the positive network effects that can be achieved in the educational sector are 
similar to the characteristics of those found in the Open Source movement in the technology.98 In 
the tech world, the organization of the computer industry has been generally configured  to allow 
innovators to participate in open source innovation while still contributing to, rather than 
borrowing or subtracting from, their employers’ profitability. Universities should model the 
incentives that spur faculty to innovate in the MOOC space on the incentives that are shared 
within the tech space. They should also borrow selectively from other features of the open source 
movement, such as drawing on the kinds of disclosure agreements that now abound among 
developers. In certain cases, such as courses that are unlikely ever to offer strong returns from 
monetization, experimental courses, courses involving creativity that does not need protecting 
(for e.g., some creative writing workshops), among others, universities should consider drafting 
                                                
95 See discussion in supra Chapter 4 subsection III.B.4. 
96 See, e.g., Sharon Wienbar, The Power of a Fluid Market: Employee Mobility Makes Silicon Valley 
Flow, SCALE VENTURE PARTNERS (March 19, 2013), http://www.scalevp.com/the-power-of-a-fluid-
market-employee-mobility-makes-silicon-valley-flow; Sye T. Hickey, To Compete or Not to Compete: Is 
That the Question?, AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 16, 2014), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/summer2014-0914-to-compete-or-
not-to-compete.html; James Bessen, How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job Searches, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/how-
companies-kill-their-employees-job-searches/381437/.  
97 See discussion in supra Chapter 4 section II.E., III.C.2, and IV.C.2.  
98 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.B, II.C, III.B.4, III.B.6, III.C.2, and IV.D.1. 
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IP-related contracts that are inspired by open source agreements. For instance, a generous license 
that allows multiple participants to contribute, but requires attribution, precludes others from 
staking ownership claims in the creative endeavor, and restricts IP rights to exclude others -- in 
other words, the kind of licensing agreement that has been instantiated by the GNU contract and 
the Creative Commons License, as discussed in chapter 4, pp. 57-58 -- should be as valid when 
applied to education as it is when applied to computer software. 
 
Finally, educational institutions should model their efforts on another feature of the open source 
movement: they should endeavor, where possible, to avoid proprietary interfaces and closed 
systems.99, . Maintaining such openness is particularly vital in the early stages of MOOC 
development, in which it is unclear which model is to be preferred and will prevail, and in which 
collaborative or exchanged work can be most helpful to a great many interested parties. It may 
be tempting to create a single entity with a closed system that dominates the market and 
capitalizes on first mover advantages. This is potentially becoming the case with Coursera, for 
instance, which is private, centralized, closed, and increasingly dominant. At present, as MOOCs 
are not yet readily monetizable, the almost uncontested market position of Coursera is not a 
marked concern. But as a closed system, with completely proprietary software, systems, data, 
and know-how, Coursera runs the risk of becoming the overwhelming favorite for course 
delivery among universities. There are obvious monopoly concerns that arise in this regard. 
There are also concerns that Coursera could create an entire ecosystem that is closed, and that 
precludes interoperability with other systems by design, thereby rendering it analogous to an 
Apple100 (or in earlier days Microsoft). Another concern is that such a closed system could 
negatively affect licensing across institutions and/or platforms, either by chilling cross-licensing 
efforts or by setting onerous terms on such efforts. The greatest concerns, especially at this early 
juncture in the MOOC universe, are that wholly proprietary systems could negatively affect or 
restrict interoperability down the road, with anti-competitive effects in the long run (for instance, 
if universities want to create networks with various other institutions).101 For these reasons, 
institutions should build open source systems into the groundwork of their MOOC-related 
projects and business plans. 
                                                
99 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.D., III.B.6, and III.C.2. 
100 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.B.2. 
101 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections III.B.4, III.B.6, and III.C.2. 




1. IP Solution to Disaggregation of Courses 
 
 
The disaggregation of courses, coupled with the destabilization of academic employment, makes 
copyright in courses an immediate imperative. While degree programs are presently protected 
from disruption by their value to students102, courses do not have such protection, and the 
historical determination of how courses should be protected is far from clear or settled at law. As 
the online space grows, students will likely be incentivized to compare and shop around for 
online courses, while faculty will gravitate to course providers that compensate them for online 
course development and instruction. Institutions too will have incentives to construct online 
programs, but may shape those programs with an interest in generating revenue as much as 
educating students. Such courses have the potential to be monetizable, or to be valuable as 
transfer credit units at schools that accept them for credit in degree-granting programs. 
Therefore, compensation for those courses will require the establishment of institutional 
guidelines, procedures and agreed-upon practices to allocate course-related returns. 
 
Copyright in courses should be established to ensure that copyright owners benefit from any 
royalties or other related revenue streams, and to regulate the administration of course proceeds. 
Copyright will also ensure that courses taught in multiple venues, or on multiple occasions, will 
be duly managed and regulated, so that schools that have invested in the development of online 
programs will be able to recuperate their investment and earn returns on their efforts. Faculty 
involved in online instruction will also be bolstered in their initiatives and supported in their 
efforts to receive compensation for online instruction, rather than having such work be perceived 
as extracurricular, voluntary, or otherwise not meriting remuneration. The protections extended 
by course copyright should strengthen institutional viability, as schools vie to find a competitive 
advantage in the online education marketplace. The scope and strength of coverage should be 
further extended by trademark protection in the institutional name, to ensure that the quality of 
                                                
102 The degree will be protected by institutional structure: students will still have to enroll, matriculate, 
pay tuition, and earn a full degree (thus, there is no need for IP inhering in the degree, as the very process 
of obtaining a degree safeguards and guarantees its value). 
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the online product is associated with the quality of the institution (as it would ordinarily be in the 
case of real space instruction), and thereby to protect the “name brand” of institutions, which are 
often valuable properties that require vigilant safeguarding.103 
 
As mentioned in Faculty Labor, above, copyright in courses follows upon recognition that the 
work faculty undertake with regard to online offerings such as MOOCs exists above and beyond 
standard coursework, and thus is specifically worthy of compensation. For this reason, 
monetization of MOOCs will require allocation of some revenues to online instructors. The 
clearest path to revenue allocation is by determining copyright in courses and directing related 
royalty flows to and among the relevant parties. Copyright allows such revenue allocation to be 
made fairly, consistently, and transparently, and further allows these determinations to be 
attached to courses wherever they may be taught and under various circumstances (online vs. in 
real space, at one institution or at several, team taught or individually instructed, and so on). It 
also allows for fluctuations in revenue streams, which is likely to occur over time in such an 
emerging and uncertain space. But copyright allocation should be accompanied by business 
strategies that recognize from the onset the crucial element that faculty labor represents in the 
construction and deployment of online education. Such labor should be compensated in ways 
that are proportionate to the success of MOOCs in attracting, instructing and, where appropriate, 
charging students for their online education. 
 
2. IP Solution to Dispute over Course Ownership  
Relating to Work-for-Hire Doctrine 
 
The changing nature of academic employment is at the heart of the debate over copyright in 
courses because it increases the stakes in course ownership and rights to proceeds from courses 
that are taught for a fee. Academics have not been driven to argue over the nature of their 
employment in the courts, due in part to divided ideas in the field of what academic work really 
is, and in part to a lack of pressing monetary concern related to course instruction. The courts, 
moreover, have not been determined to settle the matter -- in some cases, a “teacher exception” 
has been articulated, but it hardly been clarified or consistently applied in litigation. But 
                                                
103 See HARVARD TRADEMARK PROGRAM, supra note 70. 
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resolution of the debate is now critical, and academics should seriously consider bringing a 
viable case to the academic community, but also through the court system if necessary, in order 
to bring clarity and establish agreement with regard to the nature of their work. In so doing, 
academics should explicate the changing nature of their field, with respect to both employment 
and innovation in the venues where academic work takes place.  
 
The legal implications begin with the understanding that faculty who are expected to teach 
courses, to change institutions, and to cobble together their professional work are far closer to an 
independent contractor prototype than to a full-time employee prototype. Faculty, particularly 
those engaged in online work, should seek to establish an agreement in the academic community 
that they primarily function more like independent contractors than like fully engaged employees 
and therefore merit ownership of copyright in their own work pursuant to the work-for-hire 
doctrine. This would eliminate the necessity for a “teacher exception” to the doctrine, and would 
simply settle the matter on the basis of well-established law granting copyright in creative work 
to independent contractors.104 Importantly, it would clarify the designation of course copyright 
and thereby bring consistency across the educational spectrum. It would also bring clarity to the 
table at a much-needed point, when educators are not only dealing with internal wrestling over 
copyright but also with an increasing array of interested third-parties, such as service and 
platform providers, spin-offs, for-profit competitors, and so on. Further, it is likely to make 
academic copyright easier to administer, as educators would have clear and consistent guidelines 
for course ownership to follow, enabling them to create administrative bodies, possibly the 
copyright equivalent to technology transfer offices, that could manage and allocate a range of 
complex copyright rights and royalties. 
 
While it is still possible that a case could arise that resolves the applicability of the work-for-hire 
doctrine to the academic work force, currently such a possibility appears both uncertain and 
remote. Moreover, the work-for-hire doctrine has never been particularly agreed upon by 
educators, who who tend to feel that the hallmarks of teaching (autonomy, academic freedom, 
etc.) distinguish it from most typical employment situations. Whether or not it is true that 
teaching is somehow exceptional, dispensing with the doctrine clears the path for coming up 
                                                
104 See generally supra Chapter 2, Part II.  
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with better crafted, more widely agreed-upon solutions that do not require ongoing adjudication. 
For these reasons, and due to the increasing urgency for the need to have clear, flexible, and 
workable solutions, academic institutions should address course copyright via contractual and 
licensing agreements.105  
 
3. Propertizing Courses 
 
Academic copyright must begin with the propertization of courses.106 This allows education to 
incorporate the fundamental incentive scheme of copyright into its regime: creating, developing 
and owning courses can generate revenues that help enable academics to earn their livelihood, 
which will further encourage creation, innovation and production.107 It is particularly important 
that educators establish well-crafted policies that balance rights among academic stakeholders, 
due to the complex balancing of interests that the field requires in order to support and sustain its 
many goals, such as teaching and learning, research and collaboration, nurturing of students and 
extension of resources to the greater learning community, and so on. Propertization should begin 
with balanced initial allocations of copyright.108 Further, it should calibrate the durability of 
academic copyright.109 Propertization should also be crafted to promote collaborative and 
interdisciplinary efforts, not only in research and scholarship but also in teaching and 
outreach.110 Finally, propertizing courses should be accompanied by systemic mechanisms that 
effectively regulate the dispensation of rights, rewards, and responsibilities among copyright 
holders and stakeholders alike.111 
 
                                                
105 Historically, many universities have considered official documents such as faculty manuals or 
handbooks as appropriate venues for addressing any course copyright policies. But for the most part these 
are inadequate to cover the range of copyright-related disputes that may now arise when courses are 
taught online and to diverse audiences.  
106 This is relevant to online courses. In the case of real space courses, the institution is not likely to be 
involved in tussles over course copyright, unless a real space course comes into conflict with an online 
one. But there is no apparent reason to draw lines and exempt out real space courses. 
107 See 17 U.S.C. §102.  
108 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.1. 
109 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections V.C.2 and V.C.3. 
110 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections III.B.4 and V.C.3. 
111 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.C.4. 
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A strong example of an academic contract that propertizes online courses, sets the terms of 
licensing, and regulates online course offerings at a traditional institution is the Penn Online 
Contract112 (the “Penn Online Contract”), specifically prepared by the University of 
Pennsylvania (“Penn”) to manage its newly emerging online program. As such, it presents a 
strong example of a tailored disposition of rights.113 The Penn Online Contract stipulates that 
Penn faculty own their online courses and will license such courses back to Penn; Penn then 
licenses the courses back to the faculty for the duration of the online educational term (such as it 
is defined). A faculty member is not allowed to take a course elsewhere, that is, to rival online 
institutions and/or providers, and to offer the course in direct competition with a Penn online 
course. This provision applies equally to faculty who originate, develop, or repeat a given online 
course. The third-party course provider, Coursera, also enters into an agreement with Penn, 
which stipulates that Coursera intermediates course websites and online programs, but owns no 
rights in courses and course materials.114 Coursera is entitled to take a share of revenue streams 
flowing from online instruction, should any arise.115  
 
The Penn Online Contract is an excellent launching point for course copyright and content 
licensing in the online context. But there are additional refinements that should be considered as 
online education matures and mutates. For instance, exclusionary rights should be time sensitive 
and time limited.116 This means that institutions should not allow faculty to take their courses to 
rival institutions and offer them in direct competition with similar or identical versions of the 
original course, especially when the original course is still being offered at the home institution 
where it was first developed and offered. Importantly, however, this restriction on direct 
competition should be time-bounded, so that faculty can eventually have control over, and rights 
                                                
112 PENN ONLINE CONTRACT (on file with author). 
113 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.1. 
114 This is an interesting reintroduction of the middleman, whose demise has long been discussed in 
copyright circles. Clearly in the case of education, the middleman will still have a significant role in the 
emergence and development of online instruction. 
115 See, e.g., Online Course Hosting and Services Agreement Between Coursera, Inc. and the Regents of 
the University of Virginia, available at https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/400864-coursera-
fully-executed-agreement.html. See also Tyler Cowen, What does a contract with Coursera look like?, 
MARGINAL REVOLUTION (July 29, 2012, 3:33 AM), 
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2012/07/what-does-a-contract-with-coursera-look-
like.html.  
116 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section V.C. 
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in, their own courses. Having a limited time of protection allows the initial university to reap the 
full benefits of its course development when such a course is at its peak value, presumably at its 
inception, without incursions by direct competition from its originating professor. But such 
protection cannot be endless, especially given the real likelihood that the originating professor 
will be called upon to teach the course on multiple occasions and at various locations. 
Historically, itinerant professors were fully free to take their courses and teach them at different 
locales. The difference is that they would not previously have been in competition with their own 
course, as it were, and would not have the opportunity to benefit from monetization of the course 
on multiple occasions. In the present day, allowing a time-restricted protection gives the 
founding institution some due for providing the resources to develop and offer the course, while 
still affording the professor the time-honored right to teach the course throughout his or her 
professional career. In the adjunctification landscape, this is the best balancing available with 
respect to online courses that may generate new but unpredictable monetary returns. 
 
The university should be allowed to bar faculty from offering their online courses at rival 
institutions for a given period of time. This ensures that the university can recuperate its 
investment, including starting up the online program, offering and supporting courses initially, 
arranging a partnership with Coursera, and other start-up costs and expenses.117 Eventually, 
however, these costs will be amortized over time. After a certain point, the costs of maintaining 
an ongoing online program are likely to recede, and should be offset by profits (such as they are) 
as well as the university’s main sources of funding, including tuition, alumni giving, and outside 
grants. After a certain time, therefore, the university should allow the faculty member who 
retains an online course copyright to exercise the full array of her exclusive rights, including 
licensing with other schools, preventing others from copying her course, being able to go 
elsewhere with her course, and so on. This could also be made available as set of options..118 For 
instance, faculty should have the right to exercise copyright after a set statutory period of time; 
or faculty and universities should have the right to strike a bargain to trade and/or exchange 
course copyright for more traditional compensation (that is, a faculty member may effectively 
trade her course copyrights for promotion to tenure track or full tenure employment position, not 
                                                
117 Id.  
118 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.C.2. 
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unlike her ability to leverage her scholarship record to obtain tenure). The point is to increase the 
flexibility that course copyright should offer both faculty and institutions, but also to grant the 
full range of copyright protections to the copyright holder, particularly when the initial 
investment has run its course. The eventual ability to teach, license, contract, or sell courses 
freely are integral parts of the array of rights that copyright should extend to its holder. While 
institutional safeguards are necessary, particularly in the online educational space, they should 
not place endless limitations upon the faculty’s ability to exploit their courses and to bring such 
courses to the widest audiences possible in a manner that will enhance education overall. 
 
The time sensitivity of academic copyright is critical to maintaining a balance of rights between 
faculty, institutions and other stakeholders. It also prevents rigidity and over-expansive scope 
with respect to copyright, which would otherwise run the risk of unduly hampering or burdening 
key academic freedoms. As in the case of music and other creative fields, overly restrictive 
ownership rules and practices are liable to dampen other vital activities that should be allowed to 
flourish, such as creative borrowing, collaboration, and cross-pollination among different 
institutions and individuals. For this reason, in education, as in music, generous licensing 
guidelines should be promoted and the possibility of alternative licenses (such as GNU and the 
Creative Commons License) should be included wherever appropriate and helpful to academic 
pursuits. In the case of music, for instance, performance rights ensure that a musician can cover 
another musician’s original work without having to seek permission to do so, but with a requisite 
royalty payment.119 The analogy in education should be the ability of a teacher to create a course 
that “covers” the work of another, possibly originating, teacher, without having to seek 
permission but with a royalty payment required if the course generates revenues. Some disputes 
may arise if a follow-on course hews closely to the original but does not wholly imitate or 
replicate it: the extent to which a “cover” is the equivalent to a music cover (which after all is a 
replication of the original work as far as its melodic composition is involved) may prove 
vexatious at the start. But the importance of allowing generous licensing of work, in order to 
leave room for a broad range of creative and collaborative work, is still more important than 
diminishing licensing rights to avoid such dilemmas. Educators should be able to clarify the 
extent to which courses can be licensed, covered, shared, or protected in due course. Eventually, 
                                                
119 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.2. See also 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2012). 
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educational contracts and licenses should evolve to a point that is generally agreed upon and 
accepted as standard practice and even norm. 
 
As noted earlier, the Penn Online Contract, particularly when modified by the suggestions 
offered herein, should offer educators a workable solution to propertizing online courses and 
setting the terms for the regulation and administration of rights that flow from these 
arrangements.120 Institutions should establish these governing contracts, but then should consider 
the best means to achieve the orderly dispensation of related rights and returns. Eventually, the 
educational community may need to consider whether external third-party administrators, such 
as the CROs found in music and other creative fields, may be helpful in administering rights 
more cost effectively, equitably, and evenly across the field. These organizations can be coupled 
with the establishment of a compulsory license, thereby regulating copyright holders’ rights but 
also extending rights to certain follow-on creators, collaborators121, and end users.122 In this way, 
academic copyright can be expanded as the demands of online education become more elaborate 
and complex, while essential academic rights and freedoms can be secured, and possibly 
equalized, throughout the greater academic community. 
 
4. Trademark in “Name Brand” of Schools and the Degrees They Confer;  
Trademark in Faculty 
 
Copyright in online courses is likely to prove especially valuable to traditional institutions that 
can and should capitalize on their established reputations to bolster their marketability, appeal, 
and assurance in the market that they offer a quality product. As in the case of fashion, elite 
institutions have long known that their brand name has innate value -- Harvard, for instance, is as 
well-known and well-regarded as Prada, and can therefore set a premium on its product -- and 
thus work intensively and continuously to protect their brand (Harvard has a team of lawyers 
dedicated to protecting the Harvard name).123 In education as in fashion, then, trademark 
becomes an IP protection that has real economic importance, as discussed in chapter 4, pp. 19-
                                                
120 See supra note 112.  
121 Alternatively, collaborators may want to rights as co-creators and/or co-authors. 
122 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2,  IV.A.2, and V.C.4. 
123 See HARVARD TRADEMARK PROGRAM, supra note 70.  
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20.124 As the value of educational name brands is only likely to increase as online education 
expands (particularly students unfamiliar with the American educational system will be likely to 
seek out known entities for education, such as highly ranked schools and programs), traditional 
schools should follow the example of Harvard and its peers and not only trademark their names 
but also actively defend their trademarks.125 
 
Faculty too should consider seeking trademark protection, particularly in cases where their work 
is highly regarded, sought after, and valued. For instance, Michael Sandel teaches “Justice”, a 
course that is well known both at Harvard and online.126 By protecting his name brand, Sandel 
can ensure that his course is not replicated (hard though that may be) and exploited by rival 
institutions or professors. Moreover, he may be able to charge a premium associated with his 
name, the course, or his home institution (presumably exploitation of the school’s name would 
require some portion of royalties to be shared with the school, but this can be worked out by 
contract). Indeed, there is some precedent for the exploitation of academic trade brand online: 
Professor Arthur Miller’s attempt in 1998 to offer a course on civil procedure at Concord 
University Law School, a wholly online venture, was considered not only a violation of contract 
by Harvard but also an attempt to trade on their brand name, as the course was touted as a chance 
to study with “Harvard Law School professor Arthur Miller.”127 In lieu of such disputes, faculty 
and institutions should choose to trademark their name brands, create and enter into contracts 
that manage the deployment of their name brands and the dispensation and division of royalties 
                                                
124 This can be the case in music -- Tom Waits and Dolly Parton wielding trademark protection 
strategically are cases in point -- but it may be less so because there haven’t been quite as many rampant 
attempts to piggyback on the names of successful bands/performers (but see cases where political groups 
try to benefit by association with bands, such as use of Bruce Springsteen’s songs by members of the 
Republican Party and his protests). See, e.g., Doctor RJ, When Politicians Use Music Without Asking 
Permission, DAILY KOS (Jan. 26, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/01/26/1360245/-
When-politicians-use-music-without-asking-permission#. 
125 This is not as far-fetched as it may sound: if a school or faculty member develops a course and it 
becomes hugely popular, and a competitor runs a knock-off course in direct competition, the siphoning 
off of students may prove costly to the originator. As in fashion, anti-counterfeiting can become a means 
of thwarting, defending, or recuperating damages against those losses.  
126 See HARVARD UNIVERSITY’S JUSTICE WITH MICHAEL SANDEL, http://www.justiceharvard.org/ (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2015). Professor Sandel’s “Justice” lecture series is also available on iTunes U. 
127 See ARTHUR MILLER: IS HE AT HARVARD OR CONCORD LAW SCHOOLS, available at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/concord.htm. 
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flowing from the use of their name brands, and agree to defend their name brands against 




MOOCs are on the cutting edge of educational innovation. It is widely believed that they have 
the potential to open education to new audiences and to transform learning and pedagogy alike, 
as discussed in chapter 2, supra. They also have great potential to be data mining resources (for 
instance, with every online click made by a student, institutions can track students’ interests, 
intent to learn, participation, and so on.). And they may conceivably be new resource generators 
for many educational providers and their strategic allies. Therefore, it is clearly valuable to 
universities to keep MOOCs in their sights and to keep innovating in that space. The promises 
that MOOCs extend, coupled with the pursuit of potential new revenue streams, comprise some 
of the reasons why universities are racing to stake a claim online. But the pursuit of colonizing 
the online educational space also raises the need for universities to invest in infrastructure, and 
possibly in data tracking and mining software. Further, universities will have to invest in an array 
of ancillary and support systems, such as grading and grades disclosure systems, payment 
systems, authentication software, and privacy safeguards, both to comply with federal standards 
and regulations (for instance, privacy requirements with respect to disclosure of personal 
information) and to satisfy student needs and demands. But such technology, as well as course 
platforms and online instruction, are sure to prove an expensive investment. Budgets for such 
investment may be available to wealthier institutions, but possibly not as readily within the reach 
of cash-strapped ones. Many institutions will be forced to make a calculus regarding expansion 
into online education, and are will have to choose whether to pursue the online option, either on 
a small scale or at a greater commitment level. 
 
Course providers will also have to make considerable investments in technological systems and 
support. As in the case of institutions, this is likely to favor the larger, better-established 
providers, as well as those that have strategic partnerships with well-heeled institutions. Student 
privacy and security concerns, a counterpart to student identification and authentication, is liable 
to raise a host of issues. Moreover, many course providers, such as Coursera, are persuaded that 
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employment tie-ins are a natural and potentially lucrative complement to MOOC offerings. 
Many universities seem to agree, inviting providers to extend innovative job-related services to 
the MOOC students that are enrolling in online education. However, if course providers and 
universities start seeking out tie-ins with employers and other third-parties, they will require at 
least one of the interested parties to maintain and manage systems that can host job-related 
activities, networking events, and so on. Making these available, while protecting privacy and 
proprietary rights in data (such as students’ resumes, grades, etc.), is likely to require fairly 
sophisticated tracking and sharing systems. Again, this could prove costly, and could compel 
some institutions to work on collaborative tech solutions to share the costs and more effectively 
and efficiently manage the data and services involved. Finally, if MOOCs do prove to be 
financially rewarding, there will likely be contentious issues over ownership, licensing, revenue 
splits, and so on. This may be heightened if MOOCs become increasingly controlled by a few 
big providers, such as Coursera, as the bargaining power of the service providers will be 
strengthened if they are concentrated and powerfully appealing (that is, the only game in town). 
Technology that organizes complex and numerous licensing agreements, and that manages 
revenue allocations, should go a long way in helping institutions and service providers manage 




1. Education as Constructed Commons 
 
a. Cost to Education if it Expands Copyright: Loss of Education’s “Negative Space” 
It is instructive to compare education with other creative content-rich industries to evaluate its 
position as a constructed commons,128 and a negative space.129 Fashion has never had a 
commons, but it arguably once functioned as a guild130. There are debates over whether or not its 
                                                
128 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.D., IV.C,  
129 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section II.D. 
130 See Picker, supra note 11. See also Robert P. Merges, From Medieval Guilds to Open Source 
Software: Informal Norms, Appropriability Institutions, and Innovation (Conf. on the Legal Hist. of 
Intell. Prop., Working Paper, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=661543. 
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nature encouraged originality, but there were guild-like protections of original material, such as 
certain dress designs.131 But to date fashion remains a negative space, and relies almost 
exclusively on trademark among the range of IP protections available. Music was once a guild 
(as in the time of sacred music), but moved away from the guild to a system of patronage 
(supported mainly by aristocrats, municipalities/states/towns, subsidized institutions such as the 
Staatskapelle, and the church), and then to a market-based system (the iconic case is of Guiseppe 
Verdi establishing and wielding copyrights in his hugely successful operas).132 Some music was 
treated as common property -- for instance, blues, jazz, plainsong, gospel -- but arguably 
primarily because the originators didn’t have the power, opportunity, or backing (such as 
lawyers, agents, and other powerful allies) to assert their rights in their music compositions.133 
Moreover, even when such music was propertized, it was often at the expense of the artists and 
to the benefit of the middleman, as in the case of Motown, due to copyright ownership asserted 
and exploited almost exclusively by the middleman (that is, the agent, producer, and/or record 
label).134 Education has been more readily characterized as a commons, or a “constructed 
commons”, and has traditionally been seen as a sphere in which IP has been kept at a minimum 
in order to foster its cultural values135, such as academic principles of sharing, “standing on the 
shoulders of giants”, academic freedom, and so on.136 Like fashion, it has minimal copyright. But 
in other respects, as in scientific research and discovery, it more closely resembles music, with a 
broad, complex, and well-established system of rights in productive output (notably, patent rights 
and in some cases copyright in creative works such as publications and other scholarly works). 
 
                                                
131 See, e.g., Johnny Diaz, Fendi, Filene’s Basement Settle Suit for $2.5 M, BOSTON GLOBE (July 3, 
2010), http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2010/07/03/fendi_filenes_basement_settle_suit_for_25m/ 
(discussing a massive settlement between Filene’s Basement and Italian fashion house Fendi over the 
retailer’s sale of counterfeit Fendi products).  
132 Michael W. Carroll Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came To View Musical Expression As A 
Form Of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 (2004). 
133 Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural 
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 571-72 (2006). 
134 See generally, GERALD POSNER, MOTOWN: MUSIC, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER (2002).  
135 Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann, & Katherine J. Strandburg, The University as Constructed 
Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365 (2009).  
136 See READING, supra note 80; Robert K. Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267 (Norman W. Storer ed., 
1973); Zuckerman, supra note 87; CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING 
FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001). 
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In contrast to the ideal of education as a constructed commons, however, some commentators 
have argued that propertization of academic work is part of an ongoing (and accelerating) trend 
of commodification or “corporatization,” that is undermining key academic principles.137 It’s not 
clear which way the causation runs, however: is academic corporatization a trend whose time has 
come (due to external factors such as the rising cost of education, federal funding changes, job 
market demands, etc.), and universities are just bowing to the inevitable; or is it being driven by 
universities’ insatiable appetites for new sources of revenue to keep them self-sustaining? Still 
more importantly, it is far from clear whether propertization actually does undermine such 
academic principles. For instance, the principle of free and open collaboration has always been in 
tension with the desire of individual academics to publish, gain recognition for their work, and 
show mastery over the competitors in their field. How does propertization undermine these 
longstanding incentives and interests? It is just as likely, perhaps, that propertization merely 
offers academics another tool to managing and regularizing the work that they do. 
 
The strongest argument supporting the proposition that propertization creates a more 
corporatized educational environment is the effect that it can have on long-term commitments 
between institutions and faculty. If courses can be taught in a number of unrelated venues, 
faculty mobility becomes a real and inculcated premise, allowing new fluidity in the educational 
labor market. If course propertization becomes innately valuable, it is likely to become more 
important for faculty, not just institutions, to monetize courses. If mobility is valuable and 
courses are valuable, publication may retain its value for recognition/reputational purposes but it 
is likely to become less important for job securing, retention, promotion, and tenure and 
longevity purposes. This diminishes the value of publication in a strategic sense for faculty, and 
trades off publication as a key skill for teaching courses (and in particular the large-scale courses 
that MOOCs comprise).138 All of these are fundamental changes in the nature of the educational 
structure, mission and rewards system. Academic institutions and faculty alike must consider 
these ramifications, and ask themselves if this is the direction that education should embrace, or 
if it sacrifices practices and principles that have served education best throughout its history. 
 
                                                
137 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.F, II.H, and II.I. 
138 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.A, V.C, V.D. 
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b. How to Deal with the Constructed Commons of Education 
Education calls itself a commons, with many of its features; and it has been characterized as a 
guild-like space139. Now, however, we should recognize that all the commons-like features and 
characteristics of education are increasingly falling by the wayside or being discarded and/or 
lost. Some of these features that are at risk of disappearing include a sense of the common good; 
an interest in self-policing for the benefit of community members; real collaborations (not 
merely those that involve partnership with commercial and/or for-profit ventures that are driving 
toward some kind of money-making end); a commitment to the protection of the rights, such as 
academic freedom, of community members; and a diminution of full-time employment and 
reduction or elimination of job security for employees. This represents a real challenge to vital 
pre-existing norms and practices that have been long established in education.140 It may be that 
these practices and values are deemed to be obsolete. If so, and if education is not, or no longer, 
a commons, then in order to keep its valuable output secure and to continue to supporting its 
production, educators should agree to propertize its output completely and to ascertain the IP-
based rewards and allocations that relate to its output -- just as has been done in academic 
scientific research and development, and in bringing related R&D properties to market.141 
 
Even if the eventual propertization of courses is taken as a given, however, efforts should be 
made to sustain and strengthen some of the characteristics that education has traditionally 
preferenced and valued, such as open collaboration, publication (for the sake of disseminating 
knowledge and information, as well as for garnering recognition), institutional commitment by 
faculty, and so on. These normative values and preferences, however, should be bolstered by the 
shape and structure of education and its institutions, rather than solely by IP allocations. For 
instance, strong tenure principles and practices should keep in place several of these priorities by 
creating a rewards structure that reinforces research, scholarship and publication (as a means of 
                                                
139 See Madison, Frischmann, & Strandburg, supra note 134. 
140 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section V.D. 
141 A case in point is the “Pennovation” campaign at the University of Pennsylvania. Lauren Hertzler, 
University of Pennsylvania launches new Penn Center for Innovation, PHILA. BUS. J. (June 2, 2014, 12:15 
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2014/06/02/university-of-pennsylvania-launches-
new-penn.html?page=all. For more on emerging university innovation incentive models, see Brady 
Huggett, US university technology transfer offices are adopting new models in search of increased return 
on research investment, BIOENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.nature.com/bioent/2014/141201/full/bioe.2014.12.html.  
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gaining tenure and securing an academic reputation), longevity (the brass ring of tenure to be 
won by publication and good teaching), collaboration (strengthened by interdisciplinary 
programs that reward long-standing teachers who want to venture into other intellectual areas, 
which tends to occur more when faculty have tenure and the security that enables them to 
explore scholarship outside the parameters of their core competencies), and so on. In some of 
these cases, strengthening norms will not only reinforce the sense of shared values among 
academics, but it will also incentivize the creation of valuable institutional output. As in the case 
of scientific research and scholarship, for instance, rights in patentability do not serve as 
motivational factors for academic scientists, because the institution typically claims patent rights 
from the outset.142 Publication rights, however, offer scientists rewards that are recognized, 
sought after and valued. The norms that underlie publication therefore operate by incentivizing 
production without granting IP rights in the final outcome of the work. Without these norms, 
there is little incentive for scientists to engage in academic research and development, and little 
recourse for a university to stimulate its scientific output. Thus, norms unite the academic 
community, and at the same time underlie its productivity. 
 
Turning to a system that relies solely on copyright in course “properties” as a sinecure, or as the 
sole or primary relevant reward that faculty are afforded, educators will lose the benefits of the 
norms-based incentive system. This is likely to have several long-term results that will not be 
desirable to institutions and faculty alike. For instance, it may lead to increased competition 
among faculty for the highest-paying teaching positions and/or jobs, whether such are offered by 
MOOCs, for-profits institutions, or other venues. Faculty will also be incentivized to teach large 
online courses (such as survey courses) at multiple venues, as opposed to focusing on teaching at 
their home institution, thereby diluting the attention they bring to their real space jobs, and 
possibly diminishing the quality of those courses. It may also lead to similar discrepancies of 
interest, attention, and quality among institutions. For instances, institutions will be incentivized 
to race to secure funding for MOOCs, and to focus on online instruction, which may or may not 
be beneficial to students at traditional institutions. Institutions may also be predisposed, due to 
fiscal interests, to favor faculty who like to teach online, which may or may not include 
identifying and rewarding the best professors to suit the needs of the institution and its students. 
                                                
142 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section V.D. 
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Bearing in mind these concerns, institutions should ensure that the propertization of courses is 
counterbalanced by efforts to retain core normative values, practices and aims. In this regard, 
valuing and agreeing to uphold the notion of a constructed commons, as well as expressing those 
values in practice and expression, should go far in strengthening an institution’s commitment to 




1. Problems with Current State of the Industry 
 
The music industry has been transfigured by changes brought about by technological advances, 
most notably the advent of the Internet. In the late 1990s, recording music on digital tracks 
enabled the disaggregation of music into single units, such as a single song, contrasting with 
earlier iterations that bundled music into a larger collective unit, such as an album or compilation 
(for instance, an entire symphony). Music listeners began seeking out disaggregated songs in 
various venues, leading to the rise of the CD single, but also to the introduction of Napster, a 
free, peer-to-peer music sharing service that proved immensely popular. Napster introduced 
consumers to the idea that music could be obtained, shared, exchanged and listened to without 
cost; and it persuaded consumers that free music was viable, acceptable and desirable. Music 
producers were quick to recognize the threat to their business model posed by Napster, but slow 
to respond to its challenge by changing their business strategies and solutions. While generally 
seeming to agree that they should band together, music producers were in fact reluctant to enter 
the online music space and unable to come to terms for concerted music sales online. By being 
so reluctant to jump into the online music space, music producers lost a great deal of market 
share to Napster and its rivals, and further lost the opportunity to gain important first mover 
advantages in the music market. At the same time, Apple, a technology company offering 
personal music devices that are reliant upon disaggregated digital tracks (such as the iPod), 
finally brought the major music producers together and compelled them into contractual 
licensing agreements with Apple for the sale and licensing of music online via the Apple iTunes 
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Store.143 The Apple model proved immensely popular, due in no small part to aggressive pricing 
of songs by Apple (beginning at 99 cents per song), and quickly became responsible for a large 
share of online music sales (and importantly legal music sales). While initially Apple was 
required to cross-subsidize support of music sales via the iTunes store with the sale of personal 
music devices,144 many industry observers suggest that, today, the store is far more profitable 
than Apple’s leadership let’s on.145 Currently, the iTunes model has proven the hallmark of the 
industry for online music sales, and now faces some competition with other venues, such as the 
behemoth Amazon. More significantly, a number of consumers seem to be moving away from a 
music ownership model, or even a licensing model, to online music streaming offered by 
services such as Pandora, Rdio, and so on. Music streaming most closely resembles broadcast 
radio, and therefore does not entail music sales. The music industry is now contending with the 
streaming model and the business challenges it presents to an industry that has already seen a 
large decrease in sales. 
 
The music industry faces a host of challenges ushered in by the new online era. Reduced music 
sales, whether online or in real space, have become the new reality to music industry 
participants. Music disaggregation has resulted in lowered sales, not just of albums but also of 
songs; and this downward spiral has not abated to date. Revenues across the industry have hit 
new low-water marks, but it is unclear whether this is a “new normal” or whether they can be 
improved and/or turned around. To thwart some degree of copying, the music industry attempted 
to adopt technological anti-copying protections, or DRM, which has proven hugely unpopular 
among its customer base. The resistance to DRM took the industry somewhat by surprise, and 
sparked the recognition that while it may offer a viable technological barrier to copying, such 
protection comes at a significant cost in terms of customer satisfaction and acceptance. In the 
                                                
143 The terms of these agreements were arguably not optimal for the music producers, for instance, they 
were not able to singlehandedly set the terms and pricing of online music sales, but by the time they 
entered into an agreement with Apple, they had lost the upper hand and were more or less forced to take 
what they could get. 
144 See, e.g., Chris Taylor, Apple’s Business Model is Backwards – And It Works Like Crazy, MASHABLE 
(Oct. 23, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/10/23/apple-free-software-expensive-hardware/ (quoting Steve 
Jobs on Apple’s unusual cross-subsidy model saying “[t]he dirty little secret of all this is there's no way to 
make money on these stores,” and that the reason to keep the price low is “[b]ecause we’re selling iPods).  
145 Saul Hansell, The iTunes Store: Profit Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2008), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/steve-jobs-tries-to-downplay-the-itunes-stores-profit/?_r=1. 
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case of Apple, the tradeoff was deemed too costly: after considerable consumer pushback, Apple 
permanently removed its version of DRM, FairPlay, from its system. 
 
But the impact of these industry changes is not felt by music producers alone. Many composers 
and musicians are struggling to figure out how to make a livelihood in the music industry, 
particularly as revenues from recording have dropped off so significantly for all but a handful of 
star acts.146 Due in part to shrinking music sales, the divide between extremely successful artists 
(the “haves”) and struggling artists (the “have nots”) seems to be growing, although the extent to 
which this is a new or growing phenomenon is always subject to debate. It is true, however, that 
an increasing percentage of an artist’s revenue is accounted for by ticket and merchandise sales 
at concerts and live performances. In contrast, revenues from online music streaming are proving 
elusive, as streaming providers argue that the terms of their rights-related obligations leave them 
with very little margin with which to compensate performers (they further argue that limitations 
on advertising revenues, which are notably lower online than in real space, contribute to 
constraining their operating budgets). On the other side of the table, middlemen are struggling to 
find new roles, or to bolster established roles, in the new online music economy. Record labels 
are disempowered by sales declines, and have not yet found a substitute for the solid revenues 
that once were typically gained from the issuance of albums and CDs. Agents, talent scouts, 
marketers, music critics, and other intermediaries are likewise looking to establish their footing 
in an increasingly web-based economy. Their roles, however, are facing challenges from several 
directions, such as the rise of self-marketing via YouTube and other sites, the popularity of 
online reviewers who promote musical acts via v-blogs and other channels, the amelioration of 
widely available recording and sound editing software enabling musicians to create high quality 
recordings in their own home, and so on. 
 
On the one hand, these advances are a positive development for the music marketplace, as fewer 
intermediaries can result in lower production costs and eventually lower costs of goods for 
consumers (if cost savings are passed on to consumers).147 On the other hand, however, these 
changes can reduce the availability and effectiveness of authoritative entities that screen for 
                                                
146 This was always the case, but it is notably heightened today (and no patrons, guilds, etc. offer fallbacks 
anymore). 
147 This is the model evinced by “store brands” in the grocery store context. 
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quality and value. For instance, a reduction of the role and viability of established, vetted and 
usually respected critics, when coupled with the emergence of unknown amateurs who are 
neither easily located nor readily assessed, may result in the promotion of musical acts that do 
not necessarily meet the highest quality standards but rather pass a nebulous popularity test.148 
Moreover, the loss of other middlemen can similarly represent a significant cost to the industry. 
Some record labels, talent scouts, and agents historically chose the artists that they intended to 
represent, promote, and perfect over a long period of time. These emerging artists could find 
support, reinforcement, and resources that they might not have been able to attain without the 
backing of their industry representatives. While the historical record of music representation is 
far from unimpeachable, it does reveal certain benefits that afforded artists the room to mature, 
grow, and put out long-lived, classic albums and repertoires. Thus, while some have lauded the 
loss of middlemen,149 it should be recognized that such a loss is not clearly a net positive, and 
they should not be jettisoned without further thought. 
 
2. Business Solutions 
 
a. Change to Essential Business Model 
The music industry has already been compelled to rethink its core business strategies and model. 
It has faced multiple challenges posed by high fixed production costs,150 content devaluation,151 
losses in established revenues,152 and heightened competition from lower-valued goods.153 These 
trends have driven the industry to rethink its business strategies across the board,154 with respect 
to production, marketing and sales, the portfolio of properties, nature of contracts and licensing 
agreements, and treatment of end users and consumers. New business solutions should continue 
                                                
148 Of course, the traditional presence of established music producers and critics did not always result in 
the emergence of the finest and best talent. But it is arguable that establishment figures are held to some 
accountability, and called upon to explain and defend their choices to consumers and fans. 
149 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of 
Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002).  
150 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.1. 
151 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.2. 
152 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection I.A.5. 
153 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.6 and I.A.7. 
154 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section III.A.  
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to be adopted and refined, particularly as the music market confronts further changes in 
emerging technologies, practices, and consumer preferences. 
 
Recently, changes to the basic contractual arrangements among industry representatives and 
artistic acts have emerged as a promising set of business solutions. These should be pursued at 
every level of musicianship, and should afford the artist the best possible returns on their creative 
output. One instance of a newly emerging contract is the 360 deal,155 in which the artist is 
compensated with a percentage of box office, or the revenues from sales of concert and live 
performance tickets. Artists should also be compensated for online performances of their music, 
including streaming, playing of their music over a sound system at a public venue, and so on.156 
Artists themselves should also vigorously seek out new potential revenue streams and activities 
that may bolster their revenues in the future. For instance, some musicians have created websites 
that enable them to engage in outreach to listeners and consumers, including interactive chats, 
notification of early ticket sales, special song releases targeted at loyal fans, and so on. Some of 
these activities may eventually be made on a fee-paying basis. But others may remain free loss 
leaders,157 that build fan bases, loyalty, and interest in future performances, music and 
merchandise purchases, and sponsorship and/or membership drives. Similarly, musicians should 
seek to build their listener base via YouTube, online releases, and other activities that attract the 
attention and name recognition that in the long run are likely to contribute to music sales. Online 
radio streaming should also increase exposure to new audiences, serving much the same purpose 
as traditional radio broadcasting.158 The exponential and ongoing growth of Internet use and e-
commerce can be a boon to artists, who should mine its potential for exposure, self-promotion, 
outreach and eventually marketing and sales. Taken together, new contracting arrangements that 
maximize performance-related rights and revenues, as well as new efforts to build reputation, 
renown, and audience approval, will reduce the industry’s historical dependency on single-
stream revenues from album and song sales. This multivalent approach will create a portfolio of 
                                                
155 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2. 
156 For instance, skating rinks are now required to pay performance rights for playing music over their 
loudspeakers. At times this is pre-recorded music, but increasingly they are playing music streamed by 
Pandora or other services. This public performance of music should trigger a performance right 
obligation, whatever the source of the music played might be. See also discussion in infra section III.B.  
157 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2. 
158 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2. 
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business practices and legal rights that should generate various revenue opportunities and 
sources, which should counteract the loss of earlier revenue sources that have been eroded by 
technology and changing user practices and tastes. 
 
b. Music Licensing Arrangements 
Record labels should band together and create more contractual licensing arrangements that 
disseminate music to competitors that span both retail and technological sectors, rather than 
simply distributing their music via iTunes. These arrangements do not require new copyright 
measures, but instead entail application of existing practices to new commercial ventures that 
have not yet been fully exploited. Retail and technological competitors can be found both online 
and in real space, and can overlap or comprise multiple players: for instance, Amazon is now 
attempting to create a new music service via Amazon Prime, which the record labels should 
embrace. Music industry participants should also enter into better and more comprehensive 
licensing contracts -- in the case of Amazon, for instance, record labels have proven so resistant 
to change that the new streaming service targeted at Amazon Prime customers is missing entire 
record labels and/or copyright holders, such as Universal.159 This is detrimental to the industry 
overall, as it prevents healthy competition from improving access to a wide range of audiences, 
and may result in music releases becoming locked into the universe of one online merchant, such 
as the Apple iTunes Store. In Technology and Culture, below, locking music into one ecosystem 
will be detrimental to interoperability, the generation of diverse formats (such as MP3 and 
others), and possibly the quality of music dissemination and reception at the consumer end.160 
Moreover, it can unnecessarily forfeit potential revenue streams, such as music sales on Amazon 
Prime and other competitors that emerge in the music retail and delivery business. In this regard, 
the music industry would do well to reconsider the history of how Apple compelled the record 
                                                
159 Ben Sisario, Amazon Music Streaming Service Is Expected Soon, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/business/media/amazon-said-to-be-close-to-unveiling-music-
streaming-service.html?_r=0. See also Sarah Perez, Amazon Expands Prime Music Catalog By 
“Hundreds Of Thousands” Of Songs, TECHCRUNCH (July 23, 2014), 
http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/23/amazon-expands-prime-music-catalog-by-hundreds-of-thousands-of-
songs/ (noting that while Universal ultimately agreed to add a large number of songs, many popular artists 
such as Kanye West and Katy Perry were not added to Amazon’s streaming service).   
160 Potentially better compression formats that were not popularized by sites like Apple were eventually 
abandoned or relegated to niche markets. See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections III.B,  
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labels at the bargaining table to agree to cooperate in distributing songs via iTunes,161 which 
proved a very successful business strategy (and the only viable response to illicit music sharing) 
in the long run. This should spur industry participants to devise similarly innovative solutions 
that anticipate the need to meet new demands for music delivery on diverse platforms and in 
diverse venues. 
 
At the same time, technology companies that are rivals to Apple in the handheld device space 
(including mobile telephones, tablets, music devices, and certain compatible devices, such as 
headphones and speakers), such as Samsung and others, must determine how to get record labels 
to distribute music on their devices, such as the Android, on a scale comparable to iTunes’ scale. 
Economies of scale should make music delivery systems more affordable, and therefore more 
desirable, to consumers.162 These companies should follow Apple’s model of initially leveraging 
their market segment in the handheld devices sector to promote aggressive pricing of music and 
stimulating early music sales, as well as establishing a solid customer base. Eventually, they 
should follow Apple’s model by gradually raising prices per song (if they can sustain it and keep 
their customer base), adding new features (such as offering sampling, free songs as loss leaders, 
strategic placement), incorporating interactive services, and so on. 163These companies should 
recognize, however, that Apple enjoys a huge competitive advantage, having effectively 
cornered the music market, and is likely to prove stiff competition that will likely defy 
incursions.164 Nonetheless, retail and technology companies should strive to negotiate deals with 
record labels to sell music via more venues, for instance, to effect music sales through music 
streaming providers, independent artists’ websites, real world locales (at concerts, open markets, 
Starbucks and other retailers), and so on.165 Historically, music producers have proved woefully 
slow to recognize the potential that innovative technologies can offer creative content industries 
                                                
161 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.A.2. 
162 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.B.5. 
163 They should also capitalize on relationships with famous musicians, as the wildly successful “Beats” 
by Dre model, and its later acquisition by [Apple], has shown possible 
 164 Similarly, the Apple consumer base has allowed the company to corner the market on third-party 
applications, or Apps. This has allowed Apple to insist that many of its App partners design Apps that 
only function within the Apple universe, thereby thwarting interoperability and ensuring that Apple’s 
dominance in the market remains extremely difficult to challenge. 
165 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection III.B.6. 
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such as theirs166. It behooves music industry players to hire technologically adept and forward-




Advertising revenues have proven a tried-and-true avenue to monetizing content placement 
online.167 As in the case of print media, radio and television broadcasting, and other media, 
advertisement has historically been used to support the dissemination of content without 
requiring consumers to pay directly for access to the creative work that they enjoy. However, it 
has become increasingly clear that advertisers are not willing to pay as much for online ads as for 
ads in print.168 In the case of the Internet, therefore, advertising plays can offer relatively low 
returns.169 Nonetheless, music industry participants should explore advertising options as one 
way to bolster their flagging revenues. They should consider targeted marketing, such as ad 
placement for music on music-related websites, optimized product placement, or arrangements 
with large music intermediaries such as Ticketmaster, which should generate some revenue. 
Overall, however, music industry players are likely to encounter many of the same issues with 
monetization through advertising that other content industry producers have had: advertisers are 
not yet willing to pay enough for online ads to pay off in the long run, and advertising revenues 
will have to be merely a supplement to revenues drawn from steadier and more lucrative sources. 
 
d. Reinforcing the Role, Utility and Value of Middlemen/Intermediaries 
While some have argued that middlemen are, and perhaps should be, becoming obsolete,170 there 
are to the contrary several strong arguments for keeping middlemen alive. Music industry 
participants should consider the historical role of middlemen and the range of activities that they 
have spanned and continue to offer today. First, they screen musical talent for quality, 
originality, marketability, and other useful features. Further, they polish products and package 
                                                
166 For instance, they were slow to recognize that ringtones on cellular devices could be monetized by 
making snippets of songs available for download 
167 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection IV.D.1. 
168 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.5, III.A.2.a, and IV.D.1. 
169 See Zuckerman, supra note 87. 
170 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.3. 
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them for commercial success (for e.g. high quality editing). Further still, they bring products to 
market through efficient, streamlined, and well-established avenues. Finally, they serve a critical 
function, distinguishing and promoting the best acts.171 Technology has placed access to some of 
these functions in the hands of emerging musicians and independent promoters, marketers, and 
even amateurs. For instance, technology is now making it possible for amateurs to attain quite 
high quality production values, and the quality of a recorded musical work cannot be so readily 
distinguished between commercially and non-commercially produced output. But technology has 
not yet displaced the role of professionals in the music marketplace. For instance, the Internet 
abounds with music critics, some of whom are more interested in real quality than commercial 
viability; and savvy online users are finding it increasingly easy to screen and search for good 
critics. At the same time, however, in depth criticism, based in experience, analytic skills, and 
longstanding engagement with the work comes at a cost, and often requires support systems to 
allow it to attain maturity (just as musical acts themselves may). Traditionally, journalism 
offered support to critics who were able to engage in deeply insightful critical thinking. Music 
industry participants should recognize the value of this kind of engagement, and should seek to 
foster and promote it, rather than to assume that it can survive online without formal support and 
adequate remuneration. 
 
i. Keeping the Middleman Alive 
 
The various roles of industry intermediaries do not yet seem to have disappeared. Even though 
some commentators argue that they are fast becoming obsolete,172 there are others who have 
moved toward recognizing the centrality and usefulness of middlemen to the process of bringing 
cultural content to market.173 Digital era innovations are not quite threatening the entirety of 
                                                
171 One caveat is that the definitions of “the best” musical talent that middlemen use may well be founded 
in various factors, such as sales-worthiness, popularity with audiences, and so on, which are not 
necessarily proxies for quality, greatness, uniqueness or originality. Nonetheless, for the most part, their 
criteria tend to be known quantities, and many choices made my middlemen will be put to the test of time. 
172 Byungwan Koh, B.P.S. Murthi & Srinivasan Raghunathan, Shift in Demand for Music: Causal Effect 
of Online Music Piracy and Digital Music, 1 (Nov. 2010), available at 
https://www.misrc.umn.edu/wise/papers/4b-1.pdf.  
173 Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations, 84 CALI. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and 
Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2002).  
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music intermediation: for instance, agents are still needed to locate talent (even though some 
may have moved more online), marketers and producers to bring works to commercial fruition, 
critics to asses the output, and so forth. 
 
Equally importantly, the online music world requires rights-clearing entities (CROs) that should 
continue to administer the complex portfolio of rights that accrue upon the production and 
dissemination of musical works. The importance of these entities will not diminish anytime soon, 
as the industry is dependent on their services for rights management and administration. But 
CROS should also strive to ensure their centrality by diversifying the services they offer, the 
resources they command, and the relationships they can build with artists over the course of 
entire careers. CROs, for instance, should undertake new roles in managing music, and should 
follow the examples of BMI and ASCAP, which are continuing to offer new outlets, support 
systems, and resources to emerging and established artists alike. These ventures make it clear 
that innovative intermediaries should stake their position in online music spaces, but should 
expand their capabilities and services to meet the needs of artists in managing a host of musical 
products and venues, such as digital streaming, direct-to-consumer online sales, and so on. These 
practices increase efficiencies for artists seeking commercial success that will ensure their 
livelihoods, and also increase the centrality of middlemen as vital authorities who can manage 
and clarify musical rights and returns.174 
 
Another middleman that should be recognized, but that often goes unremarked, is the 
astonishingly powerful role that technology companies play in the music world. Technology 
companies increasingly add new levels of intermediation in various ways. First, by featuring 
music on a website or online store, a technology company that offers or serves as a music vendor 
is making a decision that affects the market visibility and viability of an act. Second, a popular 
online vendor can use its market share to compel artists to release on its site, or in exclusive 
partnership with it, or to engage in ancillary activities with it such as offering tie-ins with its 
products. Third, an online vendor that has significant market share can dictate key contractual 
terms for online distribution and sales to producers175. Fourth, a technology company that is or 
                                                
174 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section III.B.  
175 This is increasingly becoming evident in the case of e-books. 
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has an online vendor can compel artists and producers alike have to make their product 
compatible with its devices, and can extract promises that they will commit to limiting such 
compatibility to a finite set of devices, products and future roll-outs. 
  
In sum, as bricks-and-mortar retailers have disappeared from the music landscape, online 
retailers have gained increasing clout. In the case of a behemoth like Apple or Amazon, they can 
set the terms by which music is delivered to the masses.176 They can also, however, offer sites 
where musicians can release new music, possibly at lower costs than via record labels, and 
possibly offering them a larger cut of the revenues than the record labels historically offered (as 
in the case of e-books). The issue here is that the musician is likely to be responsible for doing 
what record labels have typically done, such as finding audiences, garnering positive reviews, 
standing out from the crowd, etc. This is a tradeoff that is not easy or obvious: as authors who 
self-publish e-books on Amazon have found, the work of intermediaries, such as marketing, 
outreach, rights management, and so on are often easier to outsource to third-party entities that 
specialize in such services than to assume and add to the creator’s responsibilities and demands. 
Musicians and other industry participants should not jettison middlemen in favor of an online 
distribution model, particularly via Amazon, Apple, or other market-dominating entities, without 




The point of interoperability is that it will presumably make more music available to more 
consumers, on a wider variety of platforms, which will in turn encourage audiences to consume 
more.177 That is, a consumer who knows that she can have a song available in the cloud, on her 
devices, as her ringtone on her mobile telephone, and wherever and whenever she may want it, 
may be more likely to buy or license a song, or indeed multiple songs, precisely because the 
music that she desires is readily available in multiple forms and therefore is generally ubiquitous. 
But interoperability also benefits the marketplace on a more universal scale. Companies that 
make interoperable devices can innovate products that are available to an array of consumers, at 
                                                
176 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.3. 
177 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections III.B. 
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highly competitive prices. Where interoperability prevails, no one company can create a closed 
ecosystem, or a network of its own products that locks in consumers and does not allow them to 
pick and choose from among the best offerings on the market. No one company can attain a 
monopoly or quasi-monopoly position in the market, as it cannot concentrate consumers within 
the walls of its ecosystem. Finally, interoperability helps to ensure that pricing of products is 
subjected to downward pressure due to competition among market rivals. This benefits 
consumers, and enables them to select the exact combination of products, devices, and content 
that they choose from among the multiple providers that operate in the given market. 
 
a. Private Companies Striving for Interoperability 
Private companies should strive for interoperability, as it offers the best option by relying on 
private arrangements to maximize individual corporate goals (primarily, of course, profitability), 
industry-wide improvements (such as streamlined ways to disseminate content), and end user 
benefits (such as the greatest availability of content across multiple platforms and devices). But 
interoperability is most likely to prevail when companies’ interests are aligned, such that they act 
in concert toward unified ends, as discussed in chapter 4, pp. 34-36, 39-41, 56-58. This is a 
challenging proposition, in part because the rewards of closed ecosystems are numerous: a 
company that can corner a market will be able to exploit its advantage by offering exclusive 
products to its market, which can expand its per-consumer profits while drawing new consumers 
into the fold and driving them completely away from any competitors’ markets. 
 
A vivid illustration of the costs, benefits, and complex dimensions of the interoperability 
challenge is offered by the Apple Company.178 By taking an early lead on personal devices, 
Apple gained a huge first mover advantage and garnered a large share of the consumer market 
well in advance of its competitors. It has built on that advantage by building and guarding its 
closed systems, which in some respects are not designed to be interoperable with other systems. 
For instance, while Apple music devices can play music imported from non-Apple sources (such 
as MP3-format songs, CDs, and so on), music purchased via the iTunes Store is intended for 
compatibility only with Apple music devices (although iTunes songs can be copied or “ripped”, 
                                                
178 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections III.B. 
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doing so interjects another layer of effort in the music downloading and saving process). Further, 
it has added to its line of products so that Apple customers can continue to expand their own 
collection of Apple closed-system products: for instance, a consumer can own an iPod, an 
iPhone, an iPad, and an iMac, on which her content can of course move freely; but she cannot 
easily and effortlessly move that content onto an Android or an MP3 player. Apple’s devices 
have proved so popular that now third-party App providers and sellers flock to the Apple App 
Store to sell their products, resulting in well over 1 million apps available to date.179 This 
reinforces the locked-in nature of the Apple universe, and when new users are considering which 
system to enter, they are persuaded by the sheer size and relative strength of Apple’s panoply of 
offerings, which again reinforces the growth of Apple’s customer base at the expense of its 
competitors. 
 
The entire cycle of closed systems maximizes profitability for Apple, but runs wholly counter to 
the premise of interoperability. In essence, then, keeping the system closed would appear to be 
best practice for Apple, at least as far as cornering the market (and eventually perhaps attaining 
the supra-normal returns of a virtual monopoly) is concerned. But more recently, a countertrend 
has begun to emerge: Apple has found that the immediate demand for third-party applications, or 
“apps”, is so immense that it is strategically advantageous for Apple to host some third-party 
apps that are not exclusive to the company, but that are available on a number of its competitors’ 
servers, sites, and/or delivery systems. In other words, Apple is strategically opening its universe 
to offer interoperable apps when consumer demand makes the benefits of selling those apps 
surpass the costs of limiting its sales to exclusive products. This offers one argument in favor of 
interoperability: when users want maximum mobility of their creative content, creating or 
hosting third-party providers can prove more profitable than the rewards of exclusivity. 
 
Another important argument against closed ecosystems is that by keeping interoperability alive, 
companies can cross-market not just within one space, such as the world of individual digital 
devices or systems, but potentially across new spaces, such as cloud storage (or whatever comes 
next). Right now, Apple may have created a tightly-controlled ecosystem that is still going 
                                                
179 See Sarah Perez, iTunes App Store Now Has 1.2 Million Apps, Has Seen 75 Billion Downloads To 
Date, TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/06/02/itunes-app-store-now-has-1-2-
million-apps-has-seen-75-billion-downloads-to-date/.  
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strong, if not actually growing. But in the technology world, standing alone can ultimately mean 
being left behind.180 It is increasingly likely, and it appears that Apple increasingly agrees, that it 
is preferable to keep open the possibility of creating interoperable systems for content delivery 
and sharing so that it can tap new markets that are still to come. Particularly in the world of 
creative content, where it is not yet clear what the future of content delivery holds (or where it 
will be newly profitable), it may behoove Apple and its competition to look at interoperability as 
a means of keeping flexible and open to new channels of content dissemination, user access, and 
possibly new creative generation. 
 
b. Governments Forcing or Incentivizing Interoperability 
Given the current socio-political landscape and climate, it seems highly unlikely that a 
government agency will arise to compel, reinforce, or require interoperability through regulation 
or mandate. There are some technology-related areas in which the government has (so far) found 
a compelling interest in promoting certain standards, such as net neutrality, the ICANN system, 
and so on. However, promoting cooperation instead of competition is not quite comparable to 
establishing overarching systems of online operations. Any attempt that touches upon private 
actors is far more likely to be a lightning rod, and equally likely to come under assault by free 
market advocates who contend that private actors should be wholly unfettered in their practices, 
choices, and commercial plans. 
 
Nonetheless, the government should strive to incentivize interoperability by crafting policies that 
make it more profitable than not to make interoperable systems. Such efforts will require some 
industry lobbying, which can be rendered especially powerful if efforts can be made to align the 
interests of as many content industry companies, tech companies, Internet service providers, 
consumer advocates, and other key players as possible. Government incentives should operate on 
a number of planes, including for instance: (a) offering faster or cheaper bandwidth to companies 
with interoperable systems and/or devices; (b) offering some tax relief to companies that actively 
pursue interoperability in their design choices (again, this may not prove politically feasible); (c) 
passing regulations that would make it harder to place digital protections on recorded content; (d) 
                                                
180 In differing ways, Microsoft, Nokia, and RIM Blackberry are cases in point. 
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offering incentives to content producers to sell content to companies with interoperable systems; 
and so on. 
3. Licensing/Streaming 
 
Some music industry observers contend that music, like other creative content (for instance, 
book publishing and e-books) is moving away from an ownership model toward a content 
streaming and licensing model.181 They argue that consumers are relinquishing a preference for 
physical ownership of content and moving toward a preference for content that is readily 
available but not owned.182 For instance, music content may be licensed by a consumer, kept in a 
cloud (possibly temporarily), and consumed until the licensing contract ends; then the content is 
either kept (bought), or, more likely, cycled through (that is, forgotten, replaced, discarded) by 
the consumer. This form of consumption essentially treats music and other creative content as a 
commodity: although in the case of creative work the commodity itself is ephemeral, it is still 
subject to transactions, retail pricing, and so on. The only difference that has emerged in this era 
is that its value is not for the most part seen as lasting or meriting saving in a permanent medium. 
 
a. Promoting Licensing/Streaming 
The key ways in which music industry participants should satisfy consumer demand and promote 
music licensing and streaming are straightforward.183 First, as has already been undertaken by 
Apple, the industry should change the preponderance of online music distribution contracts to be 
licensing-based, rather than sales-based (some outright sales may still be retained, such as the 
sale of CDs on Amazon and other online stores). Second, the industry should change music 
broadcasting rates by standardizing them across the board, putting online music streaming such 
                                                
181 Christopher Morris, Album Sales Continue Decline, Music Streaming Rises in 2014, VARIETY (Jan. 6, 
2015), http://variety.com/2015/music/news/album-sales-continue-decline-music-streaming-rises-in-2014-
1201394229/ (noting the nine percent decline in album sales in 2014 and that an eight percent decline was 
registered in 2013); Katie Marsal, Digital Music Sales Dropped 9% in 2014 While Streaming Surged 
54%, APPLEINSIDER (Jan. 2, 2015, 10:31 AM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/15/01/02/digital-music-
sales-dropped-9-in-2014-while-streaming-surged-54 (citing the Apple acquisition of the Beats Music 
streaming service, in addition to the larger trends in industry data, in support of the idea that streaming is 
overtaking content ownership in the music industry).  
182 See, e.g., Alan McGlade, Steve Jobs Was Wrong – Consumers Want To Rent Their Music, Not Own It, 
FORBES (March 25, 2014, 1:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanmcglade/2013/03/25/steve-jobs-
was-wrong-consumers-want-to-rent-their-music-not-own-it/.  
183 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.A.2, III.B, IV.A, V.C. 
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as Pandora, Rdio, on a level playing field with traditional radio broadcasting. Third, the industry 
should encourage record labels to agree to pricing of music sales and streaming. so they can 
uphold content prices to keep the industry viable long-term184. Fourth, if possible, the industry 
should create policies that encourage record labels to enter into agreements with Amazon, 
Pandora, Rdio, and other distributors on a relatively equitable footing.185 
 
These efforts are paramount to making licensing rights more readily available and profitable, 
primarily by standardizing and streamlining their operations in various digital contexts, and by 
expanding the range of business arrangements that can be made by music producers who seek to 
capitalize on growing digital audiences. However, it is important to recognize that some open 
questions are bound to persist. First, as in the case of interoperability, it is far from clear which 
of these initiatives are politically possible. Even if the music industry can shape business 
practices via incentives-based initiatives, there is likely to be some degree of resistance, if not 
outcry, when large-scale cooperative agreements are introduced and attempted. For instance, the 
music industry response to standardization of online music streaming, and reconciliation with 
traditional music radio broadcasting, has been rife with dissent among interested parties.186 
Further, the likelihood new entrants, such as independent start-ups, will be interested in joining 
such agreements will complicate matters, both due to discrepancies among players and due to the 
ongoing nature of rollouts that will require some negotiation and resolution. Finally, industry 
observers and participants may raise concerns that policies promoting wide-scale private 
arrangements, particularly those promulgated by governmental fiat, may skirt freedom of 
contract principles. The music industry should be prepared to address these concerns, and should 
realize that they must be allayed in order to achieve the maximum possible industry buy-in. 
 
                                                
184 Importantly, the industry should also fight vigorously against antitrust suits that may be brought 
alleging industry-wide price-fixing, as has occurred in the book publishing industry with respect to e-
book pricing. This will likely entail a combination of lobbying, outreach, educational campaigns, and so 
forth. 
185 The dominance of Amazon as a retailer and pace-setter is admittedly bound to make this a challenge. 
186 See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Thom Yorke Hates Spotify, Doesn’t Mind YouTube for Some Reason, 
EVOLVER.FM, (Oct. 11, 2013, 9:43 AM), http://evolver.fm/2013/10/11/thom-yorke-hates-spotify-doesnt-
mind-youtube-for-some-reason/. 
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4. Making a Music Market 
 
Music industry participants, including music-related creators, producers, retailers, technology 
companies, and providers (such as ISPs), should join forces and create a consortium to address 
and resolve some of the most pressing industry-wide issues, as discussed in chapter 4, p. 80. 
Such a music consortium should create a newly unified market in music content and related 
products, with some emphasis on targeting the challenges of the digital music arena.  It should 
also serve as a voice for the industry, which will be essential when the industry needs to lobby 
for change among consumers, policymakers, funders, and other stakeholders. If successful, the 
consortium can offer a model that other content producers, like e-book publishers, will be able to 
emulate and adapt as best suits their fields. While the effectiveness of the RIAA in representing 
the industry is a much-contested issue in the industry, it should be well-suited to adopting these 
priorities and initiatives. The industry should put these interests before the RIAA and seek to 
reform it accordingly. 
 
a. Making a Music Consortium Entails Some Baseline Efforts 
Any efforts at creating a music consortium will find it essential, but challenging, to bring a fully 
representative sampling of music industry participants to the table. As seen in the case of fashion 
and other creative industries that are trying to create consensus on industry-wide policies and 
practices, it is always hard to align interests, fix agreed-upon goals, address the needs of varying 
constituents, set markers for success, and so on.187 The best solution that the industry must 
embrace is to set limited and agreed-upon tactics, goals and practices. Further, industry 
participants should agree from the outset that canvassing user experience and satisfaction will 
bring critical information to bear on the industry’s goals and plans. This is a relatively 
uncontroversial precept, as consumers are the ultimate target of the industry, and their 
consumption will keep the industry both viable and innovative. Thus, industry participants 
should make certain that they include representatives of the user community in any 
determinations of industry policies, direction, and initiatives. These consumer representatives 
may include non-profit organizations that are well-regarded lobbyists for consumer interests, 
knowledgeable users, or other groups that offer a representative sampling of user preferences. 
                                                
187 Indeed, these are prototypical collective action issues. 
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b. Business Goals of the Music Consortium 
Once industry participants establish a music consortium, they should explore more ambitious 
goals for the consortium to undertake that can improve the music market. One goal should be to 
create a kind of exchange or open market in creative properties, which should be concretely 
measurable in production units (such as single digital tracks or songs) for maximum efficiency. 
The features of a music exchange or market should to some extent resemble a commodities 
market,188 and should include: (a) a liquid market in readily available properties; (b) properties 
bought and sold on an exchange; with (c) open and transparent pricing showing where revenues 
are made, expenses incurred, and how returns such as royalties are allocated (how much do 
record labels get; how much do artists earn per song; and so on). The point of such an exchange 
should be to make consumers feel confident in their knowledge, choices, and the allocation of 
their support. This will enable them to feel confident that (a) they have maximum music 
availability; (b) they are making an informed choice among comparable offerings; (c) they know 
where their money is going, who it’s paying (many music consumers want to compensate 
creative talent, but feel too much is going to the middleman, such as labels, providers, marketers, 
and so on), and on what basis pricing decisions are made; and (d) music is fairly priced. These 
measures should go a long way toward reassuring consumers that the music market compensates 
artists fully and fairly, and that consumers are supporting costly production of high quality 
products or inexpensive production of disposable products, both of which are possible and 
indeed desirable in a rich and active market.189 
                                                
188 One caveat is that technically and functionally music properties are not and cannot be commodities, in 
the sense that they’re not fungible, not easily quantified, and so on. But they can still be sold more openly 
and widely, with more information to consumers as to pricing, payment of royalties, and so on. 
189 It is not possible to predict whether or not this will put an end to consumer dissatisfaction or demand. 
For instance, in the case of e-book publishing, consumers felt that electronic books “should” cost less. 
than hard copy books, as the costs of physical book production would presumably be lower than the costs 
of creating wholly electronic properties. See, e.g., Jeremy Greenfield, Consumers Upset and Confused 
Over E-Book Pricing, DIGITAL BOOK WORLD (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.digitalbookworld.com/2012/consumers-upset-and-confused-over-e-book-pricing/. Consumer 
dissatisfaction was roiled in the industry when e-book publishers were seen as unfairly propping up 
elevated e-book prices. Id. The antitrust lawsuit that was brought against e-book publishers effectively put 
an end to this latter concern, but it came at a critical cost to the industry. See Nate Raymond & Alison 
Frankel, Apple Agrees to Conditional $450 million e-books antitrust accord, REUTERS (July 16, 2014, 
1:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/16/us-apple-ebooks-settlement-
idUSKBN0FL22P20140716. Many publishers now contend that they are losing money on book sales, and 
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Treating music like a commodity may or may bring prices down, but it should be accompanied 
by an outreach program that informs consumers of the value of their commodity, and the fact 
that the value is benefiting the “right” people, like creators, producers, technicians, and others 
who are integral to the process of music production.190 As the consortium matures and becomes 
adept at undertaking these tasks, and at the same time garners acceptance and trust of the user 
community, industry participants should consider further expanding its role. One avenue they 
should consider is to use the consortium to open up delivery channels that are owned, managed, 
administered, and developed in-house, by members of the music industry, rather than relying 
solely on third-party distributors. These services should include music streaming sites, online 
stores, recording and production service providers, and other music purveyors (such as tie-ins to 
printed music, learning software, instrument sales, and other music-related output).191 
 
c. Copyright Goals of the Music Consortium 
Industry participants should ensure that IP lobbying (both public and private, including efforts 
within the community and before policymakers and the public) are part of the consortium efforts. 
Consortium lobbying should be targeted at concrete aims and directives. For instance, one 
important goal is the reform of online music streaming,192 which is proving immensely popular 
                                                                                                                                                       
that the industry decline is unsustainable. See, e.g., Natasha Bertrand, How Amazon's Ugly Fight With A 
Publisher Actually Started, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2014, 1:14PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-did-the-amazon-feud-with-hachette-start-2014-
10#ixzz3VzXm7By0. Moreover, the dominant e-book seller, Amazon, is now demanding that e-book 
publishers negotiate new contracts (many of the existing contracts are set to expire soon) that offer far 
more favorable terms to Amazon, and that further reduce publishers’ margins. Id. It is arguable that had 
publishers undertaken a large-scale, even international, campaign explicating basic publishing industry 
practices and defending their pricing, they would have avoided some of the customer blowback. If music 
is able to establish a consortium that addresses some of these matters efficiently, publishing will do well 
to learn from and emulate its example.  
190 In many respects, this is comparable to the fair trade/fair market movement in coffee. 
191 It is possible that music producers and other participants will prove resistant to creating purveyors of 
music materials. This is similar to objections that are currently being voiced by e-book publishers with 
respect to selling books online: many book publishers do not like Amazon, and do not feel they can clear 
their margins if they accede to Amazon’s contract terms, but at the same time they do not want or feel 
equipped to enter Amazon’s logistics space and create online retailers themselves. Again, music industry 
participants should set the pace here, and if they prove successful, should point the way to online retail 
opportunities for a host of creative content industries. 
192 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.A.2, III.B, IV.A, V.C. 
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among consumers and yet less popular among musicians due to its minimal royalty returns. In 
this regard, the consortium should at a minimum lobby for standardized practices in music 
delivery systems, ensuring both that radio broadcasting is not operating at an advantage versus 
its online counterpart and that an innovative venue for music delivery is not strangled by onerous 
regulations, excessive regulatory rates, and unfair pricing constraints.193 
 
5. Open Questions 
 
As noted, it is possible that the market created by a music consortium would raise antitrust 
concerns among policymakers and/or industry critics (as in case of the recent price-fixing lawsuit 
successfully brought against e-book publishers). An open question arises if the industry brings 
technology companies into their purview in order to bolster their interests, strengthen their 
position, and involve a highly interested and critical commercial ally. Music industry participants 
certainly should consider technology companies as essential partners whose cooperation and 
support are likely to prove beneficial overall. But the inclusion of tech companies such as Apple 
may have adverse affects as well, such as heightening the scrutiny and concern of policymakers 
who are alert to antitrust behavior, such as price fixing, cartel-like practices, and so on. 
 
Another concern is that a music consortium that yields real power, and that tries to effect real 
change, is inherently a novel and risky proposition. Even attempts by an existing industry 
representative, the RIAA, have proven a double-edged sword: for instance, their lawsuits against 
alleged individual infringers have created a great deal of consumer consternation and backlash, 
and have not appreciably succeeded in quelling infringing activities (such as uploads to peer-to-
peer file sharing services) to boot. One possibility that industry participants should contemplate 
is to agree amongst themselves to create a consortium that is meant to exist and operate on a 
time-limited and experimental basis. Another possibility is to approach government 
representatives, policymakers, and other key political figures to seek early approval of the 
consortium, even prior to taking action. After all, the content industries, music included, are 
responsible for billions of dollars of commercial activity, and the long-term protection of their 
                                                
193 The problem here is that there are vested interests that are strongly opposed to changing the copyright 
terms for music streaming. But concerted efforts on the part of a band of industry participants will likely 
prove more successful than leaving the online streaming companies to fight their battles alone. 
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property rights is readily acknowledged to be integral to the U.S. economy. By obtaining a broad 
base of buy-in, the music industry should secure its interests in creating an effective consortium, 
which it should then use to innovate in both policy and commerce. Finally, the largest open 
question is whether a music consortium would effect or contribute to improvements across the 
industry that put it on a better track toward commercial health and long-term profitability. 
Perhaps the biggest counterargument to such concern is the fact that the industry is facing 
immediate challenges that are not being solved, and have not been solved, since the incursion of 
disruptive innovation in the late 1990’s. The creation of a music consortium is a proactive and 
innovative step in another direction; and whether or not it is the right direction will only be seen 




1. Copyright Solutions 
 
a. Clarify Copyright Terms of Creative Borrowing (Such as Sampling, Remixes, Mash-Ups, 
Etc.) 
The music industry should appreciate and encourage the growth of technology-enhanced musical 
creativity across the spectrum of artists, emerging talent, and enthusiasts. Techniques such as the 
use of computers to generate music, sample works and blend samples into interesting pastiches 
or new compositions altogether, privately record music with high production quality and 
showcase works on websites and blogs, and other newly emerging and innovative practices, are 
more likely to keep the field fresh and appealing than to stifle commercial results. Creative 
borrowing in content fields should be recognized as a net positive feature of creativity, rather 
than as an impediment to protection of already-existing copyrights and products.194 For these 
reasons, the industry should welcome genuine artistic borrowing, but should develop clear 
policies, guidelines and norms as to what constitutes, or will be deemed, acceptable creative use 
and what will be regarded as overly imitative reproduction and appropriation. The industry 
should strive to leave ample room for new forms of creativity, such as sampling, which not only 
                                                
194 See also discussion in supra Chapter 4, section III.B. 
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can contribute to new and interesting music composition and production, but also can create 
entire new genres of contemporary work such as “mash-ups”.195 At the same time, the industry 
should not be constrained from seeking to obstruct clear violations (such as lifting an entire line 
of melody and passing it off as original without attribution or compensation to the artist), a task 
which should be made easier by the clearer guidelines called for here. The music industry should 
recognize that the sphere of creative artists in the musical world is ever-expanding, accelerated 
by the access that technology offers to budding talent and amateurs alike. Thus, the industry 
should actively seek the participation of as wide a range as possible of musicians, including 
amateurs and fans, at copyright drafting sessions, and should invite creators from the newer 
musical genres and practices, such as hip hop, rap, sampling, and so on are suitably represented. 
 
In shaping copyright policy and practices, the music industry should promote regulations that 
extend the definition of musical “covers”, and the right to make musical covers, to encompass a 
broader range of work and practices, so that composers who want to use earlier works (or 
portions or variations of work, such as chord progressions, melodies, and riffs) are able to avail 
themselves of prior works without being burdened by onerous licensing rules.196 The industry 
should likewise consider increasing the scope of permissiveness with respect to very short 
portions of works, or “snippets”, and establishing guidelines that either make snippets very easy 
                                                
195 One example is the rise of club DJs who specialize in mixing and “scratching” albums, and sampling 
pieces of work, and cobble these elements together to create startlingly original new works. While they 
have not generally sought copyright in their works (in part because they can be ephemeral, created in the 
course of a single night), they have built their reputation on this form of musical creativity, thereby 
revealing the appeal of their output to their audience. Artists such as Girl Talk, White Panda, and Danger 
Mouse have built massive followings by blending existing works in new ways. See, e.g., Julie Zeveloff, 
GIRL TALK, How I Actually Create The Musical Mashups That Make Crowds Go Insane, BUS. INSIDER 
(July 18, 2011, 5:10 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-girl-talk-makes-music-2011-7 (noting the 
millions of fans garnered by Greg Gillis, the artist behind Girl Talk); Forrest Wickman, The Grey Album 
Gets Remastered, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2012) 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2012/11/28/the_grey_album_remastered_download_or_stream_the
_unauthorized_remastering.html (describing the revolutionary nature of Danger Mouse’s Grey Album, 
which was released in 2004 and blends Jay-Z’s Black Album with the Beatles’ White Album). For a 
general overview of mashup culture, see Top Ten Mashup Albums of All Time, VIBE (June 14, 2013), 
http://www.vibe.com/2013/06/top-10-mashup-albums-all-time/.  
196 The tangled and cumbersome rights clearing processes in film, which has resulted in some long drawn 
out battles over licensing rights -- and which has obstructed the production of several films due to the 
inability of the parties to come to a resolution over rights -- is a case in point. In several of these cases, the 
use of as little a portion as a few seconds of an earlier work is at dispute. This is a cautionary tale, 
revealing the risk of throttling an industry that an overly restrictive rights policy is bound to pose. See 
also the discussion in supra Chapter 4, section IV.A.   
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to license,197 curtailing the right to assert copyright in these short sections of work, or exempt 
them from copyright claims altogether, possibly under an expansive fair use treatment.198 The 
distinctive treatment accorded to snippets should not affect copyright in the work as a whole: it is 
only when the fragment is at issue that this exceptional treatment should occur. The industry 
should apply this treatment to very short works that are meant to introduce the listener to the 
work, as in the case of iTunes’ free snippets that introduce listeners to works that they have 
sought on the iTunes Store website. This treatment would be analogous to that of snippets in the 
context of Google Books and its related search features.199 
 
There are clearly roadblocks to this option. First, treating a portion of a work as wholly distinct 
from the work itself is a complicated matter, and diverges radically from standard copyright 
practice. At the same time, however, the use of stand-alone snippets has taken on new 
dimensions that also have little historical precedence. It is conceivable that the law can and 
should to these new practices and concerns. Further, the terms of the treatment of snippets must 
be defined and agreed upon. For instance, the definition of a snippet is open to debate, raising 
such questions as: what is its length (30 seconds, 1.5 minutes); does its length vary in relation to 
the length of the entire work, its recognizability, or other factors; does its accepted use vary with 
regard to the proposed use; can its use be restricted at its inception, so that maximum commercial 
value can be exploited until its peak viability is exhausted; and so on. Another concern is 
whether the fair use doctrine, is the appropriate means for exempting snippets from licensing 
rights and responsibilities.200 For instance, under a fair use exemption, any use of snippets would 
be permissible, which might prevent music creators from recovering licensing royalties in an 
array of uses that were not initially intended, such as movie rights, or imagined, such as the use 
of snippets in new digital contexts that are still to emerge. Lastly, if snippets prove to be 
immensely valuable, as has proven to be the case with respect to cellular telephone ringtones,201 
                                                
197 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, section IV.A, V.A. 
198 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.3.  
199 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections I.A.9, II.J, V.A.3. 
200 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.A.3. 
201 Although on decline in recent years, the market for ringtones hit $600 million in 2006. Breeanna Hare, 
Whatever happened to the ringtone?, CNN (May 16, 2013, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/09/tech/mobile/ringtones-phones-decline/. Even following a drop off in 
sales, ringtones still accounted for $167 million in sales in 2012. Id. 
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composers and producers are not likely to be willing to forego easy and reliable revenue streams 
that increase the revenues they can extract from their copyrighted material.202 
 
The industry should be prepared to hear lively dispute within its ranks, and should be ready to 
formulate responses that are transparent, flexible, and as even-handed as possible. Nonetheless,  
it should anticipate resistance among various interested parties. As mentioned, one downside is 
that liberalizing the use of snippets is likely to have some negative commercial ramifications. For 
instance, in the absence of copyright or licensing rights, certain lucrative uses of snippets, such 
as the sale of ringtones on cellphones, would not be monetizable, and the device manufacturers 
would likely be loathe to relinquish those revenue streams. Vested interests, therefore, would be 
opposed to the liberal use of snippets as much for commercial reasons as on principle, and would 
likely vocalize its resistance to relinquishing new revenues.203 This would make the liberalized 
and/or cost-free use of snippets a tough sell. Still, the industry can propose a tradeoff or a 
compromise, such as guidelines that contextualize the use of snippets and only allow them in 
certain accepted contexts. But raising this objection reveals just one point of complexity in a 
policy change that is no doubt bound to be challenging, fraught and protracted. The industry 
should recognize these challenges, and should anticipate various lobbying activities, such as 
seeking carve-outs or exceptions, which industry participants are likely to pursue, and which 
moreover is likely to make changing copyright a messier, harder to agree on, more costly to 
administer, and even more complex than it already is. 
 
If the industry does not want to commit to a complete overhaul of policy and practice, it should 
consider another option that would enable the creation of a kind of hybrid copyright. In this 
scenario, a composer would seek copyright in the complete work as usual, but voluntarily and 
expressly reserve the right to allow other to use snippets under a kind of partial Creative 
Commons license.204 While possibly complicated, particularly for the composer who must 
determine in advance how she intends to manage her composition, the hybrid copyright should 
allow both the protection of vital copyrights and the freedom to release portions of a musical 
work without completely relinquishing control over and credit in the snippets that are put to use. 
                                                
202 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection IV.A. 
203 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsection V.D.4. 
204 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections III.B, IV.D, V.D. 
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This should allow artists in pop, hip-hop, rap, and other genres that tend to be particularly subject 
to (and open to) creative borrowing of snippets to extend, and avail themselves of, the possibility 
of sharing without endangering their revenues in the work as a whole. The industry should 
follow the main precepts of the Creative Commons license, while not being constrained to adopt 
its exact model if it is not agreed upon by stakeholders. One such precept maintains that in the 
case of creative borrowing, liberal licensing and/or the expansion of use of borrowed works 
should be accompanied by norms and practices of attribution and recognition. (see Cultural, 
below) 
 
b. Objections: Costs to Music if it Tailors by Changing Copyright  
When pricing changes the IP balance altogether, it can be a good example of the limitations of 
the ability of copyright to manage or change an entire industry.205 In the case of music, sales of 
individual of units of work (songs), which disaggregated earlier larger units (records), has lead to 
a precipitous decline in net sales in the industry (even factoring out unpaid downloading and 
copying). The industry has stayed somewhat healthy through the "360 contracts" that make 
revenues from sales related to musicians' work, such as concert tickets/tours, merchandise, 
promotional materials, and so on. But in music, a strong IP regime, even wielded with some 
major enforcement efforts (such as lawsuits instigated by the RIAA), and coupled with attempts 
at some price discrimination,206 may not have lead to optimal industry production and profits. 
 
The limitations to wielding copyright rest in several factors. First, simply expanding the scope of 
copyright in musical components, such as expanding copyright to cover snippets of songs, 
however minute in length of melody or notes (for instance, a simple 3-note or 3-chord 
progression), may lead to greater revenue streams.207 However, it will likely be unduly 
burdensome on some legitimate uses of those works or components (for e.g., there are only so 
many note or chord progressions possible in music, and they may be used by composers without 
                                                
205 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections I.A, V.D.4. 
206 See, for example, iTunes movement away from the uniform $0.99 prices on songs to a three tiered 
system. Brad Stone, Want to Copy iTunes Music,? Go Ahead, Apple Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/technology/companies/07apple.html (noting Apple’s introduction of 
tiered pricing as well as, perhaps not coincidentally, the elimination of its DRM software).  
207 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.F. 
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intent to copy prior works). Moreover, expanded copyright will likely impose substantial 
licensing and/or cross-licensing costs (and related transaction costs, such as those related to 
negotiation, formalization, and so on) on an already-burdened industry. And they may have 
unintended consequences on the future use of snippets as new digital innovations emerge and 
compete for market share. 
 
Second, infinitely expanding copyright can sweep into its scope formerly legitimate uses that 
have typically been permitted, including certain personal uses (such as copying on multiple 
devices that one owns, making copies of songs for one’s friends), playing music recordings in 
private settings, as well as certain non-commercial uses or uses that fall in gray areas (such as 
playing music in public venues like a restaurant or sports facility).208 This can have adverse 
impact on users, follow-on creators, and a range of music aficionados, giving rise to audience 
pushback and resentment of the industry. In some cases, it may lead to users seeking ways to 
gain access to illicit music sources, simply due to the perception that the scope of what is 
allowed with one’s fairly purchased or licensed music has been reduced. While this kind of 
unintended consequence can be deleterious in the short run, it can be disastrous in the long run, 
particularly if it forms the basis for an entrenched antagonism to the music industry that persists 
among generations of its user base and fan base. 
 
Third, music, like many other creative industries, has functioned as a kind of constructed cultural 
commons, with norms and practices that cannot be superseded or replaced wholesale by 
copyright alone.209 Thus, expanding copyright risks undermining the commons by over-
restricting it and under-valuing its utility in keeping the industry healthy, balanced, and 
productive. As user-generated content is increasing, and likely to continue to increase, it 
becomes a new source of potentially marketable and commercially exploitable works for music 
industry professionals. The incorporation of UGC in the music marketplace is a notable 
development of the digital era, and should not be curtailed by overly restrictive copyright of 
original source material. By threatening to impose stringent copyright restrictions on such 
resources, the industry runs the risk of persuading creative artists that creative follow-on 
                                                
208 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.G. 
209 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.J, IV.C.  
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borrowing is not worth the cost or effort. If expansive and/or restrictive music copyright 
undermines or discourages user-generated creative content and alienates an active part of the 
user base, it may not be worth the costs of advancing and enforcing original copyrights that are 
part of music’s heritage and serve as building blocks to follow-on works. 
 
Fourth, no amount of copyright-based action alone will likely be able to thwart the most 
egregious online pirates from setting up online file sharing and/or streaming services (technology 
may advance to the point where this can be identified more quickly, thwarted by blocking 
devices, or by other means, but this would not constitute a pure copyright-based solution). It may 
be the case, therefore, that the industry must resign itself to allocating only a limited amount of 
resources to thwarting piracy, and recognize that it is unlikely to stop piracy in its tracks in a 
cost-effective and final manner. 
 
2. Solutions Based in Anti-Piracy Measures 
 
The music industry should continue to pursue forceful measures that thwart, challenge and 
sanction illegal music sharing and streaming sites such as BitTorrent, Pirate Bay, and so on.210 
However, the industry should work harder to distinguish this kind of large-scale pirating from 
the individual, small-scale activities that they have pursued, perhaps too aggressively, under the 
aegis of the RIAA.211 Clearly the industry is aware of the negative popular reactions and public 
relations backlash that the individual lawsuits have generated, and is retreating somewhat from 
their earlier stance of challenging a host of relatively minor alleged offenders. In their defense, 
piracy is a problem that plagues the industry and that is as impossible to destroy completely, like 
a many-headed Hydra that grows a new head in the place of each that is slain. But anti-piracy 
measures could be better implemented and pursued if efforts were more concerted both here and 
internationally. Some initiatives in this regard have emerged recently, and should be pursued and 
expanded, ideally on a global scale (especially as piracy often entails international players). The 
industry should concentrate its efforts, possibly via the music consortium proposed earlier, in 
                                                
210 See, e.g., Matt Murphy, Pirate Bay Co-Founder Arrested in Sweden, GAWKER (June 1, 2014, 1:45 
PM), http://gawker.com/pirate-bay-co-founder-arrested-in-sweden-1584465759. 
211 See the discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections V.C.  
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order to have a wider and more meaningful impact on piracy than the piecemeal efforts of its 
constituents will otherwise effectuate. 
 
3. Increase Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement 
 
The U.S. domestic music industry should consider following the European model of secondary 
liability for copyright infringement, which can confer responsibility on various third-party 
providers, such as content portals, delivery systems, and ISPs, as well as websites that serve as 
conduits such as YouTube, Pinterest, MySpace, and others. Industry participants may object to 
such broad policy changes for various reasons, arguing that an expansive scope of secondary 
liability deflects the problem onto ancillary parties; increases their burden and/or transaction 
costs; may make third parties more aggressive at surveilling and curtailing activity on websites 
like YouTube and other sites oriented toward user sharing and activity, which may hamper 
creative user activity, limit growth and innovation at such sites, and restrict a venue for new and 
potentially marketable musicians to bring their work to the attention of music producers and 
other industry players. 
 
4. Fix Regulation of Online Music Streaming (Including Pricing of Rights/Royalties) 
 
The music industry should normalize, strengthen and streamline the regulation of online 
streaming and licensing on services such as Pandora, Radio, and so on.212 It should also lobby to 
change the rules and rates related to performance rights and royalties so that streaming 
companies are able to be on a level competitive playing field with other broadcasters such as 
traditional radio. 
 
5. Streamline Music Rights by Unifying and Strengthening  
Collective Rights Organizations 
 
                                                
212 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections I.A  II.A.2, III.B, V.C. 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 449 
Some commentators contend that one of the strengths of the music industry is the growth and 
development of its rights-clearing organizations.213 They further argue that concentrating the 
various collective rights organizations that currently manage the array of music rights and 
royalties into a single entity will streamline processes and will help make the industry function 
more efficiently.214 The music industry should seriously consider proposals to unify the CROs, 
and should pay particular attention to the positive effects that such unification may promise. 
Advocates of streamlining the CROs argue that the move will reduce transaction costs; improve 
transparency; facilitate and ease the entry of new composers and artists in the market, and 
increase their access to the array of services that CROs have to offer (such as informational 
workshops, technological support, advice from senior artists and management, as well as the 
central service of managing music rights and royalties); reduce costs and complications relating 
to licensing and cross-licensing; achieve economies of scale by pooling the resources and 
expenses of CROs; and various other efficiencies. 
 
But while considering the prospect of streamlining music rights, the industry should ask whether 
having multiple agencies has promoted innovation through competition among the various 
entities. For instance,: new technologies launched under the aegis of BMI, such as the music 
recognition software Shazam,215 can spur ASCAP to innovate in its own areas of technological 
expertise. In sum, the music industry should ask whether or not streamlining rights organizations 
will help make the industry more robust. If the industry determines that streamlining promotes 
licensing and makes rights-clearing easier, it should move forward with the proposal, and defend 
its decision on the basis that streamlining rights management aligns well with the direction that 
the industry appears to be taking (that is, the increased reliance on licensing rights). 
 
6. Proactively Tackle Future Technologies That May Be Unfairly Disruptive 
 
                                                
213 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, section IV.A. 
214 See Carroll, supra note 132. 
215 See, e.g., Ralph Oman, Michael P. Ryan, Bhamati Viswanathan, The Songwriters’ Performing Rights 
Organization Imperative and Copyright Law for the Music Electronic Marketplace (working paper, 
2008)(on file with author). See generally BMI Acquires Shazam technology, MUSIC WEEK (Aug. 30, 
2005, 2:35 PM), http://www.musicweek.com/news/read/bmi-acquires-shazam-technology/028503.    
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The music industry should remain alert to technological innovations that may challenge its 
commercial practices and profits. For instance, the industry should ensure that if an equivalent to 
Aereo, or a similar company that engages in commercially challenging music broadcasting, 
emerges, the industry should lobby and/or litigate against its incursions.216 The industry should 
be prepared to defend itself against innovative but illegitimate services that threaten the 





The industry should work to make devices more interoperable and to encourage companies to be 
willing to arrange interoperable systems and content-sharing agreements. (see Business, above, 
and Cultural, below) 
2. Technological Protections 
 
Technological advances are increasing the efficacy of anti-copying measures such as DRM.218 
Vigorous industry efforts have also resulted in legislation, such as the DMCA, that legitimizes 
and supports the use of such protections.219 However, consumer resistance to anti-copying 
devices and measures has created an ongoing tension between the industry and the user 
community, resulting in public and costly battles that do not serve the industry well in the long 
run, either in terms of loss of good will or with respect to economic losses (for instance, Apple 
was compelled to remove FairPlay from its devices, presumably incurring wasteful losses in the 
process220). Resorting to restrictive technological anti-copying measures is therefore a fraught 
                                                
216 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections V.A, V.E. 
217 For an overview of Aereo and its legal battles, see Sarah Perez, TiVo Receives Approval to Acquire 
Aereo Assets, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/13/tivo-receives-approval-
to-acquire-aereo-assets/.  
218 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections I.A.10, IV.C, and V.A.  
219 Digital Millenium Copyright Act, H.R. 2281 105th Cong. (1997)(enacted).  
220 Nicola F. Sharpe and Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Is Apple Playing Fair? Navigating the iPod FairPlay 
DRM Controversy, 5 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 332 (2007); Urs Gasser & John G. Palfrey, Case 
Study: DRM-Protected Music Interoperability and e-Innovation (Berkman Center Research Publication 
No. 2007-9, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1033231; Slater, Derek and Gasser, Urs and 
Smith, Meg and Bambauer, Derek E. and Palfrey, John G. Content and Control: Assessing the Impact of 
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proposition, even for an industry that has been ravaged by rampant copying and file-sharing 
online. 
 
There are several courses that the music industry should pursue, but each of these comes at some 
cost. First, the industry should intensify its efforts to patrol the Internet for potential large-scale 
violators, and should litigate most forcefully against those whose incursions are of a magnitude 
worth pursuing. This would reduce the impact of anti-copying campaigns on individuals and 
smaller-scale alleged offenders, and possibly minimize the public relations effects of music 
industry litigation. The problem with this tactic is its innate cost: pursuing large, offshore and 
decentralized sites is always a challenge, and has not proved to be successful as a deterrent to 
new entrants in the file sharing space. Second, the industry should encourage the development of 
music recognition software that can recognize copyrighted music (for instance, building on 
innovative music recognition apps such as Shazam) so that licit and illicit sharing or streaming 
can be differentiated, and further pursue the development of software programs or apps that can 
block illegal streaming at the user end (for instance, building on blocking devices used by 
parents to prevent their children from seeing undesirable material online). This requires 
collaboration with technologically advanced companies, software engineers, or other innovators, 
and thus is dependent on outside forces to achieve effective results. Third, the industry should 
strive to ensure that its technological protections do not hinder important baseline practices and 
norms, such as fostering user activity and supporting long-term interoperability. With respect to 
the former, recent technologically-imposed restrictions on user activity have raised the ire of 
many consumers and consumer advocates. For instance, Apple has restricted the ability of Apple 
devices and iTunes to make personal copies of iTunes music to only a limited number of devices. 
This is a reduction of earlier practices and norms, and a curtailment of personal use that has been 
criticized by more than one commentator.221 This is a significant incursion on user rights, that 
has limited positive commercial impact, as it is not likely preventing personal copying that 
would have significant retail value.222 These kinds of measures may be popular in the music 
industry, as beleaguered participants tend to consider all forms of copying to pose a threat to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Policy Choices on Potential Online Business Models in the Music and Film Industries (Berkman 
Publication Series Paper No. 2005-01, Jan. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=654602.  
221 Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
222 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections III.B.5, V.B.4, and V.D.4. 
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their rents. But the industry should resist such knee-jerk reactions, and should consider keeping 
personal use as free from constraint as possible to be an important aim, not merely for public 
relations reasons but also to maximize consumer satisfaction among those who purchase or 
license music with the intention and desire of listening to and enjoying their music on as broad a 
range of devices as they can command. And fourth, the industry should promote collaborative 
and cumulative innovation in various areas that have an impact on music content creation, 
delivery, scalability, shareability, and other features that promote the commercial viability of the 
industry’s diverse creators, stakeholders and users.223 
 
3. Payment Systems 
 
In music, where the disaggregated unit seems parsed into increasingly minute segments (initially 
digital tracks and/or songs, now portions or snippets of the work), micropayments would be a 
useful feature to help users pay for music without feeling stung by seemingly unfair or unwieldy 
price-per-unit costs (for instance, it can be irksome to an ordinary consumer to be charged a few 
pennies, or a fraction of a penny, per work). The music industry should welcome and adopt a 
viable micropayment system, one of which is likely to emerge in the near future. 
 
D. Cultural 
1. Work to Promote Interoperability and Open Source Production and Sharing 
 
As stated earlier, the music industry should work to promote interoperability among music 
production, marketing and delivery systems, devices, portals and streaming services, and other 
providers and operators in the field. (See Business, above) By pushing for interoperable systems, 
content companies can strive to maximize their access to content delivery systems and end-user 
markets.(See Business, above) This is not readily addressed by policy-based solutions, in part 
due to the unpredictable nature of technological innovation and change. Cultural practices, 
however, can be driven to change by advocacy efforts that are made to creative content industries 
and related technology providers and that emphasize the benefits that accrue from 
interoperability and the positive returns that technology companies pursuing interoperability can 
                                                
223 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, subsections II.A.3, II.J, III.B.3, IV.C.3. 
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eventually realize. The music industry should point to increases in profits that occur when 
consumers are able to access music in as broad a way as possible, as indicated by trends in 
consumer preferences and purchases. Content companies should also lobby for governmental 
incentives that promote interoperability, even as they are bound to recognize the many possible 
shortcomings of such solutions, such as the challenges of lobbying and consensus-building; the 
slow pace of regulatory change; transaction costs; and so on. 
 
The industry should also point to the success of other fields that have benefited from 
interoperability, particularly when changing practices and norms have led to the emergence of 
collaborative solutions, such as the open source movement and the innovation it has spawned. 
The music industry should recognize a model in the computer industry and its successful 
incorporation of open source software in its commercial practices and production.224 There are 
many parallels that can be drawn between the history of music production, such as group 
movements that involved creative sharing and exchange, decentralized creation of new styles, 
genres, sounds, and songs, and innovations in music instrumentation, implementation, and 
production, and the open source movement in software, which likewise gives rise to innovation 
outside the contours of privatized ventures that are wholly commercially driven.225 The music 
industry should emphasize that this kind of production is vital to the generation of new musical 
works and genres. A strong cultural emphasis on music’s normative practices, including valuing 
non-formalized production and unconventional creation and sharing, is necessary to ensuring that 
music continues to flourish, not just as a creative industry but as a set of creative practices 
yielding a rich, diverse and lasting heritage of cultural work.  
 
2. Emphasize the Constructed Cultural Commons of Music 
 
In a constructed commons, creative work occurs within the borders of spaces that are delineated, 
to varying degrees, by members of the productive creative class as well as other interested 
                                                
224 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.B, II.C, III.B.4, III.B.6, III.C.2, and IV.D.1. 
225 See, e.g., Adam Wood, Open Source for Sacred Music Infrastructure, MUSIC FOR SUNDAYS (Feb. 4, 
2013), http://musicforsunday.com/2013/open-source-for-sacred-music-infrastructure (discussing what 
role if any is appropriate for IP in sacred music). See also Carroll, supra note 132; Michael W. Carroll, 
The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907 (2005). 
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stakeholders.226 It is debatable whether the universe of music can be described as being parsed 
into such definite clusters that are self-regulating and self-patrolled. But music does share many 
features of the constructed commons, with institutions that set the terms and act as administrators 
for important rights, such as PROs, those that speak for industry participants and lobby, legislate, 
and engage in legal actions on behalf of the industry, such as the RIAA, and those that undertake 
many of the protections that commons and guilds can offer, such as musicians’ unions, guild-like 
organizations (for e.g., the Songwriters Guild of America), and the like. Therefore, the music 
industry should recognize that it bears many of the features of the constructed cultural commons, 
and should learn from the examples of comparable commons in other creative fields. 
 
The music industry should recognize and condone, and openly extol where appropriate, the 
centrality of the constructed cultural commons in the production of music.227 Music has enjoyed 
many of the same norms as other creative fields, in which reputation, paying homage, attribution, 
awards and other rewards, and peer recognition of creativity have long been respected.228 These 
norms-based measures not only give artists incentives to create and improve their output, but 
they also play an important role in buttressing the more tangible returns artists gain from the 
business and copyright side of music production. Thus, they add value to the more formalized 
incentive scheme of copyright and other property rights, The importance of such norms is 
heightened when creative borrowing occurs in a field and may not be compensated For instance, 
taking a line, a riff, a chord sequence, a melody, or any recognizable part of a prior work cannot 
occur without compensation, and if it is not to be monetary, it should be compensatory in less 
tangible but still valuable ways. Recognition in music contributes to professional success (as in 
education, cuisine, or virtually any other creative field), and if “imitation is the highest form of 
flattery”, it should also be an explicit and attributed act. This is not a sinecure when wholesale 
theft occurs; it is a tradeoff made when users borrow from original works for legitimate creative 
reasons, such as to create a new work that is inspired by an original one. 
 
However, the industry should understand that the culture of recognition coupled with 
appropriation absolutely mandates the buy-in of artists across the spectrum. Music’s history is 
                                                
226 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections II.J. 
227 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, sections III.B.4.  
228 See discussion in supra Chapter 4.  
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rife with examples of great musicians (such as African-American musicians in genres including 
jazz, blues, R&B and American roots music) being subject to appropriation of their original 
works without receiving compensation, recognition, or any form of reward, tangible or 
otherwise. The industry should be aware that music copyright is intended in part to forestall the 
wholesale appropriation that can occur, and that can either dis-incentivize creative artists who are 
uncompensated or simply mean that they continue to create without being able to earn a 
livelihood from their creations.229 If the music industry chooses to limit music copyright’s scope 
in order to promote creative borrowing -- particularly the kind that occurs when eager amateurs 
take music into their own hands and homes and create works that are inspired by love -- then it 
must strive to ensure that the norms of music otherwise duly appreciate, intangibly reward, and 
recognize the original composer. The industry should emphasize that the constructed cultural 
commons of music considers “making a name for oneself” to be an important goal, not just a 
vanity project. Monetizing creativity should be valued, but in the interest of growing and 
nurturing creativity, as well as replenishing music’s treasure trove, recognizing and honoring 
creativity should likewise be valued and promoted across the music industry spectrum. 
 
3. Support UGC, Openness, Users’ Rights, and the Public Domain 
 
The music industry should recognize and make room for creative borrowing, which can generate 
new works that are commercially promising and culturally enriching.230 Nowhere is this more 
important than in the support and openness that are required for user-generated content to thrive. 
Supporting UGC should be considered in part an effort to advance content production that will 
provide new revenue sources for the industry, particularly as innovative music delivery systems 
make such music more accessible, desirable and marketable to new audiences. But it should also 
be considered as part of a plan to promote users’ rights, particularly when taken in conjunction 
with efforts to curtail DRM, expand interoperability, support existing personal use, and enable 
new genres that are predicated on creative borrowing, such as sampling, to emerge and be 
sustained. The music industry should also be aware that championing users’ rights will help 
contribute to improving relations between the industry and its audiences, which naturally will 
                                                
229 See discussion in supra Chapter 4, Part 4. 
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advance its bottom-line goals, as these same audiences overlap extensively (if not wholly) with 
its consumer base. In other words, the support between the industry and its end users and 
consumers must be mutual, and must be recognized and advanced by both sides. Finally, there 
are entire areas of music production that are non-commercially based, and these works are 
equally important to the collective cultural trove as those that have some commercialized or 
professionalized basis. These non-commodified works are an important part of the public 
domain, and while they may be brought into the domain of protected music at some future point 
(as occurred in the case of many later-copyrighted works), their IP status does not determine 
their worth, but rather instantiates and formalizes only a part of their worth. Creative content 
industries like music should be keenly aware of the value of a rich public domain, and should 
take every action possible to sustain their public domain, both for commercial reasons and for 
broader normative ones.231 
 
4. Need to Address (And Improve) Users’ Attitudes 
 
Broadly speaking, the music industry’s recent history of interaction with its user base has been 
thorny and fraught with misunderstanding, miscommunication, and mistrust. The industry should 
recognize that improving communications, and thereby improving users’ perspective on the 
industry, is an immediate goal that will lead to stronger commercial prospects in the long run. 
There are several corrective measures that the industry should begin to implement immediately, 
such as initiating public awareness campaigns that will help users to understand the costs of 
pirating, not merely to music producers but especially to creative composers and performers. By 
increasing musicians’ outreach to listeners via online efforts, advertising, and campaigns, the 
industry will help users and listeners feel they are paying artists rather than primarily supporting 
middlemen. The industry should coordinate outreach efforts, such as colloquia and other 
exchanges that allow emerging and/or struggling artists to discuss their concerns with receptive 
audiences, and to explain exactly how piracy makes unwarranted inroads on their livelihoods. 
Increasingly, many listeners and amateurs are endeavoring to join the ranks of bread-winning 
musicians; and their concerns and interests should also be taken into account by more influential 
members of the industry. The music CROs have already begun to point the way to addressing the 
                                                
231 Id. 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 457 
range of musicians that they serve by offering an array of services that help manage their rights, 
defend them against infringement, and educating them as to rights, responsibilities and defenses 
that are at their disposal. 
 
a. How to Get Listeners to Pay For Music? 
One of the most challenging, but obviously most vital, imperatives facing the music industry is 
how to get users to pay for music when many of them (particularly the generation that has come 
of age with file sharing services) have become accustomed to getting access to music for free. 
The strategies for meeting this challenge that the industry should adopt are varied, and some will 
require refinement or restructuring as the degree of their efficacy is revealed. First, as discussed 
earlier in this section, industry participants should approach listeners at the points where they are 
currently getting access to music, and to monetize uses that are commercially viable and valid. 
For instance, music that is used in video games, as background music in various settings 
(whether live or recorded), and so on, can and should be monetized by the enforcement of 
copyright. This may entail carving out exceptions to other important policies: for instance, if the 
industry decides to allow expansive use of snippets for non-commercial use, it may opt to 
exempt commercial use of snippets, as in the case of ringtones, and require that such use remains 
compensable. Second, in pursuit of new revenue sources the industry should scour new points of 
contact, such as music festivals and fairs, album releases (for instance, possibly charge a 
premium for pre-releases, offering additional content only available online, and so on), artists’ 
websites, and other sites at which artists and fans are likely to interact. Third, the industry should 
emphasize subscription services, whether such services offer music streaming, licensing or 
purchasing, as well as membership-based groups, or organizations that turn listeners into 
regularly-paying subscribers.232 Fourth, the industry should harness the resources of PROs (such 
as clout, technology, administrative/organizational framework and support system, scope of 
artists, range of reach, lobbying arm, and funds) to support artists’ outreach to their audiences. 
This should not be limited to educational campaigns, but should extend to marketing, public 
relations, efforts to reach audiences via various media, and a range of other activities. Eventually, 
                                                
232 Such services are, roughly speaking, online versions of earlier album subscription services, such as the 
now-defunct Columbia House Record Club. In their day, these subscription services were both popular 
and lucrative; and their newest iteration should have the potential to match or exceed their appeal and 
success. 
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the PROs should be able to help musicians monetize these strategies, for instance by charging 
for, and selling music and merchandise, live public appearances. Finally, the music industry 
should strive to show users how to support composers and musical acts, whether by 
micropayments, advance music purchases, voluntary donations, or other innovative alternatives 
to standard commercial practices that are sure to emerge as online payment becomes more 
widely accepted, standardized, and adopted by a majority of Internet users, not just in the 
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CHAPTER 6: SALIENT FACTORS 
INTRODUCTION  
 
An array of diverse creative content industries are wrestling with many of the same disruptive 
innovations and challenges as those faced by the fashion, music and education sectors. They are 
well-suited to following the kinds of analytical evaluation that these three industries have 
undertaken; however, each industry will naturally be required to construct its own tailored 
response to disruptive innovation, and its own set of business and intellectual property (“IP”) 
strategies and goals that will lead to long-term viability and growth. How best to tackle these 
complex issues? Following is a blueprint that is necessarily broadly drawn, but that also poses 
specific questions designed to shape an analysis, lays the groundwork for inquiry into industry-
specific needs, and provides examples from a range of creative content industries to illustrate 
possible solutions. While these prescriptions are intended to lead to well-crafted and tailored 
solutions, they are more a starting point for prompting proactive reflection among creative 
content industries than a final resting place. Most importantly, they stand as an action plan, and 
allow the earlier analysis of fashion, music and education to light the way for creativity in other 
sectors to be incentivized, monetized, and made accessible to new and existing users, disruptors, 
innovators and creators. 
 
The analytic framework that creative content industries begins by dividing the fundamental areas 
of inquiry into four broad rubrics that are parallel to those used in the earlier analysis of the 
fashion, music and education industries. Within each of these areas of concern, the framework 
poses a set of central questions that address the basic structure and makeup of a given industry, 
in terms of business plans and strategies, IP-based practices and policies, technological solutions 
and guidelines, and cultural values and norms. Depending on the answers to these inquiries, the 
framework then offers possible business and IP-based solutions. Finally, real world examples are 
suggested as both guidelines and instructive models for success, with the caveat that even their 
paradigms may shift and require adaptation to a host of challenges, including environmental, 
political and/or regulatory changes, shifts in consumer preference and/or user adoption and 
practices, technological advances, and other reconfigurations of the creative landscape. 
 




A. Introduction to Business Issues 
 
The first set of issues that creative content industries should consider involves the business plans 
and practices that they have mapped out. These questions work at both structural and operational 
levels—that is, they ask how the industry is configured and how it carries out its functions—and 
each question works on a stand-alone basis and in conjunction with others. They are for the most 
part addressed separately, except when they are so linked as to form a unified or overarching 
concern. Taken together, they are linked by their centrality to the industry’s particular business 
paradigm. The questions presented are: (i) How fluid/resilient/adaptable is your business model? 
(ii) Can you change your profitability paradigm by moving to revenue-generating sources; and 
how much can you change or affect your pricing and/or price discriminate? (iii) How important 
is licensing vs. ownership to your business model? (iv) Do you (still) rely on 
middlemen/intermediaries? If so, how good are your PROs/CROs/clearing-houses? and (v) How 
do you remunerate your labor? 
 
B. How Fluid/Resilient/Adaptable is Your Business Model? 
 
1. Questions for Analysis 
 
Creative content industries should begin their analysis with an assessment of the disrupted 
landscape they face, and move toward identifying and implementing tailored solutions that will 
optimally meet their challenges and position them for future growth. The inquiry should start 
with an analysis of the dominant business model that is currently being deployed. The questions 
raised should be familiar from the earlier discussion of the three creative content industries. First, 
how high are industry production costs? Second, how fixed are industry production costs? That 
is, can such production costs be changed by technology? And can the industry harness 
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technological innovations and changes to its benefit by reducing production costs?1 Third, do 
recouping costs need to be built into the business model? That is, does the investment have to be 
profitable early on in its life cycle, or can its expenditures (including start-up costs) be amortized 
over time, subsumed into other larger capital outlays, or otherwise absorbed?2 Fourth, in which 
core property or properties does the industry’s value-add proposition inhere? That is, can creative 
works be treated differently when they are offered on a stand-alone basis versus when they are 
offered as part of a package?3 Fifth, has the industry fully exploited its currently protected IP 
holdings? And has it taken into consideration and adjusted to any expansions in its rights to such 
exploitation that have been recently granted by copyright policy and law?4 Sixth, how dependent 
is the industry on advertising revenues? Does it have the ability to move beyond advertising-
                                                
1 In the case of music, the industry can reduce costs of using agents and representing new artists by 
searching for musical talent on YouTube and other online sources. See Chapter 3, Section V.F. In the case 
of education, the industry can use cheaper and larger online courses to supplement their regular courses, 
teach more students for more revenues, or use third-party educators to add to course catalogs. See Chapter 
2, Introduction. In the case of fashion, the industry can use social media to disseminate patterns, use 
websites like etsy.com to sell lower-end but unique designs, or use bloggers to move merchandise rather 
than expensive print magazines. 
2 In the case of universities, for instance, some costs can be deemed part of an annual operating budget, 
and can be offset by various funds, such as endowment, grants, outside funding, or funds raised by 
lucrative activities at the school (like football games, executive education, and so on). See Business 
Models for Online Higher Education, HANOVER RES. REP., 
http://www.hanoverresearch.com/insights/business-models-for-online-higher-education/?i=non-profit-
organizations. 
3 In the case of education, this distinction has been drawn between single courses versus a degree-granting 
program; in the case of music, distinct treatment is given to single songs versus entire albums (including 
artwork, lyrics, and other features of a CD’s jewel box). 
4 In the case of music, this may include exploitation of performance rights at a broad range of venues, 
such as restaurants, sports facilities, etc.; ringtones and other new forms of content delivery; copies made 
across different devices, or that exceed the authorized copies permitted on given devices; and so on. See, 
e.g., Jennifer Mariano Porter, Comment, Compulsory Licensing and Cell Phone Ringtones: The Phone Is 
Ringing, a Court Needs to Answer, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 907 (2007); Ellen Rosner Feig, Do Cellular 
Ringtones Violate the Copyright Act?, LEGAL ZOOM (Dec. 2009), 
https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/do-cellular-ringtones-violate-the-copyright-act. In the case of 
comedy, this may include recordings of live performances, staged readings, etc. See Michael J. Madison, 
Response, Of Coase and Comics, Or, the Comedy of Copyright, 95 VA. L. REV. 27 (2009). In the case of 
cuisine, this may include performance rights, such as chefs doing demonstrations, lectures, television 
shows, competitions such as Iron Chef, etc. See Malla Pollack, Intellectual Property Protection for the 
Creative Chef, or How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 (1991). In 
the case of yoga and certain sports activities, this may include teaching moves and poses, routines, 
programs (Tabata, CrossFit, etc.), football plays, etc. See, e.g., Alexander Bussey, Streching Copyright to 
its Limit: Copyrightability of Yoga and Other Sports Movements in Light of the U.S. Copyright Office’s 
Characterization of Compilations, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1 (2013).  
Chapter 6: Salient Factors Viswanathan 
 462 
supported models?5 Seventh, can competitors secure first mover advantage and capitalize on 
their standing within the industry?6 Eighth, how important is price signaling to the industry? Do 
consumers rely upon clear, transparent and readily available pricing information, as exemplified 
by the case of commodities, or do consumers accept (or embrace) price opacity?7 
 
2. Business Solutions 
 
Content industries must realistically assess their production costs and values. They should 
harness technology on all points of the value chain, from creation through production through 
marketing and distribution and sales. They should also consider new ways of using technology to 
garner more profits out of their properties wherever possible. If feasible, content industries 
should consider forfeiting short-term payoffs in order to secure market position (possibly using 
loss leaders as a strategic tool) and to seek a long-term payoff.8 They should also continue 
seeking advertising revenues, but should attempt where possible to reduce reliance on 
advertising-supported models by exploring other revenue-generating models. Advertising should 
                                                
5 In the case of music, this may include revamping business models for online music streaming and other 
forms of digital music delivery.  
6 The case of Apple iTunes is one of the clearest examples of such first mover advantage and the 
advantageous positioning it has secured for the company in the music sector (despite the fact that Apple is 
primarily a technology company, it is still a hugely dominant player in the music industry to date). See 
generally supra Chapter 3, subsections II.B.1 & III.A.2. 
7 In the case of music, pricing of music is generally clear (but the allocation of revenues among industry 
participants may not be available to outside audiences). In the case of fashion, arguably price opacity is 
accepted and/or embraced by consumers, some of whom enjoy the “hunt for the bargain,” sales, and other 
common industry practices. In the case of education, pricing is somewhat clear, as the sticker price of 
schools is readily available. However, “discounts” given in the form of scholarships, grants, loans, and 
other aid can have a considerable effect on sticker price. Some of these may also be negotiable, variable, 
and highly unstandardized. Therefore, opacity goes hand-in-hand with tuition pricing at traditional 
schools. However, in the case of single course units, there may be less variation between the price that is 
stated and that which is actually paid.   
8 In the case of education, the elite institutions and some spinoffs, such as Coursera, are sacrificing 
immediate payoffs in the search for market position and ultimate profitability. Coursera has shown that 
ensuring first mover advantage has significant benefits, as it has been able to corner the MOOC market 
among elite institutions, virtually compelling many schools to join its ecosystem and thereby reinforcing 
its lock-up. See generally Michael Horn, The Intrigue of Coursera, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelhorn/2013/12/19/the-intrigue-of-coursera/. Much like technology 
companies that are able to corner the market and compel consumers to work within their ecosystem—
even at the price of interoperability—the ability of content industry participants to corner a market may be 
the single most important step in ensuring their competitive viability over the long haul. 
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be considered a useful tool in sustaining the industry, but not a silver bullet that solves the 
industry’s profitability equation. 
 
3. IP Solutions 
 
Content industry participants should consider the extent to which they want to invest in trying to 
secure market position by the business strategies outlined above. They may then choose to add 
layers of IP to ensure protection of their revenue-generating properties while still covering other 
goals, such as retaining maximum flexibility, gaining buy-in from labor, and ensuring that they 




Most commercial industries producing highly finished content are likely to factor high 
production costs as a major expense, such as entertainment, journalism, and print publishing. 
Other more individualized industries may have slightly lower costs, such as comedy, yoga, 
magic, and exercise.9 Some content industries may be able to harness technology to increase the 
value that their properties offer. For instance, the publishing industry should try to profit from 
licensing rights in extracts or abstracts of works that can be widely made available through 
electronic devices, as the music industry has done with ringtones. Google Search already makes 
short snippets available, but has secured a ruling that they fall under the fair use exemption to 
copyright protection.10 However, longer extracts and abstracts may still be fair game, and may be 
                                                
9 See generally Christopher J. Sprigman & Dotan Oliar, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L.. REV. 
1789 (2008) (discussing comedy); Kristen McCallion & Sara O’Coin, Yoga, Exercise or Dance, INTELL. 
PROP. MAG., March 2013, at 28, available at 
http://www.fr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/McCallion,OCoin.IPMagazine.YogaExerciseDance.March2
013.pdf (discussing Yoga and exercise); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: How Magicians Protect 
Intellectual Property without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS (Christine Corcos, 
ed., 2010) (discussing magic). There are a few caveat here. For instance, creating new exercise classes, 
such as cycling/spinning, step aerobics, weights classes, or pole dancing classes may require some 
investment in creating and perfecting the equipment and training. But these creative endeavors generally 
involve a single performer, minimal props, and relatively low production costs. 
10 See generally Google’s Publication of Electronic ‘Snippets’ as Part of Plans to Digitise Books Is “Fair 
Use” Says US Judge, OUT-LAW (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.out-
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sufficiently valuable that they can be monetized (albeit perhaps modestly). Publishing as well as 
entertainment and media companies, such as the film industry, should also experiment with a 
“windows” model of new product releases, in which staggered releases maximize the 
profitability of new works when they are first revealed and at the height of their popularity with 
most audiences.11 The film industry is leading the way on this charge, and the music industry is 
beginning to explore its options to follow suit, but there are further expansions of staggered 
release models underway, as well as changed models of simultaneous release, often with 
multiple or varied products, that are beginning to come into play.12 
 
Many of the content industries will need to lengthen their timelines to profitability in order to 
explore, shape and fine-tune these new business models. Journalism, publishing and other 
content providers with high production costs may need to resort to cross-subsidization within 
their parent companies, where possible, to defray the immediate costs of such exploration and 
expansion.13 Keeping long-term strategies is especially necessary in a quickly changing 
environment, where many complex forces can rapidly change the direction of growth, the 
domination of the market by industry leaders, the system or entity that emerges as a powerhouse 
driving the market, and the shape that products, devices, and outcomes will take. The examples 
of cellular telephones (the dominance and decline of Nokia),14 television recording devices (the 
                                                                                                                                                       
law.com/en/articles/2013/november/googles-publication-of-electronic-snippets-as-part-of-plans-to-
digitise-books-is-fair-use-says-us-judge/; Marvin Ammori, Copyright Misunderstandings and the Google 
Competition Inquiry, MARVIN AMMORI (May 8, 2012), http://ammori.org/2012/05/08/copyright-
misunderstandings-and-the-google-competition-inquiry/.  
11 See, e.g., Reel Time: The Incredible Shrinking Window for Movie Releases, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON 
(Nov. 24, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/reel-time-the-incredible-shrinking-window-
for-movie-releases/; see also Helienne Lindvall, Staggered Releases—Everyone’s a Loser, GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 27, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2008/nov/27/staggered-releases; Greg 
Sandoval, Spotify: Staggering Music Releases (Like Movies) Won’t Work, CNET (Feb. 29, 2012), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/spotify-staggering-music-releases-like-movies-wont-work/.  
12 The music industry is also searching ways to inform its consumer base of compensation models to 
artists and creators in order to justify their revenue models and pacify consumers. This is a potentially 
powerful tool to use in conjunction with these new revenue-generating plans. 
13 See generally Joe Moran, The Role of Multimedia Conglomerates in American Trade Book Publishing, 
19 MEDIA CULTURE SOC’Y 441 (1997). 
14 See Roger Cheng, Farewell Nokia: The Rise and Fall of a Mobile Pioneer, CNET (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/farewell-nokia-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-mobile-pioneer/. 
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triumph of VHS over BetaMax),15 computer hardware (the declining market share of once-
powerful entities, such as IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Dell),16 and computer software (the relative 
decline of Microsoft versus the rise of Apple)17 all provide ample evidence that markets change 
extremely swiftly, possibly ever more swiftly as technology evolves at lightning pace, and the 
advantages of consumer lock-in and a self-contained ecosystem may be offset, or even erased, by 
the disadvantages that lack of interoperability generates when the market turns to new systems, 
devices, and controlling forces. For entertainment and media industries, this appears to be a 
challenging proposition: they have traditionally been driven by the need to realize immediate 
returns on their products. However, the long-tail of entertainment—for instance, the realization 
of longer-term profits in international markets in the film industry—has begun to spark a 
recognition that long-term payoffs may be the best path to long-term vitality.18 As technology 
continues to force these recognitions, content industries should continue to pursue longer term, 
and possibly riskier, solutions to their business endeavors. 
 
In terms of determining where an industry’s value-add inheres, various content industries should 
consider unbundling their offerings and attempt to profit from sales or licensing of individuated 
works. This may prove, however, to be a challenge. In the case of journalism, for instance, the 
customary product is an entire newspaper or magazine. However, many publications are 
discovering that a subscription model for a publication—traditionally the practice for retaining 
readers and thereby retaining the viewership for the advertising supporting the publication—only 
works online when an audience is willing to pay for the entire product. The Wall Street Journal 
has succeeded in this practice,19 but few others, including even the venerable New York Times 
                                                
15 See generally Michael A. Cusumano, Yiorgos Mylonadis & Richard S. Rosenbloom, Strategic 
Maneuvering and Mass-Market Dynamics: The Triumph of VHS over Beta, 66 BUSS. HISTORY REV. 51 
(1992).  
16 See Steve Denning, Why IBM Is in Decline?, FORBES (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2014/05/30/why-ibm-is-in-decline/. 
17 See Kurt Eichenwald, Microsoft’s Lost Decade, VANITY FAIR (August 2012), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2012/08/microsoft-lost-mojo-steve-ballmer.  
18 See, e.g., The Television and Movie Industry Explained: Where Does All the Money Go?, STRATEGY 
ANALYTICS, http://www.strategyanalytics.com/reports/vg5d52vcWt/single.htm. 
19 See generally The Media’s Risky Paywall Experiment: A Timeline, WEEK  (July 30, 2010), 
http://theweek.com/articles/492336/medias-risky-paywall-experiment-timeline, But see Jeff Bercovici, 
Whoa! WSJ.com Quietly Makes Big Traffic Strides, UPSTART BUS. J. (Apr. 11, 2008), 
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/companies/media/2008/04/11/whoah-wsjcom-quietly-makes-big-traffic-
strides.html (“No wonder Rupert Murdoch's in no hurry to do away with The Wall Street Journal's online 
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and the Times (London), have been unable to follow suit.20 Further, some stand-alone products 
may not be desirable enough that a readership is willing to pay for them: in the case of the New 
York Times, few readers proved willing to pay for editorial content (op-ed and opinion pieces) 
that was placed behind a firewall and available only on a subscription basis.21 The experiment of 
placing editorial content behind a paywall was abandoned due to an apparent lack of interest 
among its readership in paying for editorial content.22 But it was also doomed by the ready 
availability of such content through workarounds that do not require payment: for instance, the 
same content offered via various services (Lexis and Westlaw), or linked by third parties and 
thereby made available through blogs, sites, and other online resources.23 Even in the case of 
new revenue initiatives, such as offering versions of news publications on tablets, hand-held 
readers and other devices, the results have been decidedly mixed, and have run into many of the 
same issues that basic online services have faced.24 Nonetheless, the verdict is still out on 
paywalls, and major journalism sources are still striving to make them revenue-positive in new 
and emerging media.25 Newspapers can continue to experiment with various blends of paywalls, 
subscription services, or metering-per-pay models, and it is possible that they will eventually 
find a successfully balanced solution. But there remains little doubt that new media will continue 
to push journalism to identify its most valuable properties—those for which its readership will 
pay—and that the proliferation of diverse sources, free content, and freely available links will 
continue to pose significant challenges to traditional journalism’s long-term success. 
                                                                                                                                                       
paywall. Even with it still in place around large sections of the site, traffic is still growing at a most 
impressive rate.”).   
20 See, e.g., Gilligan Reagan & Lauren Hatch, Five Failed Paywalls and What We Can Learn from Them, 
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/failed-paywalls-2010-4; Erick Shonfeld, 
The Times UK Lost 4 Million Readers to its Paywall Experiment, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 2, 2010), 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/11/02/times-paywall-4-million-readers/. 
21 See Reagan & Hatch, supra note 20. 
22 The New York Times itself is now behind a partial paywall. That is, it offers free access to a limited 
number of articles per month (10 articles per month as of this Article). However, the success of its current 
model remains mixed at best. See id. 
23 See We Take You Beyond the Paywall . . . to Deliver More Relevant Results, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://www.lexisnexis.de/whitepaper/beyond-paywalls-whitepaper.pdf. 
24 See, e.g., John Reinan, Can Paywalls and Tablets Save Newspaper, MINNPOST (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.minnpost.com/business/2011/11/can-paywalls-and-tablets-save-newspapers. 
25 See, e.g., Roy Greenslade, Soft Paywalls Retain More Users than Hard Paywalls—by a Big Margin, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/07/paywalls-
charging-for-content; Paul Osgerby, Pay Walls and the Future of Online Journalism, DAILY IOWAN (Jan. 
23, 2015), http://www.dailyiowan.com/2015/02/23/Opinions/41046.html. 




These roadblocks reveal that the disaggregation of content on the Internet is a challenging 
proposition: if journalism cannot be fully protected behind a paywall and is widely available for 
free or competing with free resources, it is very unlikely to be a source of revenue, and it is 
unlikely to be a reliable source of viewership for supporting advertisers. On the other hand, in the 
case of more protected properties, such as e-books in the publishing industry, content may be 
more readily monetized.26 While offering some of their works through lending libraries, the 
publishing industry may prove successful in keeping their e-book properties profitable by 
imposing similar restrictions on them to those imposed on digital tracks by the music industry. 
Further, if abstracts, excerpts or other kinds of properties become desirable to consumers—
perhaps enhanced by products such as Google Books27—publishers may find new revenue 
sources in the sale or licensing of portions of written works. 
 
C. Can You Change Your Profitability Paradigm by Moving to New Revenue-Generating 
Sources? How Much Can You Change or Affect Pricing and/or Price Discriminate? 
 
1. Questions for Analysis 
 
This layer of analysis, which is critically important to content industries confronting disruptive 
change, overlaps with the first set of questions but extends it further. Content industries should 
scrutinize their profitability paradigm, or business models and strategies for attaining 
profitability, to ensure that they are taking advantage of all commercial opportunities that have 
been opened or expanded in recent years. First, as suggested earlier, can they increase revenues 
from properties that they already own via exploitation of related rights? Second, can they adjust, 
differentiate, or otherwise tweak pricing to maximize their returns in rent-producing properties? 
Third, can they create business synergies other content industry players or complementary 
enterprises? Fourth, can they improve advertising-related returns? Fifth, can they improve their 
                                                
26 See eBook Sales Growth—Where It’s Really Coming From (an Analysis of Author Earnings), PUB. 
TECH. (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.publishingtechnology.com/2014/02/ebook-sales-growth-where-its-
really-coming-from-an-analysis-of-author-earnings/. 
27 GOOGLE BOOKS, https://books.google.com. 
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exploitation of the digital realm? Sixth, can they leverage their digital presence to pursue new 
markets and opportunities? 
 
2. Business Solutions 
 
New technologies can increase potential revenues in already-existing content and products. First, 
as earlier suggested, content industries should assess whether they are able to increase revenues 
from properties that they own and/or to which they have proprietary rights, including but not 
limited to performance rights, ancillary rights (for instance, merchandise tie-ins),28 related 
entertainment rights (films, ringtones, Disney tie-ins),29 digital rights (for instance, rights in 
online streaming on Hulu and other such sites),30 and so on. Second, they should critically assess 
the extent to which they can change or adjust pricing, create pricing tiers to serve differentiated 
market segments, and/or price discriminate as a means to maximizing returns in rent-producing 
properties. Third, they should aggressively explore various opportunities: (i) to cross-license 
with partners from various industry sectors; (ii) to merge with (or acquire) complementary 
partner or products or otherwise vertically integrate; (iii) to sell or license their products in new 
or emerging markets; and/or (iv) to create new or variegated distribution schemes. Fourth, 
content industries should examine the extent to which there is room for increased advertising and 
for improving advertising-related returns (which should in turn increase advertising rates in both 
traditional and digital channels). Fifth, they should explore their ability to expand into new 
online venues (such as YouTube, sites, blogger tie-ins, and so on). Sixth and more generally, 
they should pursue new markets and technologies as they emerge, recognizing that the risk of 
such investment may pay off with the reward of being early adopters, and possibly market 
leaders, in newly colonized digital spaces. This may be a delicate balancing act: content 
industries will need to ensure that they are not being taken advantage of by new technologies 
                                                
28 See generally GREGORY GOODELL, INDEPENDENT FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION 252 (1982).  
29 See, e.g., ALAN BRYMAN, THE DISNEYIZATION OF SOCIETY 79 (2004); Opinion: On Ringtones and 
Copyrights, MACWORLD (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.macworld.com/article/1060142/ringtones.html. 
30 See, e.g., William Coates et al., Streaming into the Future: Music and video Online, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L. REV. 285 (2000).  
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(such as Aereo),31 but at the same time will need to be open to new technologies that innovate in 
ways that benefit their business model (for instance, using the Internet to disseminate product, 
build user bases, move merchandise, and so on). 
 
3. IP Solutions 
 
Many of the solutions presented above are inextricably intertwined with IP-based practices and 
policies. The exploitation of IP-protected properties is the clearest example, but other strategies 
such as cross-licensing, vertical integration, and expansion of IP-protected properties in online 
fora are equally certain to involve IP practices. Content industries should ensure that they have 
strong governance methods for these ventures, and should lobby to secure industry-wide backing 
for favorable conditions for IP exploitation, such as strong clearing-house institutions, capable 




Exploration of IP-related rights has expanded not only within content industries but among them.  
The expansion of commercial exploitation of secondary and ancillary rights has already begun in 
many established content industries. In the entertainment and media industries, several large-
scale approaches to new media markets and opportunities are afoot: for instance, the film 
industry continues to move aggressively to license works in international markets; to diversify its 
online offerings via strategic alliances with Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, Apple TV and other 
venues for digital release; and to increase its availability on a host of personal electronic devices 
via relationships with Apple, Android, and other technology companies.32 Further ancillary rights 
                                                
31 For an overview of Aereo and its legal battles, see Sarah Perez, TiVo Receives Approval to Acquire 
Aereo Assets, TECH CRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/13/tivo-receives-approval-
to-acquire-aereo-assets/. 
32 See, e.g., Ian Paul, Amazon Prime vs. Netflix: Video Streaming Feature Showdown, PC WORLD (Feb. 
23 2011), http://www.pcworld.com/article/220399/Amazon_Prime_vs_Netflix_Video_Streaming_ 
Feature_Showdown.html. 
Interestingly, non-traditional producers are moving in on this space, as Amazon itself is 
beginning to launch movies on Amazon Prime. See Amazon to Produce Original Movies for Theaters, 
Prime Instant Video (Jan. 19, 2015), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2015011900 
5090/en/Amazon-Produce-Original-Movies-Theaters-Prime-Instant. It will be interesting to see if this 
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can and should be explored, such as the limited release of snippets, trailers, ringtones, and other 
individuated properties that are valuable to consumers. Likewise, expansion should occur with 
respect to merchandising rights such as merchandise tie-ins (for instance, film tie-ins tend to be 
hugely profitable, such as t-shirts, mugs, McDonald’s Happy Meals, “action figures” based on 
heroic movie characters, and other branded products that rely heavily on the exploitation of 
trademarked properties).33  
 
In other creative industries, the pursuit of commercialization of products and performances is 
also growing. In comedy, recording rights in performances have been well established as 
monetizable property rights. Building on these rights, comics also establish rights in live 
performances (whether or not performed in a studio, on a stage, or elsewhere), licensing rights in 
stand-up performances on television, cable (such as HBO), and online (released on such sites as 
Hulu, the Daily Show, and so on).34 In cuisine, star chefs are similarly establishing rights in live 
performances (whether in their own kitchens and restaurants or elsewhere), licensing rights in 
performative acts on television, cable, and online, and are seeking to expand rights to their 
demonstrations when undertaken in less traditional venues, such as at food festivals, in private 
residences, and so on. Increasing attention is being paid to rights in performance in sports and 
fitness related fields.35 In yoga, certain star practitioners or gurus, such as Bikram, have sought to 
establish trademark in signature practices and moves.36 In fitness, some companies have sought 
trademark in distinctive classes, such as Reebok Spin classes, CrossFit training methods, Tabata 
high-intensity workouts, and so on.37 In many of these cases, trademark has been sought, 
appropriately, to protect valuable and often innovative additions to the field of creative endeavor 
                                                                                                                                                       
pushes movie producers to be more innovative, or if it will stiffen competition that crowds them out of the 
lucrative Amazon market. Id. 
33 See, e.g., Jeff Jensen, McDonald’s Hungry for Disney Tie-Ins, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 17, 1995), 
http://adage.com/article/news/mcdonald-s-hungry-disney-tie-ins/81441/. This is analogous to the 
merchandise tie-ins that are proving so popular in music, such as concert and band t-shirts and other 
memorabilia. 
34 See Michael J. Madison, Of Coase and Comics, or the Comedy of Copyright, 95 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 
27, 35 (2009).  
35 See Nicole Davis, Celebrity Chef Licensing: Cookin’ Up Something New, LICENSE MAG. (June 16, 
2014), http://www.licensemag.com/license-global/celebrity-chef-licensing-cookin-something-new. 
36 See Joshua Kurlantzick, The Money Pose, MOTHER JONES (March/April 2005), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005/03/money-pose. 
37 See, e.g., Dale Saran, CrossFit: Defending the Name, CROSSFIT J. (Oct. 2013), 
http://library.crossfit.com/free/pdf/CFJ_08_2013_Trademark_Saran7.pdf. 
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and practice. Indeed, in this regard the expansion of rights is a useful way to seek to maximize 
returns from legitimately protected properties. At the same time, however, as discussed in the 
Culture section, below, expanding rights must be counterbalanced against the need to preserve 
key elements of a creative field’s mutually agreed upon culture, values, norms, and practices.38  
 
With respect to pricing, content industries should tackle pricing plans that both maximize their 
immediate returns from properties and capitalize on the potential for future returns, some of 
which may be experiencing growth due to the emergence of new technologies and venues. In the 
publishing industry, the explosive growth of e-books should compel publishers to undertake new 
approaches to pricing of product licensing and sales.39 As distribution is facilitated by the 
Internet, publishers should be able to deliver e-books to various audiences both efficiently and at 
cost points that are calibrated to different market sectors. Technological tools, algorithms, and 
other strategies should be harnessed to put into place refined pricing schemes, allowing 
publishers to derive the best returns possible from their e-books, e-readers, and related materials. 
While there is bound to be pushback from distributors, retailers, and third-party participants, 
publishers should be in a position to control the initial pricing and terms governing the 
dissemination of their product.40 Some publishers should also consider tying in marketing, 
promotion, and possibly retailing in their arsenal. Vertical integration offers a means of freeing 
the publisher from the distributor, and thereby enhances the autonomy of the publisher over the 
pricing of both hard copy books and e-books. In relation to pricing plans, creative content 
                                                
38 See infra Part IV.  
39 See Aaron Pressman, The Book Industry Isn’t Dying, It’s Thriving with an Ebook Assist, YAHOO (Jan. 
14, 2014), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/the-exchange/the-book-industry-isn-t-dying--it-s-thriving-with-
an-ebook-assist-191025547.html. 
40 One caveat is that publishers must steer clear of behaviors that may trigger antitrust concerns, such as 
making concerted efforts to control pricing and delivery terms, or other such potentially cartel-like 
behavior. The case of the retail and distributor giant Amazon versus the publisher Hachette, as well as the 
conglomerate Time Warner, are illustrative. See generally, e.g., Jim Milliot, BEA 2014: Can Anyone 
Compete with Amazon?, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bea/article/62520-bea-2014-can-anyone-
compete-with-amazon.html; see also David Streitfeld, Hachette and Amazon Dig in for a Long Fight over 
Contract Terms, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/technology/amazon-
hachette-book-publisher-dispute.html?_r=2; David Streitfeld, Amazon Stops Taking Advance Orders for 
‘Lego’ and Other Warner Videos, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2014), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/amazon-stops-taking-advance-orders-for-lego-other-warner-
videos/. 
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industries, including publishing, should also appropriate rent-maximizing pricing strategies and 
schemes devised by other industries.41 
 
Illustrative are the film, television, and entertainment industries’ differentiated pricing plans that 
serve important strategic goals in targeting consumer markets, cross-pollinating viewership, and 
taking advantage of a property’s maximum value at its peak commercial moments, typically 
upon first release or run. The cable television industry achieves these goals by offering bundled 
packages of channels that viewers must subscribe to in order to have access to their preferred 
programming.42 In this way, viewership of a popular channel, such as HBO, can effectively 
subsidize viewership of other, more niche channels, such as TMC, TLC, and so on. These 
packages of channels are also priced variously, so that viewers may choose how many stations to 
purchase and have available. At the same time, “on demand” offerings make immediate 
viewership of stand-alone shows both immediately accessible and profitable on an individuated 
basis.43 The film industry similarly engages in tiered pricing, in part by offering movies at 
different prices based on the popularity of venues, the time of release (first-run or second-run 
shows),44 and so on. The film industry also engages in tiered releases of its output through a 
series of “windows,” beginning with the most lucrative first-run window in which the movie is 
priced for maximum returns, followed by windows of release on cable and DVD, Netflix, 
streaming, and eventually second-run releases, television screenings, online streaming, and so 
forth.45 This also enables the film industry to time international releases in ways that will 
maximize their popularity and returns in multiple international markets.  
 
Other creative content industries, such as e-books and music, should consider these models of 
release and determine whether they fit the contours, demands, and business models that will 
increase their returns. The publishing industry has already incorporated the windows scheme of 
release in its conventional area, first releasing books in hard cover, followed by paperback, trade 
                                                
41 See Moran, supra note 13, at 441-55. 
42 See generally Gregory S. Crawford & Joseph Cullen, Bundling, Product Choice, and Efficiency: Should 
Cable Television Networks Be Offered a la Carte?, 19 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 379 (2009).  
43 See generally Ronald J. Rizzuto & Michael O. Wirth, The Economics of Video On Demand: A 
Simulation Analysis, 15 J. MEDIA ECON. 209 (2009).  
44 See Reel Time, supra note 11. 
45 See id. 
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paperback, and similarly lower-priced versions.46 In the case of e-books, it should consider first 
releasing digital copies at a premium price, without distribution to libraries and lending sources, 
followed by less expensive releases to e-readers and eventually online. Similarly, the music 
industry should consider releasing digital tracks in various windows, with differentiated pricing 
that reflects the time of release, popularity of the work, and other key factors. Particularly in the 
case of music streaming, this option offers the industry the opportunity to release the work to 
large audiences without undermining their revenue models. In some cases, such as the 
subscription-based models of Rdio, Spotify, and others, the windows model is already proving 
effective, and thus should be further pursued to capture new markets without sacrificing 
immediate or long-term returns.47 
 
D. How Important Is Licensing Vs. Ownership to Your Business Model? 
 
1. Questions for Analysis 
 
The opening ante question for content industries is whether the industry is adhering to a 
traditional ownership model (in which product is sold by the company and owned outright by the 
consumer) or it should move to a licensing model. They may, naturally, choose a hybridized 
model, in which some products are sold—in the publishing industry, for instance, hard copies of 
books sold in traditional retail stores—and others are licensed—in publishing, e-books 
transmitted digitally—while still retaining an interest in other rights, such as performance rights, 
which likewise flow from their properties. There are consequences, however, to adopting a 
model primarily based in licensing rather than sales. In some industries, the move to licensing 
may shift the battleground of rights: that is, copyright may still be crucial to allocating rights and 
reaping revenues, but rights based in ownership may become less worth fighting over, and rights 
                                                
46 See also Evil Wylie, Staggered Digital Release Dates Worry Music Industry—Are Books Next?, 
DIGITAL READER (Oct. 8, 2010), http://the-digital-reader.com/2010/10/08/staggered-digital-release-dates-
worry-music-industry-are-books-next/ (noting that some publishers stagger the release dates for e-books 
“in a move intended to artificially inflate demand for print books”).  
47 This has been presented as an alternative to the kind of release, and the concerns, recently raised by the 
dispute between Taylor Swift, an enormously popular artist, and the online streaming site Spotify. See 
Pamela Engel, Taylor Swift Explains Why She Left Spotify, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/taylor-swift-explains-why-she-left-spotify-2014-11.  
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based in licensing may become paramount.48 Services based in licensing content likewise 
become more valuable, and often more contentious, when the model changes, and in particular 
when technology allows consumption of licensed content to become more immediate, 
streamlined, and often transitory.49 
 
2. Business Solutions 
 
Content industries that focus their energies on building out licensing of their properties should 
ensure that adequate support mechanisms are in place to facilitate the smooth flow of content to 
satisfy consumer demand. First, they should equalize and fully operationalize licensing-based 
services, such as online release of products and services, streaming, and so on.50 Second, they 
should strive to promote interoperability among content providers, both among creative and 
technological allies, thereby allowing content licensing to occur on many platforms. This will 
further enable consumers to have as wide a range of choices as possible on which to have access 
to the content they license. Not only will this increase consumer satisfaction, but it will also 
likely increase consumers’ willingness to pay for products that they can immediately use and 
enjoy. For some consumers, this may also be considered an acceptable tradeoff: that is, an 
increase in immediacy of goods and services may counterbalance any reduction in actual 
ownership or longer-term rights (which accompanies a diminution in outright sales).51 Third, 
                                                
48 In the music industry, licensing rights are becoming increasingly dominant, particularly as an 
increasing number of music-related transactions are occurring online. See MICHAEL UPSHALL, CONTENT 
LICENSING: BUYING AND SELLING DIGITAL RESOURCES (2009). There are some exceptions, however, 
such as music rights in the ownership of valuable properties such as back catalogs of content, classic 
music albums and recordings, and so on. These can be significant revenue sources over time, for instance 
as reissues, revivals, remastered albums, and so on are enduringly popular among music listeners and 
consumers.  
49 In the case of music, iTunes and similar music-playing services (and related music-playing devices) 
allow streaming and other transitory ways of consuming entertainment to become more dominant, 
pervasive, and negotiable among interested parties. 
50 In music, the iTunes model illustrates how important a strong mechanism is: its ease of use and 
consumer-friendly features, coupled with Apple’s licensing contracts with record labels that secured a 
large music library, catapulted it to overwhelming success that continues to date. 
51 It may also counterbalance any reduction in the actual rights consumers have in the use and enjoyment 
of their products. For instance, if Apple iTunes music consumers are only permitted to make 10 number 
of copies of their music on personal electronic devices, the fact that they can listen to the music on 
various devices may seem a kind of fair compensation or trade. See Manage Your Associated Devices in 
iTunes, https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204074. 
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content industries should strengthen cloud-based services to afford consumers strong, stable, and 
adequate storage of their licensed content, as well as ready access to such content. Fourth, they 
should consider creating strategic alliances with companies that facilitate online payments, 
micropayments, data encryption, and other technological services and products needed to support 
online commerce. 
 
3. IP Solutions 
 
First and foremost, content industries should ensure that licensing mechanisms, such as 
collective rights management organizations, are well-established, funded, and secure, and that 
they operate efficiently and smoothly. Creative content industries that rely on such clearing-
houses should be aware that expansion of services, products and resources to creators will 
benefit the industry as a whole, and will increasingly enhance consumer satisfaction as more 
consumers become engaged in creating, adapting, or otherwise interacting with creative content. 
Further, content industries should equally ensure that cross-licensing mechanisms are securely in 
place and efficient, entailing solid contractual ground rules, reasonable balances struck with 
respect to non-competition agreements and the like, and other practices, policies and norms that 




Licensing of creative content is expanding in an array of industries. Examples abound, including 
streaming of films, television shows and series, e-books, and any other content that may be 
streamed online rather that outright purchased. Technological innovations are helping to support, 
if not promote, the availability of licensed content, including the expansion of cloud computing 
and cloud-based software; improvements in streaming technology; increases in availability, 
speed and bandwidth with respect to Internet connections, as well as management of Internet 
provision by Internet Service Providers (ISPs); the growth of data storage and security in 
personal computers and devices; and the expansion and multiplication of electronic devices that 
enable consumers to obtain quick, easy, affordable, and typically temporary access to a range of 
creative content. This last factor is significant, as it appears to reflect a growing preference 
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among users and producers in favor of licensing content.52 Content industries should recognize 
that building user satisfaction is the most direct and reliable inroad to creating a system in which 
licensing becomes the de facto practice, and which eventually becomes the prevalent and 
preferred mode of consumption of creative commercial content, goods, and related services. 
 
E. Do You (Still) Rely on Middlemen/Intermediaries; If So, How Good Are Your 
Pros/Cros/Clearing-Houses? 
 
Creative content producers are not alone in facing the challenges posed by disruptive innovation. 
As discussed earlier in chapter 4, intermediaries and middlemen are also essential participants in 
content industries who are being confronted by changing roles, business models, and risks that 
threaten their long-term viability. Challenges within the content industries raise important 
questions about the position, both actual and potential, of middlemen in their given field. First, 
are there still roles, or are there newly emerging roles, for middlemen to undertake in order to 
facilitate production, commercialization, and other aspects of creative content generation? 
Various aspects of middlemen’s roles traditionally include (i) agent and talent scout services that 
identify, select, and cull artistic talent, which may include connecting artists with content 
companies and nurturing artists throughout their career; (ii) editorial and other services, which 
may include refining content, checking accuracy, finessing production values, and preparing 
works for commercial roll-out; (ii) marketing services; (iii) product distribution services (both in 
real space and digitally); (iv) management of IP-based rights and rewards, which may include 
collective rights management; (v) credentialization, accreditation, authentication and 
authorization, which may include critical roles such as publicly reviewing works; (vi) curation; 
and (vii) reward of exceptional work, which may include extending or facilitating praise, prizes, 
or other reputational boosts to deserving creators. Second, are there roles for middlemen that are 
irreplaceable by digital technologies, or that cannot be perfectly substituted by disintermediated 
processes? Third, are the roles that middlemen play valuable enough to content industries that 
they will continue to receive remuneration—in other words, will they get paid? Fourth, is the 
role of intermediaries that manage IP-related rights, such as Collective Rights Organizations 
                                                
52 It may be, however, that the market is driving consumer preference by increasing its offerings of 
licensed content. But users do not seem to be resisting in any concerted way, at least; and many users do 
seem satisfied to relinquish long-term ownership for more immediate but transitory availability. 
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(CROs), still valuable to content industries? For those industries that do not currently have 
rights-clearing organizations in place, this question should add: would establishment of a CRO 
improve efficiency and revenue maximization of IP-related rights? Fifth, is there a role for 
technology companies to serve as middlemen, possibly by brokering arrangements or alliances 
among content companies, creating innovative software and devices that facilitate content 
dissemination and consumption, or otherwise shaping the course of creative output (and possibly 
creative content itself)?53 
 
While it is clear that challenges to intermediaries arise in part from changes wrought by 
longstanding content industry participants, there are also challenges that arise from newer 
arrivals in the creative fields. This raises a host of questions, beginning with the identity and 
nature of the more recent participants. Are there encroaching competitive sources of labor in the 
creative industries? In the online sphere, the emergence of blogs, online magazines, scholarly 
resources, such as the Social Sciences Research Network, or SSRN, the scholarly database of 
articles,54 and other sites, demonstrates the willingness of interested parties to contribute their 
labor toward the production of content-rich materials. In many of these cases, the labor of 
creators and contributors is donated voluntarily, often without compensation. Moreover, the 
fruits of their labor, such as websites, databases, blogs, magazines, and so on, are released via the 
Internet directly to the reader, thus throwing into question the relevance and role of a middleman. 
Another recent phenomenon, likewise facilitated by the Internet, is the increasing prevalence of 
amateur creators, many of whom are artistically inclined but lack professional standing, that are 
bringing their user-generated content to large-scale audiences.55 Again, these creators are able 
                                                
53 In the case of music, the Apple iTunes model serves as a powerful example of how a technology 
company has come to play such a vital intermediary role. Apple was able to broker agreements among 
record labels for the online release of digital tracks—a function that had not previously been mastered 
within the industry—and was further able to create electronic devices, software and services that made the 
dissemination of music readily, easily and affordably available to listeners. This has had an indelible 
impact on the course of the music industry worldwide. It may be arguable that creative content itself is 
and will be shaped by the iTunes model—as artists recognize that their path to renown rests in part on 
iTunes release, they may be incentivized to make digital tracks that work best on iTunes technologies. For 
a general discussion of iTunes’s role as an intermediary, see W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-Middleman: 
Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 852-53, 859 (2007) 
54 Frequently Asked Questions, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com/en/index.cfm/ssrn-faq/. 
55 In the case of music, these artists have turned to sites such as YouTube, MySpace, SoundCloud, and 
others to release their creative efforts in the hope of attracting online audiences. In the case of fashion, 
some amateur fashion lovers have created designs, assembled outfits, and crafted a unique fashion “look”. 
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either to find or to build online venues that afford them immediate and direct access to 
audiences, bypassing the necessity for a traditional facilitator or intermediary. Lastly, in some 
content industries, newer participants are entering the market via solely online venues, rather 
than establishing a presence in real space, and are directly bringing their products to consumers 
via online outreach, marketing and delivery.56 In sum, the emergence of new participants directly 
questions the role and relevance of middlemen, and asks: (i) is intermediation necessary, (ii) does 
it add value to the content generation chain, and (iii) is it worth preserving, configuring to fit the 
contours of the new content economies, and remunerating? 
 
1. Business Solutions 
 
Content industries should determine the utility of middlemen to their various enterprises. As 
noted, the roles that middlemen play, the points of contact at which they facilitate industry 
processes, the services that they offer, and the value that they add to creative endeavors are 
highly diversified and most likely difficult to isolate and quantify. Nonetheless, some creative 
industries will find that middlemen have valuable contributions to offer—and at times, this 
recognition may occur while change is occurring, or after it has taken place, when the value of 
the middleman becomes apparent in his or her absence.57 To avoid this shortcoming, content 
industries should scrutinize the benefits that middlemen confer and only countenance the 
reduction or elimination of their role when it is clear that those benefits are outweighed by the 
costs or fees that middlemen impose over the course of content commercialization. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Others have created venues, such as street fashion blogs, Instagram pages, and so on, that expose their 
own works or reflect the efforts of others that they appreciate, admire, and wish to promote. 
56 In the case of education, online education providers, the majority of which are organized on a for-profit 
basis, resort solely to the Internet to reach and educate learners. Only some of these providers seek or 
obtain credentialization by traditional educational accrediting bodies. 
57 In the case of music, it is clear that talent identification, music production, marketing, and other 
functions are still best served by traditional middlemen, whose skill and expertise have not proven readily 
replaceable or reproducible. Moreover, music criticism, promotion, and “evangelism”—that is, praise of 
musical talent that critics can spread to build audience recognition and appreciation—has proven equally 
indispensable to the music industry’s vitality. Notwithstanding the ability of amateurs to adopt some of 
these roles via the Internet, they have yet to demonstrate a commensurate capacity to the professional 
middlemen who still fulfill these vital roles. 
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Overall, content industries should begin with the premise that middlemen are sufficiently 
valuable to merit retention and fair compensation. As technology develops and comes to offer 
innovative substitutions for intermediation functions, this baseline should naturally be revisited 
and, where necessary, revised. But such an undertaking should be made with caution, and with 
an understanding that it will have deep repercussions on the industry as a whole.58 As a corollary 
proposition, content industries should support and sustain the frameworks, institutions, 
mechanisms, and inputs that are critical to keeping middlemen operational, effective and secure. 
In the case of agents and talent scouts, for instance, content industries should support their efforts 
to cull talent from both digital sites and real space locales. In the case of credentializing and 
authenticating critics, reviewers, and curators, content industries should recognize the many 
layers of value that they add to content dissemination, consumer appreciation, and other aspects 
of content generation. Further, content industries should not only ensure that audiences are aware 
of the valuable role that critics and other such intermediaries play, but they should also continue 
to vest such critical participants with authority in their given field. This is not to suggest that 
critics do not have an obligation to defend themselves and to demonstrate their enduring 
importance. But at the same time, content industries have not typically ceded critics their due, 
nor have they communicated faith in critical faculties to their audiences. Content industries 
should recognize the integral role of critics and other such intermediaries in serving as a bridge 
between creators, producers and audiences, and such a recognition should be tangibly expressed. 
One means of such expression is to remunerate critics, reviewers, curators and others; another is 
to continue to turn to and rely upon them for a host of activities, such as supporting artistic and 
cultural competitions and prizes, underwriting critical publications and reviews, sustaining 
institutions that promote creative talent, and so on. At the same time, content industries can and 
should also pursue critical figures that emerge through less traditional venues, including those 
enabled by the Internet, such as blogs, online publications, amateur enthusiast and hobbyist sites, 
and others. By bringing these outsiders into the mainstream, content industries can strengthen 
their position in the digital realm, while at the same time reinforcing the sense among their 
audience that critical intermediaries remain informative, valuable, and vital. 
 
                                                
58 Moreover, the more cautious industries are, the more time they will buy themselves to learn from the 
example of other content industries’ experiences. This may enable them to avoid costly mistakes that can 
take years to undo, if undoing them is even possible. 
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For their part, middlemen must prove their utility to content industries as well.59 Middlemen 
involved in creative content production should strive to distinguish their products and services 
from amateur productions by adding value and retaining high quality standards.60 They should 
also work to distinguish their product from those produced by non-professionals and to 
demonstrate that their labor cannot be readily displaced by advanced technologies alone.61 
Intermediaries such as critics and curators should pursue online roles that play to their strengths, 
such as websites and blogs that highlight their knowledge, experience, and critical prowess. They 
should consider banding together to create high-value sites that are often attractive to educated, 
interested audiences; at the same time, they should strive to monetize their offerings in creative 
ways, using a combination of advertising support, subscription-based offers and services, and 
where possible strategic alliances with content companies that can help underwrite their work. 
These activities can include joining online websites, group blogs, joint databases, scholarly 
resources, and other collaborative efforts that highlight the strengths of professional critics and 
reviewers while creating new opportunities for emerging talent, whether professional or amateur. 
Intermediaries involved in credentialization and accreditation should work to ensure that their 
services are deemed essential to quality control by both content industry participants and their 
                                                
59 See generally DEREK SLATER ET AL., CONTENT AND CONTROL: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF POLICY 
CHOICES ON POTENTIAL ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS IN THE MUSIC AND FILM INDUSTRIES 11-15 (2005). 
60 In the case of music middlemen, such as record labels, this should include keeping high quality of 
audio, recording, sound editing, and so on. In the case of fashion middlemen, such as fashion retailers, 
this should include maintaining both quality and exclusivity of curation, skillful promotion of designers, 
and so on. In education, this should include accreditation institutions and bodies, which subject 
educational institutions and programs to a process of peer review as a basis for measuring and 
authenticating institutional quality. Among these recognized bodies are regional accrediting agencies, 
such as the New England Association of Schools and Colleges, national accreditors, such as the 
Accrediting Council for Independent Schools and Colleges, programmatic accreditors, such as the 
Accreditation Council for Business Schools and Programs, and specialized accreditors, such as the 
American Bar Association. Other middlemen in education that facilitate quality control are entities that 
review colleges and universities, such as U.S. News and World Report’s annual ranking of schools and 
programs, as well as other trusted reviewers that help applicants differentiate among educational products 
and services. 
61 In the case of music, personal computers can now easily be loaded with relatively sophisticated sound 
recording, mixing, and editing software programs, thus enabling talented amateur musicians to create and 
record digital tracks with remarkably polished finishes. This notwithstanding, however, there remains a 
distinction between even well-produced “demo” tracks and professionally produced tracks for 
commercial release. It behooves music middlemen to bring this distinction to the fore, and to make clear 
that they are adding value by bringing music production to a professional level that remains higher quality 
than even the best home-produced efforts can attain. 
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consumers.62 Likewise, intermediaries involved in authentication and authorization should 
increase their efforts to provide vital services online to content industry participants that are 
engaged in digital dissemination of their products and services.63 In all of these cases, middlemen 
and intermediaries in the content industries who are confronting either obsolescence or 
competition should lobby extensively to protect their value-add proposition and should strive to 
prove to industry participants and their audiences that their ongoing vitality is crucial to industry 
survival and health. 
 
2. IP Solutions 
 
Content industries often monetize their properties via licensing, cross-licensing, and other IP-
related transactions, agreements, and alliances. It is imperative that the content industries buttress 
these practices by streamlining the mechanisms that allow them to proceed and minimizing the 
costs that they incur. In some content industries, the solution has been to put into place and 
institutionalize formal content management organizations or clearing-houses that handle rights 
licensing, revenue collection, rights and ownership issues, and various transactional concerns.64 
But in the case of content industries that have not yet instituted formalized clearing-houses, not 
only the utility but also the cost effectiveness of introducing such an intermediary must be 
carefully evaluated prior to instigation. 
 
First, content industries should recognize that adding an institutional intermediary to rights-
clearing processes is bound to involve the imposition of significant systemic transaction costs.65 
                                                
62 In the case of education, accrediting bodies are considered vital to maintaining educational standards, 
and receiving accreditation remains a necessary prerequisite to maintaing institutional standing, or 
obtaining external funding (such as federal and state grants).  
63 In the case of education, online educational providers are increasingly offering authentication and 
authorization services to students for various reasons: to allay privacy concerns; to secure identity of 
students; to thwart attempts at online cheating; and to ensure that students receive proper recognition for 
their work. 
64 The music performing rights organizations (PROs) are well-established examples of successful 
collective rights management organizations, and their development is instructive to content industries 
seeking current examples of successful rights-clearing institutions. See generally Merges, supra note 59. 
65 See generally Merges, supra note 59, at 1295, 1320. In music, PROs do not operate cost-free. Further, 
music rights are managed by several different organizations in accordance with the rights involved, which 
raises costs and arguably diminishes efficiencies. Costs associated with PROs are spread across industry 
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Perhaps the most important concern in this regard is that the imposition of transaction costs due 
to the introduction of rights-clearing intermediaries should not impinge upon the actual creative 
processes taking place at the inception of creative content. That is, creators, artists, and other 
content generators should not be intimidated by the prospect of transaction costs, such as the 
necessity of paying clearing-house dues or other up-front fees or expenses, and thereby evince a 
reluctance to undertake the creative process and the eventual effort to bring their creative work to 
commercial producers and markets. Countering this possibility, however, is the potential that 
rights-clearing organizations have to enable the metering of rights that are generate revenues 
(such as royalties) and to enable or facilitate more fine-grained payments to creators and/or rights 
holders. Also countering the concern that creators may have regarding transaction costs is the 
prospect that rights-clearing organizations can also be expanded to offer a range of services to 
emerging creators, and may thus prove to be well worth the costs associated with membership 
and participation in their institutions. 
 
Further, impending transaction costs should not impede or constrain collaboration among content 
industry participants. In some content industries, the prospect of transaction costs imposed by 
clearing-rights organizations may be daunting to participants who have historically engaged in 
transactions and alliances without intermediation. This is a reasonable concern in the case of 
industries that have a rich, historic, and well-founded public domain, and in which therefore the 
establishment of rights and the management of rights are liable to represent a major, costly 
undertaking. In other content industries,66 however, the prospect of transaction costs imposed by 
rights management organizations may be offset by the prospect of clearing the path of IP-related 
barriers—such as multiple individually-held rights that must be negotiated and agreed upon ex 
ante—and thereby enabling collaboration to move forward apace.67 Content industries with a 
                                                                                                                                                       
participants, and so may impose relatively minor strain on any individual entity. Nonetheless, they must 
be factored into the cost of doing business in the music sector. 
66 Again, in fashion the historic practice industry-wide has been the creation of works that are not 
protected by copyright and that therefore enter into the public domain. See supra Chapter 1, Section II.A. 
Many commentators, as well as fashion industry insiders, have argued that superimposing a rights-based 
model, as well as rights-based institutions such as clearing-houses, will impose weighty transaction costs 
on the industry. See id. 
67 It is interesting to compare creative content concerns with the issue of transaction costs as it pertains to 
collaborators in patent-related work, particularly in areas such as scientific research. In the patent context, 
there is an acute concern with clearing multiple rights prior to engaging in cumulative innovation, on 
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vested interest in seeing collaborative efforts grow and thrive should ascertain whether collective 
management of rights would be deemed an encumbrance to previously unfettered transactional 
practices or an aide in clearing a path to multi-layered or multi-party ventures. 
 
Lastly, content industries should scrutinize the nature of the collective rights management they 
are considering implementing in order to determine the structure that will best fit the contours of 
their landscape.68 As earlier discussed, the most effective CROs are structured to be maximally 
cost effective, and avoid unnecessary bureaucracies liable to impose heavy administrative 
burdens on industry participants.69 Also discussed is the ability of CROs to meter usage of IP-
protected properties and to collect per-use or collective royalties, fees, and other payments.70 In 
some instances, clearing houses can manage not only rights but also access to materials in its 
                                                                                                                                                       
which much scientific research and patentable work is predicated. This is often referred to as the threat of 
“patent thickets,” and is especially relevant where rights in underlying scientific materials, such as gene 
sequences, are concerned. See generally Intellectual Property and Genomics, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME 
RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/19016590. The fear of encountering patent thickets, or “a dense web 
of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually 
[generate and] commercialize new technology” can be a major impediment to productivity. Carl Shapiro, 
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120-21 
(Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2000). Clearing these thickets, analogous to clearing copyright rights, is a vital 
step that must precede innovative and patentable activity. Id.In the case of scientific research, rights 
clearing organizations—whether formally instigated, privately undertaken, or narrowly engaged—may 
serve to help overcome the impasse that overly onerous rights can present, thereby opening the path to 
collaboration and improving the prospect of rewarding scientific research & development (“R&D”) 
throughout the greater scientific community. 
68 See MIHALY FICSOR, COLLECTIVE RIGHTS MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 129-
32 (2002). Michael Einhorn identifies several characteristics that are useful in determining the nature of 
rights that must be managed, which in turn helps to refine decisions concerning the optimal corrective 
rights management system and institution to administer such rights. Michael Einhorn, Transaction Costs 
and Administered Markets: License Contracts for Music Performance Rights, 3 REV. ECON. RES. 
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 61 (2006). 
69 See supra notes 59-Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. As in the case of music, 
some CROs may be large, bureaucratic, but still relatively cost effective. ASCAP and BMI are quite 
positive examples, despite their size and overwhelming share of the clearing-house practice in the music 
sector. It is not the size of these institutions that makes music rights clearing somewhat cumbersome—
rather, it is the nature of complex and overlapping rights, such as sound recording and performing rights, 
which are more a historical artifact (and anomaly) than a recent development, that can weigh down the 
industry with a certain amount of superfluous transaction costs. 
70 See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.  
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purview, and can undertake duties analogous to database management.71 This may entail making 
materials available to select members of a group who have agreed to cooperate or collaborate on 
creative efforts (as in the case of scientific research) or to a wider audience that is interested in 
the resources being managed (as in the case of scholarly or specialized research databases). 
Other CROs may actively engage their members by offering a range of services, information, 
resources, and other input that may be critical to emerging artists and creators.72 These are 
secondary features that broaden the appeal of CROs, but also offer support to content generators 
whose work forms the basis of creative industries. Finally, some collective rights organizations 
may be well-positioned to improve payment systems that collect and distribute royalties and 
other IP-related revenues. Content industries should consider this a potential avenue for 




Content industries that depend upon multiple properties, complex contractual and licensing 
arrangements, products that may require an array of rights to be cleared such as tie-ins and other 
forms of brand-based marketing, and so on are well-advised to consider instituting centralized 
rights-clearing organizations. The film industry, for instance, shares many of the characteristics 
of the music industry, yet its products often involve even more complicated rights-clearing 
processes than do typical music products, as multiple markets, products, venues for viewing 
(virtual and real), follow-on products (such as sequels) and tie-ins (such as merchandise rights) 
tend to be involved. A centralized rights management institution could facilitate cross-licensing 
of rights in the components of films that draw on various cultural resources and references; and it 
could manage the rights in the release of films, both at the inception of the works’ launch and 
                                                
71 In the case of scientific research, this may entail managing access to gene sequences or other 
fundamental research materials that otherwise might be propertized and thereby trigger onerous licensing 
and cross-licensing arrangements to advance scientific R&D.  
72 For example, the two major music PROs, ASCAP and BMI, offer member musicians a broad range of 
services and resources. See ASCAP Member Benefits, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/benefits/; Royalty 
Information, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/creators/#royaltyinformation. 
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throughout their long trajectory across various markets (such as DVD release, international 
release, second-runs, revivals, remasterings, and so on).73  
 
Other creative content industries that have not traditionally relied on IP rights and are currently 
considering implementing a formalized IP rights regime are also well-advised to consider 
collective rights management. Implementing a systemized approach to rights management is 
particularly helpful at the outset of large-scale propertization, as it should set the terms for an 
orderly deployment of rights and rewards. As in the case of the fashion industry, bringing a new 
set of rights into play—such as the proposed copyright in fashion designs, adds layers of 
complexity that are only likely to increase as rights-based transactions, such as licensing, cross-
licensing, and so on grow in size and complexity. Creative industries that have remained 
relatively rights-free, such as comedy, cuisine, yoga, and certain sports activities (gym training 
classes, football plays, some non-traditional sports training, and so on) fall in the broad category 
of regimes that have not had a complex system of formalized rights but are currently considering 
where IP rights fit into their landscape. In these diverse cases, collective rights management 
should be an important consideration and not a last but a first resort. 
 
F. How Do You Remunerate Your Labor? 
 
1. Questions for Analysis 
 
Content industries rely on skilled workers, gifted artists, trained researchers and technicians, and 
other highly valuable creators to conceive, generate, and produce the creative content that they 
                                                
73  While not specifically addressing the exigencies of the film industry, Ruth Towse offers a model for 
collective rights management in the digital age that would meet many of its needs, such as the ability to 
manage complicated rights in diverse markets and over time. Ruth Towse, Economics of Copyright 
Collecting Societies and Digital Rights: Is There a Case for a Centralised Digital Copyright Exchange?, 
9 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3 (Dec. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216165. It is 
also noteworthy that some countries have begun to implement centralized collective rights management 
systems in film rights, including Uganda, see Hillary Muheebwa, Collective Rights Management Takes 
Root in Uganda, IP WATCH (July 24, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/07/24/collective-rights-
management-takes-root-in-uganda, and Croatia, Collective Management Rights, STATE IP OFFICE, 
http://www.dziv.hr/en/intellectual-property-protection/copyright/management-of-crr/collective. 
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purvey. Such industries should recognize the centrality of these workers to their enterprises, and 
should ensure that their remuneration enables them to make a livelihood and to create in the most 
optimal circumstances possible. Notably, the central premise of intellectual property law and 
property—that creators are incentivized to create when their work receives adequate reward and 
recognition—finds its best expression in the compensation structure of creative content 
industries. Therefore, content industries should examine the structure of labor rights and rewards, 
the terms and conditions of labor, and the environment in which workers create and operate, and 
should adjust their business models and legal solutions to optimize creative ventures and output. 
 
Content industries should ask a series of questions that will help to determine the structure of 
rights and remuneration of labor in their sector. The first set of questions relate primarily to 
knowledge workers in content industries such as education, scientific research, and so on. First, 
what is the status of industry workers: are they primarily full-time employees (in which case the 
employer typically retains and owns rights pursuant to the work-for-hire doctrine) or independent 
contractors (in which case the employee may retain rights pursuant to Community for Creative 
Non-violence v. Reid74). Second, do workers have professional status, and are they well-
compensated for their creative or innovative output, whether or not they retain IP ownership 
rights? Some indications of professional status include autonomy in the work that they 
undertake, rights such as academic freedom, and so on. Third, are workers compensated for their 
creative or innovative work by non-tangible rewards, such as authorship and publication rights, 
reputational benefits, awards and prizes, credit for work, and other resume-enhancing rights? 
Fourth, do workers have job mobility and knowledge portability? Fifth, are workers limited in 
their knowledge portability by standardized non-competition agreements or arrangements (short- 
or long-term) that prevail in their field? Sixth, and relatedly, are workers eventually able to resort 
to standardized workarounds in order to bring their know-how, expertise, and knowledge to their 
new employment? 
 
The second set of questions relate primarily to working artists in content industries such as 
music, fashion, entertainment and media, journalism, comedy, cuisine, or yoga. First, are 
working artists independent, or do they work with a middleman who typically retains ownership 
                                                
74 490 U.S. 730 (1989).  
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rights in their creative output? Second, do working artists typically create without retaining a full 
roster of ownership rights (for instance, in the cases of fashion, cuisine, yoga, and with some 
exception comedy), but are otherwise compensated (for instance, live performance payments, 
reputational benefits, publication rights, grants and funding, and so on)? Third, how are working 
artists compensated with respect to licensing rights? Are they compensated by standard 
contractual licensing agreements that give them a percentage of royalties (in which case IP 
arrangements must regulate and administrate the payout of royalties), or are they otherwise 
remunerated (such as on a flat fee basis)? And fourth, do working artists have the ability to assert 
other IP rights, such as trademark rights, in some aspects of their work? 
 
2. Business and IP Solutions 
 
In the case of labor, content industries will need to consider business and IP-related solutions 
contiguously, as the status of industry workers will be inextricably linked to their IP rights, and 
may in fact determine their IP rights. On the one hand, content industries whose workers are 
long-standing, full-time employees, with tenure rights or rights comparable to tenure (such as 
full-time employment, retention rights, or partnership rights) should realize that their workers are 
professionals who may not retain IP rights in their output subject to the work-for-hire doctrine. 
Nonetheless, such content industry professionals may be compensated by more than just salary 
and benefits: they generally tend to have rights such as academic freedom, publication rights, 
peer recognition, eligibility for prizes and awards, and so on. In these cases, content industries 
should realize that IP rights may not be paramount for securing the rewards of creativity and 
innovation. Thus, content industries should understand that while professional workers may 
forfeit some of the purely financial rewards of IP rights, such as royalty streams or payouts from 
commercialized IP properties, they may be making a tradeoff, and arguably a fair and balanced 
tradeoff, for other compensations, rights, privileges and rewards. 
 
On the other hand, however, content industries whose workers are short-term, subject to firing, 
have little professional autonomy or rights such as academic freedom,75 and are not particularly 
rewarded for creative work, should realize that their workers are functioning more like 
                                                
75 In education, such workers are often adjunct or non-tenure track professors, and graduate students. 
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independent contractors, and that their employment does not hinge upon long-term prospects or 
payoffs. These content industry workers are not likely to have the option to balance rewards, 
both tangible and non-tangible (such as publication rights or securement of employment based 
on creative and innovative output), that established professional employees in a tenure or 
partnership-type track position enjoy. In this case, content industries should consider whether 
their employees should be deemed independent contractors and granted IP rights in their output, 
or whether another form of compensation should be extended in order to keep them remunerated, 
foster their creativity, and retain them over the long term. 
 
Content industries should also take into account their workers’ job portability and knowledge 
mobility. In cases where workers are highly mobile and can bring their skills to bear on a number 
of desirable positions in their industry, content industries can argue that perceived shortfalls in 
their immediate contract terms are counterweighted by the freedom to leverage their work to 
secure a stronger position in the future. This should give content industries flexibility in setting 
the terms of employment of their workers, and should assist them in cases where they intend to 
retain the bulk of IP rights in creative properties. At the same time, however, it should imply that 
highly skilled workers would be desirable throughout the field and therefore both valuable and 
mobile. This should indicate that worker salaries are likely to be elevated by competition, and in 
these cases content industries should be aware that they will have to keep salaries at a highly 
competitive level to retain their best workers. Further, content industries should consider the 
standard in their field regarding the retention of IP rights as part of an employee’s portfolio, 
rather than as part of the employer’s holdings. In some industries, IP rights may travel with the 
employee, particularly if the employee is able to create or self-fund independent ventures, such 
as startups or spin-offs.76 In such cases, content industries should realize that their ability as 
employers to retain IP rights may be limited by convention, competition, or self-sufficiency on 
the part of the employee. All of these factors must be taken into consideration when content 
industries consider the balance of compensation, rights, and rewards in its labor pool. 
 
In content industries that center on the output of creative artists, compensation of labor should be 
structured to remunerate artists fairly at different points on the spectrum of creativity, longevity 
                                                
76 For example, in start-ups, high-tech entrepreneurs bring key IP rights to the table. 
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and success. In these industries, companies and intermediaries may follow industry standards 
with respect to retention of IP rights, such as performing rights, sound recording rights, rights in 
previously-issued material, and so on. At the same time, however, content industries should 
recognize that artists may value tradeoffs that are similar, if not analogous, to workers in other 
creative fields. That is, relinquishing IP rights may be more viable for artists who are seeking to 
establish long-term careers in their field, and who believe that reputational payoffs may flow 
from joining well-known institutions (such as renowned publishing houses or imprints, record 
labels, newspapers or magazines, film studios, restaurants, or yoga studious), from capitalizing 
primarily on immediate live performance rights rather than on recorded rights, and from working 
under the protection of established parties (such as music or literary agents) rather than striking 
out on their own. In this sense, content industries should recognize that some working artists may 
prefer some of the conditions of long-term “employment” to the retention of IP rights in their 
work. However, while acknowledging this tradeoff, and while recognizing that the balance of 
power initially favors the industry in this case because artists who are making this choice may 
not yet be secure, and may not yet have leverage, content industries should recognize that the 
terms of such contracts are liable to shift if and when the artists they are fostering develop 
reputational markers such as widespread recognition, star power (that is, the ability to draw and 
keep large audiences in attendance), the ability to move products (such as recordings) and sell 
branded merchandise, and so on. Content industries should realize that they have a vested 
interest in fairly compensating their emerging talent, for many of the same reasons that have 
been enumerated here: first, the mobility of their workers, and the portability of their works, 
serves as a counterbalance to the power and leverage wielded by companies and intermediaries; 
and second, while IP rights in creative output may be retained by the industry and/or its 
representatives or intermediaries, the creative endeavor itself remains in the control of the artists, 




The computer software industry illustrates one way in which division between the retention of IP 
rights and compensation, as well as related rights and rewards, may operate. In the software 
industry, long-term employees are deemed skilled professionals who are well-compensated with 
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salary, benefits, and often stock options,77 but who do not typically retain IP rights in their 
professional output.78 These employees also garner reputational benefits in the field, in part by 
being recognized for their work (for instance, the developer of a software program may be 
named, be eligible to receive awards, earn noticeable bonuses, and so on), and in part by being 
sought-after among their competitors and peers. Due to the desirability and job mobility of such 
workers, software industry companies often try to condition their employment on agreements to 
stay with the company for a given period of time, or not to transport their work or know-how to a 
competitor.79 These non-competition agreements, widely known as non-competes, however, are 
difficult to enforce, often limited in scope and strength, and subject to lengthy and expensive 
dispute in the courts.80 Moreover, skilled software development workers consider such non-
competes to run counter to the balance of rights and rewards that are standard in the field.81 
While the software industry may disagree, it is also aware that they may on occasion prefer not 
to honor non-competition agreements when they are trying to lure a worker away from a 
competitor. These are among the reasons that job mobility and knowledge portability remain at a 
premium in the software development industry. 
 
In other creative content industries, such as film, entertainment, and music, established star 
artists may resemble skilled and talented software developers in certain features of their labor: 
they have mobility and portability of their talent and success, they cannot be bound for long 
periods of time by the equivalent of non-competition agreements, and they enjoy reputational 
                                                
77 See Software Developer: Salary, US NEWS, http://money.usnews.com/careers/best-jobs/software-
developer/salary. 
78 Employees may retain rights in work they have created on their own time and using their own 
equipment, but they must be scrupulous in segregating such efforts, and may face contentious claims if 
their work leads to IP-protected properties and success. The allocation of IP rights to the employer, which 
is the norm in the computer industry, is typically made pursuant to standard work-for-hire doctrine. 
http://wtnnews.com/articles/7421/ ; http://www.tms.org/pubs/journals/JOM/matters/matters-9608.html. 
The applicability of the work-for-hire doctrine to education is discussed in Chapter 2. 
79 See Dane Stangler, Non-Compete Agreements: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, XCONOMY (Aug. 14, 
2014), http://www.xconomy.com/national/2014/08/14/non-compete-agreements-the-good-the-bad-and-
the-ugly/; Bob Weinstein, What You Should Know Before You Sign a Noncompete Agreement, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/what-you-should-know-before-you-
sign-a-noncompete-agreement/.  
80 See Weinstein, supra note 79 (noting that many non-competes are not enforceable). 
81 See Scott Kirsner, Time to Get Rid of ‘Noncompete’ Agreements, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 19, 2014), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/04/19/time-get-rid-noncompete-
agreements/VcIjVuaAcOopLZOvwqSMtK/story.html. 
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benefits from being associated with, promoted and protected by well-established companies 
(such as film studios), agents, and other industry representatives. While they typically do not 
retain IP rights in their output, some of these artists do in fact carve out certain rights that they 
choose to retain (which is becoming increasingly prevalent as artists become more aware of their 
rights and options)82; and even where they retain no IP ownership rights, they do of course retain 
rights in royalties and other IP-related returns.83  
 
They may also resemble tenured faculty in other features of their labor: they have status, 
longevity, and more or less tenure for life (that is, they are retained by a record label, and upon 
attaining a certain level of success, are likely to be retained by that label for their entire career). 
Multiple rewards and rights accrue to creative workers who have achieved high levels of success 
in their profession: they collect long-term royalties from recorded performances (including 
reruns and re-issues), long-term reputational payoffs (being a star for a given film studio, record 
label, or publishing house is mutually beneficial and redounds to the credit of both institution and 
artist), earnings from IP-related sales, licensing, merchandise, and so on. In this regard, star 
performers are even better situated than their counterparts in certain other content industries, as 
they enjoy the benefits of long-term employment as well as earning IP-related royalties; 
however, like their counterparts, they do not typically retain ownership in the underlying works 
(although, as noted earlier, this may be changing). 
 
The difference between established artists and emerging artists, however, is stark, and should be 
recognized and taken into account by content industries. Emerging artists also typically do not 
retain ownership in their underlying properties. They do earn royalties in their work, but some of 
these rewards may be sacrificed for placement and visibility goals: for instance, releasing works 
online may gain audience share, but is not likely to be immediately monetizable.84 Further, in 
certain industries the initial contractual terms governing emerging artists may cede the lion’s 
share of profits in early works to the companies that represent the artists (and typically own the 
IP rights in their output) rather than the emerging artists themselves. In music, for instance, 
                                                
82 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.  
83 For instance, they may also benefit from ancillary relationships based in branding and brand promotion, 
which raises trademark implications that are out of the scope of this paper. 
84 This holds true for several industries, such as music, film, journalism, publishing (e-books), and so on. 
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initial recording contracts often require artists to cede a large percentage of up-front earnings to 
the record label, only yielding returns to the artists after a large number of recordings have been 
sold.85 Similar patterns can be found in other industries as well. In film, for instance, initial 
signing contracts often require artists to agree to a flat-fee payment for their performance in a 
new release, thereby forfeiting rights in royalties that will accrue if the film becomes successful 
and over the lifetime of the film.86 
 
It is arguable that the differential in terms (and returns) between star artists on the one side and 
emerging artists on the other side can be explained by the respective difference in bargaining 
power and leverage that they can wield. Still, content industries should be aware of the 
discrepancy, and should recognize that in some fields, such as entertainment, publishing, and 
journalism, emerging artists may be particularly disadvantaged by not having rights that are 
triggered by long-term success. This may prove a disincentive to emerging artists, but it also may 
prove an incentive for them to move from traditional contracting arrangements to more 
innovative and more favorable arrangements where nascent technologies make them possible. In 
the case of music, for instance, some emerging recording artists are now retaining or re-obtaining 
rights in their work, releasing works directly on the Internet and thereby bypassing traditional 
intermediaries such as talent scouts, agents and record labels.87 In the case of film, some 
emerging actors are requesting up-front payments coupled with the right to take a percentage of 
future royalties (and possibly secondary rights).88 In the case of publishing, some emerging 
authors are likewise releasing works directly on the Internet, self-publishing via online 
publishers or e-book purveyors such as Amazon, and retaining rights in royalties (and secondary 
                                                
85 See generally M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE 
BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY (2007); see also Mitchell Einhorn, Gorillas in 
Our Midst: Searching for King Kong in the Music Jungle, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 145, 146-48 
(2008).  
86 See MARK LITWAK, CONTRACTS IN THE TELEVISION AND FILM INDUSTRY ch.4 (2010). 
87 For example, Ingrid Michaelson financed and released her first hits. See Jim Farber, It All Adds Up for 
Ingrid Michaelson, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music-arts/ads-ingrid-michaelson-article-1.296269. Metallica 
re-obtained its rights and opened its own record label. See Randall Roberts, Metallica Leaves Warner 
Music with its Masters, Forms Blackened Records, LA TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/30/entertainment/la-et-ms-metallica-leaves-label-forms-blackened-
records-20121130. 
88 See DINA APPLETON & DANIEL YANKELEVITS, HOLLYWOOD DEALMAKING: NEGOTIATING TALENT 
AGREEMENTS FOR FILM, TV, AND NEW MEDIA ch.7, § 4 (2010). 
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rights).89 And in the case of journalism, some emerging authors are retaining rights to publish 
their articles in multiple venues, thereby retaining the ability to gain multiple streams of royalties 
in a given work or body of work.90 
 
Finally, in the case of performance-based industries, content industries should be aware that 
artists are more likely to focus on live performance fees, merchandising revenues, and IP-based 
rights and returns that are performance-related, due primarily to the fact that live performance 
will usually garner greater returns than recorded performance.91 In fields such as comedy, 
cuisine, yoga, or sports instruction, artists will be aware that creative content, brand and value 
are integrally tied to the persona and performance of the artists themselves: their expertise and 
know-how, but also their recognizable “brand” identity, their delivery of a performance, their 
signature characteristics, and so on. In this respect, content industries should recognize that some 
of the value that performing artists (broadly speaking) offer will inhere as much in their brand 
and performance as in their lasting recorded creations. In comedy, for instance, comics make the 
bulk of their revenues in live stand-up comedy, appearances in other live shows (such as star 
turns in Las Vegas), appearances on television shows (which will trigger recorded performance 
rights), and so on. While some comics may earn revenues in recorded performances, the market 
for such recordings is relatively low, and has not seen the returns that it once did. In cuisine, 
many chefs make substantial revenues in live performances, such as appearing in their 
restaurants and offering courses to aspiring cooks, private appearances, and appearances on 
                                                
89 See Ronald H. Balson, Bestseller Success Stories that Start Published Books, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ronald-h-balson/bestseller-success-storie_b_4064574.html 
(detailing the stories of now-famous authors who started by self-publishing); Emma Barnett & Richard 
Alleyne, Self Publishing Writer Becomes Million Seller, TELEGRAPH (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/booknews/8589963/Self-publishing-writer-becomes-million-
seller.html (discussing John Locke’s success publishing and promoting its own works); Ed Pilkington, 
Amanda Hocking, the Writer Who Made Millions by Self-Publishing Online, GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/jan/12/amanda-hocking-self-publishing (discussing how 
Amanda Hocking sold over 1.5 million books on Kindle); Lizzie Skurnick, ’50 Shades of Grey,’ a Self-
Published Book, Is the Future of Publishing, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 17, 2012), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/17/50-shades-of-grey-a-self-published-e-book-is-the-
future-of-publishing.html.  
90 See generally Allena Tapia, Know Your Publishing Rights, ABOUT, 
http://freelancewrite.about.com/od/legalissues/a/rights.htm. 
91 There are some exceptions, as in the case of comedy recordings made by famous comics, which peaked 
in the 1950s-80s with the works of Mel Brooks, Richard Pryor, Bill Cosby, Bob Newhart, and Jerry 
Seinfeld, among others, but these remain the exception rather than the rule. 
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televised cooking shows (which again will trigger recorded performance rights). While chefs do 
realize returns on specialized cookbooks that trade on their identity and brand, these are closer in 
nature and size of returns to merchandise and other brand-related products. In yoga and sports-
related fields, instructors tend to realize the majority of their revenues in instruction, again 
including live performances, instruction, and lectures. While they may earn revenues on related 
materials, such as instructional manuals, CDs or DVDs, or a trademarked set of moves, poses, or 
plays, these are likely to be ancillary proceeds that supplement the bulk of their performance-
related returns. 
 
The implications for content industries that should be recognized here is that artists in 
performance-based practices will be empowered in negotiations over IP rights and returns by the 
strength of their creative position: they themselves are the product that is not only valuable but 
also non-fungible, inhering as it does in their very identities and identity-based performances. 
While such artists may not need to retain ownership rights in their recordings (although some 
might, especially if they have the leverage to be able to negotiate such ownership), they also 
have a powerful argument for garnering significant rights and returns in their performances. As 
in any situation, of course, established artists are more likely than emerging artists to have and 
wield real bargaining power. But the take-away that content industries should have is that in 
performance-related creative fields, performing rights and returns are liable to be the point of 
contention and control. Insofar as performing artists are able to seek out either new and possibly 
dis-intermediated means of dissemination of their content or to retain the right of ownership over 
their content, industry companies, representatives and other intermediaries are well advised to 
find suitable means of granting artists a host of rewards, services, and other value-adds in order 
to retain the talent that fuels their field and underlies their path to success. 
 
In sum, content industries should be aware that the terms of contractual arrangements among 
companies, representatives and other intermediaries, and creative workers and artists are not 
fixed in stone but are subject to change, and are being subjected to change via the disruptive 
innovations that have transformed virtually every aspect of their operations, performance and 
ongoing viability. By taking into account labor relations, and adjusting their business models and 
legal strategies, content industries should be able to secure fair terms for their companies and 
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artists, so that both established and emerging creators feel tethered to the content industry in 
which they should create and thrive. This may mean that content industries will be obliged to 
grant a greater share of rights and long-term returns, broadly predicated upon success, to both 
established and emerging artists. It may also mean that the retention of ownership rights in 
promising IP properties becomes an increasingly contested issue in the content industries—and 
an issue, moreover, in which artists have greater leverage than they once had, owing primarily to 
their ability to bring works directly to their audience via new digitally-enabled technologies, 
mechanisms and devices. But this need not be a cause for alarm among the content industries. 
Rather, it should be a cause for reconsideration, and possibly recalibration, of the relationship 
between companies and artists, and of the balance of IP rights and returns that are the prevailing 




A. Introduction to Legal Issues 
 
Legal strategies are necessarily crucial focal points for creative content industries striving to rise 
to the challenges of disruptive innovation. As seen in the cases of the fashion, music and 
education sectors, they are perhaps the most complicated of areas in which to tackle change, but 
also among the most powerful and effective tools for building strength and shaping solutions. 
The means to weigh and choose legal policies and practices, the balancing act that must be made 
when choosing, and the implications of legal choices are all threads that run throughout this 
paper, and that together constitute its most forceful recommendation for tailoring strategic 
solutions that lead to long-term success. 
 
Here, a more streamlined approach to assessing legal issues is offered, to provide creative 
content industries with the essential outline of what to consider when approaching the analytic 
challenge. First, creative content industries should ask whether they have IP content, or whether 
they are a negative space in which IP-based solutions are limited, either historically or by choice, 
or close to non-existent. In cases where industries rely on IP, they should ask whether it is 
Chapter 6: Salient Factors Viswanathan 
 496 
properly calibrated to maximize protection, particularly against other measures (such as revised 
business practices, enhanced technological protections, or renewed commitment to normative 
codes). Establishing a carefully weighted IP portfolio is especially important when disruptive 
innovation has transformed the industry’s landscape, as it serves as one of the most effective 
bulwarks against erosion of creative property values. On the other hand, however, IP protection 
may not be appropriate for all industries that generate content. Those creative content industries 
that are constituted as negative spaces, and that are high-functioning despite a relative lack of IP 
protections, should ask what kind of model best suits their practices and needs. That is, industries 
that are negative spaces should ask: Is enhanced IP good for your industry? Is a certain amount 
of room for appropriation or copying beneficial to your industry or is a hybridized model, in 
which some IP is counterbalanced with a certain amount of leeway for copying, most appropriate 
for your industry? 
 
B. How Do You Maximize IP Protection? 
 
A majority of creative content industries retain IP rights in their valuable properties as a means 
of securing returns in existing works and ensuring ongoing generation of new works. In some 
industries, a portfolio of IP rights will best serve to maximize protection and ensure positive 
returns. Creative content industries should ask if their original works should be protected by 
copyright, licensing rights, and contractual terms and conditions that retain such rights to 
creative content owners accordingly. They should also consider trademark rights that may be 
useful strategically, for various reasons including: to protect the integrity of brands; to prevent 
dilution that might otherwise occur through consumer confusion; to thwart inferior goods that 
competitors and/or counterfeiters may be trying to pass off as originals; to allow vigorous pursuit 
of, and enforcement against, such counterfeiting; and so on. Lastly, some creative content 
industries should consider seeking patent rights in creative or innovative patentable work, 
notably when the work is completed and made commercially viable. 
 
In all of these cases, creative content industries should consider the various parties involved in 
the production and dissemination of creative properties, and should recognize that the allocation 
of IP rights will necessarily be a significant concern. External third-parties and contractually 
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obligated partners will naturally require the explication of rights allocations, but other interested 
parties, such as employees, contractors, and others are also likely to be found at the bargaining 
table. Moreover, the industries should also consider the rights of the user community, as 
satisfying users, encouraging their creativity, and assuring users that their rights are as expansive 
as possible, while still staying fair to the creative originators, are key goals that the creative 
content industries recognize and embrace. 
 
The myriad considerations that assessing IP rights necessitates must be made in the context of 
business directives and goals, so that IP control becomes part of an overall strategic plan of 
attack, rather than serving as a single weapon that is loosely deployed. The most effective IP 
portfolio should bolster the productivity of a company, industry, and the creative community. 
Moreover, IP rights should be adjusted to fit the needs and demands of a given time. Thus, for 
instance, in creative markets that are becoming dominated by licensing rights, rather than 
outright ownership via purchase and sale, creative content industries should also consider how IP 
rights will be deployed through licensing and cross-licensing arrangements. These private 
ordering arrangements will be paramount to the success of creative content industries, and 
therefore should be carefully conceived, negotiated and secured.  
 
C. If You Are a Negative Space: Is IP Good for Your Industry, Is Copying Good for Your 
Industry, or Is a Hybridized Model Good for Your Industry? 
 
Negative space creative content companies, particularly those that have been well-established 
without historically relying upon complex or multi-layered propertization, should likewise 
consider the importance of revisiting the question of IP rights in their current landscape. In cases 
of fully fledged industries, as earlier illustrated by the fashion industry, creative turnover, 
commercial appeal of transitory goods and services, and similar other industry-specific factors 
should play a large role in determining the IP makeup of a creative content industry and its 
participants. At the same time, the cultural touchstones of a creative industry should play just as 
significant a role in helping to set the parameters of propertization and control of creative 
content. In the Cultural section, below, these factors will be examined in further detail. Negative 
space industries should recognize that a deeply rooted culture, coupled with wide-scale industry 
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practices that have proven successful over time, can create a highly efficient system that is not 
readily subject to change via the imposition of a new layer of IP rights or other such 
recalibrations of IP properties. Creative content industries that are contemplating new IP 
measures should recognize, therefore, that their culture itself is at stake, and its diminution or 
loss may in the long run prove to be equal to or greater than the costs that disruptive innovation 
can impose on even the most productive and profitable of industries. 
 
D. If You Are Seeking to Implement or Enhance Your IP Protection, How Much Transaction 
Costs Would Change Incur? 
 
Creative content industries contemplating restructuring their IP rights should carefully scrutinize 
the transaction costs associated with any such changes. Perhaps the clearest transaction costs are 
raised by the prospect of formulating, implementing, organizing, and maintaining a system for 
the management of rights, whether within a given company, among various strategically allied 
partners, or within an entire industry. The negotiation of IP rights among interested parties, 
including employees, contributing users, third-party providers or contractors, and others, also 
raises the likelihood that transaction costs will be non-negligible. Further, industry-wide 
solutions, such as establishing collective rights management organizations, not only requires 
significant start-up costs and maintenance costs, but also may require legislative change and 
approval, the costs of which are likely to be passed on, at least in part, to industry stakeholders 
and participants. These costs are at least foreseeable; what may not be as clear are the costs 
arising from industry-wide adjustments to a new landscape and new business imperatives and 
practices that will necessarily ensue. Hardest to ascertain will be which entities will be winners 
or losers in a landscape arising from significantly altered IP rights and protections. Creative 
content industry participants should consider their position vis-a-vis their competitors and other 
stakeholders; and creative content industries should recognize that because creating a coalition 
among these participants and stakeholders is itself likely to be costly and challenging, it must 
therefore be shown to be sufficiently rewarding to undertake at all. 
 
1. Questions for Analysis 
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Creative industries are centered on the production of content, and therefore are strongly inclined 
to protect their core content with at least some measure of formal protection. In some cases, this 
may entail a complex portfolio of IP rights, including copyright, trademark, patent, and trade 
secret protection. In other cases, this may entail practices that appear to eschew the more obvious 
blanket forms of IP protection, such as copyright, but yet harbor certain specific kinds of 
coverage, such as trademark or trade secret protection. In any case, creative industries need to 
consider the nature and scope of their IP rights, and should ask a series of questions that will help 
ascertain the proper balance that they strike, to allow IP rights to protect precisely the work that 
needs to be protected, while at the same time affording business practices the room to thrive and 
expand to maximize revenue realization. 
 
First, creative content industries should ask whether they typically have and rely on IP rights, 
and whether they would benefit from having single or multiple layers of IP protection. An 
important facet of this question is whether, and how, a content industry uses IP strategically. 
There are several instances in which this might be the case: for instance, IP may be used to 
protect an entire area of work (such as a set of commercial goods, processes, and output which 
may be vertically or horizontally integrated); to enable the best possible balance of propertization 
and publication; to create strategic advantages vis-à-vis competitors; to promote interoperability; 
and so on. Second, some creative content industries should ask an opposing question, that is, 
whether they eschew IP rights, and whether they are benefited by having virtually no IP 
protection, or by retaining only limited protection in specifically designated areas. This may 
equally entail the strategic use, or rather non-use, of IP, to achieve key commercial goals. In this 
scenario, restraint in the use of IP may be profitable in several cases: for instance, maintaining an 
IP-free or low-IP environment may be used to promote informal practices such as collaboration 
and creative exchange; to create ample space for creative appropriation, thereby enriching 
production across the industry; to provide creators with alternatives to formal arrangements for 
the release of material, such as creative commons-type licenses; to support norms-based 
practices; to foster communal sensibilities; to promote long-established tenets such as academic 
freedom, open exchange, community-based production; and so on. Lastly, the curtailment of 
formalized IP rights may offer creative industries greater freedom in exploring and engaging in a 
wide range of business arrangements and alliances, particularly in cases in which rights-clearing, 
Chapter 6: Salient Factors Viswanathan 
 500 
cross-licensing, and other issues involving the management of IP rights may otherwise prove 
onerous, cumbersome, costly, or challenging to negotiate and settle.  
 
In all cases evaluating IP, or lack thereof, creative content industries should recognize that IP as 
a strategic tool must be wielded both in concert with other useful tools, such as business 
practices (for instance, the use of loss leaders, discriminatory pricing, and so on) and norms-
based approaches (for instance, the use of social sanctions, communally-determined behaviors, 
and so on), as well as in the context of an overarching creative environment. From this 
perspective, the use or lack of recourse to IP should be considered part of a larger vision for 
creative industries to prepare and undertake. 
 
2. Business and IP Solutions 
 
First, content industries should regard IP as a strategic tool, whether used as a portfolio of IP 
holdings (such as multiple properties), a single area of coverage (such as the use of trademark 
alone), or a restraint of protection (such as an low-IP or no-IP practice). As such, IP should be 
wielded strategically and precisely, to ensure that it protects productive and profitable output 
without choking off other important features of production, including collaboration and creative 
alliances, incremental development and/or improvement through a broadly-derived range of 
inputs and tweaks, the ability to partner and cross-license, publication rights, and so on.92 
 
Second, content industries should consider the role that IP rights play in their respective markets. 
In cases where IP rights help control transactions, stabilize and reinforce prices, and incentivize 
creativity, as well as supporting price discrimination and clarifying pricing signals, industry 
participants should consider amassing IP rights to be an important part of their strategic arsenal. 
Further, the accrual of IP rights should be wielded to strengthen the ability of content companies 
to dictate certain key terms in the market: for instance, a powerful IP strategy may allow a 
                                                
92 See generally JOHN PALFREY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (2011); William W. Fisher III & 
Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management of Intellectual Property: An Integrated Approach, 55 CAL. 
MGMT. REV. 157 (2013) available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/CMR5504_10_Fisher_III_7bbf941f-fe1b-4069-a609-
9c6cd9a8783b.pdf. 
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company to price discriminate; to set the terms of interoperability or, conversely, to create an 
entirely closed ecosystem; to meter rights and royalties (possibly through the mechanism of a 
collective rights management system); to add DRM and other anti-theft technologies to vital but 
vulnerable products and devices; to secure a first mover advantage and marketplace position; to 
prevent the appropriability of key ideas, know-how, products, work product, and so on;  to 
corner a market (which may have the potential downside of creating monopoly-seeking behavior 
that could raise red flags among competitors and regulators); to increase the amount that may be 
extracted from protected material (possibly generating supra rents); to reinforce and clarify price 
signals; and so on. 
 
To the contrary, however, many content industries flourish when private ordering arrangements 
abound (and are considered preferable to externally-imposed arrangements, such as publicly or 
governmentally mandated solutions). The creative industries that most highly value the freedom 
to make private arrangements (between and among companies, employees, contractors, and other 
parties) should see payoffs to keeping IP rights cabined in contractual and transactional 
arrangements.93 Many creative industry firms may prefer private ordering solutions on an array 
of grounds, including because they are more flexible, industry-specific and entity-specific; they 
entail fewer transaction costs; they do not require legislative intervention; they can be readjusted, 
renegotiated, and renewed; and they can be made privately (or even secretly) among private 
entities. Creative content industries that consider intellectual property rights in this light should 
consider that a strategy restraining IP rights may serve various interconnected goals, such as 
promoting interoperability, enhancing the availability of open source solutions, encouraging 
secondary production (such as knock-offs and generics), opening up follow-on innovation, and 
contributing to the stability of a constructed commons. Most of all, restricting IP rights to those 
strictly necessary may afford creative industries the flexibility and latitude to explore strategic 
alliances on the spur of the moment, responding to market demands and changes with the 
swiftness that new technologies and disrupted landscapes often demand. This freedom should be 
weighed against the utility of IP-based rights and solutions, but it cannot be undervalued 
considering the vicissitudes of the creative markets and their ever-evolving nature. 
                                                
93 Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright’s Private Ordering and the ‘Next Great Copyright Act,’ 29 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1595, 1598 (2014). (“In some instances, the best option is for [copyright] law to get out of the 
way and leave room for a variety of private approaches to flourish.”). 
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Third, content industries should consider the rights, responsibilities and rewards of employees to 
determine how best to balance and allocate their IP rights. Employees should be afforded a good 
measure of job mobility and knowledge portability, both to support their position within a 
company and to ensure their standing in the market. While this may seem contrary to a firm’s 
retention of its employees, in the long run having employees that are recognized and 
compensated by a healthy mix of rewards—possibly including returns in their original output—
will strengthen a company’s position and build an industry’s competitiveness across the board. 
Employees’ rights should be considered paramount, but naturally should not be made at the 
expense of a firm’s competitive advantage; nor should it compromise trade secrets, investment in 
high-cost projects, or other costly build-outs.94 The judicious allocation of IP rights and/or 
rewards to employees should also help content industries to generate positive network effects 
and spillover effects, which are particularly vital in the case of knowledge-rich economies (such 
as technology, biotech, and education sectors). 
 
Content industries that are especially constructed around the retention (and conversely the free 
flow) of highly skilled employees should consider ceding some IP rights and/or returns to their 
employees. This may include a non-exclusive license in their creative output,95 which may be 
limited over time so that the firm can recoup its initial investment costs; this may potentially 
allow for employees to exert fuller control over rights in their output over time, or it may carve 
out certain other rights and privileges, such as the ability of employees to retain publication 
rights.96 Alternatively, firms should consider offering employees the option of a Creative 
Commons-type license that is open and usable by all, but requires attribution and restricts access 
to output to strictly non-commercial uses and purposes.97 
 
                                                
94 For instance, in the case of education, the cost of creating online education providers, support systems, 
MOOCs, and so on should not be compromised by giving full IP rights in courses to academic faculty 
without ensuring that the institution retain some ability to earn revenue offsetting the initial start-up costs. 
95 As in the case of education, as noted supra Chapter 2, Sections IV.C-D. 
96 As in the case of scientific research, as noted earlier. Again, as in the case of education, publication 
rights may be explicitly retained. See e.g., Policies and Procedures, HARVARD OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., 
http://otd.harvard.edu/faculty-inventors/resources/policies-and-procedures/statement-of-policy-in-regard-
to-intellectual-property/. 
97 CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org. 
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The allocation of IP rights and/or rewards to employees requires a careful balancing act. On the 
one hand, creative content industries are typically eager to create an environment that fosters 
spillover effects and positive externalities. At the same time, content firms are highly motivated 
to protect their business model, retain a strategic IP portfolio, and carefully manage their IP 
rights and returns. On the other hand, creative industries are aware that their competitors will 
avail themselves of every means possible to retain and reward high-performing employees, 
which may entail offering key employees IP-based rights and rewards. To remain competitive, 
therefore, content firms unwilling to cede IP rights or rewards to employees should recognize 
that they may be at a strategic disadvantage by appearing to offer less desirable employment 
terms, and may thereby potentially jeopardize their actual or potential workforce. To some 
extent, this may depend upon the leverage and bargaining power employees bring to the table 
when negotiating their compensation. But it may also depend upon the competitors’ hiring and 
recruiting strategies, including extending IP rights or rewards as part of a compensation package. 
In this vein, creative industries must evaluate whether to extend such rights and returns, even if it 
may to a certain extent compromise their net flexibility and control over their creative properties 
and output. 
 
Finally, in certain creative content industries, IP rights and/or rewards may not customarily be 
ceded, but they may be restrained in order to permit employees to exercise publication rights in 
their work. Again, in this regard offering the right to publish to key employees should be 
considered a strategic measure that will help build and sustain an optimal workforce. Creative 
industries should recognize the competitive value of publication rights, and should consider them 
part of their IP-based arsenal. At the same time, they should take into consideration other vital 
interests that may be served by publication among their employees, such as supporting 
scholarship, rewarding collaboration, receiving peer recognition for significant intellectual 
contributions to the field, rewarding creative and innovative output, encouraging originality, 
contributing to a rich scholarly and public domain, and reinforcing a host of shared values, 
norms-based practices, and communal exchange. The value of publication may to a certain 
extent stand in the way of amassing and wielding IP rights and garnering IP-based returns. 
However, a heavy-handed emphasis on IP properties can stifle innovation, throw up impediments 
to creative exchange (such as patent thickets), and in the long run reduce the reputational capital 
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that is often integral to creative content industries.98 Therefore, content industries should not only 
consider sharing their IP-based rights and/or rewards with productive employees, but should also 
consider when those rights and rewards should be restrained in order to further other equally 




Content industries whose profitability springs from the ongoing generation, monetization and 
exploitation of innovative and/or creative products are most likely to have significant IP 
portfolios. Technology companies, biotech firms, the computer industry (both hardware and 
software), and the pharmaceutical industry offer a few major examples of IP-rich sectors that 
have a long history of building multilayered IP holdings and wielding them strategically.99 In 
these sectors, IP rights are held for a variety of purposes, including bolstering cross-licensing 
potential, protecting possible areas of development (for instance, patenting basic research that 
may lead to new discoveries), positioning strategically against competitors, preserving (or in 
some cases thwarting) interoperability, or incentivizing employee productivity. But it is not only 
the technical sectors that value and emphasize the propertization of output. The entertainment 
industry, including music, film, television, and cable broadcasting, also ensure that their core 
creations are IP-protected, and moreover consider their ownership of IP properties as central to 
their productivity, profit model, and net worth.100 Similarly, the education sector protects at least 
                                                
98 See Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, The Problem of Patent Thickets in Convergent Technologies, 
1093 ANNALS OF THE N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 180, 188 (noting that IP law can be used to stifle innovation); 
Alex Tabarrok, Patent Thickets Reduce Innovation, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2013/04/patent-thickets-reduce-innovation.html. 
99 See, e.g., Ralph Minderop et al., Key Issues in Building a Strong Life Sciences Patent Portfolio, INTELL. 
ASSET MGMT., July/August 2012, at 126, available at http://www.iam-
media.com/Magazine/Issue/54/Management-report/Key-issues-in-building-a-strong-life-sciences-patent-
portfolio; Julia Love, Apple’s Growing Patent Portfolio Offers Clues about Future Products, San Jose 
MERCURY NEWS (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_27377473/apples-growing-
patent-portfolio-offers-clues-about-future; Antonio Regalado, Google’s Growing Patent Stockpile, TECH. 
REV. (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/521946/googles-growing-patent-
stockpile/. 
100 For examples of patent portfolios in the entertainment industry, see Gene Quinn, Apple Expands 
Patent Portfolio Relating to GarageBand, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 27, 2009), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/10/27/apple-expands-patent-portfolio-relating-to-
garageband/id=6912/; Press Release, Tribune Media Services Acquires Television Interactive 
Programming Guide Application and Patent Portfolio (July 22, 2003), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
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some of its properties and creations for various reasons that may also be tied to motives of 
providing incentives, protecting licensing and exploitation rights, and maintaining 
competitiveness in an increasingly global marketplace.101  
 
Other creative content industries find that not protecting core properties, or only protecting them 
in certain strategic cases (such as the use by of trademark in anti-counterfeiting situations that 
arise in the fashion industry) can serve their purposes more aptly than large-scale propertization. 
As in the case of fashion, which demonstrates a singular economic structure predicated upon 
high turnover of goods, creative appropriation, and consumer-driven commerce, certain creative 
industries find that their particular make-up is less prone to seek recourse in IP protection and 
more interested in maintaining openness and pursuing profitability through other means. In the 
case of creative industries such as cuisine, comedy, some of the performing arts such as ballet 
and dance, yoga, certain sports activities and maneuvers such as football game plans, and so on, 
refraining from propertizing certain creative acts, routines, moves, and other output is a strategic 
choice that can allow monetization of creation while still providing room for future innovation, 
exchange and collaboration, artistic appropriation, and creative flexibility. This is not to imply 
that a draconian solution removing all IP from the landscape is the sole option available to 
content industries. Rather, only certain creations may be considered ripe for propertization, while 
others may be considered valuable without requiring the formalities of IP protection to be 
undertaken.  
 
In the case of cuisine, for instance, propertizing cookbooks, particularly those with valuable 
annotations and notes, may be deemed to add value to a chef’s creative output, while the 
performative acts of cooking in front of a live audience, creating meals in a restaurant, teaching 
                                                                                                                                                       
releases/tribune-media-services-acquires-television-interactive-programming-guide-application-and-
patent-portfolio-70812777.html; Press Release, GTT Announces Patent Portfolio Acquisition Opportunity 
Related to Video Game and Movie Animation (August 2010), http://www.gttgrp.com/2010/09/16/gtt-
patent-video-game-movie-animation/; Press Release, Soryn IP Group to Sell Patent Portfolio Related to 
Smart Home Technology (Nov. 15, 2013), http://sorynipgroup.com/2014/09/10/soryn-ip-group-to-sell-
patent-portfolio-related-to-smart-home-technology/; Chris Ferrell, Comic Book Conundrum: Who Owns 
the Copyrights to the World’s Most Valuable Entertainment, L. TECH. & ARTS BLOG (Nov. 17, 2014), 
https://wjlta.wordpress.com/2014/11/17/comic-book-conundrum-who-owns-the-copyrights-to-the-
worlds-most-valuable-entertainment/. 
101 See Sheldon E. Steinbach & Bruce T. Wieder, Protect Your Patent Portfolio, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 
24, 2008), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2008/04/24/steinbach. 
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apprentices a master’s cooking secrets, and the creation of new recipes may all be deemed worth 
bringing to the market without property rights necessarily attached. Likewise, in the case of 
comedy, performative routines tend not to be IP protected, in part due to the singular and 
personalized nature of jokes and routines, as well as the drive to produce fresh material that is 
rife among comics, the reputational benefits that accrue to creative comics (which outweighs the 
cost of possible appropriation without attribution), and the interest in gaining exposure to wide 
audiences without needing to clear the barriers of propertization (such as seeking permission, 
licensing, and so on) in advance. In these cases, as in the case of certain other creative industries, 
restraint on IP protection becomes a strategic tool for maximizing profitability, retaining a 




A. Is Technological Protection Good for Your Industry?— 
Introduction to Technological Issues 
 
Creative content industries are well aware that technological protection offers a powerful barrier 
to thwart appropriation of valuable content, thereby not only protecting a key incentive to create 
and reap the profits of creation, but also ensuring that creative ecosystems can be grown without 
unfairly requiring their originators to assume undue risks. Yet many such industries overlook the 
often complex and subtle tradeoffs that adding technological protection to content may entail, 
and the long-term effects of content lock-up that may affect a company, industry, or entire 
creative ecosystem. The questions that must be asked begin with the effectiveness of 
technological protections adopted by an industry, but then expand to ask how much the industry 
values interoperability, as well as the extent to which protective technologies enhance, curtail, or 
otherwise affect positive externalities that may be intrinsic to a given creative industry. As the 
overarching questions regarding technological protections are closely entwined, their challenges 
and proposed solutions are addressed together. 
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B. What Technological Protection Do You Have in Place and  
How Effective Is It 
 
Bearing in mind that technology is fundamentally a means of securing an optimal balance 
between business and IP solutions that ideally lead to industries thriving even in the face of 
disruption and change, creative content industries should appraise their technology solutions and 
needs with careful deliberation. First, content industries should ask whether their technology is 
effective, flexible, adaptive, and cost-effective. Second, they should ask whether it achieves its 
intended purpose, but also whether it is properly cabined rather than exceeding the appropriate 
range of reach. Third, they should ask whether the technology is accepted by the user 
community. This is often overlooked or given short shrift, but it is an important consideration, as 
the user community is not only the consumer base but can also serve many important purposes, 
such as spotting real issues and trouble-shooting (particularly in cases where open source 
development is encouraged by industry participants); seeking out and rewarding the strongest 
innovators (which conversely can be problematic for companies that are not wielding their 
technology effectively or lagging behind in the technological arm’s race); and embracing 
companies and products that have the best balance of technology and openness in the 
marketplace.102 Finding the proper technological balance is admittedly likely to a challenge. On 
the one hand, technological protection, such as anti-counterfeiting technology, may be required 
to protect core properties and returns.103 On the other hand, however, technological openness 
may contribute to new forms of creativity, new revenue sources, and renewed participation in the 
creative community.104 The determination of technological adoption, therefore, must not only be 
                                                
102 A useful case in point is the music industry: technological protection has not worked particularly well 
in preventing piracy; nor has it proved a panacea against the loss of content value that has ensued upon 
industry-wide changes to the music business model, product pricing, and delivery systems. See supra 
Chapter 3, Section I.E.  
103 In the fashion industry, anti-counterfeiting technology has proven at least somewhat effective in 
curtailing rampant copying of high-end branded goods (although fashion industry participants are still 
forced to play catch-up with counterfeiters, to an extent that is often described as “whack-a-mole”). 
Examples of anti-counterfeiting technology in fashion include special paper, watermarks, intaglio 
printing, geometric lathe works, holograms, and microprinting. 
104 In the case of music, some artists such as jam-bands allow and encourage copying, restraining 
themselves from using any anti-copying technology or practices; this enables at least a subset of 
musicians to make a living almost exclusively from live performances & merchandise rather than from 
recording revenues. It also enables fans to appropriate music creatively, making, recording, and 
disseminating their own versions of songs, crafting new works that respectfully reference the originals but 
creating imaginative versions that are wholly new. This is a tradition that would have been lauded by 
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industry-specific but also company-specific. Overall, however, content industries should 
recognize that technology is only a tool, and should not be allowed to comprise the major 
mechanisms that support and protect an industry’s vitality. 
 
C. How Much Do You Value Interoperability? 
 
 
Technological protection may be a valuable tool for creative content industries, but it also may 
entail costs that should be assessed and weighed in the balance. The greatest of these costs may 
be interoperability that, as has been discussed, can be a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, 
locking users into a single ecosystem may lead to supra-normal rents, as users are compelled to 
consume products, services, and resources using one set of devices that are offered by a single 
manufacturer or closed group of manufacturers. This may lead to consumer loyalty and 
satisfaction with a given ecosystem, which may include its providers, creators, and delivery 
systems. But it may also generate consumer dissatisfaction with the restrictions, perceived or 
real, of a closed system, such as a lack of access to other distributors, a limitation of content to 
that which is on offer (presumably offered by strategic partners who have agreed upon the terms 
of content release), a possible curtailment of user rights due to IP protections (for instance, 
limited copying even for personal use, limited rights to re-create or build upon creative output, 
and so on). The returns that interoperability can generate, therefore, may weigh in the balance 
against the potential costs that it can impose across an industry.105 
 
There are other tradeoffs to interoperability as well. A closed system may also allow content 
creators, as well as manufacturers of technology carrying content, to exert considerable control 
over third-party providers who want to join the ecosystem, such as offering third-party 
applications.106 In the closed and non-interoperable system, then, creative content industries 
should recognize that they may be able to leverage their centrality by capturing a significant 
                                                                                                                                                       
Mozart and Haydn, as well as a host of classical composers and musicians, not to mention traditional 
American roots, R&B, blues, jazz, and rock artists. 
105 See generally URS GASSER & JOHN PALFREY, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC., BREAKING 
DOWN DIGITAL BARRIERS: WHEN AND HOW ICT INTEROPERABILITY DRIVES INNOVATION (Nov. 2007), 
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/interop/pdfs/interop-breaking-barriers.pdf. 
106 See id. at 10.  
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market share, not only compelling users to consume their content on the terms that they are able 
to set, but also compelling other participants such as third-party manufacturers or strategic 
partners to accede to the terms that an ecosystem may establish and control.107 While this may 
seem attractive to creative content industries, there is again a cost: namely, the loss of flexibility 
that a closed system may entail. By establishing a closed ecosystem, creative content industries 
may commit themselves to a relatively locked structure that is resistant to sweeping outside 
changes in technology, user preference, competitive costs and pricing, and so on.108 As 
disruptive innovation so often entails technological change, and as technological change can be 
swift, seismic, and inexorable, creative content companies must be wary of being trapped by a 
well-enclosed ecosystem into a position that cannot respond to innovation with the same speed 
and adaptability that smaller, more agile market competitors can marshal.109 Creative content 
industries that have already been challenged by disruptive innovation are especially well-
positioned to recognize that such flexibility is paramount in an ever-changing world, and thus 
should assess the value they place on interoperability accordingly. 
 
D. What Kind of Positive Externalities Do You Have? 
 
Creative content industries should be aware that paired with interoperability questions are 
considerations of positive externalities, such as the ability to grow or scale growth as users are 
added to the system, which can generate massive potential for creative content industries to build 
out and grow profits in the long run. Thus, for instance, nascent industries are likely to build their 
user bases from scratch, and may require a period of time to achieve a certain mass and stability. 
Over time, however, the user base can reach a tipping point that leads to a much more rapid and 
exponential phase of growth, in which users are multiplied due to such factors as inclusion from 
other user bases (for instance, users of a technological device will be compounded by users of 
other linked devices, third-party apps, or related products and services), exclusion from other 
                                                
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 17. 
109 For instance, size, complacency, and a lack of agility when confronted with digitization are typically 
cited when describing the demise of the famous maker of camera film, Kodak. See e.g., John Kotter, 
Barriers to Change: The Real Reason Behind the Kodak Downfall, FORBES (May 2, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkotter/2012/05/02/barriers-to-change-the-real-reason-behind-the-kodak-
downfall/. 
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incompatible locales, and so on. In addition, passing a tipping point may also lead to a realization 
of economies of scale, at which point greater efficiencies are achieved than could otherwise be 
achieved at lesser magnitudes and among a smaller user base. These efficiencies of scale may 
include reduced operating costs, enhanced marginal returns, greater services provided at the 
same or lesser cost, and ultimately larger net profits. Further, the increase in users can actually 
enhance the utility and value of industry products and services to other users. These network 
effects, or positive externalities, will generate positive feedback loops that are immensely 
important to building creative content industries, supporting the growth of creative enterprises, 
and supporting both content creators and generators.110 
 
Creative content industries should consider whether or not technological protections advance or 
impede such positive externalities. In some instances, technological lock-in may enable an 
ecosystem to keep users loyal to one set of products and devices, achieving some of the same 
goals that lack of interoperability can offer.111 In other instances, however, technological lock-up 
may exclude users who might otherwise participate in an ecosystem but who do not want to be 
restricted in their freedom of access and use.112 This may present some of the same drawbacks 
associated with a lack of interoperability, such as reducing the ability to achieve significant scale 
or related economies of scale. The tradeoff for creative content industries is therefore crucial to 
their long-term plans for viability and growth, and technological protections should be viewed 
with the goal of advancing positive externalities kept foremost in sight. 
 
1. Business Solutions 
 
Creative content industries may differ widely in their technological needs, options, and solutions, 
as well as in the degree of sophistication they may require their technologies to offer (this may 
vary with cost effectiveness concerns, the challenges faced, knowledgeability, and adaptability of 
users, pace of innovation in the industry, the often-competing interests of industry stakeholders, 
                                                
110 See generally CAL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES (1999). 
111 See generally Robert M. Metcalfe, All In Your Head, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2007), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0507/052.html. See also Jospeh Farrell & Paul Klemperer, 
Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1967 (M. Armstrong & R. Porter, eds. 2007). 
112 Farrell & Kiemperer, supra note 111, at 2055.  
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and other factors both indigenous and exogenous to the industry). Notwithstanding such 
differences, however, there are certain business strategies and solutions that will be relevant to 
virtually all content industries. From the outset, technological change should be approached 
conservatively: technological solutions tend to be costly, and are not likely to be a cure-all for 
deeper industry issues that have been brought to the fore by disruptive innovation. Further, the 
pace of innovation is a dual-edged sword, bringing new solutions to the market but not always 
vetting such solutions for utility and effectiveness; and the necessity of vying in a crowded field 
does not always yield the best-fitting technological choices among the most popular ones.113 
Most importantly, technology is always a moving target, as has been amply demonstrated by the 
emergence of disruptive innovations—including, in the music and entertainment sectors, 
recording devices ranging from the cassette player, the CD, the DVD, and more recently to TiVo 
and Aereo114—which argues for caution, rather than precipitate change. The reaction of creative 
industry markets to technology is equally a moving target, and may not be readily predicted or 
corrected. The optimal strategy, therefore, is to address the root causes and ramifications of 
disruption with solid business strategies and well-tailored IP solutions, rather than merely 
resorting to technological protections. 
 
Despite this cautionary notice, many creative industry participants remain persuaded that they 
require technological protections to prevent theft, unwarranted use, revenue-reducing activities, 
or other threats to their valuable content, products, and creative incentive plans.115 It is vital that 
the creative industries recognize, however, that, while technological protections may be valuable, 
                                                
113 See supra Chapter 3, Section IV.A. Many critics point to the entertainment industry as an example, in 
which dominance of the recording device market by VHS systems over BetaMax systems has been 
argued to be emblematic of the market choosing an inferior product to a better one. See supra note 15 and 
accompanying text. Similarly, in the music industry, the emergence of Beats By Dre headphones, not 
especially renowned for sound quality (with what many argue to be a marked overemphasis of bass), may 
be an example of consumer appeal trumping quality measures. See Are Beats by Dr. Dre Headphones 
Worth the Money?, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2013/05/are-beats-by-dr-dre-headphones-worth-the-
money/index.htm. 
114 Note for e.g. Jack Valenti’s dramatic comment predicting that the DVD would spell the demise of the 
movie industry (which it most certainly did not, rather contributing handsomely to its growth). See supra 
Chapter 3, Section II.B.  
115 See, e.g., Brian X. Chen, In a Bay Area Courtroom, Lawyers Hit Replay on Apple’s History, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/in-a-bay-area-courtroom-lawyers-hit-
replay-on-apples-history, 
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they may also come at a steep cost, which must be weighed against their benefits and ultimately 
estimated to yield net positive results. Creative industries should recognize these myriad costs 
associated with the adoption of technological measures designed to protect creative properties, 
and should assess and act accordingly.116 Several technological measures illustrate the cost-
benefit calculus that underlies this approach. For instance, anti-counterfeiting devices (such as 
watermarks and other identifiers) are useful, but work only until sophisticated counterfeiters 
devise new workarounds, copying methods, or other means of subverting or avoiding 
detection.117 Similarly, firewalls protect content from illicit access and use to a certain extent, but 
can be thwarted by third parties that post links to the protected content, or can otherwise be 
evaded (for instance, the use of multiple access accounts, and so on). 
 
Equally dual-edged are anti-copying protections, devices, or measures (such as limiting access to 
paid content or forbidding reverse engineering of technological protective software and/or 
devices), which effectively cabin content but run the risk of alienating core consumers, thereby 
potentially jeopardizing key industry business models.118 This is particularly risky when 
consumers feel as though their rights to content they have purchased, licensed, or otherwise 
legitimately accessed are being unfairly curtailed, changed, or rescinded.119 Creative content 
                                                
116 See, e.g., Michael Arrington, The Future of DRM, TECH CRUNCH (Dec. 14, 2006), 
http://techcrunch.com/2006/12/14/bill-gates-on-the-future-of-drm/ (quoting Bill Gates as saying that 
DRM “causes too much pain for legitimate buyers”); Justin Mann, UK Study Claims DRM Encourages 
Piracy, TECH SPOT (May 28, 2009), http://www.techspot.com/news/34881-uk-study-claims-drm-
encourages-piracy.html; Maira Sutton, Copyright Provisions in the TPP Would Stifle Innovation and 
Impede the Economy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 6, 2013), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/copyright-provisions-tpp-would-stifle-innovation-and-impede-
economy (“DRM can easily be used to support anti-competitive business practices and hamper innovation 
that builds upon existing technologies. For example, a company can prevent “unauthorized” software or 
digital content from interoperating with their devices by inserting DRM.”); Dave Their, DRM Hurts 
Companies More Than Piracy, Developer Argues, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidthier/2013/03/19/drm-hurts-companies-more-than-piracy-developer-
argues/ (discussing how DRM can breed apathy in customers toward key products). 
117 This is exemplified by the arms’ race in the fashion industry, with the added wrinkle that some of the 
counterfeiting may occur at the originator’s manufacturer when it is outsourced to countries that have 
high degrees of counterfeiting activities, such as China. 
118 For example, the Apple FairPlay DRM technology has proven unpopular, which arguably only 
somewhat offsets its utility and value. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 115. 
119 This happens particularly when their rights to content is established through prior practice or policy. In 
the music industry, for instance, recently imposed restrictions many commentators have argued have 
alienated consumers include restrictions on previously permissible uses, such as unlimited copying of 
content on one’s own personal music devices; restrictions on the ability to “rip” new CDs and share music 
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industries should strive to make their technological protections most effective, while yet bearing 
in mind users’ rights, consumers’ desire and demand for choice, and the reality of today’s 
innovative technologies that enable tech-savvy amateurs to copy, and even to distribute, content 
easily, cheaply or freely, and widely. These activities may seem counterintuitive to the protective 
aims of content industries, as well as to the incentive structure that are enshrined at the heart of 
intellectual property laws, practices, and policies, but they are innately creative activities that can 
serve highly positive purposes, such as increasing user engagement with content, spurring net 
creative output, and enriching the creative domain. 
 
Overarching these concerns is the potential that technological measures have for restricting 
interoperability of content, devices and delivery systems, and supplementary content and 
materials developed by third-party providers (such as support platforms, apps, GPS systems, 
tracking devices, games, and so on). Interoperability offers an especially complex technological 
concern, as it may present the ability to lock up an entire market (particularly if the leading 
company has garnered significant market share), but at the same time may prove an obstacle to 
creating strategic alliances among content industry participants, third-party providers and other 
useful entities (such as rights management organizations, supporting institutions, and so on).120 
Thus, creative content companies should understand that there may be unintended negative 
consequences that ensue from the overuse of protective technologies, as evinced when thwarted 
interaction or systemic lock-ups prevent industry participants from staying flexible and adaptive, 
                                                                                                                                                       
on a non-commercial basis (for example, the circulation of mix-tapes among friends); restrictions on the 
ability to have access to music on different operating systems and/or devices, to have access to music 
internationally, and so on. See generally Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 
(2007). 
120 Both creative content companies and their potential strategic allies can be made aware of these 
concerns and can address them with concerted and purposeful strategies. Many developers of applications 
that may be complementary to content acknowledge the challenges of interoperability and integration 
among content providers operating systems, and other interested parties. See, e.g., The Challenge of 
Cross-Platform Development, APP DEV. ALLIANCE, 
http://www.appdevelopersalliance.org/interoperability-the-challenge-of-cross-platform-development. 
Even the main operating systems are cognizant of these concerns as well. For an interesting comparison 
of Apple vs. Microsoft in this regard, see Fahad Al-Riyami, Interoperability: Pushing Towards a Unified 
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only to find that they are confined to an ecosystem that is rendered obsolete by technological 




Creative content industries offer diverse examples of how technology can be well-utilized, 
particularly when paired with strong business solutions; but they also offer other examples of 
technologies that are poorly executed, intrusive, or unbalanced, and have negative repercussions. 
In the case of protective firewalls, for instance, the computer industry presents several examples 
of highly functional firewalls, developed and refined over time, that serve to protect data, user 
privacy, know-how, and proprietary materials. But in the creative industries, the functionality of 
firewalls, or more commonly paywalls, often used to combat illicit or unpaid access or use of 
valuable content, has sometimes proven to be more problematic. The journalism industry, for 
instance, has not yet found an effective and viable use of paywalls coupled with business 
strategies. Reputable newspapers and magazines, such as the New York Times and the 
Economist,121 placed their key content behind paywall protection, seeking to compel 
longstanding readers to pay for content on a subscription basis for current news and/or a per-
article basis for archived content.122 There are, however, relatively easy work-arounds that users 
have found allowing them to obviate the paywall protections, such as reading sites that aggregate 
                                                
121 The only exception that seems to have succeeded in protecting journalistic content is the Wall Street 
Journal, in part because its target market is highly specific and targeted, and its news has proven 
invaluable to its readership. See Michael Nevradakis, Behind the Paywall: Lessons from US Newspapers, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2013/mar/27/behind-paywall-
us-newspaper-websites (noting that the Wall Street Journal implemented its paywall in 1997 and only 
registered a 15% decline in print circulation in the following fifteen years). The Wall Street Journal is an 
interesting exception, however, because while its content is valuable, it does not seem to be so unique that 
it is not somewhat fungible with its competitors’ news, such as that provided by Bloomberg News and 
others. Yet it thrives, and manages to attain subscription numbers that are the envy of its peers in the 
journalism industry. See The Wall Street Journal, NIEMAN J. LAB, 
http://www.niemanlab.org/encyclo/wall-street-journal/ (noting that the Wall Street Journal had 917,000 
digital subscribers in 2013).  
122 See Ryan Chittum, The NYT’s $150-Million-a-Year Paywall, COLUMBIA J. REV. (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/the_nyts_150_million-a-year_pa.php; Ryan Chittum, The NYT’s New 
Paywall Products Flounder, COLUMBIA J. REV. (July 29, 2014), 
http://www.cjr.org/the_audit/the_nyts_new_paywall_products.php; David Kaplan, The Economist’s 
Paywall Rises a Little Higher, GIGAOM (Apr. 5, 2010), https://gigaom.com/2010/04/05/419-the-
economists-paywall-rises-a-little-higher/. 
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and post links to content, using multiple accounts to avoid article limits (typically, newspapers 
only allow users to access a limited number of articles per month without charge), accessing go-
between sites that repost articles and links, and so on. Moreover, other content providers, such as 
online magazines, blogs, or group and political publications (such as Talking Points Memo or 
Politico) have joined the online sphere, adding to the competitive pressure on more traditional 
news sources. The turmoil that disruption in this industry has seen is well-documented, and has 
certainly not been quelled by technological means or other more drastic measures.123 The 
services and devices that effectively enable newspaper and magazine readers to make an end-run 
around technological protections, which are intended to keep content proprietary and to retain its 
commercial value, undermine the business model of the journalism industry.124 Most of the 
major newspapers and magazines in the industry are still wrestling with this conundrum, and 
continue to seek new ways to wield technological protections such as firewalls to support their 
at-risk business models.125  
 
Many similar issues have arisen in the creative industries that look to anti-copying devices to 
protect their content. Illustrative is the publishing industry, which is contending with the 
vulnerability of e-books to illicit copying and appropriation.126 Publishers have attempted to 
place anti-copying protections on e-books, somewhat analogous to anti-copying mechanisms on 
digital songs and musical content, as well as on film, media, games, and other entertainment and 
                                                
123 “White knight” rescues, such as Jeff Bezos’ purchase of the Washington Post or Carlos Slim’s 
purchase of a large share of New York Times stock, do not seem to have panned out. See Janet Asteroft, 
Progress Report on Jeff Bezos Transforming the Washington Post, PBS (Jan. 14, 2015), 
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2015/01/a-progress-report-on-jeff-bezos-transforming-the-washington-
post/. Infusions of cash appear to be stop-gaps, but only seem to be slowing, rather than reversing, the 
demise of even the best-established journalism outlets. 
124 See Some Readers Will Get Around Paywalls, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/some-readers-will-get-around-paywall-ny-times-20110323-
1c70j.html. 
125 See, e.g., Ken Doctor, The Newsonomics of The New York Times’ Paywalls 2.0, NIEMAN LAB (Nov. 
21, 2013), http://www.niemanlab.org/2013/11/the-newsonomics-of-the-new-york-times-paywalls-2-0; 
Laura Hazard Owen, New York Times Launches 2 New Paywall Products—and Rolls Out Native Ads, 
GIGAOM (Mar. 26, 2014), https://gigaom.com/2014/03/26/new-york-times-launches-2-more-paywall-
products-and-rolls-out-native-ads/; Ravi Somaiya, The New Yorker Alters Its Online Strategy, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/business/media/the-new-yorker-alters-its-online-
strategy.html. 
126 See, e.g., Roberto Baldwin, New DRM Will Change the Words in Your e-Book, WIRED (June 17, 
2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/06/new-ebook-drm/. 
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cultural content.127 Many publishers are finding, however, that anti-copying measures are 
proving as unpopular to their readership as they are to music listeners, movie watchers, and game 
players.128 This supports the proposition that the public relations problems that Apple 
experienced with respect to their digital rights management (DRM) protection, FairPlay, was not 
an isolated incident, but instead is germane to a host of creative industries.129 In the publishing 
industry, a similar outcry arose when publishers not only protected e-books with anti-copying 
technology but also restricted the release of e-books to public libraries, schools, and other 
community-oriented venues.130 Eventually, the publishing industry was compelled by the 
response of its user community to relent, releasing its e-books to libraries and other such 
institutions with strict restrictions upon the use and circulation of their published content.131 The 
publishers’ dilemma—that is, trying to quell appropriation while needing to provide adequate 
access to its materials and satisfaction to its broad user community—vividly illustrates the 
importance of balancing technological protections of content and related revenue against the 
need to preserve access, satisfy consumers, and limit incursions on well-established and valid use 
of materials for educational and enrichment purposes. 
 
The film and media entertainment industries have likewise faced dilemmas regarding the use of 
anti-copying technology to protect their properties and safeguard their revenue streams while 
striving to satisfy consumers, incentivize creativity, and enrich the cultural domain.132 In the case 
                                                
127 See id.; see also What is DRM (Digital Rights Management)?, DIGITAL PUB. 101, 
http://digitalpublishing101.com/what-is-drm-digital-rights-management/. 
128 See eBook and Digital Rights Management (DRM), for ePublishers, TINY HAT, 
http://www.tinhat.com/ebooks_epublishing/epublishers_drm.html (“DRM is unpopular with customers, 
and for good reasons.”).. 
129 The vast unpopularity of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998) (codified at scattered provisions in 17 U.S.C.), may also be regarded in this light as part of user 
resistance to both anti-copying measures and related policies, such as restrictions or bans on reverse 
engineering of such measures and devices, strict sanctions for attempts to circumvent anti-copying 
measures, and so on. For a discussion of the Act, see supra Chapter 3, subsection II.B.5. 
130 Ebooks and Copyright Issues, AM. LIBRARY ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/news/state-americas-libraries-
report-2013/ebooks-and-copyright-issues; see also Julie Bosman, Publisher Limits Shelf Life for Library 
E-Books, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/business/media/15libraries.html?_r=0. 
131 See Matt Enis, With All “Big Five” Ebooks Now Available, Ebook Vendors Assess the Road Ahead, 
DIG. SHIFT (Aug.5, 2014), http://www.thedigitalshift.com/2014/08/ebooks/big-five-ebooks-now-
available-ebook-vendors-assess-road-ahead. 
132 The movie industry is cognizant of this issue, and has made attempts at solving it at various times. See 
Michael Arrington, Movie Labels to Launch New “Open Market” Play Anywhere Scheme as Last Ditch 
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of the film industry, technological protections create lock-ups particularly problematic for 
international consumers who may seek access to content released in various markets both at 
home and abroad.133 DRM protections that are placed on movies domestically usually render 
those movies incompatible with foreign devices, unavailable in original form in foreign markets, 
and sometimes inaccessible to foreign consumers.134 Particularly when films in high demand are 
released on a “worldwide” basis, global audiences eagerly await access to such products and are 
liable to be vociferous in their disappointment if they do not have immediate access to the 
works.135 At the same time, there is a domestic counterpart to the problem: films that are 
distributed for first release in movie theaters are in high demand, but large audiences will clamor 
for their early release in second release forms, such as in DVD and BluRay formats, on services 
such as Netflix and Blockbuster,  through distributors such as Amazon Prime, and via online 
streaming sites. At the initial release of films, therefore, the combination of international demand 
for interoperable works and domestic demand for multiple release and formats of content render 
new films especially vulnerable to copying, appropriation, and illicit distribution. Sometimes, but 
not always, such copying is meant for commercial purposes; however, even when intended for 
private use, the copied content represents a revenue loss for film producers that they are 
unsurprisingly loathe to assume or forgive. 
 
In responding to these concerns, the film industry has devised an ingenious solution: it makes 
films available in sequential “windows” of release, which are staggered to maximize viewership, 
revenue, and audience satisfaction.136 The first window of release is typically known as first-
release in prime movie theaters, domestically and/or worldwide, in exclusive showings.137 At this 
juncture, films are fully armored with technological protection, and cannot yet be copied without 
                                                                                                                                                       
Effort to Save DRM, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 26, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/08/26/movie-labels-to-
launch-new-open-market-play-anywhere-scheme-as-last-ditch-effort-to-save-drm/. 
133 See generally Peter Ecke, Coping with the DVD Dilemma: Region Codes and Copy Protections, 38 
DIE UNTERRICHTSPRAXIS/TEACHING GERMAN 89 (2005). See also Robert Silva, DVD Region Codes—
What You Need to Know, ABOUT, http://hometheater.about.com/cs/dvdlaserdisc/a/aaregioncodesa.htm. 
134 Id. 
135 See, e.g., Amrisha, Fifty Shades of Grey India Release Date Still Unknown, FILM BEAT (Feb. 24, 
2015), http://www.filmibeat.com/hollywood/news/2015/fifty-shades-of-grey-india-release-date-still-
unknown-174817.html; Donald Ash, Why Does Japan Get Movies So Late?!?, JAPAN GUY, 
http://www.thejapanguy.com/why-does-japan-get-movies-so-late/. 
136 See Reel Time, supra note 11. 
137 Id. 
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some loss of quality, so that commercial appropriation is not viable.138 The second release of 
films is via other distribution services, providers, and devices, as discussed above, and while 
equally impregnable with respect to anti-copying protection, is perhaps somewhat more 
susceptible to personal copying, such as via “ripping” personal copies of DVDs, copying some 
streaming sessions online (if the user is sophisticated enough to know how to circumvent 
protections, which has proven to be the case on certain occasions), and so on. Further releases 
will occur in less significant venues, such as second-run movie theaters, release to libraries and 
other public resource institutions, and releases in smaller international venues,. While not 
impervious to copying—for instance, the depredations of large-scale illicit copyists and 
distributors such as Pirate Bay still prove to be as vexing to the film industry as their 
counterparts continue to be to the music industry139—these sequential windows of release 
remove some of the pressure to thwart copying felt by the industry, satisfy consumers with 
multiple opportunities to see and access their preferred content, and eventually allow content to 
make its way to more public resources such as libraries, teaching institutions, and so on. 
 
Interestingly, some music streaming services, such as Rhapsody,140 are beginning to contemplate 
a similar model of staggered or “windowed’ releases, in which music is released first to paying 
subscribers, when it is at the height of its popularity and thus commercial value, and only later to 
listeners who do not pay fees but support the service by listening to ad-supported online radio.141 
Book publishers are also considering following suit by staggering digital release dates of e-
                                                
138 Copying via hand-held devices such as camera recorders, iPhones, and so on, does not represent a 
significant threat, partially due to this loss of quality. But it is possible that technology in personal 
electronics will evolve to the point where this becomes a concern in the future.  
139 See Mike Masnick, Entertainment Industry Demands Swedish ISP Block the Pirate Bay; ISP Says No, 
TECHDIRT (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20150304/10332430208/entertainment-
industry-demands-swedish-isp-block-pirate-bay-isp-says-no.shtml. 
140 Note that Spotify does not have the windows of release option, which may be part of the reason they 
are in disputes with the hugely popular artist Taylor Swift, who feels that releasing her music online does 
not adequately compensate her creativity or protect her revenue stream that, as she claims, represents her 
livelihood. See supra note 47. 
141 See Jason Epstein & Rob Glaser, Essay: Why Streaming (Done Right) Will Save the Music Business, 
BILLBOARD (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6327429/essay-why-streaming-
done-right-will-save-the-music-business. 
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books, a move which has met with mixed response.142 In both these cases, then, anti-copying 
technology is used to protect the product, but flexible business models reduce the negative 
impact of content lock-up, and at times provide the means for the creative industry to release the 
music at a later date, after the period of greatest commercial value has passed, to a wider 
audience that is not willing or able to pay full freight to gain access to the content. The value in 
leaving this latter option open lies in part in satisfying the widest possible band of audiences, but 
it also increases exposure to creative content, thereby ensuring that the content will gain the 
largest familiarity possible among actual and potential consumers. It also increases the likelihood 
that such content will provide a baseline resource for future creators, only some of whom may be 
able to pay to gain access to such content. By harnessing technological protection to business 
plans that maximize the monetization of content but leave room for user enrichment and 
exposure, the film and music industries are adopting a well-balanced strategy that bodes well for 
the long-term success of their creative endeavors and commercial viability. 
 
Lastly, legal databases offer a different perspective on technological protection. The two main 
competitors in this field, Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw, have been battling for market share in the 
area of legal resources, information, services, and “content-enabled workflow solutions.”143 Both 
services have highly proprietary models that are, of course, technologically protected.144 Yet they 
offer a strikingly similar array of data, information, research, resources, and services.145 It is in 
the nature of their technological tools that they differ and aim to distinguish themselves among 
their user base.146 Each has proprietary search tools and capacities, formats, page delineation 
systems, organizational devices and aids (to assist legal researchers in managing data and 
findings), and so on. While technologically protected, the materials that Lexis and Westlaw most 
value are the means and methods that they offer to researchers, rather than any of the underlying 
                                                
142 See Chris Walters, Hardcover vs. eBook: Why Staggered Release Dates Are a Bad Idea, BOOKSPRUNG 
(Nov. 7, 2009), http://booksprung.com/hardcover-vs-ebook-why-staggered-release-dates-are-a-bad-idea; 
see also Wylie, supra note 46.  
143 See About LexisNexis, LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/about-us/about-us.page. 
144 See, e.g., Electronic Publications Master Agreement, LEXISNEXIS, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/terms/bender/MasterAgreement/; Terms of Use, WESTLAW, 
https://lawschool.westlaw.com/pdf/online%20law%20school%20student%20faculty%20user%20agreeme
nt.pdf. 
145 See LYNN LENART, COMPARING WESTLAW NEXT, LEXIS ADVANCE AND BLOOMBERG LAW (2013), 
http://www.uakron.edu/law/library/docs/chart_comparing_3_research_systems.pdf. 
146 Id.  
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information, data, or resources (most of which would, at any rate, be challenging to 
propertize).147 In relying on their technological innovations to vie for and secure market position, 
Lexis and Westlaw emphasize propertization and protection of their services and research tools 
as the fundamental value-add of their business model.148 In the case of these legal databases, 
technology is used in conjunction with IP rights to protect innovations in search methods, 
research tools, and organizational aids. These innovations are a form of creativity akin to 
creativity in the production of content; but the content itself, unlike in other creative industries, 
are not deemed creative works that merit protection. The legal databases, however, still serve to 
highlight the importance in content industries of determining where the valuable product and 




A. Introduction to Cultural Issues 
 
For virtually all creative content industries, the nature of their cultural ecosystem—bound to be 
highly individualized in its construction and particularized in its ramifications—should be 
considered at the very outset of shaping business and IP policies. A cultural ecosystem may 
comprise various commons-like aspects, institutional support structures, certain cultural features, 
room for open source or non-propertized production, and so on. When disruptive innovation 
occurs, its effects on the ecosystem should be still more closely examined, and responses should 
be crafted to accommodate vital cultural attributes that underpin creativity, productiveness, and 
commercial success. 
 
A series of initial questions should be posed to frame cultural concerns; and the outcomes of this 
multi-pronged inquiry should be taken as the baseline for industry adaptation and adoption of 
any new changes in policy, practices and strategies for the future. These questions are deeply 
                                                
147 Id.; see also Rob Corrao, Westlaw v. LexisNexis—Which Is Better?, LAC GROUP, http://lac-
group.com/westlaw-vs-lexisnexis-better/. 
148 See, e.g., West Pub. Corp. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Minn. 1985), aff’d, 799 
F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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interconnected—at times overlapping in certain respects—and thus should be considered 
systemically insofar as possible. The vital questions that creative cultural industries must ask are: 
(i) Do you have the critical features of a constructed commons/guild; and/or are you supported 
by an institutional edifice? (ii) Do you have important cultural features that substitute for some 
of the operations of a formalized legal IP system? That is, (a) Do reputation, attribution, and 
homage work? (b) Do prizes and rewards work?149 (c) Do your norms and practices inhibit 
stealing? (d) Are there sanctions within the community against stealing/plagiarism/outright 
copying? (iii) How much room is there for open source production? and (iv) How much 
spillover/network effects can your industry produce?150 
 
B. Do You Have The Critical Features of a Constructed Commons/Guild?  
And/Or Are You Supported by an Institutional Edifice? 
 
First, some creative content industries will have the hallmarks of constructed commons or guilds, 
featuring: strongly defined and united communities; internalized guidelines for behavior, such as 
a communal belief in collaboration, openness, sharing and interdisciplinary or cross-cultural 
efforts, outreach, and output; a sense of membership in the given community that may be either 
structurally defined or unspoken yet well-limned; self-governance rules, policies, practices, 
principles and norms; institutional support systems; and so on.151 In some cases, creative labor 
may be premised on, and supported by, established long-term institutional arrangements, some of 
which may be formalized in contracts and other concretized agreements, others of which may be 
more loosely arranged (such as short-term stays at institutions, affiliations, and so on).152 Further, 
some institutions in the creative content realm may establish normative policies and procedures 
able to assign rights and responsibilities, support key community-held principles, and achieve 
                                                
149 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes, Not Patents, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/prizes--not-patents; see also Stephen Shavell & T. van Ypserle, Rewards 
Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J. L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 
150 See generally supra Section III.D. 
151 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, 
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 9 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 659-60 (2010). 
152 In the case of education, for instance, long-term arrangements such as tenure-track and tenure 
positions, administrative roles, and so on tend to be highly formalized and managed within an institution’s 
organizational structure. There are looser affiliations, such as visiting faculty roles, adjuncts, and others, 
but these too are subject to contracts, albeit typically shorter-term and less binding on both sides. 
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other vital objectives, with or without attaching the propertization of content and/or the 
distribution of IP rights and rewards.153 
 
But the hallmarks of constructed creative commons may not always be so intangibly drawn. 
They may also include powerful institutionally granted financial supports designed to benefit 
legitimized members of the creative community.154 These supports may prove essential in times 
of disruption, for they can allow creative work to be ongoing without necessarily requiring 
immediate (or possibly even long-term) returns. Such support may include deep operating 
budgets earmarked to underwrite innovative projects, new ventures, and creative output that may 
not be readily marketable or monetizable.155 Support may also be extended in the form of non-
monetary incentives and rewards, which can be equally gratifying to creative projects 
spearheaded by visionaries who have not yet determined the commercial value or viability of 
their output, but who believe that their work will lead the way to responding to, and overcoming 
disruptive innovation in their creative content industry.156 It behooves creative industries to take 
these elements into consideration, and to recognize the strength and utility of constructed 
commons in spurring and supporting new innovative endeavors and creative output. 
 
                                                
153 In education, some of these rights and responsibilities include tenure rights, publication rights, 
academic freedom, and professional autonomy. 
154 See Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Economic Structure of Higher Education, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 161 
(2012); see also JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, DANIEL E. ATKINS & DOUGLAS VAN HOUWELING, HIGHER 
EDUCATION FACES THE DIGITAL AGE: TECHNOLOGY ISSUES AND STRATEGIES FOR AMERICAN 
COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (2002).  
155 In education, this may include institutional support, including financial backing, reducing teaching 
loads, and coverage of expenses, for the development of MOOCs, online teaching platforms, and so on. 
This kind of institutional support is particularly helpful when such innovations need not be monetized 
immediately, so that experimental efforts, adjustments, new creative and pedagogical projects, and other 
output may be generated without the immediate to justify or recuperate costs. At the same time, however, 
this may encourage work that is not likely to be self-sustaining in the long term. Educators must, 
therefore, consider whether or not they consider such work to be compatible with their budgets, time 
management plans, and priorities. 
156 Penn Online Contract (on file with author). 
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C. Do You Have Important Cultural Features at Work that Substitute for Some of the 
Operations of a Formalized Legal IP System? That Is, (A) Do Reputation, Attribution, and 
Homage Work? (B) Do Prizes and Rewards Work? (C) Do Your Norms and Practices Inhibit 
Stealing? (D) Are There Sanctions Within the Community against 
Stealing/Plagiarism/Outright Copying? 
 
Second, the cultural space creative content industries inscribe is also likely to have key features 
that drive behaviors and practices, underlie norms and value-based guidelines, and incentivize 
creativity. Some industries will find that these cultural features substitute for some or all of the 
operations of a formalized legal IP system, while others will find that they are entwined with IP 
rights and rewards, and serve as a buttress that is difficult to quantify yet essential to success. 
The cultural features that prevail in creative industries are richly varied, and may dominate an 
industry’s practices or lie more subtly below its surface operations. In both cases, however, they 
may be harnessed by creators, producers, and other industry stakeholders to shape practices, 
policies, and strategies that will lead to commercially valuable output and creative churn. These 
features may include: a culture in which homage and attribution are the norm; a culture in which 
norms and practices inhibit and/or sanction stealing: a culture requiring due attribution among 
creators; a culture rewarding reputation (which may include securing a reputation, protecting it, 
and preventing others from sullying it); a culture that leaves room for community disapproval, in 
which pointing out and shaming appropriation without attribution, outright stealing, and other 
practices or acts that violate the communal ethos; a culture that rewards creativity and 
productivity with prizes and rewards, which may be valued and useful for promoting careers, 
building resumes, etc.; a culture that accommodates the strategic use of prizes and rewards for 
other purposes, such as increasing institutional exposure, building or expanding consumer 
awareness, familiarity, and appreciation; and so on. 
 
In some cases, these cultural features may seem at tension with practices and directives that are 
expressed in an industry’s statement of purpose and operations. For instance, some creative 
content industries will express a commitment to sanctioning appropriation, but at the same time 
will tacitly condone a certain amount of creative appropriation in order to promote new output, 
satisfy consumer demand, and generate an economic and/or creative churn that is commercially 
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helpful and ultimately profitable.157 Creative content industries should, therefore, consider how 
central their cultural features and tenets are to their practices, how they mesh with industry 
policies and directives, and how they are to be reconciled with business strategies and goals. 
 
D. How Much Room is There for Open Source Production? Do You Benefit from Open 
Source Production? 
 
Third, creative content industries should consider the value that they place on the generation of 
work that is unpropertized, uncommercialized, and likely to occur among a wide base of 
creators, users, and other industry participants. In certain cases, the potential for open source 
production may be a crucial element that a creative industry considers central to its business 
strategies for growth, development, exploration, R&D, and generation of new revenue sources; 
in other cases, open source production may be a peripheral area of production that holds the 
possibility of opening new directions, but that is something of a wild card in the industry’s 
estimation.158 Creative industries must ascertain how much they value open-source production 
and whether they choose to centralize it in their organizational planning and practices. They 
should, therefore, ask a series of questions that will contribute to making such a determination. 
At the outset, creative content industries should ask what the advantages to open source 
production are. Among the possibilities are: its ability to promote basic/fundamental research; its 
potential to stimulate innovation and creativity to emerge and develop in different directions, 
thereby allowing the best practices and best solutions to rise to the fore without being stifled by 
competitive forces (this may usefully counterbalance the fact that the first mover advantage gives 
the early entrant, and not necessarily the best innovator, an early advantage); its availability to a 
great many users who are able to crowdsource solutions (that is, to allow open input from as 
many interested and able participants as possible, not drawn just from within the community but 
from an array of talent pools); its avoidance of hierarchies that may stifle talent (due to peer 
envy, bureaucracy, and other potentially negative features of organizational and institutional 
                                                
157 As in the case of fashion, some industries require such churn to keep generating products and 
satisfying rapid, voluminous and ever-changing consumer demand. 
158 See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2005).  
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structures); and potentially its ability to democratize innovation, promote reputational norms and 
keep peer collaboration, influence, respect, and sharing alive and well.159 
 
Creative content industries should further consider the practical demands that open source 
production is likely to mandate. Not only do they need to prioritize keeping open source values 
in place,160 but they also need to have mechanisms in place that will allow open source to thrive 
and prevent it from being copied (this may include proprietary barriers, oversight, norms, 
contractual agreements and/or Creative Commons-type licenses, as well as possible 
technological measures, such as firewalls). Moreover, creative content industries should ask 
whether the open source work that they support or privilege may eventually be captured both 
fairly and within reasonable parameters, so that new innovators are able to capitalize on parts of 
open source creation while leaving other parts open and accessible (for instance, the Adobe 
software makers use, generate, and make available a blend of proprietary and non-proprietary 
output). Creative industries should ask whether the long-term prospects of such open source 
production point in the direction of openness or propertization, and should shape their plans, 
mandates and priorities accordingly. 
 
Creative content industries should also consider the impact of open-source production on their 
employees and laborers. One significant concern is how and where an industry’s vital laborers 
are paid: for instance, some salaried workers may be paid to perform professionally at their place 
of employment, and their salaries then support the open source work that they do, effectively 
underwriting their unpaid efforts. In this case, creative industries should consider the extent to 
which they are either supporting such efforts or being supported by other institutions. They 
should also consider the extent to which the creative industry’s market structure supports 
widespread open-source production, thereby effectively amortizing the costs of unremunerated 
production across a market, and reducing the burden on any one industry participant. Lastly, 
creative content industries should also consider the extent to which laborers choose to participate 
                                                
159 See id.; see also Katherine Noyes, 10 Reasons Open Source Is Good for Business, PCWORLD (Nov. 5, 
2010), http://www.pcworld.com/article/209891/10_reasons_open_source_is_good_for_business.html. 
160 In the case of education, for instance, openness, a commitment to educating the populace, a belief in 
open access to creation, production, and resources, and other such values are commensurate with open 
source ethos, norms and values. 
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in open source and the extent to which they feel rewarded by open source work, for a variety of 
possible reasons, including: satisfying curiosity, interest, or desire to explore in ways that are not 
directly in line with one’s primary employment; obtaining peer approval and recognition; 
participating in creative experimentation; seeking to add to the greater good and/or the greater 
public domain; and so on. 
 
E. How Much Spillover/Network Effects Can Your Industry Produce? 
 
Fourth, creative content industries should recognize that cultural openness may be sustained not 
only by open-source production but also by other factors such as job mobility among skilled and 
creative workers, strong institutional settings (such as major universities, civic organizations, 
educational resources, and so on), and a host of favorable environmental conditions. These 
features often contribute greatly to establishing a setting that affords creative industries a talented 
and secure workforce, a desirable and attractive locale, and a powerful draw to outside talent. 
Together, these features are likely to create spillover and network effects that enhance and 
encourage creative production. Tapping into these spillover and network effects is paramount for 
creative industries, but the approach to maximizing their utility should be closely studied and 
carefully mapped out. In some creative industries, widespread open source production, as 
discussed above, may be the best means to fostering network effects. In other creative industries, 
a certain amount of propertization, balanced with a certain amount of “leakiness”, or lack of 
propertization, may prepare the groundwork for wide-scale creative and innovative growth. 
Similarly, treating talented employees as valuable, while recognizing their prospects for 
mobility, propensity to seek due compensation, and the possibility that in some cases know-how 
will be inextricably linked to a given individual or team, is an important undertaking that creative 
content industries must assume while seeking to benefit from industry-wide spillover and 
network effects. 
 
1. Business Solutions and Normative Approaches 
 
Establishing a constructed commons may be challenging to creative content industries, but 
putting into place some of its features should be manageable, in part because many creative 
Bhamati Viswanathan CREATIVE COPYRIGHT 
 527 
industries are already founded on normative principles and values, such as openness and 
collaboration, professional autonomy, or publication rights. These norms may be supported by 
formalized policies that clarify the terms of creative work and its rewards, but they may also be 
sustained by expressions of commitment that are made at all levels of the industry. Where 
possible, financial support should be extended as well, which will ensure that industry 
participants continue to engage in experimentation, cross-pollination, interactive projects, and 
other efforts that may not be immediately valuable commercially but that have good long-term 
prospects. Institutional support should offer creative talent the incentive to expand horizons 
within a circumscribed setting and with well-drawn incentives, backing, and rewards. At the 
same time, however, creative industries should ensure that they will eventually benefit from 
creative efforts resulting in propertizable and/or commercially valuable output, which will entail 
reserving the right to secure intellectual property rights in fully realized creative work. 
 
Creative content industries should also allow normative self-monitoring and self-sanctioning 
where appropriate. For instance, practices that encourage attribution, sanction appropriation 
(particularly without attribution), confer reputational benefits, and reward a high level of 
creativity should be allowed to flourish, whether or not alongside formalized procedures or stated 
policies. Some creative industries should establish prizes, rewards, and incentive schemes that 
further support emerging and established talent (possibly without going so far as to award IP 
rights in the creative output). By harnessing normative approaches to business practices, creative 
industries will be able to sustain and reap the benefits of strong a cultural system that is not 
solely dependent on IP rights to promote and reward creative production. 
 
With respect to open source production, creative content industries should seek to accommodate 
broadening outreach to as wide a range as possible of creators while again reserving the right to 
seek intellectual property rights in some creative output. These initiatives must begin with a 
consideration of the nature of an industry’s production, by asking at the outset what materials 
should be protected (that is, commercializable R&D, finalized creative output, propertized work, 
and so forth) and what should be kept open (that is, basic research, creative experimentation, 
non-commercial work, and so on). Only after such a determination has been made should 
creative content industries establish the means and terms of open source production within their 
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purview. This may include restricting commercialization of early-stage work in various ways: for 
instance, establishing shared open databases (for instance, in the case of scientific research, 
gene/SNP databases) or pools of information and/or data; limiting the extent to which creators, 
researchers, institutions, partners (whether or not corporate or institutional), the user community, 
and other interested parties can seek IP rights in early-stage work; encouraging publication (in 
some cases, as opposed to patenting); rewarding openness, collaboration, sharing and exchange; 
establishing prizes, incentives (for instance, academic positions such as named chairs), and 
rewards; and informing the user community that open source production is valued but may not 
be remunerated by the normal means (such as salary, IP rights, or share of returns). 
 
In sum, creative content industries should recognize the extent to which creativity and 
innovation, as well as the labor that goes into such creative efforts, are supported by institutional 
edifices, external funding sources, or other safety valves that reduce financial pressures to 
monetize work. They should further recognize that such support is likely to enhance the 
prospects for open source production to thrive, since the drive to propertize, commercialize, and 
monetize will be proportionately reduced by a well-supported and long-term perspective on 
commercial viability. Creative content industries should understand that it is unrealistic to expect 
open source to thrive in an environment starved of financial support: after all, labor needs to be 
remunerated (that is, employees need to earn their livelihood). But with proper institutional 
support, where possible, creative industries should recognize that open source production is 
bound to be an avenue that is not particularly costly but may be ultimately promising, and is 
therefore worth supporting, pursuing, and encouraging. 
 
Creative content industries should also consider the spillover and network effects that may arise 
from a cultural ecosystem that promotes industry-wide vitality and growth. While efforts may be 
made across an industry to promote such effects—for instance establishing locales for growth 
(such as Silicon Valley in CA, Kendall Square and the Route 128 corridor in Boston, and so on), 
as well as tax benefits for such locales—individual efforts on the part of creative industry 
participants are equally important to creating the conditions for spillover and network effects to 
flow. Industry participants should consider joint problem-solving, interdisciplinary solutions 
(such as collaborative projects, cross-pollination across institutions, and so on), multi-tiered 
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grants that support start-ups, spin-offs, and incubators on various levels, industry-wide 
conferences that address state-of-the-art issues in the creative landscape, and various efforts 
aimed at encouraging creators to interact and engage (such as shared office spaces or media 
labs). These features will help secure skilled and talented workers, who will be drawn to creative 
sectors and are likely to settle in these areas. Industry participants should build upon such 
incentives by making certain that reputational benefits such as peer approval, recognition, and 
other rewards remain high for motivational purposes and reinforce a shared understanding of the 
value of creative talent. At the same time, creative content industries should leverage the 
advantages that their locale may offer, such as established universities and libraries, which offer 
cultural resources that are perfectly suited to fortify and further creative production. Lastly, 
creative content industries should secure and nurture close ties with user communities, many of 
whose members hunger not only to consume but also to generate creative content. 
 
2. IP Solutions 
 
Implicit in the cultural efforts that creative content industries should undertake is the mandate to 
reserve propertization, including IP rights, to the areas of output in which it is most necessary 
and useful. Incentivizing, rewarding, encouraging, and nurturing creative production, whether 
undertaken by employees for remuneration or by open source producers for other rewards, 
should be the first priority of creative content industries. Establishing and wielding IP rights 
should not be the first order of the day, but instead should ensue upon the determination of where 
they are to be ascribed and how they are to be valued. In principle, creative content industries 
should strive to minimize IP grants in early-stage work, such as basic research and exploration, 
as well as stand-alone units of work that are more effective when non-propertized (such as online 
courses), software programs, databases of information and/or data, and other endeavors that may 
be well-suited to open source production, adaptation, and improvement. Creative content 
industries should bear in mind that open source production seems to work best when it is 
embraced by a community that is eager to participate, innovate, and create, and when it is least 
subject to regulation, formalized parameters, and hierarchies. It does not follow that IP rights 
may not be superimposed upon a fairly open ecosystem that has been shaped to encourage open 
source production: when valuable creative output is generated, propertization is both essential 
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and inevitable if an industry is to remain workable and profitable. But by recognizing the cultural 
elements that undergird a vast amount of creative activity, and integrating IP rights into the 
greater culture, creative content industries are best able to harness their particular strengths to the 




When creative content industries exhibit the attributes of a constructed commons, they often 
function as a highly complex ecosystem in which institutional, individual and communal norms 
and practices are both prioritized in theory and exercised in practice. The case of the software 
industry, for instance, is built around tenets such as professional autonomy, collaborative 
outreach and efforts, attribution, peer recognition and reputational capital, a certain degree of 
self-governance including normative sanctions against appropriation of ideas and output, and 
other key features that are characteristic of commons-like approaches to creation and its related 
rewards.161 Software industry participants generally agree that these feature are not only valuable 
in promoting positive behaviors but also constitutive of the strategies that brought the industry 
long-lasting security and success.162 One way to consider the open source movement in the 
software industry is to see it as an extension of this recognition: normative commitments to 
openness, peer production, and communal participation in the growth and development of 
creativity and innovation laid the groundwork for the rise of open source production and its 
rapidly expanding acceptance among commercial entities, funders, stakeholders, and the greater 
user and creator community. 
 
Widespread recognition of the success of the open source production movement in the software 
industry has in turn spread to a range of other creative and innovative industries, including 
various technology sector industries such as Internet-based systems and services, online privacy 
and security providers, and so on. Further, the fundamental properties of open source production 
                                                
161 See generally Ashe Dryden, The Ethics of Unpaid Labor and the OSS Community, ASHE DRYDEN 
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.ashedryden.com/blog/the-ethics-of-unpaid-labor-and-the-oss-community; 
Jeremy Kahn, Open Source Does Not Mean Free Labor, JEREMY KAHN’S DEV BLOG (Oct. 19, 2014), 
http://jeremyckahn.github.io/blog/2014/10/19/open-source-does-not-mean-free-labor/. 
162 See Paola Giuri et al., Skills, Division of Labor and Performance in Collective Inventions: Evidence 
from Open Source Software, 28 INT’L J. OF IND. ORG. 54 (2010).  
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have been adopted by, and adapted to, the practices, norms, and strategies of many technology-
based industries seeking the kind of success the software industry has enjoyed in recent years.163 
In the tech sector, the development of Internet-oriented products and services, such as Facebook, 
Wikipedia, DropBox, and SoundCloud, as well as crowd-sourced sites and resources, offer 
ample evidence that many facets of the computer industry’s approach to creativity and 
innovation have been embraced and used to build an array of entities, services, and products 
enabling collaboration in the ever-expanding and rapidly globalizing user community.  
 
Other creative content industries have likewise adapted open source schemes and principles to 
their content generation, production and dissemination. Following the example of the education 
industry, for example, scholars and researchers are creating a number of repositories, many of 
which are organized on an open source or “open access” basis, to which creative producers can 
contribute content, including sites that host scholarly articles such as the Social Sciences 
Research Network (SSRN)164, The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)165, and 
Bepress.166 These may also include databases of fundamental scientific research or elements 
critical to research, such as genetic research databases167, some of which are modeled upon 
patent pools168 that provide for the sharing of fundamental scientific research.169 Similarly, artists 
are beginning to contemplate creating artistic repositories in areas such as photography and short 
                                                
163 See, e.g., LASERSAUR, http://www.lasersaur.com/ (presenting an open-source laser-cutter); Open 
Source Malaria: The Story So Far, OPENWETWARE, 
http://openwetware.org/wiki/OSDDMalaria:GSK_Arylpyrrole_Series:Story_so_far (discussing open 
source development of a malaria drug); Soft Drink Formula, ALFREDO OCTAVIO, 
http://alfredo.octavio.net/soft_drink_formula.pdf (providing the formula for an “open source soft drink”). 
164 SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, http://www.ssrn.com/en/. 
165 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/. 
166 BEPRESS, http://www.bepress.com/. University officials have also shown great support to open source 
scholarship. See Richard Wheeler et al., Values and Scholarship, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 23, 2012), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2012/02/23/essay-open-access-scholarship. 
167 See, e.g., An Overview of the Human Genome Project, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/12011238. 
168 See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (2004), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9175.pdf (providing an overview of patent pools). 
169 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Open and Collaborative Research: A New Model for Biomedicine (Duke L. Sch., 
Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 61, Oct. 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=574863; Arti K. Rai, 
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science (July 22, 1999), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=172032. 
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film.170 In the case of journalism, some joint websites and blogs are created with the free and 
voluntary contribution of authors, some of whom are employed elsewhere, in a kind of open 
source production that is greatly enriching the blogosphere.171 Examples of these include 
SCOTUSblog, Politico, Talking Points Memo, Crooked Timber, First Monday, and others. One 
more illustration of the widespread effect that the open source movement has had on creative 
content production is in the areas of online teaching and learning. Universities and other well-
established institutions were not the only ones affected; jointly-led ventures among teachers, 
educators, instructors, and those simply interested in the exchange of knowledge led to the 
creation of online language learning blogs, artistic instruction blogs (for instance, teaching music 
via Skype), and other instructional websites created, supported and developed by various online 
communities.172 In many of these cases, a resistance to propertization may or may not be due to a 
reluctance to monetize, and thereby commoditize, the output of the creative community. Rather, 
it may be a recognition that by harnessing open source production to important areas of 
creativity—some of which are nascent and emerging, others of which are fundamental to growth, 
and many of which are beneficial to the public good—the cultural ecosystem of creative 





For creative content industries undergoing disruptive innovation and searching for the most 
effective tactical plan for managing change, promoting growth and fostering longevity, the 
                                                
170 See, e.g., Open Access Policy for Images of Works of Art Presumed in the Public Domain, NAT’L 
GALLERY OF ART, https://images.nga.gov/en/page/openaccess.html; Open Content Program, GETTY, 
http://www.getty.edu/about/opencontent.html; see also, e.g., Latin American & Spanish Videos Freely 
Available on the Internet: A Guide, UNIV. LIBRARIES, 
http://libguides.library.albany.edu/content.php?pid=57045&sid=428759. 
171 Huffington Post prior to its acquisition by AOL in 2011 is a good example of such business model. See 
Nate Silver, The Economics of Blogging and the Huffington Post, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2011), 
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/the-economics-of-blogging-and-the-huffington-
post/?_r=0 (comparing the business model to “a galley rowed by slaves and commanded by pirates”).  
172 See, e.g., 10 Sources for Free Online Music Courses, STUDY.COM, http://education-
portal.com/articles/10_Sources_for_Free_Online_Music_Courses.html; Learn 48 Languages Online for 
Free: Spanish, Chinese, English & More, OPEN CULTURE, 
http://www.openculture.com/freelanguagelessons. 
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extraction, analysis and application of the salient factors presented here should prove a useful 
framework that is readily adaptable to their needs. There are a host of creative content industries 
that share a fundamental commitment to spurring creativity that will fall into this rubric, 
including entertainment and media, publishing and journalism, sporting activities, cuisine and 
comedy, as well as others that are united in pursuit of innovative research, discovery, and 
production, such as scientific research and commercial sciences such as biotech, software 
development, computers and electronics, games (electronic, console-based, video, online, and 
others) and, increasingly, new entrants such as health care, K-12 education, and so forth. As can 
be discerned from the broad range of these industries, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, and 
thus the process of tailoring business and IP solutions remains absolutely vital to the survival and 
success of commercialized creativity and industrialized innovation. The balance of salient factors 
must accordingly be developed on a case-by-case basis. 
 
It is also critical, however, that creative content industries and their ilk recognize that it is not 
merely the salient factors that matter but also the interplay among factors that is paramount to 
assess and consider. That is, changing one part of the equation is likely to have repercussions on 
other parts of the equation, and may lead to profound shifts in the industry’s landscape and 
climate. Adding layers of IP, for instance, may cause an industry to place less trust in cultural 
and normative principles and practices, so that IP enforcement comes to substitute for, if not 
wholly replace, an ethos of conduct that is primarily self-governed and self-sustained. This not 
only has the potential to transform an industry’s entire ecosystem but also has the potential to 
mutate its communally shared values, norms, and mission. Moreover, it has the potential to affect 
the community itself, which can lead to further upheaval as longstanding members of the 
creative community struggle to come to terms with the newly emerging culture in which they 
find themselves embedded. 
 
In the case of education, for instance, much ink has been spilled over the central idea of the 
university, its core commitments, its shared values and norms, and its very sense of self. Many 
agree that the recent onslaught of self-examination (and at times self-excoriation) may not be 
new, but does seem to have a new urgency (and at times poignancy) to it, spurred by a sense that 
commercialization and commodification are coming to push aside deeper commitments to 
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educational goals, the public good, and learning for its own sake.173 It is not possible to lay the 
onus for these concerns squarely on increased propertization, newly created IP rights (such as 
patent rights in scientific research and copyright in courses and course materials) and IP 
managers (such as technology transfer offices and administrators of online learning and 
MOOCs), or a newfound drive to monetize intellectual, scholarly and/or pedagogical output. But 
the many disruptions that the educational sector has faced in recent years, including 
technological changes and adoption of new technologies across academic communities (both 
faculty and administrators and students), has ushered in these increasingly important features and 
given them a newfound prioritization in the academic ecosystem. This in turn has contributed to 
a profound shift in the culture and climate of higher education and, as many commentators have 
contended, may be central to an identity crisis that will surely be as far-reaching in its impact as 
the commercial practices themselves are proving to be. What does this signify for education and 
other creative content industries? Simply that the decision to create large-scale responses to 
disruptive innovation are likely to be truly transformative, in ways that may not be wholly 
foreseeable, but to an extent that may be even greater than initially imagined. For this reason, the 
analysis that has been laid out in this paper, and the recommendations that it urges upon creative 
content industries, are offered as a means of understanding the issues, output, and values at stake 
for industries, as well as a basis for conceptualizing the impact that may be felt by industry 
stakeholders across the community. This, then, is both the strength and the vulnerability of the 
creative ecosystem: it has the potential to rise to meet the challenges of disruptive innovation, but 
it must meet those challenges wisely, carefully, and with solutions, directives, and cultural and 
normative practices and principles that are optimally tailored to foster creativity, spur 
productivity, benefit the user community and, as much as possible, contribute to the public good. 
 
                                                
173 See generally BILL READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS (1997) 




In his seminal works, which presciently mapped the copyright debates of the last several decades 
despite predating the countless technological upheavals, Justice Stephen Breyer articulated his 
persisting concern with the expansion of copyright as a means of fostering the production and 
dissemination of knowledge and information.1 Analyzing the book publishing industry, Breyer 
argued that the overall benefits of an expanded copyright could not be well-justified. This 
“unease” with copyright has persisted among many legal commentators to date, and indeed has 
only been heightened by a series of expansions to copyright law that seem not to be curtailed 
even by the restraints inscribed in the statutory grant itself.2 
 
Outlining an economic approach to copyright law (which would eventually become standard 
practice among intellectual property scholars), Justice Breyer began by pointedly noting that the 
justification for granting copyright rights cannot solely be that copiers have an economic 
advantage over initial producers, because the copiers do not bear the costs of creating the work.3 
Rather, he argued, the inquiry must be begin with a series of questions: (i) what market-based 
advantages do creators have that will allow them to recuperate the costs of creation; (ii) to what 
extent does the government subsidize the costs of creation; and (iii) are consumers able to direct 
funds to the creator that finance or underwrite the costs of creation.4 Only upon analysis of these 
inquiries, he argued, can one ascertain the marginal benefits that any grant of copyright 
entitlements might yield. Moreover, he maintained, even when such entitlements were to be 
found to yield marginal benefits, policymakers should take heed of the costs imposed by 
copyright, such as decreases in the dissemination, utilization, and access to knowledge and 
information.5 
 
                                                
1 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and 
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970); Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA 
L. REV. 75 (1972).  
2 For instance, a grant is to be made only insofar as it is “useful” to “promote progress in the Sciences and 
Useful Arts”, and the term of copyright may not be indefinite. U.S. CONST. Art. 1, Sec. 8 Clause 8.  
3 See Breyer, Rejoinder, supra note 1 at 75. 
4 See Breyer, Rejoinder, supra note 1 at 75-76. 
5 See Breyer, Rejoinder, supra note 1 at 76. 
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Justice Breyer’s analytic schema continues to offer a cogent and insightful starting point from 
which to launch an in-depth exploration of tailored copyright in creative content industries. It 
also urgently calls for empirical studies to be made that can substantiate claims that copyright 
will extend much-needed tools to industries being transformed by disruptive innovation. This 
Paper has built upon Justice Breyer’s early road map to offer new avenues for relief and new 
vistas that bring a host of important, yet sometimes overlooked, considerations into the picture. 
Effects on end-users who are also presumptive creators, repercussions on cultural environments 
and norms that are foundational to creative endeavors, and effects on the public domain are but a 
few factors that can and should be considered, both under Justice Breyer’s rubric and in light of 
the exegesis offered here. Much work remains to be done, as each creative content industry must 
chart a course that is best tailored to accommodate the demands, interests, aims and aspirations 
of its stakeholders. But the swift and relentless pace of disruptive innovation, and the challenges 
its technologies pose to creative production, mandate the construction of tailored solutions that 
balance commercial, legal, technological and cultural priorities, choices and practices. The 
“uneasy” case for copyright that I propose resembles Justice Breyer’s in this regard: it should be 
deemed appropriate when it is marginally beneficial, but also, I would argue, when it balances 
the advancement of commercial interests, the retention of cultural and normative preferences and 
priorities, and the encouragement of creative expression. 
 
